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Working on my doctoral thesis I often felt somewhat like Eliza Doolittle in 0\)DLU/DG\, 
which is based  on George Bernard  Shaw’s 3\JPDOLRQ. Ever so often I used to compare my 
supervisors with Colonel Pickering and  Professor H iggins, as they made me  pass a 
series of trials. As my first public try-out I was asked to present a paper at a national 
conference, viz. the BIVEC-GIBET Transport Research Day (Diepenbeek, 2005). 
Subsequent trials included  attending the Advanced  Industrial Economics and  
Econometrics courses as well as participating in international conferences such as the 
Maritime Transport III (Barcelona), the NECTAR Conference (Porto), the IFSPA (Hong 
Kong), and the WCTRS (Lisbon).  
Now I have crested the foothill, as it were. And  I must admit that it feels great. This leads 
me to a comparison in mountaineering terms, in particular, an expedition to the top of 
Mount Everest. The trek to Everest Base Camp is not unlike getting to know the 
(container) liner shipping industry. At the beginning of 2008, it was decided  to descend  
back to base camp I and  search for a d ifferent climbing route with state-of-the-art 
climbing equipment (i.e. new empirical industrial models). The trail from camp I (first 
publication) to camps II, III and  IV was one of ups and downs and I had  to pick myself 
up again and again. The rejection of a paper of mine was my Hilary Step, a steep spur of 
rock and  ice that is the final obstacle above which it is comparatively easy to reach the 
top. Even though writing a doctoral thesis - like climbing Mount Everest - is a highly 
individual activity, it requires a professional team. My Mount Everest expedition was 
led  by Prof. d r. E. Omey and Prof. dr. E. Van de Voorde, two well-experienced  elite 
‘mountaineers’ and  experts in their own field . Other academic and  professional experts 
guided and  supported  me throughout this process. 
Enjoy your meal. In cooking I found  another parallel. The widely popular reality TV 
cooking shows often served  as a background  while I was writing the thesis. Preparing a 
PhD is like searching for new recipes. As soon as you decide on the menu (research 
domain) the practicalities of cooking come into play: looking for the ingred ients (data), 
opting for a cooking technique (methodology), selecting equipment (Ms Excel, statistical 
software E-views 7), consulting a cookery book to solve practical questions (6LOYHU6SRRQ 
and 2QV.RRNERHN are the bibles of authentic Italian and Flemish cooking respectively, the 
second  ed ition of Industrial Organization - Competition, Strategy and Policy by 
Lipczynski, Wilson and  Goddard , was my bible), but also asking specialists for advice 
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(field  research: in-depth interviews with people from the work field , viz. carriers, 
forwarders and  liner shipping customers, associations, port authorities, and  academic 
specialists).  
First, I like to thank my two master chefs, Prof. d r. Eddy Omey, specialist in Social 
Economics (Supervisor Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and  Business 
Administration, Department of Social Economics, Ghent University) and  Prof. dr. Eddy 
Van de Voorde, internationally renowned  expert in transport stud ies (Co-supervisor 
Ghent University and Supervisor University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied  Economics, 
Department of Transport and Regional Economics). The combination of both expertises 
was beyond  any doubt an added value for my doctoral research. I gained  a lot from their 
encouragement, invaluable guidance and  attention throughout the study. A joint PhD 
degree would  not have been possible without their limitless support. 
Secondly, a twice yearly tasting of my research activities was organised . These doctoral 
commissions led  to fine-tuning the recipe, looking for extra ingred ients/ spices, and  they 
provided  cooking tips and hints (i.e. presenting my study in a series of lectures). Both 
Prof. d r. E. Omey and  Prof. dr. E. Van de Voorde were members of my doctoral 
commission, together with two other gastronomes: Prof. d r. Gust Blauwens (University 
of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied  Economics, Department of Transport and Regional 
Economics) and  Prof. d r. Frank Witlox (Ghent University, Faculty of Science, Geography 
Department). I would like to give special thanks to them for their advice, support and  
helpful comments.  
I would also like to express my gratitude to the external members of the Examining 
Committee. I w ish to express my sincere respect for the helpful comments and assistance 
on econometric issues I was given by Prof. dr. H. Meersman. During many constructive 
discussions her enthusiasm reminded me why I had  initially started  to study applied  
economics and it encouraged my interest in empirical research. I thank Prof. dr. J. Bikker 
for his contribution to a deeper understand ing of the new empirical industrial models 
and his constructive criticism at the final stage of preparation, and Prof. dr. N. Litinas for 
his knowledge and  expertise in the area of international liner shipping and  the special 
attention he gave to my research project. 
Over the past few years, many people have helped me take this d issertation from idea to 
reality. I am in debt to liner operators, national/ international associations, port 
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authorities, port consu ltants, terminal operators, forwarders and  liner shipping 
customers as well as to national/ international journalists of the maritime press. I would 
like to thank these people as well as numerous academic specialists (from Belgium, 
Canada, Italy, The Netherlands, and  the USA) for their time and  their practical input. 
These expert interviews helped  me to write this doctoral thesis and  provided me with a 
clear view  of the container liner shipping industry. Any one I have failed to mention 
here I shall thank personally in due time. 
I would  like to thank the anonymous referees of international peer reviewed  journals 
and the participants in international conferences for their useful comments. I am also 
grateful for the comments received from friend-reviewers regarding the clarity and the 
logical line of the text. 
I am obliged  to the d irectors of the University College of Ghent as well as the heads of 
the Faculty of Applied  Business for withdrawing my d ismissal that would  have 
jeopard ised this doctoral research, for their generosity in letting me attend conferences 
that enriched  this period  even more and  for the financial support, from June 2007, from 
the Research Fund University College of Ghent. 
Many colleagues have supported me patiently during the past few years. Special 
appreciation is due for my coordinators, for my language-lecturer colleagues for 
proofreading, for my ICT colleagues for developing my website and for assisting me in 
practical lay-outing matters.  
Thanks are also due to the staff of the library of the University of Antwerp, the Port of 
Antwerp, and the Faculty of Applied  Business, University College of Ghent for keeping 
me informed about the latest publications. I would  like to thank all secretarial staff 
(Hogent, UGent and  UA/ TPR) for their administrative support. 
My friends have remained  close to me along the way. I thank them dearly for their 
encouragement. They have shared  the ups and  downs, they have coped with my 
presence and  absence  during the writing of this doctoral thesis. 
Finally, I would  like to thank my sister, brother in law and my two adorable nephews, 
and above all, my parents for offering me so many opportunities, for their patience, their 
practical help  (i.e. good meals, gardening, etc), their encouragement and  their end less 
support. It has been of incalculable value to me. 
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I sincerely hope that this doctoral thesis will be of some interest to the reader and  
constitute a significant contribution to scientific research.  
Bruges, December 10th, 2010  
Christa Sys 
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De containerlijnvaart, een snel groeiend  segment van de lijnvaart, is de afgelopen 
decennia sterk veranderd . Deze verandering is toe te schrijven aan de opeenvolging van 
fusies en overnames binnen de sector. Deze opmerkelijke fusie- en overnamegolf kan de 
graad van concentratie beïnvloeden. Ook ontwikkelingen zoals de recente 
schaalvergroting van de containerschepen, de veranderende vraagpatronen, de 
verhoogde verticale integratie en het toenemende belang van integrale logistieke 
concepten etc. hebben een grote impact gehad  op de sector. Het is belangrijk om de 
gevolgen van deze veranderingen op het competitief gedrag van de marktspelers in 
kaart te brengen en te onderzoeken wat d ie impact precies inhoudt.  
Het competitieve gedrag van marktspelers hangt af van de marktstructuur. Het kennen 
van de marktstructuur is een belangrijk gegeven voor bv. de prijszetting. 
Marktstructuren variëren tussen twee uitersten. Aan de ene kant bevindt zich de 
perfecte concurrentie, aan de andere kant de monopolie en daartussen zitten de 
monopolistische concurrentie en de oligopolie. De literatuurstud ie levert voor de 
marktstructuur van de containerlijnvaart geen eenduid ig antwoord .  
Naast de introductie van stoomschepen en containers is vanuit een historisch perspectief 
de afschaffing van de lijnvaartconferentie een mijlpaal voor deze industrie. Sinds jaar en 
dag bestaan er conferenties (maritieme kartelvorming) in de maritieme sector waarvan 
de eerste teruggaat tot 1875. Het belangrijkste doel van deze conferenties bestond  erin 
een einde te maken aan de moordende concurrentie door gezamenlijk de tarieven vast te 
leggen voor het vervoer door de deelnemende rederijen.  
Op 25 september 2006 trok de Verordening (EG) nr 1419/ 2006 van de Europese Raad de 
generieke vrijstelling voor bepaalde mededingingsbeperkende regelingen door lijnvaart-
conferenties, met name het maken van prijsafspraken en het regelen van het aanbod  (nr 
4056/ 86), in. Alle belanghebbende  stelden zich de vraag of deze beleidsverandering het 
beoogde effect, met name een toename van de concurrentie, met zich zou meebrengen. 
Om de impact van deze beleidsverandering correct in te schatten, is het belangrijk om de 
concurrentiegraad  vóór de beslissing te kennen.  
De wetenschappelijke literatuur onderscheid t twee benaderingen, namelijk de 
structurele en de niet-structurele benadering. De literatuurstud ie van de 
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containerlijnvaart toont ook aan dat het competitief gedrag van rederijen in de 
containerlijnvaart onvoldoende is verkend, in tegenstelling tot andere geliberaliseerde 
industrieën. De literatuur van andere geliberaliseerde industrieën, vooral de financiële 
sector, stelt zelfs een nieuwe methodologie voor om de concurrentie te meten. De 
evolutie van de Industriële Economie (structurele benadering) naar de Nieuw 
Industriële Empirische Economie (niet-structurele benadering) bied t een bijkomend 
instrument  om de graad  van de concurrentie voor de containerlijnvaart te onderzoeken. 
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Tegen deze achtergrond  richt d it onderzoek zich dan ook op de competitieve condities, 
de concentratiegraad  en de marktstructuur van de containerlijnvaart. Dit onderzoek wil 
een antwoord  formuleren op twee onderzoeksvragen. De eerste onderzoeksvraag gaat 
na LQ KRHYHUUH GH FRQFHQWUDWLHJUDDG JHYROJHQ KHHIW YRRU GH PDWH YDQ FRQFXUUHQWLH HQ GH
PDUNWVWUXFWXXU YDQ GH]H VHFWRU. Deze vraag wordt zowel vanuit een industrieel-
economische als vanuit een nieuw-industrieel-economische benadering bestudeerd. De 
tweede onderzoeksvraag bestudeert LQZHONHPDWHGHSRVLWLHYHUHODWLHWXVVHQFRQFHQWUDWLHHQ
ZLQVWJHYHQGKHLGRSJDDWYRRUGHFRQWDLQHUOLMQYDDUW.  
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden focust het onderzoek zich op de lijnvaart, meer 
specifiek op de subdivisie containerlijnvaart. De containerlijnvaart telt in 2010 ongeveer 
400 rederijen. In het onderzoek ligt de focus op de 100 grootste rederijen. Het 
marktaandeel van de rederijen in het segment 101-400 wijzigt de concentratiegraad  
slechts voor het vierde cijfer na de komma. Het weglaten van deze lager gerangschikte 
rederijen beïnvloedt dus het beeld niet van de concentratie in de industrie.  
Dit onderzoek heeft betrekking op de periode 1999-2009. De periode varieert afhankelijk 
van de gebruikte methodologie en de beschikbare data. Via desk- en field research 
(gesprekken met bevoorrechte getuigen) werden de nodige gegevens verzameld . De 
omvang van het onderzoek is ook beperkt tot de kernactiviteit van de rederijen, namelijk 
het transporteren van zeecontainers tussen zeehavens (carrier haulage), eerder dan op de 
logistieke activiteiten. Ondernemingen zonder schepen (non vessel operating common 
carrier), expediteurs (merchant haulage) en logistieke d ienstverleners worden als 
gebruikers en niet als concurrenten beschouwd en werden buiten beschouwing gelaten. 
Het transport van een container word t als een homogeen product beschouwd. Deze 
veronderstellingen kunnen een impact hebben op het competitieve gedrag en op de 
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conclusies van het voorliggend  onderzoek. Jammer genoeg zijn er geen gegevens 
beschikbaar om de impact hiervan te bestuderen. De impact van de fusie van Maersk 
Sealand en P&O Nedlloyd  (2006), een terugkerend  onderwerp, komt daarentegen wel 
duidelijk naar voren in de resultaten van het onderzoek.  
Het proefschrift bestaat uit een bundeling van papers. De rode draad is het competitief 
gedrag, de concentratiegraad en de marktstructuur van de containerlijnvaart. 
Achtereenvolgens wordt er stilgestaan bij de gebruikte methodologie en de resultaten.  
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De eerste twee papers formuleren een antwoord  op de eerste onderzoeksvraag. H iertoe 
wordt de structurele benadering toegepast. De structurele benadering meet de invloed 
van de marktstructuur op de w inst via het concurrentiegedrag. Voor d it onderzoek 
werden zowel absolute (de n-concentratie ratio (CRn) en de Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index) als relatieve (de Lorenzcurve) ind icatoren van concentratie berekend  en 
geanalyseerd.  
In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 2) zal in het kader van de eerste onderzoeksvraag de 
analyse op geaggregeerd  niveau gebeuren, terw ijl de tweede stud ie (hoofdstuk 3) de 
analyse van de marktstructuur op gedesaggregeerd  niveau herhaalt. Intensieve 
concurrentie vertaalt zich in instabiliteit van de marktaandelen. Deze instabiliteit van de 
marktaandelen werd  berekend aan de hand  van een index voorgesteld  door Hymer en 
Pashigan. Deze beschrijving en analyse van de marktstructuur gebeurt zowel op het 
niveau van de markt (over alle routes heen) als op het niveau van de deelmarkten (per 
route) (hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3).  
In het vierde hoofdstuk word t de eerste onderzoeksvraag opnieuw bestudeerd . Ditmaal 
wordt een niet-structurele benadering toegepast d ie rechtstreeks de marktmacht van een 
sector analyseert. Deze moderne Industriële Organisatie theorieën laten toe om 
structurele- en gedragselementen te combineren. Zij modelleren het competitieve gedrag 
van ondernemingen zonder expliciete informatie over de marktstructuur te gebruiken. 
Zo’n benadering modelleert het competitief gedrag van containerrederijen zonder 
expliciete informatie over de concentratie op te nemen.  
De Panzar Rossemethodologie is een empirische test d ie toelaat een onderscheid  te 
maken tussen de d iverse marktvormen. Met behulp van standaard  econometrische 
methoden wordt de Panzar-Rosse H-statistiek berekend . Deze Panzar-Rosse H-statistiek, 
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zijnde de som van de elasticiteiten van totale opbrengsten ten aanzien van de 
inputprijzen, laat toe om de competitieve aard  van de containerlijnvaart te beoordelen. 
De niet-structurele modellen werken met opbrengsten- en kostendata. Deze data zijn 
echter niet beschikbaar voor de deelmarkten. De Panzar Rossemethodologie word t op 
het niveau van de markt toegepast, dus gebaseerd  op de veronderstelling dat het 
concurrentiegedrag hetzelfde is over alle routes heen. 
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Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de containerlijnvaart een gefragmenteerde industrie is. De 
vier grootste containerrederijen, Maersk Line, MSC, CMA CMG en Evergreen hadden op 
1 januari 2010 een gezamenlijk marktaandeel (CR4) van 37,56 % procent, gemeten in 
TEU-capaciteit (hoofdstuk 1, appendix 1-2). Afhankelijk van de bron word t een CR4 van 
40 % of een CR6 van 50 % naar voren schoven als grenswaarde tussen een 
monopolistische concurrentie (CR4 < 40 %) en een oligopolistische marktstructuur (CR4 
> 40 %). Ongeacht de grenswaarde kan de marktstructuur van de containerlijnvaart tot 
2007 omschreven worden als monopolistische concurrentie, nad ien een oligopolistische 
marktstructuur (hoofdstuk 2). Het resultaat van de marktstudie op de deelmarkten geeft 
aan dat de concentratiegraad  verschilt van route tot route. Routes kunnen op basis van 
de concentratie-indicator ingedeeld  worden in ‘tight’  (CR4 > 60 %) en ‘loose’  
oligopolistische deelmarkten. Kennis hiervan is belangrijk voor de prijszetting maar ook 
voor regelgevinginstanties (hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3). 
Alle concentratie-ind icatoren wijzen op een toegenomen concentratie. Volgens de 
structurele benadering word t impliciet aangenomen dat een meer geconcentreerde 
markt minder concurrerend  is. Echter, bij agressieve interactie van de rederijen kan een 
positieve relatie vastgesteld  worden.  
Een structurele methodologie om de concurrentiegraad  te meten is de Hymer-Pashigan 
instabiliteit index. De stud ie van de instabiliteit van de marktaandelen toont twee zaken 
aan. Ten eerste is de concurrentie op marktniveau relatief stabiel, terw ijl op de 
deelmarkten de concurrentie duidelijk verschilt van route tot route (hoofdstuk 2 en 
hoofdstuk 3). Vervolgens werd  de empirische relatie tussen concentratie en Hymer-
Pashiganindex geanalyseerd. Onderzoek suggereert een omgekeerde U-curve. Bij lage 
tot gemiddelde concentratie is de relatie positief. Ind ien de concentratie verder stijgt, 
wordt het verband  negatief. Het omslagpunt tussen het positieve en het negatieve 
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verband situeert zich op  ongeveer 36 %. De analyse op het niveau van de deelmarkten 
resulteert in een negatief lineair verband tussen concentratie en de Hymer-
Pashiganindex. Verder blijkt dat groei (in volume uitgedrukt) een significante impact 
heeft op de dynamiek van marktaandelen (hoofdstuk 3). 
Na de bespreking van de resultaten van de structurele benadering word t vervolgens 
overgegaan naar de resultaten van het Panzar Rossemethodologie. Op basis van 
bedrijfsspecifieke data van 18 containerrederijen werd nagegaan in welke mate input- en 
outputprijzen gelijk opgaan (volkomen mededinging) of niet gelijk opgaan (monopolie 
of een perfect kartel). Een gereduceerde niet-geschaalde opbrengstvergelijking werd 
gebruikt om een H-statistiek voor de containerlijnvaart te berekenen. Naast de 
inputprijzen werden als controlevariabelen de verhouding tussen het eigen vermogen en 
de totale activa en de verhouding tussen TEU-capaciteit en het aantal schepen gebruikt.  
De eerste controlevariabele weerspiegelt het gedrag en het risicoprofiel van de 
containerrederijen, de tweede controlevariabele het business profiel. Daarnaast zijn nog 
twee andere bedrijfsspecifieke factoren opgenomen om de impact van de fusies en 
overnames enerzijds en betrokkenheid in strategische allianties anderzijds op  de 
outputprijzen in rekening te brengen. Dit kan econometrisch getoetst worden door het 
toevoegen van twee dummyvariabelen. De regressie leverde significante 
coëfficiëntschattingen met het verwachte teken op en heeft een hoge verklaringswaarde.  
Verschillende regressies werden uitgevoerd . De belangrijkste bevind ing van de niet-
structurele benadering is dat de beduidend  positieve waarde van de H-statistiek 
betekent dat de hypothese verworpen kan worden dat de marktstructuur van de 
containerlijnvaart beantwoordt aan een monopolie of collusieve coöperatie (wat de facto 
neerkomt op een niet-getolereerde samenwerking). De hypothese dat H  gelijk is aan 1 
(perfecte concurrentie) kan verworpen worden op het 0,10-significantieniveau. De 
resultaten suggereren dus een monopolistische concurrentie binnen de sector. Over 
dezelfde onderzoeksperiode wijken de resultaten van de structurele en niet-structurele 
benadering niet van elkaar af. 
Het onderzoek levert nog enkele interessante bevind ingen op. Een opmerkelijke 
bevind ing is dat rederijen betrokken in strategische allianties als samenwerkingsvorm er 
niet in slagen om toegenomen kosten te vertalen in meer opbrengsten. Een andere 
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interessante bevind ing is dat het effect van fusies en overnames zich het duidelijkst 
manifesteert in de twee daaropvolgende jaren. 
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De Panzar Rossestatistiek kan de competitieve aard van de sector aanduiden maar kan 
de concurrentie en de efficiëntie in de sector over de tijd  niet beoordelen. Verder neemt 
de concurrentie toe ofwel door een afname in de toetredingskosten ofwel door 
agressievere interactie tussen bedrijven. Agressiever gedrag wordt door de concentratie-
indicatoren niet consistent gemeten.   
De Boone-ind icator laat echter wel toe om de concurrentie over de tijd  te meten en deze 
ook op een consistente manier te meten. Met consistent wordt bedoeld dat een toename 
in concurrentie veroorzaakt door lagere toetredingskosten ofwel door agressievere 
interactie tussen bedrijven, altijd  leid t tot een toename in de w inst van een efficiënt 
bedrijf ten opzichte van de w inst van een minder efficiënt bedrijf. De Boone-ind icator 
onderzoekt dan ook de relatie tussen efficiëntie en prestatie. Bedrijven verschillen in 
efficiëntie in termen van marginale kosten. Aangezien in elke industrie een toename van 
de kosten zorgt voor een lagere winst, word t een negatief verband verwacht. Het effect 
zal groter zijn in een meer concurrerende markt. Met andere woorden, de concurrentie 
zal sterker zijn in markten met efficiëntere bedrijven (dus grotere w insten en 
marktaandelen) dan in markten waarin deze relatie tussen efficiëntie en prestatie minder 
sterk of niet aanwezig is (hoofdstuk 5). 
Deze nieuwe manier om concurrentie te meten laat toe een antwoord  te formuleren op 
de tweede onderzoeksvraag. 
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Om een antwoord te formuleren op de tweede onderzoeksvraag schatte deze stud ie in 
navolging van de studie van Bikker en van Leuvensteijn (2008) de relatie tussen de 
prestaties (in termen van marktaandelen) en de efficiëntie (gemeten als gemiddelde 
kosten) op bedrijfsniveau over de periode 2000-2008. Volgens de schatting zijn 
bedrijfspecifieke elementen belangrijk. Om de ind icator nauwkeurig te schatten werden 
het aantal d iensten (services) en de gemiddelde scheepsgrootte (grotere schepen 
genieten schaalvoordelen – zie verder) als verklarende variabelen toegevoegd.  
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Diverse resultaten komen uit de empirische analyse te voorschijn. De Boone-ind icator 
duid t op een procentuele daling van de winst als gevolg van één procentpunt toename 
van de kosten. Dus een geschatte Boone-ind icator of winstelasticiteit van -0,1669 voor 
2008 suggereert dat een containerrederij met 1 procentpunt hogere gemiddelde kosten 
dan efficiëntere rederijen 16,7 % minder w inst realiseert. Tijdens de periode 2000-2008 
suggereren de resultaten een (beperkte) toename van de concurrentie. De resultaten 
bevestigen dat de grootste rederijen in de periode 2002-2003 winsten realiseerden terwijl 
in de daaropvolgende periode de concurrentie versterkte. De geïntensifieerde 
concurrentie dwingt de concurrerende rederijen om lage prijzen te hanteren. De 
resultaten moeten met enige omzichtigheid  benaderd  worden. Een langere tijdsperiode 
en een onderzoek op het niveau van de deelmarkten kan nauwkeuriger resultaten 
opleveren. Uit een stud ie op het niveau van de deelmarkten kunnen ook de redenen 
voor de kennelijk beperkte concurrentie naar voren komen. 
De bedrijfspecifieke variabelen hebben beide een beduidend positief en significant effect. 
Zo’n resultaat kan als volgt geïnterpreteerd  worden: In tegenstelling tot inefficiënte 
rederijen worden efficiënte rederijen met een technologisch voordeel (lagere 
operationele kosten door het inzetten van grotere schepen) en een uitgebreid  
dienstennetwerk beloond  met hogere winsten. In een concurrerende markt worden 
inefficiënte rederijen gedwongen om de markt te verlaten. Dat is nauwelijks het geval in 
de containerlijnvaart (Cho Yang, 2001, Senator Lines, 2009 en MBG Shipping, 2010). 
Gezien de eerder beperkte concurrentie worden inefficiënte containerrederijen nog 
teveel beschermd tegen de meer efficiënte rederijen.  
Ten slotte werd  een dummyvariabele toegevoegd om het gedrag te bestuderen van 
rederijen betrokken in een alliantie. De resultaten suggereren dat rederijen binnen een 
alliantie niet noodzakelijk efficiënter zijn in termen van winsten (e.g. te bureaucratisch?, 
tragere beslissingsvorming?). 
Algemeen kan gezegd  worden dat de sector efficiënter moet worden om hogere w insten 
te realiseren. Naast de rederijen en de verladers is dit onderzoek voor beleidsbepalers 
ook relevant. De Boone-ind icator is een interessante tool voor (pro-/ re-) actief 
mededingingsbeleid . De onderzoeksresultaten leveren een benchmark om de impact van 
(toekomstige) beleidsbeslissingen te evalueren (bv. de impact van de afschaffing van 
lijnvaartconferenties zou aan de hand  van de Boone-indicator geëvalueerd  kunnen 
worden. 
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Het voorliggende onderzoek slaagt erin de onderzoeksdoelstellingen te realiseren en de 
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. De laatste twee stud ies gaan een stap verder door 
een verklaring te zoeken voor de verkregen resultaten.  
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Ook toegangsbarrières bepalen voor een groot deel de structuur van de sector. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert de impact van zowel actuele als potentiële bedreiging van 
toetred ing op de w inst. Een dynamisch winstonderzoek houdt een tijd reeksanalyse in 
van de winst op bedrijfsniveau in en laat toe een idee te krijgen van de competitiviteit 
binnen de sector en het al of niet bestaan van toegangsbarrières. Doordat de impact van 
actuele en potentiële toetred ing niet d irect waarneembaar is, word t de afhankelijkheid  
van winstgevendheid  van een containerrederij geschat in functie van de 
winstgevendheid in het verleden. 
In navolging van de ‘Persistence of Profit’  literatuur word t dus ingegaan op de vraag of 
de winsten in de containerlijnvaart persisteren. Vijf belangrijke conclusies volgen uit 
deze regressieanalyse. Eerst word t nagegaan welk percentage van de winst in elke 
periode voor periode W persisteert op korte termijn. De resultaten tonen een positief en 
significant verband, ‘the persistence of profits above the norm’ , voor onafhankelijke 
rederijen (bv. Maersk Line, CMA CGM) terwijl de resultaten voor de CHKY alliantie1 
duiden op een gebrek aan samenhang tussen de w instgevendheid  over de jaren.  
Een tweede conclusie voegt hieraan toe dat de (over- )w insten van onafhankelijke 
rederijen trager afromen (convergeren naar de normale (gemiddelde) winst) dan d ie van 
rederijen d ie binnen een strategische alliantie werken. De winst van een containerrederij 
kan enerzijds worden afgeroomd doordat gevestigde rederijen hun productie 
(uitbreid ing servicenetwerk, uitbreid ing capaciteit) u itbreiden ofwel door de toetred ing 
van nieuwe rederijen. Dit is een eerste aanwijzing van het bestaan van toegangsbarrières.  
Vervolgens werd  de hypothese getoetst of actuele en potentiële toetreding voldoende 
vrij is waardoor de (over-)winsten op lange termijn afbrokkelen (convergeren) naar de 
normale winstniveau. De hypothese word t geaccepteerd in een winsteliminerend  
scenario voor alle rederijen. Voor de containerlijnvaart suggereren de resultaten dat de 
(over-)winsten van rederijen die buiten de allianties werken niet convergeren naar het 
                                                     
1
  De regressies konden niet uitgevoerd  w orden voor Hapag-Lloyd  en HMM. Hierdoor kan geen u itspraak 
geformuleerd  worden voor de ‘Grand Alliance’  en de ‘New World  Alliance’ . 
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normale w instniveau. De hypothese word t op basis van deze resultaten verworpen. Er 
blijven permanente verschillen bestaan. De relatieve winstafwijking van Maersk Line en 
CMA CGM ten opzichte van het gemiddelde is respectievelijk 2,89  % en 3,54  %. Dit is 
een tweede aanwijzing dat er in de containerlijnvaart toegangsbarrières bestaan. De 
hoogte van de toegangsbarrière bepaalt de mate van dreiging tot toetred ing. Een 
gedetailleerde analyse van de België-Ind ia route bevestigt het bestaan van 
toegangbarrières, maar deze zijn eerder laag. Verder ontwikkelde Mueller (1986) twee 
modellen voor de verklaring van de w instverschillen. De beschikbare data laten echter 
niet toe om deze modellen toe te passen.  
De resultaten uit d it dynamisch onderzoek tonen ook aan dat de rangschikking op basis 
van ‘persistence of profits’  verschilt van de rangschikking op basis van marktaandeel. 
Dit laatste kan wijzen op een marktgerichte strategie van behoud  van marktaandeel. 
Daarnaast suggereren de  resultaten dat rederijen in strategische allianties hun winsten 
uit het verleden niet weten te behouden. Ten slotte duiden de resultaten op een snellere 
eliminatie van de (over)winst in de containerlijnvaart ten opzichte van andere 
industrieën. (hoofdstuk 6).  
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De kans dat nieuwe toetreders de markt betreden hangt af van de reactie van bestaande 
concurrenten op  de nieuwkomer en de bestaande toetredingsbarrières. Een belangrijke 
toegangsbarrière is de aanwezigheid  van schaalvoordelen. Hoofdstuk 7 concentreert 
zich op een andere factor die de efficiëntie van een rederij u itmaakt, namelijk de 
aanwezigheid van schaalvoordelen. 
Optimale schaal wordt bepaald  door de vorm van de gemiddelde-kostencurve  op lange 
termijn. Na het inventariseren van de drijfveren achter deze schaalvergroting word t de 
gemiddelde kost per eenheid aan de hand van een cashflowmodel gesimuleerd  bij 
verschillende scheepsgroottes. De resultaten van deze simulaties tonen duidelijk aan dat 
containerrederijen nog schaalvoordelen kunnen realiseren door het inzetten van (ultra-) 
grote containerschepen. Het minimum van de gemiddelde kostencurve nadert misschien 
maar is vooralsnog niet bereikt. In deze stud ie werden kosten van een feederingsysteem 
en de hinterlandkosten niet ingecalculeerd . Deze laatste kosten kunnen ervoor zorgen 
dat de gemiddelde kosten curve sneller een U-vormige curve wordt. De link met het 
operationele gebeuren werd  ook bestudeerd . Scheepsgrootte en het operationele 
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ontwikkelingen (bv. grotere containerkranen) evolueren hand  in hand . De keuze van 
scheepsgrootte is duidelijk afhankelijk van het transportsegment (deepsea of short sea 
shipping), het type van terminal, de route en de beschikbare technologie. Met 
technologie word t bedoeld  het feit of 18 000 TEU of 22 000 TEU-schepen gebouwd zullen 
worden (hoofdstuk 7). 5 
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De resultaten van het onderzoek zijn relevant voor de rederijen. Kennis van de 
marktstructuur is een belangrijk gegeven voor bv. de prijszetting. De resultaten duiden 
op monopolistische concurrentie binnen de sector. Deze uitkomst moet de rederijen 
aanzetten tot geheel of gedeeltelijk d ifferentiëren van hun aanbod .  
Als regulatoren en mededingingsautoriteiten een gebrek aan concurrentie vrezen, 
worden zij aangemoedigd de analyse over de concurrentie te baseren op  de uitkomsten 
van meerdere concentratie-ind icatoren. Het  oordeel van de klant (verlader) over de prijs 
en de kwaliteit van de containerdiensten mag hierbij niet vergeten worden. 
Op grond van het voorgaande kan gezegd worden dat de resultaten van het onderzoek 
een belangrijke bijd rage kunnen leveren voor beleidsvoorbereidende d iscussies.  
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The container liner shipping industry has been facing comprehensive restructuring, 
particularly over the past decade. It has been a period  of significant merger and  
acquisition transactions. Successive waves of such consolidation are likely to have had  
an impact on the degree of concentration in the industry. In add ition, the industry has 
undergone fundamental changes (e.g. deployment of ultra large container vessels, 
increased containerisation and integration, and  the growing importance of integrated  
logistic concepts) that may have affected  competition. In the wake of these 
developments, the liner operators have found themselves challenged  to offer a 
worldwide container service network in order to meet the rising customer expectations, 
and to do so under competitive conditions. It is therefore of great interest to examine the 
impact of these changes on the competitive behaviour of the market players. 
This competitive behaviour depends on the market structure. Knowledge of this 
structure is relevant because it influences the behaviour of the carriers operating under 
it. This behaviour in turn affects the liner operator’s performance: price setting, profits, 
efficiency, etc. Micro-economic theory trad itionally divides market structures into four 
categories, the two extremes of which are perfect competition and  monopoly. The 
intermediate market structures are monopolistic competition and  oligopoly. A review of 
the scientific literature as well as of various maritime reports and  d iscussion groups, 
yielded no unequivocal answer regarding the market structure in the container liner 
shipping industry.  
History shows that the liner shipping industry has been characterised  by a number of 
profound changes, from the advent of steamship technology, the introduction of the 
container box in the early 1960s, the set-up  of consortia and other operational 
agreements (1970 - 1980), to the formation of (global) alliances in the 1990s. From a 
historical point of view , the abolition of the European conferences (18th October, 2008) 
put the liner shipping industry on the threshold  of a new era. International liner 
shipping has been dominated  by collusive agreements, called  shipping conferences, 
which trace their origins back 135 years. These conferences were formed for the purpose 
of restricting competition between their members and  protecting them from outside 
competition. It was the industry’ s first attempt to deal with the pricing problem. 
However, on 25th September, 2006 the Competitiveness Council agreed , under the 
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pressure of Shippers’  Councils, to repeal Regulation 4056/ 86 as of October 2008, thus 
putting an end  to the possibility for liner carriers to meet in conferences, fix prices and  
regulate capacities. The two-year transitional period  allowed  the shipping companies to 
change their mentality from that of price fixing to a competitive one. From a policy 
viewpoint, a next logical step  is to examine whether this change has the desired impact 
of increased  competition. Therefore, it is mandatory to establish the degree of 
competition that was present before the policy change took place.  
The literature d istinguishes a structural and  a non-structural approach. A review  of the 
(container) liner shipping literature reveals that the assessment of competition in the 
container liner shipping industry has remained  insufficiently explored, in contrast w ith 
that in other newly liberalised  service sectors. In the literature of other liberalised  
industries, the financial sector in particular, it is found  that a new methodology to 
measure competition has been introduced . The evolution of industrial organisation 
theory (structural approach) towards the new empirical industrial organisation 
modelling (non-structural approach) is an extra incentive for investigating the extent of 
competition in the container liner shipping industry. 
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This thesis assesses the competitive conditions, the concentration, and the market 
structure of the container liner shipping industry in the light of the developments 
mentioned above. It addresses two research questions:  
54 ,VWKHUHDQROLJRSRO\LQWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\"
54 ,I WKH FRQWDLQHU OLQHU VKLSSLQJ LQGXVWU\ LV FRQFHQWUDWHG GRHV WKH FRQFHQWUDWLRQ
DIIHFWWKHOLQHURSHUDWRUV·SHUIRUPDQFH"
These research questions are stud ied from an industrial economic and from a new 
empirical industrial economic viewpoint.  
To answer these questions, the thesis examines the competitive conditions of the liner 
shipping industry, more specifically the containerised  liner shipping industry. At 
present, in 2010, the container liner shipping industry counts approximately 400 
shipping companies. The research focuses on the 100 largest companies. The market 
shares of the liner operators ranked in the 101-400 segment affect the degree of 
concentration only in the fourth decimal place at most. The lower-ranked  carriers can 
thus be safely omitted  without affecting the picture of the concentration in the industry 
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as a whole. The research covers the 1999-2009 period. The methodology used  and  the 
availability of data require varied  sample periods. The necessary data were collected  by 
means of both desk and  field  research (collection of primary data or information through 
conversations w ith favoured  witnesses). The scope of the research was restricted  to the 
main activity of the shipping companies, namely transporting sea containers between 
sea ports (carrier haulage), rather than focusing on their logistical activities. For the 
purpose of this thesis non vessel operating common carriers, forward ing agents 
(merchant haulage) and logistical service p roviders were regarded as users rather than 
as competitors. The transport of a container is taken to be homogeneous. Although these 
assumptions may have an impact on the study of competitive behaviour and  on the 
conclusions of the research, a lack of data unfortunately made it impossible to study this 
impact. However, the impact of the merger of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  and  Maersk Sealand  
(2006), a recurrent topic, clearly shows in the resu lts of the research. 
The thesis consists of a bundled  set of papers with a common theme, linked by the 
competition issue. In what follows, the methodology and  the results are summarised  per 
research question. 
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The first two papers formulate an answer to the first research question. They use the 
structural approach to map the competition in the container liner shipping industry. The 
structural approach explains profits by means of market share variables. To do so, the 
empirical investigation uses both absolute (i.e. the n-firm concentration ratio (CRn) and 
the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index) and  relative (i.e. the Lorenz curve) concentration 
measures to compute and  analyse the degree of concentration. Chapter 2 calculates and  
discusses a number of alternative concentration measures as the magnitude of market 
share instability at aggregated level. Since liner operators compete with each other not 
only within the total container liner shipping market but also in sub-markets (read  trade 
lanes), Chapter 3 elaborates on this issue at a d isaggregated level, viz. the trade lane, and 
tests an empirical model for examining the determinants of market share instability. The 
magnitude of market share instability is calculated  w ith the Hymer-Pashigan or 
instability index.  
Since concentration measurements are ambiguous measures of competition, a non-
structural model is introduced  to collect empirical evidence on the nature of competition 
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in the container liner shipping industry by observing conduct d irectly. Non-structural 
models do not depend  on concentration. Chapter 4 documents and  estimates the Panzar 
and Rosse model. Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose a reduced-form approach to 
discriminate between monopoly, imperfect or monopolistic competition, and perfect 
competition. To assess the degree of competition prevailing at the market level, the H-
statistic proposed by Panzar and  Rosse (1987) was computed . The H-statistic (known as 
the revenue test) is defined as the sum of elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with 
respect to factor prices. Non-structural models work with revenue and  cost data. These 
data, however, are not available at the level of the sub-markets. Consequently, the 
modelling focuses on the level of the global market, assuming that the competitive 
behaviour is the same across all routes. 
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From the results it can be concluded  that the container shipping industry is confronted  
with increased  concentration and that it is found  that the containerised  liner shipping 
industry is still a highly fragmented industry. At the beginning of 2010, the four largest 
container shipping companies, Maersk Line, MSC, CMA CMG, and  Evergreen (CR4) 
together had  a market share of 37.56 per cent, in terms of TEU (see Chapter 1 – 
Appendix 1-2).  
Secondly, the find ings reveal that, depending on the source, a CR4 of 40 % (the top four 
firms have ind ividual markets shares that average less than 10 %) or a top six lines (CR6) 
of 50 % serves as a benchmark for an oligopolistic market. If one accepts these cut-offs, 
the market structure of the container liner shipping industry up to 2007 can be labelled 
as monopolistic competition (CR4 < 40 %). Since 2007, the CR4 has exceeded  40 %, and  
as a consequence the level of competition has d iminished  so that the container liner 
shipping industry (hereafter CLSI) can be classified as an oligopoly. A more detailed 
study shows that the degree of oligopoly varies between trade lanes. In terms of 
concentration, the container liner shipping industry is either a loose or a tight oligopoly 
depending on the trade lane. Knowledge of the degree of oligopoly is important for price 
setting but also for regulating (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
Third ly, all concentration ind icators point at an increase in concentration. According to 
the structural approach, it is implicitly accepts that a more concentrated  market is less 
competitive. However, a positive relation between concentration and  competition can be 
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determined through more aggressive interaction between shipping companies. 
Therefore, the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability was used to indicate 
the degree of competitiveness at both industry and  trade level. The results reveal 
evidence that the container liner shipping industry is characterised by a relatively stable 
competition. This index also allowed to measure rivals’  behaviour at the trade lane level. 
At d isaggregated level, the degree of concentration and  the degree of competition differs 
among trade routes (see Chapters 2 and 3). In addition, the relationship between 
concentration and the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability was examined. 
The findings ind icate the presence of an inverted  U-shaped  or a nonlinear relationship 
between concentration and  market share instability at industry level. The inverted U-
shaped  curve is found  to peak at around  36 % of the four-firm concentration ratio and 
then to decline. At trade level, concentration is negatively related  to market share 
instability (see Chapter 3). 
In the non-structural approach, a sample of 18 liner operators was observed  to test the 
impact variations in the prices of production factors have on firm-level revenues. The 
preformed regressions were based  on an unscaled  revenue equation. Control variables 
were added  to three input prices in order to capture differences in risk and  business 
profile. The first control variable, ‘equity to total assets’ , accounts for the leverage 
reflecting differences in risk preferences. The business profile is proxied by the ratio of 
TEU capacity to the number of ships. This variable was included to control for 
differences in deployed ship sizes. In add ition, two dummy variables were included  to 
capture the effect of membership of an alliance and / or to study the impact of mergers 
and acquisitions on turnover. 
The main finding of this study is that the significantly positive unscaled  value of the 
H-statistic for the containerised  liner shipping industry implies the rejection of the 
hypothesis that the market structure of the container liner shipping industry 
corresponds w ith a neoclassical monopolist, collusive oligopolist or conjectural-
variations short-run oligopolist. Furthermore, perfect competition, sales maximising 
firms subject to break-even constraint and  natural monopoly in a contestable market can 
be rejected  at a 10% significance level. Both the structural and  the non-structural 
approach show that up  to 2007 the market structure of the container liner shipping 
industry could  be described  as a monopolistic competition (see Chapter 8). 
The study also reveals some further interesting findings, notably concerning the impact 
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of mergers and  acquisitions on turnover. Their effect largely manifests itself in the two 
subsequent years. The results further suggest that the shipping companies involved  in 
strategic alliances as a form of cooperation do not succeed in translating increased cost 
into higher revenue (see Chapter 4) 
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The Panzar and  Rosse methodology seems well-designed  to investigate the competitive 
nature of an industry, whereas the ind icator developed  by Boone (2000) relates to the 
change in competition over time in a certain industry by taking into account the effects 
of competition based  on profits. Two effects can be distinguished in which competition 
can be intensified  in a given market. The first is a fall in entry barriers. Increased  entry is 
taken to lead  to more intense competition. Secondly, competition can be intensified  by 
more aggressive behaviour by incumbents. This increases concentration by forcing 
inefficient firms out of the market. The Boone ind icator captures both effects.  
Boone parameterises competition in terms of a negative relationship between relative 
efficiency and relative profits. The relative profits measure, or the Boone ind icator, relies 
on the notion that competition enhances the performance of efficient firms (i.e. with 
lower marginal costs) and impairs the performance of inefficient firms, which is reflected  
in lower profits or smaller market shares (see Chapter 5). 
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To analyse this question, the present study estimated  the relation between market shares 
and average variable costs, adding explanatory variables for industry-specific effects (the 
growing number of services d riven by globalisation, the introduction of larger container 
vessels). To determine the Boone ind icator accurately it is imperative to check for quality 
differences and to correct for industry-specific effects.  
Several find ings emerge from the empirical analysis. Firstly, the Boone indicator is 
defined  as the percentage decrease in profits due to a percentage increase in costs. So, a 
estimated  coefficient of -0.1669 for 2008 would  suggest that a liner carrier w ith a one 
percentage point average costs higher than another (more efficient) liner carrier, would 
have a 16.7 percent lower profit (proxied  by market shares) than the more efficient liner 
carriers. In terms of the degree of competition, the second find ing is that competition 
increased over the 2000-2008 period . While over the 2002-2003 period  the lead ing liner 
operators enjoyed profits, competition intensified subsequently. Intensified  competition 
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forces competitors to set low prices. This finding corresponds w ith the analysis of the 
evolution of profitability. The results should  be interpreted  cautiously, as research over a 
longer time period as well as at the level of the sub-markets might produce more 
accurate results. A study at the level of the sub-markets might also reveal the reasons for 
the moderate competition. Third ly, the other explanatory variables have a significantly 
positive impact on the profits (proxied by market shares). This result indicates that only 
efficient liner operators with a technological advantage (lower operating costs due to the 
deployment of larger vessels) and  with the advantage of a large network of services over 
(inefficient) competitors, can attain any profits. In a more competitive market, liner 
operators are hurt more severely for being inefficient. As a consequence, inefficient liner 
operators are forced  to exit the market. The latter, however, is hard ly the case in the 
container liner shipping industry. Very few liner operators (e.g. Cho Yang, 2001; Senator 
Lines, 2009; MBG Shipping, 2010) failed and  exited  the market. Given the rather 
moderate competition, inefficient container shipping companies are still protected  
against the more efficient shipping companies. Finally, a dummy variable was added to 
study the behaviour of shipping companies involved in an alliance. The results suggest 
that shipping companies w ithin an alliance are not necessarily more efficient in terms of 
profits.  
The second research question, ‘If the container liner shipping industry is concentrated, 
does this concentration affect the liner operators’  performance?’ , aims at finding an 
explanation for the low profitability in this sector. The results relating to the second  
research question show that the container liner shipping industry is characterised by 
increased concentration. All ind icators support this conclusion. Increased  concentration 
does not immediately contribute to profitability. To understand the (low) performance, 
the Boone ind icator measures the extent to which d ifferences in efficiency are reflected  in 
performance. This result ind icates that only efficient liner operators with a operational 
advantage of lower operating costs due to the deployment of larger vessels, and  of a 
large network of services, over (inefficient) competitors, can attain profits.The study 
reveals some further interesting find ings. The effect on tu rnover of mergers and  
acquisitions largely manifests itself in the two  consecutive years. 
Our results further suggest that the shipping companies involved  in strategic alliances as 
a form of cooperation are not more efficient in terms of profit (too bureaucratic? slower 
decision making?) (see Chapter 5) 
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In general terms, in order to realise higher profits, the sector should  become more 
efficient. The present study assesses the degree of competition over time before the 
abolishment of the block exemption from 18th October, 2008, a policy change with the 
objective of intensifying competition, and  the global downturn. The Boone ind icator can 
be used  to establish whether competition w ill be rising in the coming years. It allows to 
monitor and  evaluate (anti-)competitive behaviour. Therefore, this study is particularly 
interesting to policy makers who wish to evaluate their decision of the abolishment (see 
Chapter 5). 
The present research succeeds both in realising its objectives and in answering the 
research questions. The last two studies go one step further and search for an 
explanation for the obtained  results. 
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Barriers to entry constitute a major structural attribute of industry sectors. The 
importance of the (unobservable) threat of entry is recognised in this study. The 
persistence of profit methodology makes it possible to capture the unobservable threat of 
entry. This dynamic methodology observes profit outcomes over time to make 
interferences about the nature of competition. The central idea is that profits should  
persist if there are impediments to the competitive dynamic (e.g. entry barriers). Mueller 
(1986) shows that persistence of profits can be estimated using first order autoregressive 
equation for each firm’s standard ised  profit rate. The hypothesis is that (potential and  
actual) entry/ exit conditions are sufficiently powerful to ensure that no firm persistently 
earns profits above or below the norm. The PoP-hypothesis was tested  for a panel of 21 
liner operators observed  over the 2000-2008 period. 
Five major conclusions follow  from the time-series analysis on firm-level profits. First, 
short-run persistence refers to the percentage of a firm’s standard ised  profit rate in any 
period before period  W that remains in period  W. The econometric results reveal a 
significant positive impact on profit persistence for independent carriers (e.g. 
CMA CGM, Maersk Line). Such result ind icates that those liner operators earn retu rns 
above the competitive norm. Conversely, in the case of the CHKY alliance, the results 
show a low persistence of profits. In other words, the profits in year W of liner carriers 
involved  in the CHKY alliance do not largely depend on profits in year W. No 
generalisation for all alliances can be formulated as there are no data for Hapag-Lloyd 
and Hyundai Merchant Marine.  
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Second , the values of the speed  of profit ad justment parameter indicate how quickly the 
profit rate approaches its long-run equilibrium level. The short-run rents of CMA CGM 
and Maersk Line erode more slowly than those of liner operators involved in the 
CHKY alliance. This can be taken as an indication of the existence of entry barriers. A 
study of the BelgianInd ia trade confirms this find ing. The barriers to entry are 
moderately limited. Clearly, the extent of the barriers to entry d iffers from trade lane to 
trade lane. From the incumbent’s viewpoint, this is a position of accommodated  entry.  
Third , turning to long-run persistence, the hypothesis was tested  that (actual and 
potential) entry into and exit from any market is sufficiently free to bring any abnormal 
profits quickly into line with the competitive rate of return. If the permanent profitability 
equals zero for all liner operators, this would  support the hypothesis that all long run 
rents are zero. Otherwise, there is long-run persistence in the sense that these liner 
operators earn profits which tend to d iffer permanently from the average profitability of 
liner operators in general. In the case of CMA CGM, a permanent level of profitability of 
0.03536 implies that their profit to assets/ sales ratio (at container division) is on average 
permanently 3.5 % above the sample mean. Since the permanent level of profitability 
does not equal zero for all liner operators, the results imply that there is long-run 
persistence. Therefore, in the containerised liner shipping case, the empirical results 
suggest that the hypothesis can be rejected . The ‘persistence of profit’  approach 
demonstrates that independent carriers are able to preserve their profits over time. 
However, abnormal profit erodes at a faster pace than in other industries. 
The results further suggest that the abnormal profit (if any) of shipping companies 
involved  in strategic alliances erodes more quickly by forces of competition than those of 
independent carriers (see Chapter 6). Another observation is that the ranking of the liner 
operators d iffers from a ranking based on market share. This might be an indication that 
large operators sacrifice profit to preserve their market share. Fifth, the excess returns 
erode at a faster pace than in other industries (see Chapter 6).  
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The entrance of newcomers depends on the response of incumbents and the existence of 
barriers to entry. One barrier to entry is economies of scale. After investigating and  
classifying the factors influencing the size of containerships, Chapter 7 concentrates on 
another factor that might explain the efficiency of a shipping company, namely scale 
advantages. 
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The economies of scale in deploying larger vessels are quantified  by using a liner service 
cash flow model. The results illustrate that scale economies have been, and will continue 
to be, the d riving force behind  the deployment of larger container vessels. However, the 
operating cost (especially feeder cost) and  the landside d istribution costs should be 
integrated  in the cost model. Adding these latter costs can raise the unit cost per TEU 
more rapidly and  turn the economies of scale curve into a U-shaped curve.  
This analysis has made it clear that (optimal) ship size and  (optimal) operations cannot 
be stud ied  separately. Both develop in close connection. It has been shown that the 
determination of the optimal ship size in relation to operations depends on transport 
segment (deep-sea vs. short-sea shipping, SSS), terminal type (transhipment terminals 
vs. other terminals), trade lane (East-West vs. North-South trades), and  technology. 
Technology refers to the question when an 18,000 TEU or 22,000 TEU containership with 
an allowable d raught will be built (see Chapter 7).  
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The results of our research are relevant to the liner operator, as the market structure 
under which a carrier operates determines its behaviour. The results suggest that the 
liner carriers operate in a monopolistic competitive environment. This find ing should  
encourage liner operators to differentiate their product entirely or partially. 
The find ings of this study are economically highly relevant as information on the degree 
of competition in the container liner shipping industry is of prime importance in the 
light of a reflection on policy. This study presents an overall p icture of the concentration-
competition-profit relationship in the container d ivision. The structural approach 
demonstrates that a meaningful competition analysis must be based  on the outcomes of 
several concentration ind icators. The judgment of the customer (shipper) concerning the 
price and  the quality of container services should  also be taken into account. 
Finally, the results of the present study form a good  starting point for a comparison and  
an evaluation of the effects of future changes and  regulations in the container liner 
shipping industry. In addition, they can make an important contribution to initial policy 
discussions.  
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNDQGUHVHDUFK
TXHVWLRQV
The general research top ic of this study is the assessment of the competitive conditions, 
the concentration and the market structure of the container liner shipping industry. This 
introductory chapter explains the purpose and  the methodology of this research. It is 
d ivided into four parts. Subsequently, the container liner shipping industry, some forms 
of cooperation, two anti-trust regulations as well as the conceptual framework of this 
study will be d iscussed . 
 7KHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
A first step is to define and  outline the container liner shipping industry. A definition of 
the relevant market makes it possible to identify the competitive constraints faced  by the 
market players. The second  subsection presents an overview of the largest market 
players. Some major developments that have been challenging those operators w ill be 
discussed  in the last subsection. 
 'HOLQHDWLQJWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
In general terms, the shipping market can be regarded  as a single economic unit with 
distinct market segments, viz. the tanker fleet, the bulk carrier fleet, the liner fleet, the 
fleet of ships designed  for a single cargo or the specialised  fleet (e.g. cement carrier, 
heavy lift, refrigerated), and  passenger ships (Stopford , 2009).  
Appendix 1-1 illustrates the relative growth of the containerised  liner shipping industry. 
In 1990, the liner segment had  a share of 16.94 % of world  total (measured in 1,000 
deadweight), compared  with 42.53 % for the tanker segment, and 36.71 % for the bulk 
segment. Over the 1990-2009 period , the tanker and  the bulk segments lost about 2.5 and  
1 percentage points respectively, in favour of the liner segment, which rose to a 25.58 % 
share. As for the specialised  fleet, its share in d ropped  from 3.24 % to 1.92 % from 1990 to 
2009. The share of the passenger segment dropped  from 0.62 % in 1990 to 0.55 % in 2009. 
The liner segment consists of three divisions, namely containership, roll on/ roll off 
(ro-ro) and  other (multipurpose, tweendecker, etc.). In 1990 the segment ‘other’  was 
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largest w ith 11.72 %, followed by ‘containership ’  with an approximate 4 %, and  ‘ro-ro’  
with 1.20 %.  
Over 20 years the ‘containership ’  d ivision has expanded  its share to 18.24 %. The 
increased containerisation has been largely due to ded icated purpose-built container 
vessels, larger vessels that present increased economies of scale (see Chapter 7), as well 
as its so-called  ‘cannibalisation’  of cargo previously transported in bulk towards 
containers. To date, the ‘container’  d ivision mainly carries finished  products ready for 
consumption along the three major east-west liner trades: Transpacific, Asia-Europe and 
Transatlantic. The shares of the ‘other’  and  the ‘ro-ro’  d ivisions have shrunk to 6.76 % 
and 0.58 % respectively. Although the containerised  liner shipping industry dominates 
the liner segment, the ro-ro and  other divisions w ill no doubt continu to exist. Because of 
its d imensions, weight, etc., certain cargo will never be classified as containerised  cargo 
(e.g. out-of-box-gauge machinery, heavy lift-project cargo). 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the evolution of the world  full container trade (left-hand  axis) 
versus that of the cellular fleet (right-hand  axis). The structural changes that have taken 
place in the container liner shipping industry are illustrated in Figure 1-1 and will be 
discussed  further in Section 1.1.3. 
The container trade accounts for about 16 % of world  goods loaded in volume terms 
(tons) (UNCTAD, 2009). Measured  in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU)2 the world  total 
of containerised  trade was estimated at 148.9 million TEU in 2008. Mid  2010, the total 
seaborne container carrying fleet capacity, includ ing fully cellular capacity stood  at 14.45 
million TEU. Out of a total of 5,949 active liner ships, the world  fleet of fully cellular 
containerships stands at 4,832 cellular ships for 13.89 million TEU, 51.7 % of which are 
chartered. So, the cellular fleet aggregates 96.12 % of the total capacity deployed on liner 
trades in TEU terms (AXS-Alphaliner, 2010a). As of 2009, the capacity being added, 
fuelled mainly by the influx of ultra large container ships, has outstripped  the growth in 
world  full container trade. 
 
                                                     
2
  Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit (containers): a measu rement of cargo-carrying capacity on a container ship, 
referring to a common container size of 20 ft in length (Paelinck, 2008). 
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)LJXUH(YROXWLRQZRUOGIXOOFRQWDLQHUWUDGHYVFHOOXODUIOHHW ; 
This research study focuses on the ‘liner’  market segment, more specifically the fully 
cellular containerised liner shipping industry.  
 /LQHURSHUDWRUV
For a better understand ing of the container liner shipping market, it is necessary to have 
an adequate idea of the players and  their trade mix of services. 
First, the container liner shipping industry comprises for about 400 liner operators. A list 
of the largest companies is included  in Appendix 1-2 which also shows the container 
capacity (in TEU terms and in number of ships) of the top 25 carriers and  their rankings 
in 2000 and 2010.  
The capacity of the cellular fleet amounted  to 13.64 million TEU as at beginning 2010. 
Over the last decade, the container liner shipping industry has been characterised  by a 
growth of + 120 %. The cellular order book suggests a continuation of this growth. The 
                                                     
3
  Compiled  w ith data from Alphaliner (various ed itions) and  Drewry (various ed itions). All amounts, both 
w orld  fu ll container trade and  cellu lar fleet, are in million TEUs. 
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family-owned liner carriers MSC and  CMA CGM are among the very few carriers w ith a 
huge order book, and  clearly aim to increase their market share. To date, APM-Maersk is 
in a position to maintain its market share with a declared  order book of not more than 
352,924 TEU, unless its rivals engage in vigorous chartering activities to keep pace. It 
should  be noted that, on January 1st, 2010, the order book of the fourth largest liner 
shipping company Evergreen Line, was empty. Taiwan-based  carrier Evergreen Line is 
not only an independent carrier w ith an empty order book since 2008, but it is also one 
of the few players not ordering super post-panamax vessels, unlike several of its peers, 
such as the top  three carriers with orders of +13,000 TEU vessels, nor does it feel a 
pressing need to do so. Mid 2010, this ocean carrier’s policy of sticking to smaller-sized  
ships was confirmed with orders for 10 x 8,000 TEU and  the intention to order 30 ships 
with a nominal capacity of 9,200 TEU. In the empirical part of this study, Evergreen Line 
was regrettably not included in the sample of liner operators, as it does not publish 
segmented  figures for its container division.  
The container liner operators expanded  their capacity to a total of 5,392,351 TEU. Except 
for Evergreen and  Hanjin Shipping, every liner operator at least doubled its capacity. 
Two independent European based  liner carriers,  viz. the nominal champion MSC and  
Maersk Line, added  + 1,000,000 TEU. MSC gained size and  strength through organic 
growth, while the expansion of Maersk Line was largely the result of mergers and  
acquisitions. Carriers that are accustomed to going it alone may have a slight edge in the 
future over those that have primarily relied on alliances. Among the top 25 liner carriers, 
10 are members of alliances. This issue is addressed  in this study (see Chapters 4, 5 
and 6). 
The top 3 carriers account for a total of 4,564,504 TEU, or about 50 % of the transported  
capacity of the tops 25. In terms of capacity, these three mega carriers controlled a 
collective share of 33.46 % of the world  fleet on January 1st, 2010. Maersk Line and MSC 
have a double digit shares. The liner operators that do not make the top 20 have a 
market share of less than 1 %. 
Secondly, the trade mix of services shows that the major container shipping lines have 
global coverage across multiple trade lanes. Appendix 1-3 depicts the liner operators’  
breakdown of TEU capacity deployed  by trade. The radar chart compares the 
distribution of major liner operators across trades. Liner operators w ith a relatively large 
coverage of the Europe-Far East (EU-FE) trades are CMA CGM, Hyundai Merchant 
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Marine (HMM), Yang Ming and  Maersk Line (in descending order of importance). In the 
case of the Transpacific trade, the liner carrier APL has the largest coverage followed  by 
Hanjin, HMM and  Evergreen.  
Since freight rates d iffer across trades, the trade mix of services might affect the 
profitability of the liner operators. To test this, detailed  data are needed  at trade level. 
Regrettably, such information is not available. Instead, the number of services w ill be 
used  as a proxy for the global coverage (see Chapter 5). 
After establishing a clear idea of the market and  its players, the next section elaborates 
on the developments that challenge the industry and links these developments have 
with landmark events in the container liner shipping industry. This is shown in 
Figure 1-1. 
 'HYHORSPHQWVLQWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
The introduction of containers in 1956 was an innovative landmark in the liner shipping 
industry. The past decade (2000-2010) has probably been the most revolutionary in this 
respect. For some time now the worldwide containerised liner shipping industry has 
been characterised  by some notable developments that have challenge the liner 
operators (see Figure 1-2). 
 
)LJXUH'HYHORSPHQWVLQWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
Container 
liner 
shipping 
industry
increased  vessel 
size
/
environmental 
issues
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First, the increasing globalisation is a significant market development for the container 
liner shipping industry.  
Second , the response to globalisation is concentration (see Chapters 2 and  3), which in 
turn has been d riven by the need for economies of scale (see Chapter 7) and  has been a 
response to global shippers (e.g. Wal-mart, Masterfood , Proctor & Gamble, Ikea). 
Concentration has been achieved through mergers and  acquisitions.  
The consecutive waves of consolidation have redesigned  the container liner shipping 
industry (Sys, 2009). The first large consolidation wave in the liner shipping industry 
took place around 1995. Ten years later a second  consolidation wave started. The most 
notable example of a merger in the container liner shipping sector was the takeover of 
Royal P&O Nedlloyd  by Maersk Sealand  (since then known again as Maersk Line) in 
2006 (see Figure 1-1). The impact of this merger is a recurrent topic in the study (see 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). It also provoked  other liner operators to follow suit (e.g. CMA 
CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, COSCO)4. Since the worsening of the global financial crisis and  the 
unfolding of a worldwide economic downturn, further consolidation has been expected  
to achieve a financially more viable balance.  
Third , the development of increased  and continu ing containerisation goes together with 
increased vessel size (Sys HW DO, 2008). In 2006, Maersk Line created  another milestone 
with the deployment of the Emma Maersk (see Figure 1-1). When she was launched, the 
Emma Maersk was the largest container ship ever built (listed capacity: 11,000 TEU 
versus an estimated  capacity varying between 13,500 TEU and 15,200 TEU depending on 
the method of calculating capacity – see also Chapter 7)5. Following Maersk’s new 
build ing programme, other liner operators such as MSC (i.e. 14,000 TEU MSC Melatilde - 
2010) and  CMA CGM (i.e. 13,830 TEU CMA CGM Amerigo Vespucci - 2010) have 
ordered similar sized  series of vessels. While these liner operators are convinced of the 
superior economies of scale (see Chapter 7), not every liner operator is turning to the 
super or ultra carrying vessels. As stated  before, Evergreen is going to keep to ships up  
to 10,000 TEU, while APL is not going for the ultra large container carrying vessels of 
14,000 TEU that are being phased  into service by the top three liner operators. Their 
strategy might be driven by the greater trading flexibility offered by ‘smaller’  sized 
vessels. 
                                                     
4
  For an overview: see Appendix 2-2. 
5
  Rumour has it that Maersk Line is considering ship s of 16,000 TEU capacity. 
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Figure 1-3 shows the d istribution by size range as well as the cellular fleet projections up  
to 1/ 1/ 20146. Although the smallest size segments still account for the largest share, a 
shift towards larger ships is noticeable.  
 
)LJXUH&HOOXODUIOHHWIRUHFDVW
This influx of large ships - d riven by the expectation of significant economies of scale - is 
having consequences on the structure of the market. According to the present planning, 
a new set of larger locks will allow to transit the Panama Canal with those larger ships 
by 2014. This future operational opportunity might make international trad ing even 
more competitive.  
A further development is the continued  liberalisation (i.e. opening of trades by WTO 
agreements)/ deregulation and consequently the resulting growth in global trade, which 
is of great importance for the shipping industry. This development has intensified  
competition on many ind ividual trade lanes and  strenghtened  the incentive to cooperate.  
In response to market conditions, rationalisation has further developed . It has come in 
the form of rescheduling (i.e. merging services, teaming up with other liner operators to 
launch a new service), retonnaging (i.e. cutting capacity) and  restructuring. It aims to 
reduce the overall cost base and to ensure a more efficient service to customers. Further 
                                                     
6
  Compiled  with data from AXS-Alphaliner (2010b). AXS-Alphaliner forecasts cellu lar fleet based  on the 
order book as at 1/ 8/ 2010 assuming no cancellation of orders. 
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rationalisation is expected , and with it (increased) cooperation . The ‘cooperation’  
development will be d iscussed  in a separate section (see Section 1.2). 
Other recent developments affecting the container liner shipping industry are security at 
sea (increased  piracy activities) and an  environmental focus that grows stronger. More 
stringent legislative requirements, present and  future, w ill enforce environmental 
developments in relation to reducing fuel consumption and emission of greenhouse 
gases as well as environmentally sound  ship recycling programmes. Most liner operators 
(e.g. Evergreen, Maersk Line) set vessel-specific targets for environmental 
improvements. 
The growing awareness in the shipping industry of climate change emissions (i.e. 
reduction of tons of C02 per year) in combination with the objective to save costs (i.e. 
annual reduction of tons of bunkers), and  to trim back overcapacity triggered by the 
recent economic crisis, has encouraged  the carriers to introduce the practice of  slow  and  
super-slow steaming7. Most liner operators have implemented this on the main routes. 
In the ‘post-crisis’  era, some form of slow steaming is expected to remain the rule, on 
account of  environmental issues8. The new IMO Tier (2011) and the Tier III (NOx limits, 
2016) Marpol Annex VI regulation will provide stricter new standards regarding ship  
emission limits. Ships operating in emission control areas (ECA) would be required  to 
use fuel w ith a sulphur content that does not exceed 15,000 ppm (parts per million). To 
date, there are two Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA) designated  to control the 
emissions of SOx : in the Baltic Sea area and in the North Sea area. Will the emission 
control areas be extended? How will this sustained  environmental approach affect the 
industry? Knowing that ships are generally not designed for low speed 9, Maersk Line is 
the first to ad just its fleet technically to the practice of slow steaming by installing slow 
steaming upgrade kits.  
As yet no data are available to capture the effect of these recent developments on the 
competitive conditions of the container liner shipping industry. 
                                                     
7
  Fu ll speed  steaming corresponds with 24 knots while slow steaming means a speed  of 21 knots. Super 
slow steaming reduces speed  by up  to 15 knots by average. Different legs can be run at d ifferent speeds 
(e.g. 20-22 knots westbound and  17-19 knots average speed  eastbound considered  an 18 knot loop). 
8
  Based  on Alphaliner Weekly N ew sletter, various ed itions, 2010. 
9
  The industry d iscusses the long-term impact of super-slow steaming on d iesel engines that w ere initially 
designed  to operate at sustained  high service speeds. 
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Given that the landscape of the container trade is bound  to change, the liner operators 
that are fully aware of these challenges, should be urged  to enhance efficiency and  to 
continuously harmonise its services to order to improve its core competitiveness.  
In brief, the market developments in the container liner shipping industry reflect what 
has been happening in the other newly liberalised  sectors (e.g. telecommunication, 
broadcasting, banking). 
 &RRSHUDWLRQ
A feature of liner shipping concerns the transport of cargo. To this end, it provides 
regular services to ports on a particular geographic route, generally known as a ‘trade 
(lane)’ . On strategic grounds, liner operators could  opt to provide a wider scope of 
services. For small/ medium sized carriers, deployment of extra ships necessitates a very 
large amount capital outlay and  might restrict the set-up of a shipping service 
individually. To enable liner operators to provide a wider scope of service and  to 
increase the utilisation of vessel capacity, operational cooperation offers a solution. For 
major carriers, cooperation in jointly supplying a shipping service may further produce 
efficiencies and  benefits. 
Ryoo and  Lee (2002) divide the liner shipping cooperation forms into two groups, 
according to the nature of the cooperation: cooperation on rates and  operational 
cooperation10. While these authors identify merger and  acquisition as operational 
cooperation, this present study treats merger and  acquisition as a separate type of 
cooperation, namely full-scale cooperation. Figure 1-4 gives an overview of the liner 
shipping cooperations11. 
The major forms of cooperation are trade agreements, such as shipping conferences, 
operating agreements (consortia and  strategic alliances) and  mergers and acquisitions 
(see Figure 1-4: in italic). In the following subsections, these forms of cooperation will be 
described  briefly. 
                                                     
10
 Appendix 1-4 contains a list of the d ifferent forms of cooperation w ith a brief descrip tion. 
11
  Financial participation by third  parties is not taken into account. 
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
)LJXUH)RUPVRIOLQHUVKLSSLQJFRRSHUDWLRQ
 &RRSHUDWLRQRQUDWHV
Liner services were developed  in the second  half of the 19th century (mid-1870s) when 
reliable steam power made it possible for the first time for shipping companies to 
provide regularly scheduled  services. The rapid  growth of the liner business quickly led  
to fierce competition. Freight rates were forced  to levels that d id   not cover average costs. 
By 1875, the first VKLSSLQJ FRQIHUHQFH was set-up to stop this instability of the liner 
business and  to restore profitability12.   
The US adopted  the Section 3(7) definition of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 
1998: “$FRQIHUHQFHPHDQV DQ DVVRFLDWLRQ RI RFHDQ FRPPRQ FDUULHUV SHUPLWWHGSXUVXDQW WR DQ
DSSURYHGRU HIIHFWLYHDJUHHPHQW WR HQJDJH LQFRQFHUWHGDFWLYLW\DQGWRXWLOLVHDFRPPRQWDULII
EXW WKH WHUP GRHV QRW LQFOXGH D MRLQW VHUYLFH FRQVRUWLXP SRROLQJ VDLOLQJ RU WUDQVKLSPHQW
DUUDQJHPHQW”13. 
In the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (1975), a conference or liner 
conference is defined  as “«DJURXSRIWZRRUPRUHYHVVHORSHUDWLQJFDUULHUVZKLFKSURYLGHV
                                                     
12 In August 1875, the first conference was formed  by the lines trad ing between the United  Kingdom and 
Calcutta (Stopford , 2009, p 556). 
13
  See www.fmc.gov/ about/ shippingact.asp  (assessed  10/ 08/ 2010). 
Liner shipping 
cooperation
cooperation on rates
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FRQIHUHQFHV
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PHUJHUDQG
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LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQHU VHUYLFHV IRU WKH FDUULDJH RI FDUJR RQ D SDUWLFXODU URXWH RU URXWHV ZLWKLQ
VSHFLILHG JHRJUDSKLFDO OLPLWV DQGZKLFK KDV DQ DJUHHPHQW RU DUUDQJHPHQWZKDWHYHU LWVQDWXUH
ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIZKLFKWKH\RSHUDWHXQGHUXQLIRUPRUFRPPRQIUHLJKWUDWHVDQGDQ\RWKHU
DJUHHGFRQGLWLRQVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHSURYLVLRQRIOLQHUVHUYLFHVµ. The European Union adopted  
the definition of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences in regulation 
No 4056/ 86 of December 22th, 1986 laying down detailed  rules for the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport14.  
Conferences were formed for the purpose of restricting competition between their 
members and  protecting them from outside competition. It was the industry’ s first 
attempt at dealing with the pricing problem. 
In the 1960s, w ith the advent of containerisation, this cooperation on rates was 
supplemented  by other kinds of agreements. The role of conferences changed  towards a 
discussion platform for analysing the market, exchanging information and  evaluating 
the required  capacity. 
Mid 2010, Containerisation International online listed  46 conferences15. For instance, the 
Transpacific stabilisation agreement16 has 15 members (APL, CSCL, CMA CGM, 
COSCO, Evergreen Line, Hanjin shipping, Hapag-Lloyd , HMM, K-line, Maersk Line, 
MSC, NYK Line, OOCL, Yang Ming Line and  Zim)17. Its geographic scope is the USA, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and the Russian Far East. The area of 
services of the majority of conferences is East/ South Asia, Oceania, Africa and South 
America.  
                                                     
14 See europa.eu/ legislation_summaries/ competition/ specific_sectors/ transport/ l24064_en.htm, (assessed  
10/ 08/ 2010). 
15
  By the early 1970s, there were more than 360 conferences, while thirty years later there w ere still 150 liner 
conferences. Their membership  ranged  from 2 to 40 shipp ing lines (Stopford , 2009). 
16
  A stabilisation agreement is a modern open sort of conference system which mainly act as a secretariat to 
the trades, administering rate agreements and  dealing w ith the various regulatory bodies (Stopford, 
2009, p. 558). 
17
  See the glossary for the liner operators’  name written in fu ll. 
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 2SHUDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ
Various forms of operational cooperations are slot charters, poolings, joint services, joint 
ventures, consortia and  alliances18. Only the latter two types of operational cooperation 
will be discussed .  
In contrast to conferences, consortia19 and  alliances are technical agreements (without 
pricing considerations) to share fixed  voyage costs (e.g. fuel consumption, wages, port 
dues), other fixed  costs (e.g. capital cost, equipment) and  operational costs.  
 &RQVRUWLD KML 
The expansion of containerisation stimulated  the development of the consortium 
concept.  
A consortium, as defined  by the Commission regulation 870/ 95, is “ DQDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQ
WZR RU PRUH YHVVHORSHUDWLQJ FDUULHUV ZKLFK SURYLGH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQHU VKLSSLQJ VHUYLFHV
H[FOXVLYHO\ IRU WKHFDUULDJHRIFDUJRFKLHIO\E\FRQWDLQHU UHODWLQJ WRDSDUWLFXODU WUDGHDQGWKH
REMHFWRIZKLFKLVWREULQJDERXWFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHMRLQWRSHUDWLRQRIDPDULWLPHWUDQVSRUWVHUYLFH
ZKLFK LPSURYHV WKH VHUYLFHZKLFKZRXOG EH RIIHUHG LQGLYLGXDOO\ E\ HDFK RI LWVPHPEHUV LQ WKH
DEVHQFHRIDFRQVRUWLXPLQRUGHUWRUDWLRQDOLVHWKHLURSHUDWLRQVE\PHDQVRIWHFKQLFDORSHUDWLRQDO
DQGRUFRPPHUFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRISULFHIL[LQJµ(Brooks, 2000, p . 224). 
Thus, the formation of consortia allowed  companies to share both the additional 
investment cost that containerisation entailed  and the accompanying risk, with only a 
small number of major liner companies w ith adequate critical mass pursuing an 
independent strategy on all or some of the major routes (e.g. Two carriers can agree to 
set up a weekly service between port A and  port B, and  each carrier brings 2 ships in. 
This way they can offer a weekly service to their customers by a slot exchange 
agreement21). Furthermore, such agreements allow shipping lines to rationalise their 
                                                     
18
  The definition of the other forms is listed  in Append ix 1-4, which contains an overview  of the types and 
nature of liner shipp ing cooperation. 
19 The first consortium agreement was the Atlantic container line (1966). 
20
  Liner operators have been granted  conditional exemption from the competition rules when operating 
joint services. The Consortia Block Exemption was first adopted  in 1995 by Regulation 870/ 95. Every five 
years, this exemption has to be reviewed. September 2009, the European Commission has decided  to 
amend  and prolong the consortia Block Exception Regu lation until April 2015. Liner operators will 
continue to be allow ed  to engage in operational co-operation for the purpose of provid ing a joint liner 
service, bu t not for fixing p rices. 
21 A slot exchange agreement is an agreement between two or more carriers to exchange an equal amount 
of space on ships operated  on each other’s respective services in the same trade lane. A slot refers to an 
unit of space in a containership . One slot equals one TEU of capacity. 
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activities and achieve economies of scale and to improve the productivity and the quality 
of the liner shipping service, and  to encourage greater utilisation of the containers and  
the more efficient use of vessel capacity. 
To sum up, consortia can be described  as purely operational agreements (e.g. joint use of 
vessels, port installations, marketing organisation…) within which each carrier 
independently determines its commercial policy, but to a very limited  extent.  
 $OOLDQFHV KNK 
Early 1990s, the unprecedented demands imposed  by the globalisation of world  trade, 
began to make existing forms of agreements increasingly inadequate. Prodded  by the 
protracted poor profitability in the 90s, medium-sized  container companies started  to 
form strategic alliances operating on d ifferent routes around the world  in order to offer a 
worldwide service to their clients. A new generation of strategic partnerships emerged. 
Das and Teng (1997) define strategic alliances as “ LQWHUILUP FRRSHUDWLRQ DUUDQJHPHQWV OMP 
DLPHG DWSXUVXLQJPXWXDO VWUDWHJLFJRDOVµ. Alliance forms included  in their definition are 
joint ventures, joint R&D, product swap, equity investment and  sharing, and licensing.  
As the present study focuses on the competitive conditions of the container liner 
shipping industry and  as 10 carriers from among the top 25 liner operators are involved  
in an alliance, it is worth examining these carriers’  behaviour over the past years. The 
remainder of this subsection firstly summarises the advantages and  d isadvantages of an 
alliance membership. Secondly, it gives an overview  of the process of operational 
agreements on one trade to the formation of alliances (see Appendices 1-5 and  6-3). 
Then, it addresses the question in what way alliances differ from conferences and  
consortia. Finally, some figures give an idea of the market power of alliances. 
  
                                                     
22
  See also Heaver QNRTSVU W , 2000; Midoro & Pitto, 2000 and  Heaver QNRTSGU ., 2001. 
23
  These agreements cover emp loyment and  u tilisation of vessels (joint vessel rou te assignments, 
itineraries, sailing schedu les, type and  size of vessels, ports and  port relations); charters, space/ slot 
charters; the use of joint terminals; co-ordination of containers, pooling of containers, establishing of 
container stations; vessel feeder routes and  co-ord ination w ith inland  services and  information and  
p rocedures exchange. They do not cover joint sales, marketing, or joint maritime/ mu ltimodal pricing; 
joint ownership  of vessels or maintenance or assurance; joint or common bill(s) of lad ing; common tariffs 
or the sharing of profit/ losses; joint management and  executive functions and  revenues pools or cargo 
pools. 
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Being involved  in an alliance offers to mid-sized liner operators the possibility to 
aggregate cargo volumes; entry in new markets without deployment of additional 
tonnage; increased  service frequencies; scale economies of (larger) ships; improved asset 
utilisation through the sharing of vessels, terminals, equipment and  containers and  
coping with the hub and spoke system 24. Further benefits could  be the employment of 
their collective financial strength for long-term assets and  enforce a more powerful 
negotiating position vis-à-vis port authorities, terminal operators and  inland  transport 
firms. And finally, it is a way to deal w ith competition. 
However, the main disadvantage is that every single partner retains its role and  
influence: the decision-making process can easily become lengthy and time-consuming, 
and eventually lead to bureaucratisation of the alliance. This aspect should not be 
underestimated  (see Chapters 4, 5 and  6). 
FORMATION OF ALLIANCES25 
In a move aimed  at reducing costs and  provid ing more flexible service, major liner 
companies joined  forces to share resources on a world-wide scale.  
During the 90s several alliances were formed. The pivotal year in alliance formation was 
1995. Overall, four periods can be distinguished: (a) 1990 - 1994, (b) 1995 – 1999, (c) 
2000 – 2005, and  (d) 2006 – 2010 (see Appendices 1-5 and  6-3). 
Alliances were not a new phenomenon. Before 1995, these operational agreements 
already existed  but they were of a limited scope or active on one trade only. 
By the beginning of the second  period , nearly all principal global containership 
operators had  grouped  themselves into alliances. The first cooperation was the Global 
Alliance, formed by APL, MOL, OOCL and  Nedlloyd  (with side arrangements w ith 
MISC). This cooperation agreement was followed  by the Grand  Alliance, consisting of 
Hapag-Lloyd , NYK, NOL and P&OCL. A third  alliance was called Tricon alliance and  
comprised  DSR-Senator and  Cho Yang shipping. At that time, this alliance was more of a 
consortium, especially since the 75 % takeover of DSR-Senator by Hanjin (end 1996). This 
left Maersk, at that time the second  largest carrier in the world , with the capacity to go it 
                                                     
24 A hub is the central transhipment point in a transport structure, to which traffic from many ports is 
d irected  and  from w here traffic is fed  to other areas/ ports (referred  to as spokes).  
25
  The overview is confined  to the biggest alliances.  
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alone, but it opted  for a closer relationship with Sea-Land , taking into account the 
overwhelming economic advantages of consortia participation (Brooks, 2000). Other 
carriers chose to venture beyond  alliances and  engaged in mergers (P&O Nedlloyd) or 
acquisitions (NOL/ APL) that increased their size and expanded  their scope of 
operations. P&O’s joint venture with Nedlloyd  forced the new company to choose 
between the Global and  the Grand Alliances. Once P&O Nedlloyd  had chosen the Grand  
Alliance, the newly merged NOL/ APL opted  to join the restructured  Global Alliance. As 
OOCL was not included  in the new Global Alliance (subsequently renamed The New 
World  Alliance (TNWA)), it became a participant in the Grand  Alliance. OOCL’s 
strength in the China and  Southeast Asia markets created  a better balance within the 
Grand  Alliance rather than duplicating the strength of its former alliance partner, 
NOL/ APL (Brooks, 2000). MISC chose also to join the Grand  Alliance while Hyundai 
Merchant Marine (HMM) opted to participate in the New World  Alliance. This alliance 
agreement between APL/ NOL, MOL and HMM26 was concluded  in December 1997. 
Both the ‘new ’  Grand Alliance (w ith participation of OOCL and  MISC27) and the New 
World  Alliance became operational in January 1998. During the formation of the Grand  
Alliance and  the New World  Alliance, Hanjin missed the opportunity to join either of 
these alliances. By that time a majority shareholder of DSR-Senator, Hanjin formed the 
Tricon alliance (later renamed into the United  Alliance) w ith Cho Yang. This alliance 
entered  into  a loose agreement w ith a third  member, UASC. The latter, like the carrier 
Cho Yang, is an independent partner and has only a restricted  contribution to the 
alliance. This shows that market coverage and commitment to alliances can vary.  
The third  period started  w ith the creation of a fourth alliance, the Sino-Japanese Alliance 
(renamed as CHKY-alliance), with COSCO, K-Line, Hanjin and  Yang Ming, Asia’s 
largest container shipping lines. Hanjin also represented Senator Line28. Their aim was to 
improve vessel utilisation and  to rationalise their services worldwide. Cooperation 
through less formal vessel sharing was the forerunner of this extended partnership. 
During the third  period , the pattern of alliances was not subjected  to these p revious 
radical changes. This period  was marked  as the period  in which every carrier, even 
alliances, made operational agreements.  
                                                     
26
  In the empirical part of the d issertation, HMM is not included  in the sample of liner operators since this 
carrier does not report segmented  figures for its container d ivision. 
27
  MISC only participated  in the Eu rope-Far East Trade up  to January 1st, 2010. 
28
  Senator Line went bankrupt in 2009. 
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Another restructuring, viz. the withdrawal of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  from the Grand  
Alliance in February 2006 heralded the fourth period. The members of the Grand  
Alliance III were Hapag-Lloyd , NYK Line, OOCL and  MISC Bhd. (still Europe-Far East 
Trade only). The other two alliances remained  unchanged. Starting in early 2006, the 
seven carriers that belong to the Grand Alliance III and the New World  Alliance started  
an agreement to cooperate on key East-West trade lanes. The agreement was to enable 
the carriers to expand  their services in the face of strong competition from the newly 
merged  Maersk Sealand  and  Royal P&O Nedlloyd  (since then known as Maersk Line). 
Initially the alliances were operating on the East-West connections, North America, 
Europe and the Far East, but, through agreements w ith other alliances, they have now 
gradually been covering the North-South connection and  a connection with the East 
West container services. This period  was marked by the fact that every carrier, even 
within alliances, made operational agreements29. The latter form are known as intra-
alliance (e.g. the Grand  Alliance had a agreement w ith the CHKY Alliance covering the 
transatlantic trades, the Grand  Alliance jointly operated services with the New World  
Alliance). Nowadays, the overall p icture is very blurry, because half of the lead ing 
operators participate in alliances w ith the rest of the independent services, by means of 
slot swapping and other operational agreements (e.g. Hapag-Lloyd  with CMA CGM; the 
Grand  Alliance with ZIM; Hamburg Süd buys slots form other carriers in the Grand  
Alliance; the NWA has a slot charter agreement w ith Evergreen, covering the US/ Asia 
market and  cooperates with Yang Ming in the Asia/ Mediterranean trade). Moreover, 
independent liner carriers including Maersk Line, MSC and CMA-CGM, collaborate on 
the Transpacific and  Asia-Europe services. Any attempt to visualise all these 
cooperations, would  probably result in a spider’s web and  the picture would already 
require to be changed , by the time the visualisation was finished . 
 On May 15th, 2009, MISC Bhd, which participates solely in the Europe-Far East trades, 
announced that it would w ithdraw from the Grand  Alliance effective as of January, 1st. 
2010. Aware of the environmental challenge, as of April 2010, CHKY Alliance renamed 
itself as ‘CKYH, the Green Alliance’ , to show its determined  position on environmental 
protection (i.e. eco-steaming for energy-saving and  emission reduction, etc.). 
  
                                                     
29
 Is it the trend  of slow ness shown by alliances in achieving remarkable resu lts that has induced  some of 
their members to find yet another way to improve their competitive positioning? 
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ALLIANCES VERSUS OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION  
First, alliances are not merely new versions of the old  operational forms of cooperation, 
such as consortia. The aim of an alliance as a whole is to deliver a value that is greater 
than the sheer sum of its parts. Each partner may have a comparative/ complementary 
strength in one or more key fields of activity, which could  be effectively deployed to the 
alliance’s advantage (e.g. being active on another trade, the package of clients, specialty). 
Second , alliances offer similar regular services as conferences d id . But, whereas 
conferences provided  this regularity in exchange for price agreements, the competition 
would  largely play between alliances on the one hand  and  with independent carriers on 
the other. However, the competition is played out more subtly and  has been packaged  in 
all kinds of special contracts (like e.g. service contracts, rate contracts) in which volume, 
loyalty and  all kind  of qualitative aspects play an important role.  
IN FIGURES 
It is clarifying to have a notion of the rate at which carriers are adding capacity. 
Appendix 1-6 gives an outline of the market power of the three biggest alliances, viz. the 
CHKY Alliance, the Grand Alliance and  the New World Alliance, in comparison with 
the other independent market players. It compares the capacity in TEU terms and  in 
number of ships deployed within the alliance with the fleet capacity of the members of 
the alliance. The last two columns show the number of services and  vessels for the Far 
East-Europe service. The figures in italic represent the changes between 2006 and 2009. 
A first view  at the data reveals that no alliance controls more than the independent 
family-based  Maersk Line and  MSC do. The biggest strategic cooperation, in fleet terms, 
is the CHKY alliance w ith a share of 12.67 %. Between 2006 and  2009, the CHKY alliance 
and the Grand Alliance saw  their  market shares diminished . 
In each alliance there is a partner that dominates. In the Grand Alliance, the role and 
weight of NYK and  Hapag-Lloyd  is likely to be more significant than that of smaller 
partners. As stated  before, MISC left the Grand  Alliance on January 1st, 2010. The same 
situation applies to the New World  Alliance where APL is the major contributor in terms 
of shared  tonnage. While in the CHKY Alliance, Hanjin controls about 29 % of the 
deployed  ships, COSCO dominates the CHKY alliance in TEU terms. The column 
‘average ship size’  shows that COSCO shares larger ships. 
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Between 2006 and 2009, the average size of container ships, measured in terms of slot 
capacity, grew within each alliance. 
In 2009, the CHKY alliance operated  8 loops w ith 8 to 9 ships on the Far East-Europe 
service. Except for MSC and  CMA CGM, each market player cut services and  removes 
ships from the Far East-Europe trade. 
To sum up, for medium-sized liner carriers membership of an alliance is an essential 
way in which to compete w ith the major independent carriers (e.g. Maersk Line, MSC, 
CMA CGM). 
 )XOOVFDOHFRRSHUDWLRQ
Whereas the consortia system, which was limited to the deep-sea leg of a single trade 
lane, was a response to the investment p ressure resulting from containerisation, modern 
worldwide alliances were a response to globalisation of the production and distribution 
processes. Another strategic response by shipping companies to globalisation in terms of 
management strategy side is a merger and  acquisition strategy or a full-scale 
cooperation. The globalisation of the economy gave a new élan to consolidation. The 
shipping companies had  no other choice but to follow  this trend . 
Although from an economic point of view, full-scale cooperation seems to be a logical 
sequel to alliances, in practice, these mergers do not grease the wheels of business (e.g. 
the birth pangs of P&O Nedlloyd , the d ifficult d igestion of the acquisition of P&O 
Nedlloyd by Maersk Sealand) because of the d ifferent corporate cultures, the 
accompanying rationalisation, etc.  
The statement by Brooks (2000) that “ WKH SDWWHUQ RI PHUJHUV DQG DOOLDQFHV FKDQJHG
GUDPDWLFDOO\ EHWZHHQ  DQG  DQG KDV LQ DOO OLNHOLKRRG QRW UHDFKHG LWV ILQDO
FRQILJXUDWLRQ” has been confirmed  during the last decade.  
The empirical part of the study considers the impact of mergers and  acquisitions (see 
Chapters 4, 5 and  6).  
 &RPSHWLWLYHSROLF\
The merger of Royal P&O Nedlloyd and Maersk Sealand (2006)30 and  the abolishment of 
the anti-monopoly immunity of freight conferences are two recurrent topics in this 
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  See Subsection 1.1.3. 
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study. These two notable developments have greatly impacted  liner operators and  other 
maritime interests (e.g. shipper).  
This section outlines the regulation of competition in the (container) liner shipping 
industry31. Most countries have some anti-trust regulation. Within the scope of this 
research, the anti-trust legislation in the US and the competition policy of the European 
Union (EU) are examined. 
 )HGHUDO0DULWLPH&RPPLVVLRQ
The current American point of view on liner competition is encapsulated in the 1998 
amendments to the Shipping Act of 1984, called  the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (known 
as OSRA’98). The Shipping Act provides for a specialised  competition authority, viz. the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). This independent regulatory agency monitors and  
reviews almost all types of collaborations among liner operators (called agreements) for 
their potential impact on prices and  services. The Shipping Act exempts liner operators 
from the generally applicable antitrust laws, if the arrangements they conclude are filed 
and reviewed  by the FMC. If the FMC finds that a particular agreement is expected  to 
produce an inequitable increase in transportation prices (through a reduction in 
competition), or an unreasonable decrease in transportation service, it may bring suit in 
a federal district court.  
From time to time since 1998, there have been debates in the US about the pros and  cons 
of the current American approach32. Presently, renewed pressure has been build ing 
among US legislators for either an end  or a review of the limited  anti-trust immunity 
granted  to ocean carriers operating on US trades. The decision whether to repeal or 
modify the Ocean Shipping Reform Act which governs the regulatory regime remains 
open. 
                                                     
31
  More information regard ing the U.S. law and  regu lations and  the EU competition policy can be found by 
consu lting the FMC’s w ebsite (www.fmc.gov), the w ebpage of the European Commission, Directorate-
General for Competition (DG Comp . -  
ec.europa.eu / competition/ sectors/ transport/ legislation_maritime.html) or the press releases/ studies 
available on the webpages of ELAA (www.elaa.net > media) and  ESC (www.europeanshippers.com/  > 
document library). Brooks (2000) and  Stopford  (2009) summarise the history of regulation of competition 
in liner shipping. Furthermore, this debate is widely addressed  by a great many au thors (see Subsection 
1.4.1.1). 
32
  For a d iscussion relative to liner shipping, see govinfo.library.unt.edu/ amc/ index.html > Commission 
H earings > McCarran-Ferguson Act and  the Shipping Act (October 18th, 2006)) 
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 (XURSHDQ8QLRQ
Until October 2008, the European Union (EU) had  granted  liner operators’  pricing 
agreements a block exemption from the generally-applicable competition law 
(Regulation No 4056/ 86). Under pressure from shippers’  lobbying efforts (e.g. European 
Shippers' Council, ESC) to remove anti-trust immunity from liner conferences, the EU 
determined in September 2006 that liner shipping should  not enjoy any special 
immunity from the generally-applicable competition laws; rather, liner shipping should  
be treated as every other (non-exempt) industry and  remain subject to the same 
prohibitions and  penalties as other commercial actors. On October 18th, 2008, liner 
shipping operations to and from European Union countries became fully subject to EC 
competition law  following the repeal of a regulation that had  granted  conferences wide-
ranging anti-trust immunity33. 
What consequences does the abolition of liner conferences serving Europe, includ ing the 
Far Eastern Freight Conference34, have for the industry? Firstly, as of  October 18th 2008, 
all EU and non-EU carriers which currently take part in conferences operating on trades 
to and  from the EU, have to end their conference activities, in particular price-fixing and 
capacity regulation, on those trades. It follows that former members of liner conferences 
have had to establish their own tariffs and  surcharges.  
                                                     
33
  Since liner conferences are still tolerated  in other ju risd ictions, p ressure from Shippers’  Councils is 
bu ild ing among other legislators (e.g. United  States, China) to imitate the Eu ropean action or to review 
the limited  anti-tru st immunity granted  to ocean carriers in non-EU trade routes and  thus promote 
further competitive improvement of the liner shipping sector. With regard  to antitrust immunity, the 
American competition au thority, viz. the Federal Maritime Commission, is not yet persuaded  of the 
positive impact of this abolishment. H owever, the idea lives to introduce legislation that w ould  fu rther 
limit antitrust immunity (i.e. eliminate rate and  capacity d iscussions among carriers, bu t allow 
operational agreements). 
34
  The Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) - generally accepted  as the second conference to be founded, 
after the Calcu tta Steam Traffic Conference - was formed in 1879 (Stopford , 2009). 
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)LJXUHDE(YROXWLRQSULFHLQGH[LPSRUWH[SRUW
Freight rates have undergone enormous fluctuations in the period after the abolition of 
the block exemption35. Figure 1-5 a/ b provides evidence of this evolution by plotting the 
three-monthly aggregated  price index by trade d irection (import and  export)36. With the 
average rates for 2008 as its base of 100, an initial decline can be observed in all trades. 
The Asia and  the Indian Sub Continent/ Middle East levels about halved, while in other 
corridors, the decline was relatively less severe. In an effort to shore up rates after the 
abolition of the liner conferences, most liner operators announced  an increases in their 
rates. Since the last quarter of 2009, the freight rates have recovered. Solely the import 
price index of Asia and North America exceeded  the 2008 levels. The Asian export price 
index rose above the 2008 level. Freight rates need  to rise further if the container 
shipping business is once again to become profitable (see also Chapter 5).  
Given the decline in freight rates during the first half of 2009 to a level well below 
breakeven point, add itionaly, the liner operators have reduced  their capacity in several 
ways (e.g. by taking tonnage out of service, postponing delivery of new vessels and  
reducing speed) as well as staff cut backs (e.g. Maersk Line, Evergreen, etc.). Most liner 
operators re-routed their operations from Europe to Asia to transit the longer Cape of 
Good  Hope route (+ 14 days) avoid ing transit fees for the Suez Canal37. Apart from 
                                                     
35
  N ote, the fluctuation of the freight rates might also be related  to the financial and economic crisis. 
36
  The data have been compiled  by Container Trade Statistics (CTS), the successor group to the European 
Liner Affairs Association (ELAA - www .elaa.net). 
37
  Container vessels pay between 50 USD – 80 USD per TEU per transit of the Suez Canal, excluding 
ancillary fees (www.suezcanal.gov.eg). 
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cost-cutting, it is also a measure that minimises the risk posed  by piracy activities. In the 
meantime, some liner operators reversed  their decision due to escalating bunker fuel 
prices and faster transit times.  
From a shippers’  perspective, the abolition resulted , consequently and  not surprisingly, 
in different rates applied across liner operators. The multiplicity and  d iversity of rates 
applied  by shipping companies are putting an extra burden on shippers, who have to 
make extra efforts to keep track of them all. Next, schedule reliability has also decreased  
since the abolition of conferences in Europe rate volatility (Drewry, 2010). Cost cutting 
initiatives, includ ing the rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good  Hope, have 
extended  transit times (average duration has been lengthened from 8-9 weeks on to 10-
11 weeks) and  the inventory, all of which implied  higher costs for the shippers.  
To sum up, rate volatility and  carrier service levels have continued  to deteriorate. The 
abolishment of the block exemption has had  an impact on liner operators and  other 
maritime interests, the on-going global economic downturn notwithstand ing.  
The empirical part of this study aims to p rovide a frame of reference regard ing the 
degree of concentration and competition in the container liner shipping industry. There 
are as yet insufficient data to test the impact of the abolition of liner conferences and  the 
financial and economic downturn on the competitive nature of the container liner 
shipping industry. 
 &RQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUN
The conceptual framework gives an overview  of the research study and puts it in 
perspective.  
This section is d ivided  into four parts. The first part reviews the relevant literature. The 
second  describes the rationale of the research. The third  part states the research 
questions and the construction of the hypotheses. Finally, a thesis outline completes the 
conceptual framework. 
 /LWHUDWXUH
In setting up a theoretical framework for this doctoral study, a first step was to review  
the (container) liner shipping literature regard ing competition, concentration and  market 
structure.  
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This subsection presents the results of this review process, and  then briefly outlines the 
developments in the Industrial Organisation (IO) literature that are relevant for this 
research. Finally, it focuses on some key elements of oligopoly theory. 
 7KHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJOLWHUDWXUH
Concentration in the (container) liner shipping literature has been reviewed . Brooks 
(2000, pp. 206-7) states that the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) are interesting tools to evaluate market concentration and  the 
potential for abuse. Additionally, she refers to a study by Davies (1990) that found  a low  
HHI for the transatlantic trades between 1983 and 1988. Two other stud ies are one by 
Hoffman (1998) who addresses the issue of concentration and  one by Notteboom (2004) 
who only reports the four-firm concentration ratio based on the Top 20 for the years 
1980, 1995, 2000 and 2003.  
A review  of the liner shipping literature on assessing competition reveals that a number 
of studies theoretically examine competition in the liner shipping industry (e.g. 
Molenaar & Van de Voorde, 1994 and Brooks, 2000). Only few studies focus on 
modelling competition (e.g. Sjostrom, 2002). The literature focused  on the (de-) 
regulation of the liner shipping industry for quite some time (e.g. EC DG COMP, 1997 
and 2007; Heaver, 2001; OECD, 2002; ELAA, 2003; Benacchio HWDO, 2007). Finally, Endo 
(2005) applies the Panzar and  Rosse model to study the competitive nature of the liner 
shipping industry using a sample of three major Japanese liner carriers covering the 
1986-2002 period . In reviewing the literature on competition for the containerised  liner 
shipping industry, it is found  that assessing competition for this shipping segment has 
remained insufficiently explored . 
The scientific literature as well as various maritime reports and  discussion groups, 
clearly offer no consensus regarding the market structure38. An oligopolistic market is 
                                                     
38
  Some examples illustrating this: 
In 1998, H offman declared  that the first market structures in the majority of the shipping routes had  
become less oligopolistic in recent years. Secondly, he stated  that “ The tendency toward  treating ‘a box 
as a box as a box’  also reflects the declining monopoly power of liner companies and  their conferences”. 
In a paper prepared  on behalf of the Ocean Common Carrier Coalition for submission to ACCOS, 
industry consultants Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., assert that “ the liner industry is emerging as a 
network business” which “ is almost universally regulated because their economic characteristics are 
such that they tend  strongly to monopoly”.  
 In March 2003, the Japanese Shipowners' Association (JSA) stated  that “ A repeal of the immunity system  
w ould  lead  to destructive competition among carriers which may resu lt in an oligopoly situation in liner 
shipping …”.  
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often assumed. The rationale is found  in, for example, the simultaneous changes of 
surcharges, sharing information between liner partners with regard to a joint service, etc.  
The feature of the literature revealed by review is that the terms ‘liner shipping industry’  
and ‘container liner shipping industry’  are loosely used throughout. A clear-cut 
definition of the containerised  liner shipping industry is called  for (see Chapter 239). 
Secondly, the (container) liner shipping literature on the degree of concentration and  
competition is fairly sparse. This can largely be attributed  to data limitations, but also to 
the fact that competition is difficult to observe d irectly.  
In contrast, empirically assessing the degree of competition is a recurrent topic in the 
literature on other newly liberalised  service sectors, especially the banking industry. A 
review of this literature reveals methodologies to assess competition, concentration and  
market structure. In addition, it shows that the academic literature on the measurement 
of competition can be d ivided  into two mainstreams, i.e. the structural and  the non-
structural approach. The former is based  on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis, which laid  the foundation for the development of industrial organisation as 
a separate field  within economics. The non-structural approach for the measurement of 
competition refers to a more recent empirical framework for measuring competition: the 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) methodology. Furthermore, competition 
is also viewed  as a dynamic process. Another strand  of literature, the Persistence of 
Profits (PoP), includes these market dynamics. These academic lines of thought on the 
assessment of competitiveness w ill briefly be outlined in the next section. 
 'HYHORSPHQWVLQ,2OLWHUDWXUH
The Industrial Organisation (IO) literature focuses on firm behaviour in imperfectly 
competitive markets. In this subsection, the developments in the IO literature from 
traditional methods to new empirical IO approaches is broad ly outlined. Figure 1-6 gives 
an overview of this development related  to competition and  the present research. 
                                                                                                                                                              
In November 2006, Chris Welsh (FTA) noted  that due to the conference system the liner shipping 
industry had  been evolving from a monopolistic structure towards an oligopolistic market structure.  
Mid  2010, contributors to IFW’s Linkedin group believed the container shipping industry is like an 
oligopoly, because of the way it behaves (www.ifw-net.com). 
39
  Adding ‘in an environmentally sound  manner (e.g. low  emission, environmentally friendly technologies, 
etc.)’  cou ld  upgrade the definition, and  ‘including inland  transportation ’  could enlarge its scope. 
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)LJXUH'HYHORSPHQWVLQWKH,2OLWHUDWXUH
TRADITIONAL METHODS 
Many early IO stud ies of market structure are based  on the trad itional VWUXFWXUH
FRQGXFWSHUIRUPDQFH 6&3 SDUDGLJP. This SCP parad igm, which was originally 
developed  by Bain (1956), argues that observable structural characteristics of a market 
determine the behaviour of firms within that market, which in turn influences the 
market performance of those firms. To test the SCP hypothesis, a measure of the firms’ 
profitability is regressed  on a p roxy for market concentration. In empirical SCP stud ies, 
the n-firm concentration ratio (CRn) and  the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) are 
most frequently used as an exogenous ind icator of market power or an inverse ind icator 
of the intensity of competition (Berger, 1995). A positive relationship is expected as the 
basic idea of the SPC hypothesis is that the higher the concentration in a market, the 
lower the competition which in turn leads to a higher profitability. 
A first step in the research was the testing of the SCP hypothesis for the containerised  
liner shipping industry covering the 1999-2010 period  (see Chapters 2 and  3). 
The SCP paradigm is challenged  by the efficiency hypothesis and  the contestability 
theory. Primarily, the efficiency-structure hypothesis (ES) is an alternative hypothesis to 
explain the expected  positive relationship between concentration and  competition. This 
hypothesis tests whether it is the efficiency of larger firms that makes for enhanced  
performance. According to the ES hypothesis, firms with superior efficiency improve 
their market shares and  become more profitable (Demsetz, 1973). Both approaches focus 
on profitability, rather than on the deviation of output price from marginal cost, which is 
the correct theoretical basis for analysing competitive conditions (see below).  
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The second theory that challenges the SCP parad igm is the contestability theory. This 
theory, originally developed  by Baumol HW DO (1982) emphasises that a concentrated  
industry may nonetheless behave competitively when barriers to entry and  exit are 
surmountable. If the barriers to entry and  exit are low , potential entrants might enter a 
market and provide fresh competition to established  firms. The contestability theory 
refers to “ D VPDOO QXPEHU RI LQFXPEHQW ILUPV RU D VLQJOH LQFXPEHQWZKRVHPDUNHW SRZHU LV
FRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHWKUHDWRISRWHQWLDOHQWU\”  (Lipczynski HWDO , 2009). A market is perfectly 
contestable when the costs of entry and  exit by potential rivals are zero, and when such 
entry can be made very rapid ly. Therefore, structural barriers, entry-deterring strategies 
and sunk costs are excluded . The reality, however, is that no market is perfectly 
contestable. In other words, virtually every market is contestable to some degree. If so, 
the threat of potential entry might keep the p rices of liner operators already in the 
market low , so that they make normal profits and  produce as efficiently as possible, 
taking advantage of any economies of scale. Criticism of the theory includes (i) that it 
does not sufficiently take into account the possible reaction of the incumbents and  (ii) 
that its results are of a strictly static and equilibrium nature. 
Neither competing theory has been tested  for the containerised liner shipping industry. 
Regard ing the efficiency-structure hypothesis, Berger (1995) proposes a simultaneous 
equation to test the impact of concentration and  competition (see Chapter 5). Data 
limitations prevented  this reduced  form from being tested . The contestability theory has 
not been tested  for different reasons. Firstly, the exclusion of structural entry barriers 
and sunk costs is unrealistic in general. To some extent structural barriers exist, and exit 
is not without cost in the case of the container liner shipping industry (see Chapter 6). 
Secondly, this theory is of a static nature while competition is dynamic by definition. 
Third ly, the (container) liner shipping industry is often compared  with air transport. 
Two stud ies (Hurd le HW DO, 1989; Strassmann, 1990) found  no evidence in favor of the 
contestability markets theory (Lipczynski HWDO, 2009). Last but not least, some maritime 
economists (e.g. Heaver, 1993; Pearson, 1987; Jankowski, 1989) and  regulators (i.e. 
Federal Maritime Commission, 1989; the European Commission, 1989) have extensively 
refuted  the application of the theory of contestable markets to the liner shipping sector.  
The importance of efficiency and the threat of entry is, however, recognised  in the 
present thesis. Both issues will be addressed  by new empirical IO approaches (see 
Chapters 5 and  6 respectively). 
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‘MODERN ’  IO APPROACH40 
In the late 1970s, the formal oligopoly theory replaced  the non-formal framework of the 
SCP paradigm that had been implemented  with little theoretical guidance. This 
coincided  with the introduction of game theory, a major tool of the 1HZ ,QGXVWULDO
2UJDQLVDWLRQ (NIO) economists. This development pushed  the literature in a theoretical 
direction. According to Besanko HW DO (2004), game theory is “ WKH EUDQFK RI HFRQRPLFV
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHDQDO\VLVRIRSWLPDOGHFLVLRQPDNLQJZKHQDOOGHFLVLRQVPDNHUVDUHSUHVXPHG
WR EH UDWLRQDO DQG HDFK LV DWWHPSWLQJ WR DQWLFLSDWH WKH OLNHO\ DFWLRQV DQG UHDFWLRQV RI LWV
FRPSHWLWRUV” .  
Game theory has provided  both practical insights (e.g. conduct and performance are not 
just functions of structural market characteristics, such as concentration, barriers to 
entry) into the competitive process and  the basis for the new empirical industrial 
organisation (NEIO) literature. This latter development in the Industrial Organisation 
literature integrates both theory and econometrics.  
Since the theoretical static game theory is not without criticism (e.g. assumption of 
rational players, d ifficult to test empirically, etc.), the present study prefers the methods 
proposed in the NEIO literature. This empirical literature incorporates more industry 
and firm-specific details in modelling. 
NEW EMPIRICAL IO  APPROACHES 
Two new empirical IO approaches are adopted  in this doctoral research.  
Firstly, criticism levelled  against the structural approach (e.g. too much emphasis on 
industry structure, one-way causality from market structure to performance, etc.)41 has 
motivated  a number of authors (Rosse, Panzar) to collect empirical evidence on the 
nature of competition by observing conduct d irectly. This approach has been labeled  as 
the 1HZ (PSLULFDO ,QGXVWULDO 2UJDQLVDWLRQ 1(,2 DSSURDFK, the next step in the 
stream of empirical research after the SCP literature. Unlike the empirical literature on 
SCP, the NEIO approaches to measuring competition do not depend  on concentration 
but observe d irectly the conduct in specific industries with the aim to draw conclusions 
about structure. Two such approaches, the Panzar and  Rosse model and  the Boone 
indicator, are reviewed  and tested  in this study. 
                                                     
40
  A suggestion for further reading: Church & Ware, 2000, Bikker & Haaf, 2002, Lipczynski et al. 2009, etc. 
41
  For a checklist of criticism: see Lipczynski et al., 2009. 
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Panzar and  Rosse (1987) propose a reduced form approach to d iscriminate between 
monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition using industry or firm-
level data by using an estimated  indicator, the H-statistic (see Chapter 4).  
The Boone indicator of competition is another way to measure competition. The central 
idea is that more efficient firms are expected to show better performance in terms of 
profits or higher market shares. The Boone ind icator aims to capture both the ways in 
which competition in a market can be strengthened , viz. a fall in entry barriers and  more 
aggressive conduct by established  firms (Boone, 2000).  
The d ifferences between both approaches are twofold. First, the Panzar and  Rosse 
methodology seems well designed to investigate the competitive nature of the industry 
and to compare competition across markets (read  trade lanes), whereas the Boone 
indicator looks at the change in competition over time in a certain industry. Second, 
while the Panzar and  Rosse model is based  on the sum of the factor price elasticities of 
the reduced-form revenue equation, the Boone ind icator relies on the idea of elasticity of 
profits towards marginal costs, i.e. profit elasticity. Hence, both approaches have 
different data requirements (Degrijse HWDO, 2009). To calculate the Panzar and  Rosse H-
statistic, information on the input factor prices is required . Data on the input factor 
prices are often not accessible whereas measurement about revenue and costs may be 
available or can be proxied / estimated .  
From academic and  policy points of view , it would be quite interesting to examine the 
competition at trade level. Although both NEIO methodologies require relatively 
moderate amounts of data, information on input factor prices, revenues and costs is hard  
to collect at trade level. Consequently, the analysis of competition by adopting NEIO 
methodologies is confined to industry level in this thesis. 
BEYOND SCP AND NEIO 
A caveat of the essentially static structure-conduct-performance and the NEIO 
framework, which is currently the preferred  empirical approach42, is the fact that both 
approaches focus on equilibrium, and  consequently may not capture industry dynamics. 
In contrast, the Persistence of Profits (PoP) literature examines the dynamic structure-
performance relationships, as threatened  or potential entry is as important as actual 
                                                     
42
  It should  be noted  that the SCP parad igm, which increasingly frequently u ses improved  econometric 
estimation techniques, is still applied  even though to a lesser degree.  
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entry in determining the intensity of competition. To this end , this dynamic approach 
uses time series data to control for d isequilibrium effects.  
The main idea can be formulated  as follows: if any positive relationship between 
concentration and profits is expected to continue to future time periods and  if such 
find ings are attributed to market power, it can be argued  that incumbents are effectively 
isolated from potential competitors by entry barriers and  that consequently their high 
profits will persist. Exogenous changes in cost and demand conditions, as well as 
competition w ithin the market and  entry from outside the market, can undermine the 
persistence of profits (Mueller, 1977, 1986 and 1990; Geroski, 1990). 
To sum up, while the relationship between market structure and  performance has been 
stud ied at length in d ifferent industries, little has been done to explore this relationship  
in the (container) liner shipping industry.  
The contribution of the doctoral research to the literature is fourfold . Firstly, it offers a 
definition of the containerised  liner shipping industry (see Chapter 2). Starting from an 
appropriate definition of the container liner shipping industry might help to delineate 
the relevant market for competition issues. Creusen HW DO (2006) note that a bias in the 
relevant market affects all indicators (see also Chapter 5).  Secondly, it contributes to the 
literature by applying both the traditional and the new empirical methods to the 
containerised  liner shipp ing industry. The results are relevant for the ongoing debate on 
market structure (see Chapters 2 and 4). Third ly, as it may take time for the effects of 
competition and  efficiency to materialise, empirical estimations w ith a dynamic view 
complete the competition analysis (see Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, next to the impact of 
efficiency on performance its analysis also comprise changes in competition that may be 
due to developments in container liner shipping specific factors (e.g. being involved in 
mergers and  acquisitions, being a member of an alliance). The impact of these industry 
specific factors is also verified , as they may affect the extent of competition as well. 
 2OLJRSRO\WKHRU\
Since both the SCP and  the NEIO approach are based  on microeconomic (oligopoly) 
theory, in which optimising behaviour is assumed, it is worthwhile to elaborate on some 
principles of oligopoly theory.  
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Lipczynski HW DO (2009) summarise the theory of oligopoly as follows: “ ,Q WKH WKHRU\ RI
ROLJRSRO\LWLVDVVXPHGWKHQXPEHURIILUPVLVVPDOOEXWJUHDWHUWKDQRQH7KHILUPVUHFRJQLVH
WKHLULQWHUGHSHQGHQFHFKDQJHVLQSULFHRURXWSXWE\RQHILUPZLOODOWHUWKHSURILWVRIULYDOILUPV
FDXVLQJWKHPWRDGMXVWWKHLURZQSULFHVDQGRXWSXWOHYHOV)RUPVRIFRPSHWLWLRQXQGHUROLJRSRO\
YDU\ IURP YLJRURXV SULFH FRPSHWLWLRQ ZKLFK FDQ RIWHQ OHDG WR VXEVWDQWLDO ORVVHV WKURXJK WR
FROOXVLRQZKHUHE\WKHILUPVWDNHMRLQWGHFLVLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHLUSULFHVDQGRXWSXWOHYHOVµ.  
The fewness of the firms is the key identifying characteristic of an oligopoly. ‘Fewness’  
can be measured  by the four-firm concentration ratio (see Chapters 2 and  3). 
Fewness is closely related to the nature of the product. If liner operators would  produce 
a d ifferentiated  product (heterogeneous oligopoly), they might not see each other as 
competitors. However, the transportation of a container or standardised box is assumed  
to be a highly identical product or service across liner operators. Hence, the more 
homogeneous (undifferentiated) the product, the more acutely liner operators should be 
aware of their competitors (i.e. recognise interdependence).  
Microeconomics offers many models of oligopolistic markets. These may be d ivided  into 
cooperative and non-cooperative oligopolies. Here, it is assumed that liner operators 
behave independently or non-cooperatively. Non-cooperative oligopoly makes a 
distinction between quantity and  price setting models. Quantity setting models are often 
referred  to as Cournot models, which are static models of oligopoly. The Bertrand  model 
is essentially the Cournot-Nash model except that the strategic variable is price rather 
than quantity. Both models describe an industry that produces homogeneous products 
or services43. 
Liner operators can be thought of as Cournot competitors, viz. they chose capacity 
(number of vessels, vessel size) without knowing their competitors choice and then 
compete as price setters while capacities become common knowledge. Price competition 
is the final stage of competition. The equilibrium outcome of this two-stage competition 
coincides with the Cournot equilibrium. 
The standard  intuition of the HHI is based  on a Cournot model. Boone (2000 and 2004) 
has developed  a broad  set of theoretical models. Following the study by van 
Leuvensteijn HWDO (2007), most stud ies rely on the Boone HWDO (2004) model (i.e. using a 
                                                     
43
  A d iscussion of the models is beyond  the scope of this research: for further read ing see Martin, 2002, 
Besanko et al., 2004, Lipczynski et. al, 2009 and  Besanko & Braeutigan, 2009. 
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standard  Cournot model with a downward sloping linear demand function) for their 
application of the theory.  
 5DWLRQDOHRIWKHVWXG\
The previous sections reveal that, despite academic and policy interest, there is still no 
comprehensive view as to whether or not competition in the container liner shipping 
industry has become fiercer and why.  
The general objective of the present study is twofold . The first objective is to assess the 
competitive conditions, the concentration and  the market structure of the container liner 
shipping industry. The second objective is to document and  estimate both 
(static/ dynamic) structural and  non-structural measurements of competition in the 
containerised  liner shipp ing industry. 
After studying the developments in the CLSI, the rationale for this thesis became clear. 
First, the past decade was a period  of significant merger and  acquisition (M&A) 
transactions (see Chapter 2, Appendix 2-2). These successive waves of consolidation may 
have influenced  the degree of concentration. Next, the CLSI has experienced  
fundamental changes which might affect competition. Knowledge of the degree of 
competition is important to antitrust authorities. This offers an extra incentive to 
examine the degree of competition. Another stimulus stems from the literature. The 
evolution of industrial organisation theory towards the new empirical industrial 
organisation modelling motivates an understanding of the degree of concentration and  
competition by applying both the structural and the non-structural approach.  
The next step  in the research process is to develop the central research question(s) and  
the associated  hypotheses. 
 &HQWUDOUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVDQGK\SRWKHVHV
Given the developments in the container liner shipping industry, the doctoral thesis 
addresses two research questions:  
54 ,VWKHUHDQROLJRSRO\LQWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\"
54 ,IWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\LVFRQFHQWUDWHGGRHVWKLVFRQFHQWUDWLRQDIIHFWWKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRIOLQHURSHUDWRUV"
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These research questions are worth examining because the market structure under 
which a carrier operates w ill determine its behaviour. This behaviour w ill in turn affect 
the liner operators’  performance: its price setting, profits, efficiency. 
Subsequently, the central research question was translated into hypotheses. The 
following hypotheses play a central role in the testing of the structural and  
non-structural theories in the containerised  liner shipping industry. An overview  of the 
hypotheses is presented in Figure 1-7.   
Hypotheses 1-4 propose an answer to the first research question while hypotheses 6-8 
tackle the second research question. Hypotheses 8, 9 and  10 do not directly address the 
research questions, but complement the analysis. The last hypothesis tests whether the 
indicators agree on competition.  
After developing the hypotheses rooted  in the central research questions, calculations, 
estimations, testing statistical hypothesis, etc. were preformed to test whether the 
research hypothesis could be confirmed .  
Regard ing hypothesis 3, the econometric results indicate a non-linear relationship  
between concentration and market share instability at industry level. At trade level, 
concentration is negatively related  to market share instability. The empirical results 
suggest that the both hypotheses 5 and  8 can be rejected . 
Having phrased the central research questions and formulated  the hypotheses, the 
structure of the doctoral thesis is outlined. 
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 2XWOLQHRIWKHWKHVLV
The thesis consists of a bundled  set of research papers that deal with a common theme. 
The issue competition is the connecting thread between the papers. The thesis is 
composed  in eight chapters, each dealing with one aspect of the central theme and  
linked  to one or more hypotheses. 
The papers were written as autonomous publications. This explains some unavoidable 
overlap between the chapters. The reference list is be found  at the end  of each chapter 
while an index and  glossary can be consulted at the end  of the text. 
Figure 1-8 visualises how the study is organised . It represents the relationship between 
the literature, the chapters and  the methodologies used . The main linkages between 
concentration, market structure and competition are shown by the double arrows. 
As for the remainder of the study, chapters two and  three cover the market structure of 
the container liner shipping industry from the perspective of Industrial Organisation 
(IO) economics. Chapter two first defines the terms ‘relevant market’  and ‘container liner 
shipping industry’ . Subsequently, it calculates and  d iscusses a number of alternative 
concentration measures and  the magnitude of market share instability in the container 
liner shipping industry. Finally, the link w ith the degree of oligopoly is shown. Chapter 
three continues on this issue at an aggregated and disaggregated  level and  tests an 
empirical model for examining the determinants of market share instability. 
Chapters four and  five introduce two models viz. the Panzar-Rosse model and the Boone 
indictor in accordance with the New Empirical Industrial Organisation literature. 
Chapter four documents and  estimates the Panzar and  Rosse model, a non-structural 
methodology used to assess the degree of competition in the CLSI. While the Panzar-
Rosse model allows to exclude certain states of competition, an increase cannot be 
unambiguously interpreted as more competition. Therefore, chapter five presents and  
applies the Jan Boone’s new model-based  measure of to answer the question how 
competition in the container liner shipping industry evolves over time.  
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The last two chapters go one step further and  search an explanation for the obtained  
results. Therefore, chapters six and  seven cover the actual/ potential entry and 
economies of scale, respectively. Chapter six examines a further important structural 
attribute of industries: barriers to entry. It starts with the study of the freedom of 
entry/ exit and  entry/ exit conditions, both at industry and at trade level. Secondly, in 
contrast with the essentially static structure-conduct-performance and  the new empirical 
industrial organisation frameworks, which dominate the analysis of competition in the 
empirical literature, chapter six is devoted to the persistence of profit methodology that 
captures the unobservable threat of entry. Chapter seven defines ‘optimal ship size’  and  
‘optimal operations’  and outlines the link between both concepts. It does so by 
quantifying the economies of scale in deploying larger vessels by using a liner service 
cash flow model. 
Finally, Chapter eight ties the other chapters together. It examines to what extent the 
structural and non-structural ind icators agree on the competition. This analysis is 
reflected by the dotted  lines in Figure 1-8. The analysis also links the find ings with 
chapters 6 and  7 (see dotted  arrows). 
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Source: Ryoo, D.K., 1999 
Type Author Nature of co-operation
C
o
o
pe
ra
tio
n
 
o
n
 
ra
te
s
Conference
Frankel (1985),
Gardner (1997)
an agreement reached by shipping companies operating 
liner services for the purpose of regulating or restricting 
competition w ith  the objectives of a relative stability of 
rates, regularity and realising reasonable frequency of 
sailings w hile maintaining services to less remunerative 
ports.
Stabilisation 
agreement
Canna (1992)
a voluntary agreement to reduce the level of overcapacity 
in  order, eventually, to increase unremunarative rate 
levels.
Slot charter
Jon (1986)
an agreement by w hich a liner service operator leases part 
of the slot on another’s ships and markets that slot as his 
ow n
Pooling
agreement Frankel (1985)
an agreement betw een shipping companies in  order to 
increase the pool’s share of the market, provide an 
equitable distribution of beneftis among members, limit 
service competition and rationalise operations.
Joint service
Frankel (1985),
Gardner (1994)
an agreement w hich establishes a new  and separate line or 
service to be operated jointly by partner companies. The 
service fixes its ow n rates, publishes its ow n tariffs, issues 
its ow n bills of lading, and acts generally as a single 
carrier.
Consortium
Koch (1975),
Bras (1991)
a cooperative venture of varying degree of closeness in  
w hich shipping companies involved operate under one 
name by pooling all or some of their activities in  a  
particular trade.
Joint venture
Koch (1975),
Frankel (1985)
an agreement in  w hich each party has a share of 
ow nership  as shareholders, in one separate and legally 
autonomous venture and the participants jointly ow n or 
lease vessels, equipment, and terminals. The venture has its 
ow n management.
Global alliance Thanopoulou et al. 
(1997)
an agreement betw een container shipping companies co-
operating on a  global trade rout basis involving usually the 
provision of multimodal and logistics services as w ell.
Merger and
acquisition Jones (1982)
a fusion of tw o companies. The assets become vested in 
and under the control of one company.
O
pe
ra
tio
n
a
l c
o
o
pe
ra
tio
n
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the question whether or not the container liner shipping industry 
is an oligopoly. Although liner shipping literature has been occupied with this question, 
few authors have examined  the market structure of the containerised  liner shipping 
industry. The study of the market form at trade level fills in a gap in the literature. The 
empirical investigation uses concentration ratios to measure the degree of concentration. 
The results allow us to determine the degree and type of oligopoly. The conclusion 
shows that the containerised  shipping industry is characterised  by increased  
concentration. Some trade lanes may be characterised as a loose oligopoly; others as a 
tight oligopoly. 
.H\ZRUGV:  
Container liner shipping industry, oligopoly, concentration measurement 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Numerous stud ies in the industrial economics literature have been preoccupied  with the 
study of the market structure of various industries (e.g. banking, agriculture, steel and  
car industries, etc.). A scan of the liner shipping literature reveals that there is no 
consensus whether or not the liner shipping industry is an oligopolistic market (For 
example, see Peters, 1991; Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1991; Hoffman, 1998; Japanese 
Shipowners’ Association, 2003). In many other stud ies the liner shipping industry is 
intuitively presumed to be an example of oligopoly. Given this polemic it is interesting 
to determine the degree of oligopoly empirically. 
In addition, w ith the abolishment of the anti-monopoly immunity of freight conferences 
(as from October 18th, 2008) and  given the trend  towards consolidation, the question 
whether the container liner shipping industry is an oligopoly is yet again of current 
interest. It is a relevant question because the market structure under which a carrier 
operates will determine its behaviour. This behaviour w ill in turn affect the liner 
operators’  performance: their price setting, profits, efficiency, etc. 
The market structure of the container liner shipping industry (hereafter CLSI) w ill be 
examined  at the following three levels: the industry, the alliances and  the trade level. 
The following two hypotheses will be examined: 
` The CLSI has become more concentrated  due to consolidation. 
` The market structure in which the CLSI operates is an oligopolistic market. 
These hypotheses will be stud ied from an industrial economic viewpoint. In empirical 
research, seller concentration is the ind icator to analyse the merger impact on 
concentration and  to determine the degree of oligopoly (Lipczynski HWDO., 2005). 
The paper is organised  in four sections. Section 1 defines the terms ‘relevant market’  and  
‘container liner shipping industry’ . Section 2 focuses on quantifying the degree of 
concentration in the CLSI. The empirical investigation uses the four-firm concentration 
ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient to 
measure the degree of concentration and  the instability index to determine the 
magnitude of market share instability. In Section 3 the link with the degree of oligopoly 
is d irectly shown and  the concentration ratios are examined  at a d isaggregated  level, viz. 
the trade lane. The Section 4 summarises the main findings. 
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 7KHLQGXVWU\·VFRQFHQWUDWLRQOHYHO
Before quantifying the degree of concentration, it is important to define the terms 
‘market’  and  ‘industry’ . 
 0DUNHWGHILQLWLRQ
In theory, the definition of a market is clear-cut. Lipczynski HW DO (2005) summarises 
theoretical definitions of a market:  
` The entire territory of which parts are so united  by the relations of unrestricted  
commerce that prices there take the same level throughout with ease and  rapidity 
(Cournot, 1838); 
` An area in which prices of the same goods tend  to equality with due allowance for 
transportation costs (Marshall, 1920). 
In practice, the definition of a market depends on the context in which it is used: in 
marketing literature it is commonly defined from the supply side, while in general 
economics, it encompasses both supply and  demand. In competition law, the term 
‘relevant market’  (or the market where the competition takes place) is used . The 
definition of relevant market contains both a relevant product d imension (demand side 
substitution, supply side substitution and  potential competition) and  a relevant 
geographic d imension. The product definition of a market should  include all products 
and/ or services that are close to substitutes for one another, both in consumption and in 
production (Brooks, 2000; Bikker and  Haaf, 2002; Lipczynski HWDO, 2005). Whereas there 
is consensus regarding the product definition of the market, several definitions of the 
geographic d imension were found: 
` Lipczynski et al. (2005, p . 208) interpret the geographic definition as an increase in 
the price of a product in one geographic location significantly affects either the 
demand or supply, and  therefore the price, in another geographic location; 
` Bikker and  Haaf (2002, p . 2192-2193) state that the geographical boundaries of a 
market are determined by actual and  potential contacts between actual and  potential 
market participants; 
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` The European Commission defines the relevant geographic market as the area in 
which the undertakings concerned  are involved in the supply and demand of 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently  
homogeneous and which can be d istinguished  from neighbouring areas because the 
conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas (European Union, 
1997 and  2007). 
For the shipping industry, Brooks (2000) underlines the importance of market definition 
for the liner shipping industry in general. More specifically, for the CLSI, two definitions 
were found: 
Firstly, Van der Ziel (1994, p . 65) defines ‘market’  as the total flow of containers between 
A and  B. He proceeds that the traditional definition of liner shipping market coincides 
with the product itself (i.e. the carriage of a container between A and B) and  the place of 
production of this product (i.e. the stretch between A and  B). Furthermore, he also refers 
to the geographic location where the transportation product is sold . Under geographical 
location he comprehends the location of demand that may be exclusively at one end  of 
the stretch A to B or even far away from the place of production. 
Secondly, in contrast to the benchmark commercial understanding of a market, the term 
‘market’  is more broad ly defined  for competition analysis. Regarding the Commission 
Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law (1997), the key purpose of defining a relevant market is “ WRLGHQWLI\LQD
V\VWHPDWLFZD\ WKH FRPSHWLWLYH FRQVWUDLQWV IDFHG E\ FRPSDQLHV LQ WKHPDUNHWV LQZKLFK WKH\
RSHUDWH” . The relevant market consists of all suppliers of a container liner shipping 
service, includ ing actual or potential competitors, and  it has a product and  a 
geographical d imension. In several Commission decisions and  Court judgments, the 
container liner shipping services have been branded  as the relevant product market for 
liner shipping. Other modes of transport have not been integrated  in the same service 
market although in a few cases these services may be, to a marginal extent, substitutable. 
The reason for this is that a significant share of the goods transported  by container 
cannot simply be switched to other modes of transport (e.g. air transport services) 
(eur-lex.europa.eu). 
Should the definition of the product market be limited to a particular type of cargo 
transported  by sea? The Commission Notice states the following: 
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“ )RUH[DPSOH WKH WUDQVSRUWRISHULVKDEOHJRRGV FRXOGEH OLPLWHG WRUHHIHUFRQWDLQHUVRU LQFOXGH
WUDQVSRUWLQFRQYHQWLRQDOUHHIHUYHVVHOV:KLOHLWLVSRVVLEOHLQH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVIRUVRPH
VXEVWLWXWLRQ WR WDNH SODFH EHWZHHQ EUHDN EXON DQG FRQWDLQHU WUDQVSRUW WKHUH DSSHDUV WR EH QR
ODVWLQJFKDQJHRYHUIURPFRQWDLQHUWRZDUGVEXON)RUWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIFDWHJRULHVRIJRRGVDQG
XVHUV RI FRQWDLQHULVHGJRRGV EUHDNEXONGRHVQRW RIIHU D UHDVRQDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH WR FRQWDLQHULVHG
OLQHUVKLSSLQJ2QFHFDUJREHFRPHVUHJXODUO\FRQWDLQHULVHGLW LVXQOLNHO\HYHUWREH WUDQVSRUWHG
DJDLQDVQRQFRQWDLQHULVHGFDUJR&RQWDLQHULVHGOLQHUVKLSSLQJLVWKHUHIRUHPDLQO\VXEMHFWWRRQH
ZD\VXEVWLWXWDELOLW\.”  
Accord ing to the same Commission Notice, the geographical dimension of a market is 
determined by “ WKHDUHDZKHUHWKHVHUYLFHVDUHPDUNHWHGJHQHUDOO\DUDQJHRISRUWVDWHDFKHQG
RI WKH VHUYLFH$V IDU DV WKH(XURSHDQ HQG RI WKH VHUYLFH LV FRQFHUQHG WR GDWH WKH JHRJUDSKLFDO
PDUNHWKDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGDVDUDQJHRISRUWVLQ1RUWKHUQ(XURSHDQGRULQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
$V OLQHU VKLSSLQJ VHUYLFHV IURP WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ DUH RQO\PDUJLQDOO\ VXEVWLWXWDEOH IRU WKRVH
IURP1RUWKHUQ(XURSHDQSRUWVWKHVHKDYHEHHQLGHQWLILHGDVVHSDUDWHPDUNHWV.”  
Throughout this paper, the term ‘relevant market for the container liner shipping 
industry’  covers all vessel operating common carriers (VOCC’s) (e.g. Maersk Line, 
CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd , Evergreen). Other suppliers of a container liner shipping 
service such as non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCC’s) (e.g. ECU-line, Fast 
Line) and  logistic/ freight forwarders (Kuehne & Nagel AG, Panalpina Welttransport 
AG, Deutsche Post AG) are not taken into account in this study. Given the lack of data 
with respect to specific container liner shipping products (e.g. transport of perishable 
goods/ dangerous goods/ heavy lift/ lengthy) on the one hand  and  the fact that 
substitution is highly trade dependent on the other hand , the product d imension is 
defined  as the transport of a box. The geographical d imension of the market is 
considered  globally (see Section 2.2.5) and  at trade level respectively (see Section 2.3.2).  
 'HILQLQJWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
While the term ‘market’  encompasses both supply/ production and demand/ production, 
Lipczynski HW DO (2005) state that the term industry specifically refers to a market’s 
supply side or productive activities. Given the complexity of defining an industry, one 
can fall back on specific schemes for defining and classifying the industries (Lipczynski 
HWDO, 2005). Although these classifications provide an interesting framework, in order to 
define the CLSI, they are not useful. 
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A scan of the literature yields the following definitions: in 1932 Fayle defined a liner 
service as a fleet of ships with common ownership or management, which provides a 
fixed service at regular intervals between named ports and  offers transport to any goods 
in the catchment area served  by these ports and ready for transit by their sailing dates. 
This definition was later updated  by Stopford . He added: “ $IL[HGLWLQHUDU\LQFOXVLRQLQD
UHJXODUVHUYLFHDQGWKHREOLJDWLRQWRDFFHSWFDUJRIURPDOOFRPHUVDQGWRVDLOZKHWKHUILOOHGRUQRW
RQ D GDWH IL[HG E\ SXEOLVKHG VFKHGXOH DUH ZKDW GLVWLQJXLVKHV WKH OLQHU IURP WKH WUDPS”  
(Stopford, 2004, p 343). Davies (1983) described  the liner sector as that part of the ocean 
shipping (family of) industry(ies) which specialises in supplying scheduled  cargo 
transport services on specified  and fixed  trade routes. Bourne (2007, personal 
communication) states that the liner shipping industry is best defined  as those carriers of 
conventional general cargo (usually but not exclusively in containers these days) which 
carry cargo between defined ports on a regular basis. 
Like the words ‘industry’  and  ‘market’ , the terms ‘liner shipping industry’  and  
‘container liner shipping industry’  are sometimes loosely used. To the author’s 
knowledge, no clear-cu t definition of the CLSI can be found. Containerised liner 
shipping industry or container shipping industry can however be clearly d istinguished  
from other industries in the water transport sector and can therefore be defined  as 
follows: 
&RQWDLQHU VKLSSLQJ LQGXVWU\ D PDMRU VHJPHQW RI WKH OLQHU VKLSSLQJ LQGXVWU\ LV D PDULWLPH
LQGXVWU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO LI QRW JOREDO LQ VFRSH 7KLV LQGXVWU\ RSHUDWHV YHVVHOV WUDQVSRUWLQJ
FRQWDLQHUVZLWK YDULRXV EXW VWDQGDUGLVHG GLPHQVLRQVVL]HV UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH FRQWHQWV:KHWKHU
ILOOHGRUQRWWKHVHFRQWDLQHUYHVVHOVDUHSXWLQWRVHUYLFHRQDUHJXODUEDVLVDQGRIWHQDFFRUGLQJWR
DIL[HGVDLOLQJVFKHGXOHORDGLQJDQGGLVFKDUJLQJDWVSHFLILHGSRUWV
 0HWKRGRORJ\
To determine the degree of concentration, indicators of concentration are calculated. In 
this section, two frequently applied  ind icators of concentration, viz. the n-firm 
concentration ratio Eq. (1) and  the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Eq. (2) as well as the 
Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient Eq. (3) w ill be briefly discussed . After having 
identified the concentration level, the intensity of the competition will be examined  by 
computing the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability Eq. (4). 
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 ,QGLFDWRUVRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
A prevailing method  of analysing the industry is the measurement of concentration. In 
empirical research into industrial organisation, (seller) concentration, as a reference to 
the number and  size d istribution of firms, is an important ind icator. (Seller) 
concentration can be measured  at two levels: aggregate concentration and LQGXVWU\
FRQFHQWUDWLRQ (Lipczynski HW DO., 2005). This paper focuses on the second  level, which 
reflects the importance of the largest firms in some particular industry, in this case the 
container shipping industry45. In this paper, the product is taken to be homogeneous46, 
the CR4 ratio, the alternative Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the Lorenz curve and  the 
Gini coefficient will be applied  to the containerised  liner shipping industry to determine 
the industry’ s concentration level and  to study whether the degree of concentration is 
increasing due to consolidation and / or accelerating over the 1999-2009 period . 
The first concentration measure is represented  by the term &5[, which stands for the 
cumulative share of the x largest container liner operators in the market. The simplest 
measure of industrial concentration involves totalling up the market shares of the largest 
of so many firms (e.g. CR4, CR8, CR50). The four-firm concentration ratio, known as 
CR4, is the most typical concentration ratio for judging the degree of concentration in an 
industry. Technically, the four-firm concentration ratio can be written as follows: 
CR4 = ∑
=
÷
ø
øV
1
 
 (1) 
(Lipczynski HWDO, 2005, p .215). 
Next, the +HUILQGDKO+LUVFKPDQ ,QGH[ (HHI) will be calculated , since Vhe CR4-
concentration ratio is limited  because it only focuses on the top liner operators in the 
industry and  does not take into account the ranking of the remaining firms. HHI takes 
into account both the number of liner operators and the inequality of market shares. The 
HHI is calculated  by summing the  squared market share of all liner operators in the 
                                                     
45
 Concentration does not only occur on a horizontal level (between carriers). Carriers also engage in 
vertical integration activities that cover almost all stages of the transport chain. Abstraction is made of 
the latter in this paper, as well as of the p rofound effects of the p rocess of concentration on port 
development. 
46 For lack of information, the product is assumed homogeneous (read: transport of a container/ box). 
H owever, when service, transit time, etc. are taken into account, one evolves towards a heterogeneous 
p roduct. Although market power can be measured  at the industry level, taken into account the variation 
due to for instance service, the question regard ing concentration becomes a firm-level expression 
(Martin, 2002). 
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industry, and  then adding up those squares. Shepherd (1999) gives the following 
formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): 
∑
=
=
n
1i
2
i 10,000 x sH
 
 (2)  
where n = the number of carriers and si = the share of the ith carrier. It gives added 
weight to the biggest operators. The principle is as following: the higher the index, the 
more concentration and  (within limits) the less open market competition. The HHI 
approximates 0 for a perfectly competitive industry and  equals 10,000 for a monopoly. 
As a benchmark, a market with an HHI below 1,000 is considered to be unconcentrated  
and unlikely to be subject to any adverse competitive effects. A value between 1,000 and 
1,800 generally ind icates moderate concentration. Any value over 1,800 indicates a 
highly concentrated  market (Shepherd , 1999). 
Ultimately, the /RUHQ] FXUYH is p lotted and  the *LQLFRHIILFLHQW is calcu lated  to show 
change in concentration over time. Although the Lorenz curve is often used  to represent 
income d istribution, this concept can easily be adapted to visualise information 
regarding industry concentration. The Lorenz curve shows the variation in the 
cumulative size of the n largest firms in an industry, as Q varies from 1 to N (i.e. N equals 
100) (Lipczynski HW DO, 2005). Subsequently, to value this concentration, the Gini 
coefficient can be calculated . The formula definition for the Gini coefficient is 
1
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(Lipczynski, 2005, p . 224). The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 if there is no concentration 
and ranges to 1 if there is total concentration. 
Because the ind icators of concentration can mask the dynamics of change within 
industries, an ind icator which measures the magnitude of the changes in the market 
shares of firms in an industry will be computed .  
 ,QGLFDWRURIPDJQLWXGHRIPDUNHWVKDUHLQVWDELOLW\
Market share instability is a measure of the shift in the relative position of firms within 
an industry and is considered an important ind icator of the intensity of the competition. 
A formal measure of the degree of market share instability is the “ instability index”  put 
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forward  by Hymer and Pashigan (1962). This index is the sum of the absolute value of 
the change between two points in time in the market share of each firm. The index is 
defined  as:  
( )∑
=
−
−=
ß
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
 

 
 VV,,
1
1,,      (4) 
where si,t equals the market share of liner operator L at time W. The value of the index 
ranges between zero and  one. If the index is close to zero, this ind icates that market 
share is relatively stable, and if the index is close to one, market share is relatively 
unstable (Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2007). So, the higher the instability index, the greater the 
level of competition. Abrupt changes have trad itionally been related  to the presence of 
competition, regard less of the concentration ratio. Hymer and  Pashigan have noted  that 
although the index might be affected by the number of firms, it is empirically not very 
sensitive to it because “ VPDOOILUPVGRQRWFRQWULEXWHJUHDWO\WRWKHYDOXHRIWKHLQGH[VLQFHWKH\
DFFRXQWIRUVRVPDOODVKDUHRIWKHLQGXVWU\DQGVLQFHWKH\WHQGWRJURZQRIDVWHURQDYHUDJHWKDQ
ODUJHILUPV”  (Hymer and  Pashigan, 1962, p. 86). 
 'DWDGHVFULSWLRQ
In liner shipping, several Commission decisions and  Court judgments identify volume 
and/ or capacity data as the basis for calculating market shares. Most stud ies in container 
liner shipping literature (Hoffman, 1998, Notteboom, 2004) use the available data of 
AXS-Alphaliner, more specifically the Top 100. AXS-Alphaliner deduct the market 
shares from the existing on board TEU (twenty equivalent unit) capacities of liner 
operators, compared  to the fleet effectively deployed by each operator deployed on liner 
trades (www.alphaliner.com). 
The concentration measures are computed  over the 1999-2009 period  using the Top 100. 
Although there are about 400 liner operators, an omission of the lower-ranked  carriers 
will have no significant impact on the conclusions, as the smallest operators have a 
market share of less than 1 % each. When these very small market shares are squared, 
the contribution each carrier makes to the HHI is less than 1/ 1,000 (in other words, the 
HHI is affected  at most in the fourth decimal place). As a result, where the container 
shipping industry is concerned , the liner operators ranked  in the segment 101 - 400 can 
be safely omitted  w ithout affecting the picture of industry concentration.  
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 5HVXOWVDWWKHOHYHORIWKHLQGXVWU\
The results of the CLSI’s concentration level can be found  in Figure 2-1 (Figures refer to 
January 1st of each year). Figure 2-1 shows the evolution in market share of the Top 100, 
50, 25, 20 and  10 compared  to the total market, along with the results of the calculations 
of the CR4 ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and  the Gini coefficient. What 
conclusions can be derived  from this?  

)LJXUH0HDVXUHPHQWRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
First, a study of the market shares gives useful preliminary information on the degree of 
concentration. Appendix 2-1 shows that the Top 25 carriers had a market share 
(measured  by share of total carrier capacity) of about 69.38 % in 2003 to 85.41 % in 2008. 
The market share of the top-ten liner operators accounts for 60 percent of the total TEU 
capacity. Of these ten, four are Europe-based companies w ith 38.29 % of the total and  the 
Top 3 of these account for 34.07 % of the total share47. Compared  with 2003 (when the 
top three had a cumulative market share of 24.35 %) and 2006 (32.37 %) an increasing 
trend in market shares is noticeable.  
Secondly, the CR4 ratio is repeated ly measured  as the share of the 4 largest liner 
operators against the liner total, Top 100, Top 25 and Top 20 (see Figure 2-1). From these 
                                                     
47
  See Append ix 2-1. Liner operators in bold  are Europe-based  carriers. Carriers participating in alliances 
are shaded . 
		 		
				 		 			
Top 100 77.93% 84.73% 79.47% 88.30% 93.59% 94.16% 94.79% 94.67% 95.38% 94.50%
Top 50 71.49% 78.00% 73.66% 82.64% 88.18% 89.07% 90.51% 90.34% 91.33% 90.96%
Top 25 62.17% 68.37% 65.25% 73.90% 79.55% 81.31% 83.71% 84.25% 85.41% 84.97%
Top 20 57.21% 63.35% 60.55% 68.68% 74.23% 76.28% 80.85% 81.25% 82.38% 81.57%
Top 10 38.85% 42.32% 40.28% 46.23% 52.10% 50.00% 56.66% 60.22% 60.55% 60.01%
CR4 Liner total 23.66% 26.22% 24.66% 29.05% 31.08% 30.92% 37.60% 38.73% 39.37% 39.14%
Top 100 25.83% 30.37% 30.94% 31.03% 32.90% 33.21% 32.84% 39.67% 40.91% 41.27% 41.42%
Top 25 32.91% 38.06% 38.35% 37.79% 39.31% 39.07% 38.03% 44.92% 45.96% 46.09% 46.07%
Top 20 35.51% 41.36% 41.29% 40.72% 42.29% 41.87% 40.54% 46.51% 47.66% 47.79% 47.99%
HHI Liner total 252.21 306.96 269.87 351.87 404.91 420.13 598.33 579.16 432.05 575.15
Top 100 336.20 415.34 427.54 427.37 451.34 462.24 473.91 665.93 646.22 640.00 644.07
Top 25 545.81 640.21 645.80 624.77 636.75 633.87 630.60 850.51 813.12 795.56 794.05
Gini coefficient 0.6466 0.66537 0.6717 0.68286 0.70012 0.70881 0.71989 0.75685 0.76071 0.7664 0.7716
0.01875 0.00632 0.01117 0.01726 0.00868 0.01108 0.03696 0.00386 0.0057 0.0052
CR4 42.67% 44.20% 49.70%
26.55% 28.88% 32.14%
 
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results one can conclude that the CLSI is becoming more concentrated . Regardless of the 
calculation basis, one can notice a decrease in the CR4 ratio in the years preced ing such a 
consolidation wave. This observation ind icates a stronger growth of lower-classified 
liner operators. A remarkably higher concentration is noticeable between 1999/ 2000 and  
2005/ 2006, not coincidentally corresponding with an intense wave of consolidation.  

)LJXUH/LQHURSHUDWRUVPDNLQJXSRIWRWDOFDSDFLW\LQVHUYLFH
Figure 2-2 lists the number of players in the CLSI making up 50 % of total capacity in 
service (compiled  from data from AXS-Alphaliner). In 1995, 16 members accounted  for 
50 %, whereas in 2008 only 7 carriers have this market power, clearly indicating the 
trend of growing concentration.  
Third ly, over the years the HHI clearly increases, also ind icating a growing 
concentration in the container shipping industry. Given the 1,000 – 1,800 limits, the 
containerised  shipping industry must still be considered unconcentrated . Regardless of 
the calculation basis, the HHI is never higher than 1,000. The decrease in the HHI, 
noticeable in the Top 25 from the year 2003 to 2005 generally ind icates a loss of market 
power and  an increase in competition. Furthermore, the impact of the consolidation 
waves on the degree of concentration is again quite observable by a remarkably higher 
HHI (+ 35 %). An overview of the mergers and  takeovers in the liner shipping industry 
is given in Appendix 2-2 (compiled  from data from AXS-Alphaliner and  Dynamar - 
various ed itions). Appendix 2-2 consists of two panels. The left-hand side panel 
)*+*-, .
/+/0/ .0/0/21 .
/0/+3
1 Maersk Maersk-SL + SCL Maersk-SL + Safmarine APM-Maersk (*)
2 Evergreen Group Evergreen Group Mediterranean Shg Co Mediterranean Shg Co
3 COSCO Container L. P & O Nedlloyd P & O Nedlloyd CMA CGM Group
4 Sea-Land Hanjin/ DSR-Senator Evergreen Group Evergreen Group
5 NYK Mediterranean Shg Co Hanjin /  Senator Hapag-Lloyd (**)
6 P&O Nedlloyd NOL /  APL APL CSCL
7 Hanjin COSCO Container L. COSCO Container COSCO Container L.
8 P&O Containers NYK CMA-CGM Group
9 MOL CP Ships /  Americana NYK
10 K Line Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) CP Ships Group
11 Zim Zim
12 Hapag-Lloyd
13 NOL/ APL
14 DSR Senator
15 MSC (*) including P&O Nedlloyd
16 Yang Ming Line (**) including CP Ships
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summarises the mergers, acquisitions and  takeovers by the Top 30 liner operators. The 
right-hand side panel mirrors the liner operators opting to grow organically. 
Next, Figure 2-3 represents the Lorenz curve for the years 1996, 1999, 2003 (before the 
recent consolidation wave) and  2007 (after the merger movement) as well as 2009. The 
Lorenz curve is quite useful for graphically presenting the change in concentration over 
time.  
 
)LJXUH/RUHQ]FXUYH
The cumulative percentage of the total number of liner operators (smallest to largest) is 
plotted  on the x-axis, the cumulative TEU percentage on the y-axis. A perfectly equal-
sized  industry can be depicted by the straight d iagonal line y = x, called  the line of 
perfect equality or the 45° line. The perfect inequality line represents a distribution in 
which one carrier has the total cumulative TEU percentage whereas the others have 
none. In practice, the Lorenz curve w ill be situated below the 45° line. Over a time span 
of 10 years the curve moved  downwards away from the 45° line, suggesting a trend  of 
growing concentration. 
Ultimately, the results of the Gini coefficient that value the pace of concentration are 
stud ied. The value of G is 0.7716 vs. 0.6654 a decade ago. A rise in the coefficient value 
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suggests, yet againDKLJKHUPDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQ7KHYDULDWLRQ  LVDOVRFDOculated. 
The merger movement (+0.037) is again observable in the results.  
The concentration figures for the CLSI clearly indicate a growing concentration. In turn, 
it suggests a weaker competition. Even if increasing concentration implies decreased  
competition, fierce competition may still exist among lead ing firms. That is, the index of 
concentration ignores the shift of market shares among lead ing firms. Therefore, the 
magnitude of market share instability is calculated. Figure 2-4 shows graphically the 
evolution of the instability index on a yearly base. 
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQRIWKH+HUILQGDKO+LUVFKPDQ,QGH[DQGWKHLQVWDELOLW\LQGH[
The value of the instability index (II) is closer to zero than to one, an ind ication that the 
CLSI is characterised by a relatively stable competition. Whereas a remarkable level of 
stability is achieved  during 2000-2005,  a peak of instability was reached  in 2006. 
 5HVXOWVDWWKHOHYHORIDOOLDQFHV
After measuring concentration at the level of the liner operator, it is also interesting to 
analyse the market power of each alliance. Alliances group liner carriers operating on 
different routes around  the world in order to offer a worldwide service to their clients. In 
add ition, alliances offer a means to small- and  medium-sized  carriers to pool vessels in 
order to create sufficient capacity. The three largest alliances, viz. the Grand  Alliance, the 
CHKY Alliance and  the New World  Alliance, are compared  with number 1 Maersk Line 
over the years 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008. After the withdrawal of P&O Nedlloyd  in 
February 2006, the ‘new’  Grand Alliance was formed by Hapag-Lloyd (incl. CP Ships), 
MISC (still Europe-Asia only), NYK and OOCL. The members of the New World  
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Alliance are APL, Huyndai and  MOL. The CHKY Alliance consists of Coscon, 
Hanjin/ Senator, K-line and  Yang Ming. For purposes of review, abstraction is made of 
the United  Alliance (Hanjin and UASC). UASC, co-operating with Hanjin/ Senator is 
presently considered  as an associate member of the CHKY Alliance. 
Figure 2- 5 shows the share of the alliances versus the liner total in 4 d ifferent years, both 
in absolute figures (carrying capacity - TEU) and in percentages.  

)LJXUH0DUNHWVKDUHRIWKHDOOLDQFHV
Up to 2006 the Grand Alliance and the CHKY Alliance took the first and  second  place, 
respectively. In 2008 the biggest strategic cooperation, in capacity terms, is the CHKY 
Alliance with a share of 11.93 %. Since the takeover of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  by Maersk 
Sealand (since then known as Maersk Line), the ‘new’  Grand  Alliance saw  its share 
diminish from 13.97 % (2003) to 11.80 % (2008). After acquiring P&ONL the 
Maersk/ Sealand  alliance took over the first place. Its share rose from 11.95 % (2003) to 
18.23 % (2006). This concentration of market power illustrates that a liner operator can 
perfectly operate independently of alliances. 
 ,QFUHDVHGFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
After analysing the most important concentration figures, it can be concluded that the 
containerised  shipping industry is characterised  by increased  concentration. All indexes 
support this conclusion. The use of another criterion, viz. total turnover, where the same 
trend is noticeable, does not contradict the conclusions (see Figure 2-1).  
The first hypothesis, viz. the CLSI has become more concentrated  due to consolidation, is 
confirmed. The impact of the consolidation waves on the degree of concentration is 
clearly observable in the calculations. Furthermore, the process of concentration is likely 
to continue, as in the future the liner shipping industry is expected to face a continued  
425687 9;: : < 6
=ﬃ>5 ?+@A BDCFEHGJI K
LNM O P
KﬃI&QNR	QNG
M
4256
7 9S: : < 68=ﬃ>	5 ?+@	A BDCJEJGHI K
LFM O P
KﬃIﬃQFRQFG
M
T&UU	U
GRAN D ALLIANCE 692,551 13.45%
T&UUV
GRAND ALLIANCE 957,019 13.97%
CHKY ALLIANCE 649,709 12.62% CHKY ALLIANCE 846,251 12.35%
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consolidation process. However, focusing on the variation of the Gini coefficient, the 
pace of concentration is likely to decelerate. The slope of the trend  line is slightly 
negative. (see Figure 2-6). This deceleration can also be seen in Figure 2-1 – Gini 
coefficient and Figure 2-3. For the largest liner operators segment the curves 2007 and  
2009 are overlapping.  
 
)LJXUH *LQLFRHIILFLHQW
Nonetheless the liner shipping industry is still a very highly fragmented  industry (cf. 
HHI values lower than 1,000). In 2008 only 20 liner operators had  a share of +1 % (see 
Section Appendix 2-1). The figures are modest compared  with the concentration levels in 
other sectors (e.g. banking, media, air transport, other maritime industries), which are 
also undergoing a process of concentration. A comparison of the container shipping 
industry w ith other maritime industries shows us that the latter are characterised  by 
ever-fewer suppliers accounting for an increasing share of the world  total (e.g. shipyard  
(Japan and  Korea), car carrying, and  specialised reefer shipping sectors) (Vanelslander, 
2005).  
Having calculated  the concentration figures, Section 2 focuses on another aspect of 
concentration, viz. its d irect link to the degree of oligopoly. More specifically the 
hypothesis ‘7KHPDUNHWVWUXFWXUHLQZKLFKWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\RSHUDWHVLVDQ
ROLJRSROLVWLFPDUNHW· w ill be tested . 
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 0DUNHWVWUXFWXUH
Micro-economic theory traditionally d ivides industries into four categories, the two 
extremes of which are perfect competition and  monopoly. The intermediate market 
structures are monopolistic competition and  oligopoly. When the CR4 ratio is 40 per cent 
or more, accord ing to Martin (2002), each player must be aware of the others. Such 
industries are oligopolies. 
In this section, the link between the CR4 and the market form will be examined  at 
industry level (Section 2.3.1) and  at trade level (Section 2.3.2). 
 ,QGXVWU\OHYHO
The previous section (Section 2 – Figure 2-1) shows that the CR4 has exceeded the 40 % 
limit since the year 2000, if the Top 20 is considered. However, if the CR4 ratio is 
measured  as the share of the 4 largest liner operators against liner total, CR4 is not 
higher than 40 %. Considered  this way, the container shipping industry would  not to be 
an oligopolistic market.  
If we assume the working hypothesis that the container shipping industry is an 
oligopolistic market, a detailed analysis can determine what type of an oligopoly it is or 
negate the assumption.  
Various stages along the spectrum of oligopolistic behaviour can be distinguished (see 
Figure 2-7). Four viewpoints will be discussed. 
The first viewpoint concerns ‘grad ients in concentration’ . A CR4 of over 60 % is 
considered  a WLJKWROLJRSRO\; a CR4 between 25 % and  60 % a ORRVHROLJRSRO\ while a CR4 
below 25 % is no oligopoly at all. Furthermore, a CR3 of over 90 % or a CR2 of over 80 % 
should  be considered a VXSHUWLJKWROLJRSRO\(Shepherd , 1999). The term ‘tight oligopoly’  is 
understood to signify an oligopoly whose market characteristics facilitate the realisation 
of supernormal profits for a substantial period  and  where significant barriers to entry 
exist. 
Based  on these more detailed  limits values, the container shipping industry can be said  
to be an oligopoly (regard less of the calculation method), more specifically a loose 
oligopoly (25 % < CR4 < 60 % and a HHI < 1,000) (see Figure 2-1). A rejection of this 
assumption would  be incorrect. 
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)LJXUH7\SHVRIPDUNHWV
Secondly, taking the variations in market share into account, the container shipping 
market can neither be called  a symmetric nor an asymmetric market, but is rather located  
in between. The first and  second  viewpoints together clearly show that one liner 
operator does not dominate the container shipping industry. 
The third  viewpoint focuses on variation in competition and collusion. Given the fact 
that in 2008 the conference system was abolished (Regulation 4056/ 86), and given the 
impact of the growing concentration, the container shipping industry may be expected  
to evolve from a more formal collusively orientated  market towards a tacitly collusive 
market where operational agreements will probably become even more important. 
There are two forms of tacit collusion: dominant firm price leadership and barometric 
firm leadership. At the level of the industry, dominant firm price leadership can be 
excluded; market shares of the leading liner operators (see Appendix 2-1) show that any 
carrier can at most be taken as the barometer of the industry. At the level of a specific 
trade, however, there is likely to be a different conclusion (see Section 2.3.2). 
At this point one can conclude that the containerised liner shipping industry is an 
example of a (loose) oligopolistic market. 
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Ultimately, the fourth viewpoint concerns variation in interdependence. Machlup (1952) 
distinguishes four models of oligopoly (Lipczynski, 2005, p . 119). For the CLSI, the first 
two categories can be excluded , viz. fighting oligopoly and hyper-competitive oligopoly. 
In the post-conference era, the CLSI will most likely shift from a guessing-game 
oligopoly towards a chain oligopoly. Of guessing-game oligopoly, Machlup writes “ D
VPDOOJURXSRIILUPVPLJKWQRUPDOO\EHH[SHFWHGWRFROOXGHZHUHLWQRWIRUWKHSUHVHQFHRIDIHZ
VWXEERUQ FKDUDFWHUV WKDW UHIXVH WR SOD\ WKH EDOO” . The CLSI can be classified  as a chain 
oligopoly: the industry is competitive and  each liner carrier operates within an 
oligopolistic sub-group or trade. This brings us to the trade level. 
 6RPHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHDWWUDGHOHYHO
Following Brooks (2000), the study should  focus on the level of trade lane with port 
ranges at either end . In a first stage of the present research, due to shortage of data, only 
two trades were stud ied. Figure 2-8 lists the ranking of the largest deepsea liner 
operators on these trades, viz. the Black Sea - Far East trade, a growing trade and  the 
mature US trade48. For the three main Black Sea countries (Romania, Russia and 
Ukraine) the 2006 TEU volume of all trades (import and export but exclud ing 
transhipment) is reported  as starting from 10,000 TEUs. On the right-hand  side are the 
figures for the US full-container trade of all US ports (all destinations, all origins) over a 
time span of 2 years. Notice that these twenty lines carry more than 90 % of the total US 
containerised  import and  export trade (www.dynamar.com).  
                                                     
48
 For convenience of comparison the TEU totals (*1,000, rounded) of the (parent) companies mentioned 
have been stated  as if they w ere in existence du ring the w hole of all years indicated . US domestic trade 
has not been included  in their figures. Analyses based  on data sourced  from PIERS U.S. Global Container 
Report (Dynamar, 0907). 
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)LJXUH7UDGHDQDO\VLV
A close analysis of these two trades reveals that the market power of each carrier differs 
on each trade lane. In 2006 the four-firm concentration ratio for the US trade equals 
36.68 % (comparable w ith the CR4 ratio of the total container shipping industry - see 
Figure 2-1), whereas the degree of concentration in the Black Sea - Far East trade (only 
seven liner operators) is significantly higher, viz. 70.84 %. The study of the degree of 
concentration at trade level illustrates that it can d iffer significantly from trade to trade. 
Linking the degree of concentration with the degree of oligopoly, one can catalogue the 
US full-container trade as an example of a loose oligopoly, whereas the Black Sea-Far 
East trade is clearly an example of a tight oligopoly (CR4 > 60 % - see Figures 2-7 and 
2-8). Thus, at trade level, the containerised  liner shipping industry remains an 
oligopolistic market (CR4 > 25 %).  
For lack of data, the HHI can only be calculated using the following formula. For a given 
m-firm concentration ratio the HHI must lie between 
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min  (5) 
jSklm nHo p
m jqklm nHo p
m rm ps2o#t
u8vcw x
tn&m l
u8vcwyx
tn&m l
u8vcwyx
tn&m l
MSC 181 23.15% Maersk Line 4,179 15.27% 4,339 17.04% -3.69%
Maersk Line 159 20.33% Evergreen (incl. Hastu and Ita lia Marittima) 2,098 7.67% 2,098 8.24% 0.00%
CMA-CGM 108 13.81% Mediterranean Shg Co 1,970 7.20% 1,575 6.18% 25.08%
Zim 106 13.55% Hanjin 1,789 6.54% 1,561 6.13% 14.61%
CSAV Norasia 91 11.64% APL 1,690 6.18% 1,629 6.40% 3.74%
Hapag-Lloyd 39 4.99% Hapag-Lloyd 1,656 6.05% 1,690 6.64% -2.01%
K Line 12 1.53% COSCO Container Lines 1,172 4.28% 1,146 4.50% 2.27%
OOCL 1,166 4.26% 1,112 4.37% 4.86%
NYK 1,105 4.04% 1,085 4.26% 1.84%
China Shg C.L. (CSCL) 1,067 3.90% 823 3.23% 29.65%
Hyundai 1,064 3.89% 1,048 4.11% 1.53%
Yang Ming Line 1,046 3.82% 924 3.63% 13.20%
CMA-CGM (incl. ANL and MacAndrew s) 1,020 3.73% 753 2.96% 35.46%
K Line 993 3.63% 892 3.50% 11.32%
Mitsui-OSK Lines 797 2.91% 755 2.96% 5.56%
Zim 536 1.96% 478 1.88% 12.13%
CSAV (Libra Br/ Libra Ur and CSAV Norasia) 429 1.57% 424 1.66% 1.18%
Hamburg-Süd (incl. Aliança) 421 1.54% 346 1.36% 21.68%
Seaboard 322 1.18% 305 1.20% 5.57%
Wan Hai Lines 280 1.02% 206 0.81% 35.92%
Crow ley LS
Top 7 696 89.00% Top 20 24,800 90.63% 23,189 91.05%
Others 86 11.00% Others 2,564 9.37% 2,279 8.95%
Total 782 100.00% Top 100 27,364 100.00% 25,468 100.00%
C4 70.84% C4 36.68% 38.31%
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(Martin, 2002, p. 337). Only, in the case of the Black Sea - Far East trade, these liner 
carriers are no longer operating in an unconcentrated  market structure, since the 
minimum HHI equals 1,254.58 (> 1,000). The CR4 already indicated  the higher degree of 
concentration here. 
As the analysis of the two trades resulted in both types of oligopoly, add itional analysis 
of trade lanes was required . Access to extra data made a more detailed  analysis possible. 
Figure 2-9 shows the four-firm concentration ratio for several trade lanes. A d istinction is 
being made between eastbound / westbound and northbound/ southbound. A CR4 of 
over 60 % is marked in bold . 
 
)LJXUH&UDWLRDWWUDGHOHYHO
First, from the perspective of ‘gradients in concentration’ , the trade lanes can be 
categorised  into two groups: (a) large trade lanes (e.g. transatlantic and  transpacific 
trade; > 1,000,000 TEU volume), and  (b) new/ growing/ relatively small container trades 
(e.g. Mediterranean-North America, < 1,000,000 TEU volume). The former group can be 
catalogued  as a loose oligopolistic market form, while the latter trade lanes can be 
labelled examples of tight oligopoly. No data is available to test whether the liner 
operators realise supernormal profits in the trade lanes catalogued  as tight oligopolistic 
ones. 
Subsequently, notice that the transatlantic trade moves towards a tight oligopoly. This is 
due to economic reasons viz. the effect of a continuously sliding US dollar versus the 
7UDGH     
867UDGH 40.14% 38.82% 38.31% 36.68% 36.85%
7UDQVSDFLILFHDVWERXQG 44.89% 40.85% 40.93% 39.61% 37.50%
7UDQVSDFLILFZHVWERXQG 43.49% 43.87% 45.83% 43.96% 46.30%
)DU(DVWWR86(DVW&RDVW86*XOISRUWV 45.24% 47.10% 40.18% 39.92% 40.93%
86(DVW&RDVW86*XOIWRWKH)DU(DVW 36.65% 43.17% 44.69% 38.85% 37.25%
7UDQVDWODQWLFZHVWERXQG 48.41% 53.11% 53.03% 49.63% 49.23%
7UDQVDWODQWLFHDVWERXQG 44.69% 53.11% 53.52% 48.85% 
%ODFN6HD)DU(DVW n/ a n/ a n/ a  n/ a
,QGLDQ6XE&RQWLQHQWWR86DOOFRDVWV n/ a n/ a   
86DOOFRDVWVWRWKH,QGLDQ6XE&RQWLQHQW n/ a n/ a  56.42% 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ1RUWK$PHULFDHDVWERXQG 48.45% 57.88%  57.14% 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ1RUWK$PHULFDZHVWERXQG 48.85% 56.28%  57.06% 56.91%
1RUWK$PHULFD/DWLQ$PHULFDQRUWKERXQG n/ a   57.12% 58.28%
1RUWK$PHULFD/DWLQ$PHULFDVRXWKERXQG n/ a   58.46% 
86DOOFRDVWVWRWKH0LGGOH(DVW n/ a n/ a   
0LGGOH(DVWWR86DOOFRDVWV n/ a n/ a 48.65%  
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euro, the w ithdrawal of liner operators from this trade, as well as the crisis in the US 
hindering consumer spending on expensive European imports (www.dynamar.com). 
The relatively small container trades leapfrogging between loose and  tight oligopoly 
situations is due to the growth in market share of the ‘others’  or small p layers. 
Next, the calculations of the CR4 show that the degree of concentration d iffers between 
east- and westbound with the latter showing a slightly higher concentration degree (see 
Figure 2-9). 
Finally, regarding the variation in competition and collusion, solely in the 
Mediterranean-North America trade (westbound) Maersk Line is a dominant player 
(2005: about 40 %; 2007: about 60 %). 
The second hypothesis ‘7KHPDUNHW VWUXFWXUH LQZKLFK WKHFRQWDLQHU OLQHU VKLSSLQJ LQGXVWU\
RSHUDWHVLVDQROLJRSROLVWLFPDUNHW’  cannot be rejected. The container liner shipping industry 
operates in an oligopolistic market structure but the grad ient of concentration depends 
clearly on the trade lane.  
 &RQFOXVLRQ
The current competitive environment of the container liner shipping industry is more 
complex and  changes at a faster pace than 10 years ago. This is due to a number of 
factors such as the rapid ly changing customer requirements, the deployment of ever-
larger container vessels, advances in information technology, increasing competition and 
intense consolidation. 
This paper examined  the degree of concentration linked  to the degree of oligopoly. 
Using concentration measures, first the degree of concentration was determined. From 
the results it can be concluded  that the container shipping industry is confronted  with 
increased  concentration. In add ition, the results clearly show an increase in the degree 
of concentration in the years marked by mergers and acquisitions. Industry observers 
expect more consolidation. These elements confirm the first hypothesis that the CLSI is 
more concentrated  due to consolidation. The trend  of growing concentration will most 
likely continue (likely in the segment of the lower-ranked  carriers). Nevertheless, the 
containerised  liner shipp ing industry is still a fragmented  industry. 
Based  upon the guidelines proposed  by Martin (2004) and  Shepherd  (1999), the 
following conclusions may be drawn with regard to the second  hypothesis viz. that the 
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market structure in which the container liner shipping industry operates is an 
oligopolistic market: 
` In general, the empirical part of the paper illustrates that the container shipping 
industry operates in an oligopolistic market structure since 2007.  
` In the spectrum of oligopoly, the containerised  shipping industry moves from a 
formal collusively oriented  market towards a tacitly collusive market. 
` In a more detailed  study, it was found that the degree of oligopoly depends on the 
trade lane. In terms of concentration, the CLSI is a loose oligopoly or a tight 
oligopoly depending on the trade lane. 
` Over the years the Lorenz curve moves dow nwards, away from the 45° line, 
suggesting a trend  of growing concentration. The pace of the concentration shows a 
slight deceleration. Consequently, as mergers and acquisitions continue to occur 
within the containerised liner shipping industry and  the trend  of concentration 
continues, the degree of oligopoly will increase. 
Ultimately, the instability index provided  a measurable ind icator of rivals’  behaviour in 
oligopolistic markets. It is found  that the container liner shipping industry, in general, is 
characterised by a relatively stable competition. 
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1 «¬ ­® ­¯° ±²
³
1,878,943 18.81% 18.81% 16.06% 16.06% 1,665,272 21.77% 21.77% 18.23% 18.23% 818,850 16.45% 16.45% 11.41% 11.41%
2
­
°
´µ
¶
° ± ±¯· ° ¯·
¸
¹
º
»
¼ 1,214,486 12.16% 30.96% 10.38% 26.45% 784,248 10.25% 32.03% 8.58% 26.81% 464,236 9.33% 25.78% 6.47% 17.88%
3 » ­ « »½ ­ ½ ±¼¾ ¿ 891,803 8.93% 39.89% 7.62% 34.07% 507,954 6.64% 38.67% 5.56% 32.37% 464,236 9.33% 35.10% 6.47% 24.35%
4 Evergreen Line 619,462 6.20% 46.09% 5.30% 39.37% 477,911 6.25% 44.92% 5.23% 37.60% 394,468 7.92% 43.02% 5.50% 29.85%
5 À ¯ ¿ ¯ º ® Á Â¼Ã ´ 494,516 4.95% 51.04% 4.23% 43.59% 412,344 5.39% 50.31% 4.51% 42.11% 142,467 2.86% 45.89% 1.99% 31.84%
6 CSCL 432,251 4.33% 55.36% 3.70% 47.29% 346,493 4.53% 54.84% 3.79% 45.91% 152,923 3.07% 48.96% 2.13% 33.97%
7 COSCO Container L. 430,472 4.31% 59.67% 3.68% 50.97% 322,326 4.21% 59.05% 3.53% 49.43% 244,341 4.91% 53.87% 3.41% 37.37%
8 APL 401,625 4.02% 63.69% 3.43% 54.40% 331,437 4.33% 67.69% 3.63% 56.66% 239,844 4.82% 64.85% 3.34% 45.00%
9 NYK 375,925 3.76% 67.46% 3.21% 57.62% 302,213 3.95% 71.64% 3.31% 59.97% 207,040 4.16% 69.01% 2.89% 47.88%
10 OOCL 343,228 3.44% 70.89% 2.93% 60.55% 234,141 3.06% 74.70% 2.56% 62.53% 168,533 3.39% 72.40% 2.35% 50.23%
11 Hanjin  /  Senator 339,681 3.40% 74.29% 2.90% 63.45% 328,794 4.30% 63.35% 3.60% 53.03% 306,925 6.17% 60.03% 4.28% 41.65%
12 MOL 329,211 3.30% 77.59% 2.81% 66.27% 241,282 3.15% 77.85% 2.64% 65.17% 152,265 3.06% 75.45% 2.12% 52.35%
13 K Line 306,486 3.07% 80.65% 2.62% 68.89% 227,872 2.98% 80.83% 2.49% 67.66% 103,213 2.07% 77.53% 1.44% 53.79%
14 Zim 276,512 2.77% 83.42% 2.36% 71.25% 201,432 2.63% 85.93% 2.20% 71.93% 163,267 3.28% 84.44% 2.28% 58.59%
15 À ¯ Ä Å¾ ±º ® ¸¾ ´ ½ ±¼¾ ¿ 275,691 2.76% 86.18% 2.36% 73.61% 184,438 2.41% 91.40% 2.02% 76.51% 100,971 2.03% 88.85% 1.41% 61.65%
16 Yang Ming Line 272,813 2.73% 88.91% 2.33% 75.94% 188,206 2.46% 83.30% 2.06% 69.72% 180,715 3.63% 81.16% 2.52% 56.31%
17 CSAV Group 248,987 2.49% 91.40% 2.13% 78.07% 234,002 3.06% 88.99% 2.56% 74.49% 118,767 2.39% 86.82% 1.66% 60.24%
18 Hyundai M.M. 196,782 1.97% 93.37% 1.68% 79.75% 147,989 1.93% 93.34% 1.62% 78.13% 124,047 2.49% 91.34% 1.73% 63.38%
19 PIL (Pacific Int. Line) 169,444 1.70% 95.07% 1.45% 81.20% 134,362 1.76% 95.09% 1.47% 79.60% 103,213 2.07% 93.42% 1.44% 64.82%
20 Wan Hai Lines 137,656 1.38% 96.45% 1.18% 82.38% 114,346 1.50% 96.59% 1.25% 80.85% 82,053 1.65% 95.07% 1.14% 65.96%
21 UASC 95,516 0.96% 97.40% 0.82% 83.20% 74,004 0.97% 97.55% 0.81% 81.66% 71,161 1.43% 96.49% 0.99% 66.95%
22 MISC Berhad 82,888 0.83% 98.23% 0.71% 83.90% 40,543 0.53% 98.08% 0.44% 82.10% 40,454 0.81% 97.31% 0.56% 67.52%
23 IRIS Lines 73,921 0.74% 98.97% 0.63% 84.54% 53,512 0.70% 98.78% 0.59% 82.69% 36,162 0.73% 98.03% 0.50% 68.02%
24
½
±
µ
Ä¯
Â ´µÆ
Ç
¯ ¿¼
ÂµÈ 53,478 0.54% 99.51% 0.46% 84.99% 44,363 0.58% 99.36% 0.49% 83.18% 49,292 0.99% 99.02% 0.69% 68.71%
25 RCL (Regional Container L.) 49,198 0.49% 100.00% 0.42% 85.41% 48,604 0.64% 100.00% 0.53% 83.71% 48,580 0.98% 100.00% 0.68% 69.38%
Top 25 9,990,975 7,648,088 4,978,023
Liner total 11,697,166 9,136,632 7,174,667
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ÞFÜ&Ý ßJà
 Maersk Line (Takeover Aug. 2005) (Renamed  Feb. 2006)
Maersk-Sealand  (Ju ly 1999)
Maersk
Sealand
Torm Lines (Sep t. 2002)
Royal P&O Nedlloyd  (April 2004)
P&O Nedlloyd  (Jan . 1997)
P&O Container Lines
Nedlloyd
Blue Star Line (Feb. 1998)
Farrell Line (2000)
Ocean ica AGW (renamed  Mercosu l Line) (2000)
MCC Transport Singapore Pte Ltd
Norfolk Line Containers
Norse Merchan t (Ju ly 2005)
Safmarine Contianer Lines (Jan . 1999)
Unicorn  Lines (2002) (renamed  Ocean  Africa Container Line - 2004)
SCF Oriën tal Lines (2004) á
Ù
Üâ&ã ä Ü&Ý Ý ÞHåHÜÞHå-æ&çHè;é	Ú
ê
éÙÖëé	ìÙ
CMA CGM (1999)
CMA
CGM
CGM (1977)
MessMar
Transat
Australian  National Lines (ANL) (1998)
Cagema
Cheng Lie Navigation  Ltd . (2007)
CoMaNav (2007)
Delmas (2006)
Setramar (2001)
OTAL (2005)
Sudcargos (Sep t. 2005)
United  Baltic Corp . (Andrew  Wier) (Dec. 2002)
MacAndrews & Ellerman  Iberian  (Andrew  Wier) (Dec. 2002)
Delom SA (2002) (con trolling in terest - 80%)
Feeder Associate Systems (FAS)
Gemartrans
í î#ïHÜ&Ý è&Ý ÜÜ&å;ðFã åHÜ;ñ òcóó&ôJõ
Evergreen
Hatsu  Marine Ltd . (2002)
Lloyd  Triestino (Ju ly 1998) (renamed  Italia  Maritima)
ö ÷&ÞHøHÞFèqðFÛ Ú&ùHâ;ñ úûNä ×còcóóüFõ
Hapag Lloyd
CP Chips
Italia  d i Navigazione (May 2002)
TMM (2000)
Christensen  Canada-Africa Line (2000)
ANZDL (Sep t. 1998)
Ivarans ((May 1998)
Contsh ip  Container Lines (Oct. 1997)
Lykes Lines (Ju ly 1997)
Cast (Mar. 1995)
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Abstract49 
The aim of this paper is to study how the intensity of competition in the container liner 
shipping industry evolves over time. Therefore, the Hymer-Pashigian index of market 
share instability has been used to ind icate the level of competitiveness at both industry 
and trade level. In add ition, the relationship between concentration and  the Hymer-
Pashigian index of market share instability is examined . The findings ind icate the 
presence of an inverted  U-shaped relationship between concentration and  market share 
instability at industry level. At trade level, concentration is negatively related to market 
share instability and  evidence is provided  that the variable ‘growth’  (in terms of volume) 
plays a major role in affecting the dynamics of market share. In the policy context, 
regulators should focus on trade level since the effects are more clearly identified when 
working at the disaggregated  level rather then at aggregated  industry level. 
.H\ZRUGV:  
Container liner shipping industry, competition, instability index, market share, 
concentration 
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  Thanks are due to Prof. d r. H . Meersman and  Prof. dr. G. Blauwens for comments and  Prof. d r. E. Van de 
Voorde for insp iration. 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
When the European Commission banned liner conferences in October 200850, shippers 
hoped  for a better service and  lower freight rates as a result of more competition. In 
contrast to service and  freight rates, competition is not d irectly perceptible. Therefore, an 
indirect measurement, viz. the Hymer Pashigian index of market share instability w ill be 
used  to determine whether competition increased .  
The aim of this paper is to explore the dynamics of competition in the container liner 
shipping industry (hereafter abbreviated as CLSI). Since, liner operators compete with 
each other not only w ithin the total container liner shipping market bu t rather within 
sub-markets (read  trade lanes), this paper focuses on the degree of competition both at 
industry (Section 3.2) and  trade level (Section 3.3). It contributes to the CLSI competition 
literature in applying the market instability index next to the static concentration 
measures. Static measures include the four-firm concentration ratio and  the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index51.  
The remainder of the paper is organised  in two main sections. Successively, the ind icator 
of concentration and the ind icator of magnitude of market share instability are calculated 
and discussed  both at industry (Section 3.2.2 and  3.2.3) and trade level (Section 3.3.2 and  
3.3.3). Next to it, an empirical model is presented  to examine the determinants of market 
share instability followed  by the empirical results (Section 3.2.4: industry level and  
Section 3.3.4: trade level). Finally, conclusions w ill be d rawn about the competitiveness 
at both industry and  trade level. 
 &RQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
This section firstly presents the used data. Subsequently, the indicators of concentration 
and the intensity of competition are computed  and d iscussed . Finally, the relationship  
between concentration and  the market share instability is examined.  
                                                     
50
  “ …[T]he European Commission has granted  a block exemption from the competition ru les for 
conference liner operators since 1986. A Block Exemption Regulation defines certain categories of 
agreements which are compatible with EU competition rules provided  that the agreements meet the 
cond itions laid  down in the Regulation. In March 2003, the European Commission’s Directorate General 
for Competition announced  a review  of Regulation 4056/ 86. On September 25th, 2006, the Council 
agreed  to repeal Regulation 4056/ 86. By consequence, it pu ts an end  to the coord ination of prices, 
charges and  surcharges as well as coord inated  capacity management in European Union trades as of 
October 2008. Since that date, liner operators have to fix their own freight rates and  any surcharge 
(European Commission, 1997 and  2007; ELAA, 2003)”  ( Sys ]^	_+` ., 2010). 
51
  Appendix 3-1 summarises the calcu lation of the concentration measures used  in this paper. 
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 'DWD
To calculate the indicators of concentration and the ind icator of magnitude of market 
share instability, one needs ind ividual data of the top 4 liner operators, together w ith the 
data for the entire containerised  liner shipping industry. Therefore, the Top 100 of 
Alphaliner has been annually surveyed  (AXS-Alphaliner, various editions ).  
Capacity data is the basis for calculating market shares at industry level rather than 
turnover. According to Hymer and  Pashigan (1962) and Sakakibara and  Porter (2001), a 
turnover measure is inappropriate as it is responsive to the d ispersion of firm sizes 
within a market. So, the n-firm concentration ratio (CRn) is computed as the existing on 
board TEU (twenty equivalent unit) capacities of n liner operators compared  to the fleet 
effectively deployed  by each operator (see also Sys, 2009).  
The value of the absolute changes in liner operators’ market shares forms the basis for 
the calculation of the instability index. When calculating the instability index, it is 
sufficient to restrict attention to liner operators with market shares of 0.01 or larger. As 
the contribution of liner operators with smaller market shares do not affect the instability 
index significantly. To study the determinants of market share instability, data regard ing 
industry growth, price of secondhand  ships, etc. is collected from Drewry Container 
market annual review and forecast (Drewry, various ed itions). 
 ,QGLFDWRUVRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
A reasonable accurate assessment of the likely nature of competition in a market is to 
look whether the market is concentrated or not. Figure 3-1 gives an overview of the 
measures of concentration at industry level. 
First, a common measure of market structure is the n-firm concentration ratio. Figure 3-1 
shows that the largest liner operator (CR1) doubled  its market share over the period  
1999-2010. This is the result of mergers. Since the takeover of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  by 
Maersk Sealand  (since then known as Maersk Line), the world  biggest liner operator saw  
its share d iminishing from 19.23 % in 2006 to 16.44 % in 2010. 
The top four liner operators (i.e. Maersk Line (before takeover of Sea-land), 
Evergreen/ Uniglory, P&O Nedlloyd and  Hanjin/ DSR-Senator) held  25.83 % of the 
market in 1999. By January 1st, 2010, the leaders (i.e. Maersk Line (after several mergers 
and acquistions – e.g. Sealand , P&O Nedlloyd), MSC, CMA CGM group  and Evergreen) 
controlled  41.18 % of the containerised  liner shipping market. A CR4 of 40 % serves as a 
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benchmark for an oligopolistic market (Martin, 2002). Hence, the market structure in 
which the CLSI operates would  be an oligopolistic market since 2007 (in bold).  
The market share of the top-ten liner operators (CR10) accounts for 63.41 % in 2010, up  
from about 50 % in 1999. The results reveal that the CLSI is becoming more concentrated  
(see also Sys, 2009). 
 
)LJXUH'HJUHHRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQDWLQGXVWU\OHYHO a:b 
Secondly, another commonly used  measure of market structure is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI conveys more information than the n-firm 
concentration ratio. Over the studied  period , the HHI clearly increases, also ind icating a 
growing concentration in the container shipping industry. However, HHI never exceeds 
the 1,000 – 1,800 limits (see Appendix 3-1). Comparing with other industries, the 
container liner shipping industry must still be considered to be unconcentrated  (Sys, 
2009). 
Third ly, the reciprocal of the HHI is referred  to as the numbers-equivalent (NE). Thus, a 
market whose HHI is 647.26 has a number equivalent of 15 or the market structure is 
equivalent to having 15 firms of the same size. Over the 1999-2010 period, the NE 
halved . This would suggest less competitive behaviour. 
To sum up, one can conclude that the container shipping industry is confronted with 
increased concentration. Even if theoretically increasing concentration should  result in 
decreased competition, in practise, fierce competition may still exist among lead ing 
carriers. That is the index of concentration ignores the shift of market shares among 
leading firms.  
 ,QGLFDWRURIPDJQLWXGHRIPDUNHWVKDUHLQVWDELOLW\
In general, fueled by liberalisation/ deregulation, many studies have been conducted  in 
an effort to understand competition. Many of these studies regress profitability or price 
                                                     
52
  Figures refer to January 1st of each year. 
c-d&ddfe	g&g&gfegg?cheg&geieggWjkeg&glme	g&gDnoegg&pfeg&gDqoe	g&grieggdieg?cg
CR1 8.34% 12.88% 13.25% 12.63% 12.93% 13.13% 13.21% 19.23% 17.53% 16.84% 16.49% 16.44%
CR4 25.83% 30.37% 30.94% 31.03% 32.90% 33.21% 32.84% 39.67% s-tu vwxys+wu z{xysw+u szx|swu w}x
CR10 50.90% 52.68% 52.66% 53.54% 55.39% 55.67% 56.40% 63.26% 63.61% 63.48% 63.50% 63.41%
HHI 336.20 415.34 427.54 427.37 451.34 462.24 473.91 665.93 646.22 640.00 644.07 647.26
NE 30 24 23 23 22 22 21 15 15 16 16 15
~ 6  +Ł
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on concentration. The results of these stud ies are similar but the interpretation of the 
results is very d ifferent. Therefore, Bresnahan (1982) developed a test that involves 
estimating a structural model incorporating demand and  cost equations, linked  with the 
profit-maximising condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The main 
drawback of this methodology is its data-intensive requirements. An alternative measure 
of the degree of rivalry is the market share instability.  
Market share instability is a measure of the shift in the relative position of firms within 
an industry and is considered an important ind icator of the intensity of the competition. 
A formal measure of the degree of market share instability is the instability index. The 
instability index, devised  by Hymer and  Pashigan (1962), sums up the absolute value of 
the change between two points in time in the market share of each firm. The index is 
calculated  as follows:  
( )∑
=
−
−=

 


 VV,,
1
1,,     (1)
where si,t equals the market share of liner operator L at time W The value of the index 
ranges between zero and  one.  
This index is based  on the variation in ranking or market shares reflecting competitive 
pressure in the industry that is not observable in ind icators of concentration. In other 
words, this index provides an ind ication of interfirm rivalry. The higher the value of this 
index, the less stable market shares are, ind icating more competitive pressure in the 
industry (Hymer & Pashigan, 1962, p . 86 and  Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2007).  
Accord ing to Caves and  Porter (1978), the instability index captures the effects of both 
price and  non-price competition. Like the airline industry (Barla, 1999), liner operators 
also compete on other levels (i.e. quality of the service, frequency,…) than price53.  
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQRIWKHLQVWDELOLW\LQGH[DWLQGXVWU\OHYHO
                                                     
53
  See Staiger and  Wolak (1992) for the theoretical justification of using the instability index as an indicator 
of intensity of competition. 
&&&& &Y&& &W&& && && & Y+
II 0.162767 0.129300 0.114580 0.117452 0.121033 0.101599 0.249227 0.127077 0.074869 0.075962 0.102112
  -¡:¢¤£ ¥§¦ ¨©¨¦
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The evolution of the instability index (II) is reported in Figure 3-2. At aggregated  level, 
the value of the instability index is closer to zero than to one, an ind ication that the CLSI 
is characterised  by a relatively stable competition. 
 5HODWLRQVKLSFRQFHQWUDWLRQ²LQVWDELOLW\LQGH[
Economic theory suggests that higher concentration leads to less competition. To 
investigate this theoretical link, the analysis starts w ith a visual plot of both ind icators 
followed  by a correlation analysis. Finally, an empirical model is described  to estimate 
the determinants of market share instability. 
First, Figure 3-3 plots the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index54 (left-hand  axis) and  the 
Instability Index (right-hand  axis). Whereas a remarkable level of stability is achieved  
during the 2000-2005 period , a peak of instability was reached  in 2006. This change in 
intensity of competition coincides w ith the acquisition of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  by the 
Danish A.P. Moller-Maersk Group. Abrupt changes have trad itionally been related  to 
the presence of competition, regard less of the concentration ratio (Hymer & Pashigan, 
1962). The impact of the financial and  economic downturn is also observable in 
Figure 3-3. 
 
)LJXUH5HODWLRQVKLSFRQFHQWUDWLRQDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ
                                                     
54
  Given that the relative size of the largest liner operator’ s is an important determinant of conduct and  
performance, as economy theory suggest, consequently the HHI is likely to be more informative. 
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A scatter d iagram is another visual d isplay of both ind icators. In Figures 3-4 a/ b, the 
HHI and the CR4 (on the horizontal axis) were plotted as a scatter d iagram against the 
instability index (on the vertical axis). Even though a scatter d iagram does not determine 
the exact relationship between the two variables, it does ind icate whether they are 
correlated  or not. The scatter plot quickly identifies the merger between AP Moller-
Maersk and  Royal P&O Nedlloyd  (2006). A simple regression line can be used  to 
statistically describe the trend of the points in the scatter plot. Discard ing the outlier, the 
data pairs are exhibiting a negative correlation55. 

)LJXUHDE6FDWWHUGLDJUDP++,&5
Secondly, the question arises how the d ifferent observed  ind icators coincide mutually? 
Figure 3-5 summarises the correlation coefficients between the used  measures (t-statistics 
in parentheses). From Figure 3-5, it can be observed  that the CR4 and  HHI provide 
similar ind ications of the competitiveness of the industry. The correlation coefficient 
between the two approximates 1. Over the 2000-2010 period , the correlation between 
CR4 and II is negatively while the correlation between HHI and  II is positive. However, 
both outcomes are insignificant. Discard ing the observation of 2006, the association 
between both concentration measurements and  the instability index turns to inverse, 
meaning that concentration increases the intensity of competition decreases. The 
intensity of this inverse association is moderate and  significant. Note, a correlation 
analyses cannot be interpreted  as establishing cause-and-effect relationships between 
concentration and  competition. 
                                                     
55
  Based  on a simple regression, the resu lt should  be threated w ith caution. Adding several independent 
variables might have an impact on the correlation coefficient (see below). 
ª ª
«¬
2006
­ ­
®Y®I­
2006
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)LJXUH&RUUHODWLRQPDWUL[
Last, from these simple correlation coefficients, one cannot infer whether there may be a 
nonlinear relationship between concentration and  market share instability. In addition, 
other variables may also affect market share instability. Following earlier stud ies (Caves 
& Porter, 1978; Barla, 1999; Kato & Honjo, 2006 and Masathoshi & Yuji, 2006), a similar 
empirical model will be estimated  to examine the determinants of market share 
instability. The empirical model takes the following form:  
¯
°
±
¯
±
¯¯¯ ,6)&5&5,, µαααα ++++= ∑
=3
2
210 44    (2) 
The variables are defined  as follows: IIt denotes the market share instability. To identify 
whether concentration has a negative effect on market share instability, the four-firm 
concentration index, &5 ²  is used 56. This variable is introduced in a quadratic form to 
allow for a nonlinear relationship between II and  CR4. Caves and Porter (1978) and 
Sakakibara and  Porter (2001) suggested that the instability index initially increases with 
the level of concentration, then declines as concentration becomes more significant. Next, 
,6) ² represents industry specific exogenous factors and ²  denotes an error term. 
To control industry-specific factors, firstly, industry growth (,*5 ² ) is included in the 
model. Industry growth is expected  to affect competition. The impact is twofold : a 
growing industry is most attractive for new entrants and  is likely to trigger rivalries’  
behaviour amongst industry’ s incumbents (e.g. uncertainty regard ing scale of 
production: w ill liner operator L put an extra/ a larger ship into service?). Previous 
                                                     
56
  The alternative measure, HHI was also tested . The resu lts were similar. 
³´µ·¶ ¸	¹º:»½¼¾½¿ÁÀ ÂÃÂÄ³ ³¤³
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stud ies have found  that industry growth increases market share instability (Hymer and  
Pashigian, 1962; Caves & Porter, 1978; Papadogonas & Droucopoulos, 2006; Kato & 
Honjo, 2006). Here, industry growth is defined as the d ifferences between the value of 
world  container traffic in period  W and W, d ivided by the value of world  container 
traffic in period  W (Drewry, various editions). Since, Davies & Geroski (1997) stated that 
both positive and  negative industry growth brings larger uncertainty to lead ing firms, 
the squared term, 2Å,*5  is included in the model to verify a nonlinear relationship  
between market share instability and industry growth. It is expected  that the effect of 
this squared  term ( 2Æ,*5 ) on market share instability is positive. 
Secondly, market shares are red istributed due to entry into a trade or exit from it. Here, 
entry/ exit is proxied  by the variable 6(&21'+$1' ² . This independent variable reflects 
the price of second  hand  ships. New entrants weighing up opportunities in both the new 
build ing and  second  hand markets as well as charter markets. Separate regressions were 
run using new build  (R² = 0.79) and  charter price (R² = 0.75) as independent variables. In 
the case of second hand  price, R-squared  (0.81) was slightly higher. A large fraction of 
the variation in the determinants of market share instability can be explained. 
Last, in 2005, Maersk Sealand  acquired  Royal P&O Nedlloyd. This event lead  to a 
redistribution of market shares and  to a change in the intensity of competition (see 
Figure 3-3). This effect w ill be controlled  by the dummy variable, 0(5*(5 in the 
regression. This dummy equals 1 in the year+1 of the merger, otherwise zero. 
7KH SDUDPHWHUV 0 1,… are the parameters to be estimated. Equation 2 is estimated 
using least squares regression methods (OLS)57. The OLS estimates of Eq. 2 are reported 
in Figure 3-6. Figure 3-6 summarises the determinants of the market share instability of 
three regressions (RE1/ 2/ 3 – including t-values between parentheses). In the last 
column, R-squared is reported. 
 
)LJXUH(VWLPDWHGUHVXOWVDWLQGXVWU\OHYHO
In the first regression (RE1), the squared term of concentration (CR4^ 2) and  industry 
growth (IGR^ 2) are excluded  from the model while in RE2 only the latter independent 
                                                     
57
  Estimation is carried  out with EViews. 
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variable is excluded . The coefficients of concentration (CR4) are positive and  statistically 
significant in RE2 and  RE3. In add ition, the coefficients of its squared term (CR4^ 2) are 
significantly negative. The results suggest a nonlinear relationship between 
concentration and market share instability, which is consistent with the studies of Caves 
& Porter (1978) and  Sakakibara & Porter (2001). The inverted U-shaped  curve appears to 
peak at about 36 % of the four-firm concentration ratio and then declines.  
With respect to the variable industry growth (IGR), the coefficient is positive but only 
statistically significant in the first regression. The effect of its squared  term (IGR^2) is 
found  to be negative while the coefficient is not statistically significant. The results for 
the container liner shipping industry differ from those of other industries (see Davies 
and Geroski, 1997).  
In all equations, the effect of second hand  prices was found to be negative but not 
significant.  
Turning now to the effect of the dummy variable merger, the regression coefficient has a 
positive effect on market share instability conform to a p riori expectation. It clearly 
suggests a red istribution of market shares and a change in the intensity of competition. 
Liner operators compete w ith each other not only within the total container liner 
shipping market but rather within sub-markets (read  trade lanes). The next section 
provides evidence of the degree of concentration and  the intensity of competition at 
trade level. 
 (YLGHQFHDWWUDGHOHYHO
What is the nature of the trade lanes in which the liner operator competes and the nature 
of competitive interactions among liner operators in these markets? These are the 
questions that will be addressed in this section.  
 'DWD
To address the dynamics of competition at trade level, a newly constructed  panel data 
set has been constructed . This panel data set is the result of combining the annual trade 
routes analyses of Dynamar (various ed itions, 2007-10). These analyses contain rankings 
of top carriers by volume measured  in TEUs. Hence, these total TEUs carried  are the 
basis for calculating market shares at trade level. This unbalanced  panel covers the 
2003-2009 period . It allows computing the four-firm concentration ratio and the market 
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share instability index as well as testing the relationship between both indicators at 
d isaggregated  level. Successively the results are commented. 
 ,QGLFDWRUVRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
The four-firm concentration ratio and  the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  are calculated to 
proxy the extent of concentration at trade level. Figure 3-7 reports the four-firm 
concentration ratio at trade level (in alphabetical order). A d istinction is being made 
between eastbound/ westbound  and  northbound/ southbound legs respectively. For 
comparison reasons, the four-firm concentration ratio at industry level is added . 
 
)LJXUH)RXUILUPFRQFHQWUDWLRQUDWLRDWWUDGHOHYHO
Given the lack of data, the HHI cannot be calculated  for each trade lane. However, 
minima and  maxima values can be computed  by using the following formula of 
Sleuwaegen and  Dehandschutter (1986) whom proved that for a given m-firm 
concentration ratio the HHI must lie between 

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≤
≥
==
1/mCRwhen  /mCR
 1/mCRwhen )(CR
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m
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2
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Figure 3-8 gives an overview of the decision rules of Benitez and  Estache (2005) which 
allows us to classify the different trade lanes. 
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)LJXUH++,GHFLVLRQUXOH
The CR4 and  the derived  HHImin and HHImax for 2009 are reported in Figure 3-958. The 
multiple sort conditions of Figure 3-9 are the degree of concentration followed  by 
alphabetical order.  
 
)LJXUH'HJUHHRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQDWWUDGHOHYHO
What conclusions can be derived  from Figures 3-7 and  3-9? First, the analysis of the four-
firm concentration ratio shows that the degree of concentration d iffers from trade lane to 
trade lane.  
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  N ote: to calcu late the H HI range, one need  to multip ly by 10,000. 
++,PLQ ++,PD[ GHFLVLRQ
< 1,000 < 1,000 unconcentrated
< 1,000 1,000 - 1,800 inconclusive => presumption: unconcentrated
< 1,000 > 1,800 inconclusive
1,000 - 1,800 > 1,800 inconclusive => presumption: concentrated
> 1,800 > 1,800 highly concentrated
.0/21434576 198ﬃ5 :<;>= ?0?0@ ACB 8D?0?9@ AE1GF
EU-Latin America HJIJK LJMJN 2,168 8,671 highly concentrated
Middle East to US (all coasts) OP K OJQ N 1,843 7,372 highly concentrated
EU-Africa RJR K Q IN 1,507 6,026 concentrated
EU-Indian Sub Continent R LﬃK S P N 1,276 5,105 concentrated
Far East -Africa O MﬃK LﬃHN 1,689 6,756 concentrated
Indian Sub Continent to US (all coasts) Q SK P HN 1,043 4,172 concentrated
Mediterranean - North America (eastbound) OJT K HLJN 1,637 6,546 concentrated
US (all coasts) to the Indian Sub Continent QﬃR K L Q N 1,128 4,510 concentrated
US (all coasts) to the Middle East QJQ K H T N 1,119 4,476 concentrated
North America - Latin  America (all coasts) (northbound)Q IJK L Q N 997 3,990
North America - Latin  America (all coasts) (southbound)Q MﬃK LﬃIN 965 3,860
Transatlantic (eastbound) 56.90% 809 3,238
Mediterranean - North America (w estbound) 50.49% 637 2,549
Transatlantic (w estbound) 52.01% 676 2,705
Central America - US 49.88% 622 2,488
Far East to US East Coast/ US Gulf ports 36.14% 327 1,306 unconcentrated
Transpacific (eastbound) 38.76% 376 1,502 unconcentrated
Transpacific (w estbound) 36.97% 342 1,367 unconcentrated
US - Central America 35.64% 318 1,270 unconcentrated
US East Coast/ US Gulf to the Far East 38.38% 368 1,473 unconcentrated
US Trade 33.02% 273 1,090 unconcentrated
@ 8ﬃ3VUXWY/ Z[6 5\]5]6 41.42%
^`_baJced>f _Gg`_]hﬃikj]lnmJjVhﬃmJ_]hJif aio jVhEai4if aJp>_7q _ﬃrG_]q]s tXu>ubvw
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Secondly, some trade lanes (e.g. Transpacific eastbound/ westbound , US Trade) show a 
trend of decreasing concentration while other trade lanes are characterised  by a trend of 
increasing concentration.  
Third ly, the calculations allow us to link the degree of concentration with the degree of 
oligopoly. A trade lane with a CR4 between 25 % and 60 % is labelled  a loose oligopoly 
while a CR4 below 25 % is no oligopoly at all. A CR4 of over 60 % is considered  a tight 
oligopoly. The term ‘tight oligopoly’  is understood to signify an oligopoly whose market 
characteristics facilitate the realisation of supernormal profits for a substantial period 
and where significant barriers to entry exist (Shepherd , 1999). In Figure 3-7 and 3-9, a 
CR4 of over 60 % is marked  in bold. Figure 3-10 catalogues the stud ied trade lanes. 
Clearly, the container liner shipping industry appears to be a series of oligopolistic sub-
markets. 
 
)LJXUH'HJUHHRIROLJRSRO\
Analysing the associated  volumes reveals that the loose oligopolistic sub-markets are 
large trade lanes w ith a volume of + 1,000,000 TEU while the tight oligopolistic sub-
markets corresponds with < 1,000,000 TEU volume. Tight oligopoly corresponds with 
concentrated/ highly concentrated  trade lanes59. In add ition, the nature of the 
submarkets could  also explain some differences (e.g. the Latin America trade lane: 
served by regional carriers, the U.S. import trade: served  by proprietary carriers like 
Dole).  
  
                                                     
59
  For the U.S. airline industry, Barla (1999) states that “ Concentrated  rou tes usually have lower traffic 
density and , therefore, higher costs” . The former also applies for the CLSI. 
xzy>{}|~	 ~	|xzy>{}| xzyb{` 
ﬃŁnŁ   -ŁﬃŁ   ŁŁ VŁ   -ŁﬃŁ      Ł  -ŁﬃŁ 
Transatlantic (eastbound) EU-Africa
Transatlantic (w estbound) EU-Indian Sub Continent
Transpacific (eastbound) EU-Latin  America
Transpacific (w estbound) Far East -Africa
US - Central America Indian Sub Continent to US (all coasts)
US East Coast/ US Gulf to the Far East Mediterranean - North  America (eastbound)
US Trade Middle East to US (all coasts)
Far East to US East Coast/ US Gulf ports North  America - Latin  America (all coasts) (northbound)
Mediterranean - North  America (w estbound) North  America - Latin  America (all coasts) (southbound)
US (all coasts) to the Indian Sub Continent
US (all coasts) to the Middle East
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Figure 3-11 gives a rough idea of where the loose versus tight oligopolistic trade lanes 
are located . The dashed  black lines in Figure 3-11 shows the routes that correspond  with 
tight oligopolistic while the grey lines mark the loose oligopolistic sub-markets. To keep 
the mapping simple, if both east- and  westbound or north- and  southbound  are 
catalogued  as the same degree of oligopoly, it is depicted  by a left-right arrow. 
 
)LJXUH7LJKWYHUVXVORRVHVKLSSLQJURXWHV
Figure 3-11 shows no special patterns. The d ifference between tight and loose 
oligopolistic sub-markets is not restricted to geographic patterns. 
Fourthly, Sleuwaegen and  Dehandschutter (1986) ind icate the use of the HHI as a 
superior measure. Applying the formulae given in (3) yields HHI ranges corresponding 
with CR4 for the stud ied trade lanes (see Figure 3-9). From policy perspective, trade 
lanes labelled ‘unconcentrated ’  generally do not require further analysis. Trade lanes in 
which 1,000 < HHImin < 1,800 and  HHImax exceeds 1,800 are considered  ‘concentrated ’ . If 
both the lower and  upper bound  of the HHI exceeds 1,800, the trade lane is labelled  
‘highly concentrated ’ . In the latter two cases, antitrust authorities need to analyse 
whether competition is threatened  in the case of a new merger.  
Finally, another question arises whether the top 4 liner operators do dominate any sub-
market and hence have greater monopolistic control than might be evident from looking 
at their total market share? As a benchmark, a dominant position corresponds with a 
CR1 > 40 %. A close analysis reveals - not surprisingly - that the market shares of the 
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liner operators d iffer from trade lane to trade lane. Maersk Line is the number one in the 
US-Ind ian Subcontinent trade (ISC) on the outward  and return leg, US Trade, North 
America-Middle East trade. Solely in the Mediterranean - North America trade 
(westbound) Maersk Line is a dominant player (CR1 > 40 % since 2005). In contrast, this 
carrier was never the number 1 liner operator in Transatlantic (eastbound), North 
America – Los Angeles, South America – US on the outward  and  return leg, 
Europe-Africa, Europe-Latin America and  Far East-Africa during the 2005-2009 period. 
CMA CGM is the leader in the latter three trade lines while MSC leads the South 
America – US trade route. For the remaining trade lanes, Maersk Line was the number 1 
up to 2005 but lost its position to MSC, Hapag-Lloyd , Evergreen, Hamburg Süd  
respectively. For most of those trades, Maersk Line started  in 2009 jostling for market 
share again and  regained  its statue of maritime industry leader. 
 ,QGLFDWRURIPDJQLWXGHRIPDUNHWVKDUHLQVWDELOLW\
The Hymer-Pashigan instability index was applied  to each sub-market and  the results 
are given in Figure 3-12. 
 
)LJXUH,QVWDELOLW\,QGH[DWWUDGHOHYHO
Conforms a priori expectations, the instability index d iffers from trade lane to trade lane 
and also from the leg studied . This ind icator fluctuates between 0.04 and  0.64 over the 
¶· ¸¹º+» ¸ﬃ¼	º ½ ¾¿À Á2Â2Ã±ÄeÅÇÆeÈÈJÉÊÆeÈeÈËÌÆ-ÈÈÍÎÆeÈÈÏÐÆeÈeÈÑÒÆ-ÈÈÓÔÆeÈÈÕ
Central America - US II 0.06124 0.09670
EU-Africa II 0.23119
EU-Indian Sub Continent II 0.68570
Far East -Africa II 0.25573
Far East to US East Coast/ US Gulf ports II 0.33598 0.14386 0.11031 0.09634 0.19044 0.12305
Indian Sub Continent to US (all coasts) II 0.30571 0.23824 0.30744 0.10337
Mediterranean - North America (eastbound) II 0.30335 0.13832 0.22516 0.25230 0.21701 0.39904
Mediterranean - North America (w estbound) II 0.27079 0.18445 0.23437 0.15315 0.24568 0.38682
Middle East to US (all coasts) II 0.58018 0.18772 0.23525 0.28282
North America - Latin  America (a ll coasts) (northbound) II 0.18484 0.21676
North America - Latin  America (a ll coasts) (southbound) II 0.08385 0.10923
North America - Latin  America (northbound) II 0.08868 0.39426 0.19892
North America - Latin  America (southbound) II 0.24583 0.33198 0.31738
Transatlantic (eastbound) II 0.16833 0.24642 0.21451 0.20410 0.29120 0.28124
Transatlantic (w estbound) II 0.23248 0.06005 0.16991 0.21176 0.18838 0.17892
Transpacific (eastbound) II 0.09592 0.04208 0.06447 0.16758 0.24202 0.15222
Transpacific (w estbound) II 0.21406 0.19783 0.09710 0.36782 0.13012 0.29359
US - Central America II 0.09530 0.05981
US (all coasts) to the Indian Sub Continen t II 0.40069 0.32240 0.34983 0.32143
US (all coasts) to the Middle East II 0.30095 0.14904 0.23525 0.28282
US East Coast/ US Gulf to the Far East II 0.12184 0.11663 0.14079 0.12842 0.25589 0.19682
US Trade II 0.07232 0.07412 0.08160 0.12075 0.06233 0.24040
Ö ¼	¹ﬃ×ØÙ· ÚÛ» ºÜ-ºe» II 0.11745 0.12103 0.10160 0.24923 0.12708 0.07487 0.07596
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stud ied period. At disaggregated  level, the value of the instability index is also closer to 
zero than to one. Figure 3-13 shows the dynamics of competition over time. 
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQRIWKHLQVWDELOLW\LQGH[
Combining Figure 3-7, 3-9 and 3-12 firstly reveals that the market share instability index 
seems not to be lower in highly/ concentrated trade lanes. Secondly, the presence of a 
dominant liner operator in the Mediterranean-North America trade lane increases the 
market share instability index. Third ly, in trade lanes where Maersk Line lost its lead ing 
position, the market share instability index increased  significantly between 2006 and  
2007 (e.g. Transpacific, east-/ westbound; Transatlantic, east-/ westbound). Last, the 
market share instability index appears to fluctuate more in trade lanes labelled  ‘loose 
oligopoly’ . 
 5HODWLRQVKLSFRQFHQWUDWLRQ²LQVWDELOLW\LQGH[
Although competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured  by market structure alone, 
such as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and  other concentration ratios, it is interesting to 
look at the relationship between concentration and market share instability at trade level. 
To explain variations in the market share instability index (II) across trade lanes (L) and 
time periods (W), Eq. 2 was re-estimated now includ ing trade specific factors (7)6 ä å æ ) in the 
empirical specification. 
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7)6 ä å æ   stands for a k-vector control variables that may affect market share instability at 
trade level. Analogous to the estimated  model at industry level (see 3.2.4), trade growth 
(7*5 ä å æ ), its squared term ( ë²ìí î7*5 ), second  hand  prices (6(&21'+$1' æ ) and  the 
dummy variable 0(5*(5 are included  to control trade specific factors. 
To account for trade specific elements, Eq. 4 is estimated by using pooled least squares 
method  corrected  for fixed  effects in the cross-section dimensions. The standard errors 
are corrected  for heteroskedasticity using the White procedure. Both the estimates of the 
coefficients and  the fixed  effects are given in Figure 3-14.  
 
)LJXUH(VWLPDWHGUHVXOWVDWWUDGHOHYHO ï2ð 
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  Eastbound and  Westbound is abbreviated  to EB and  WB respectively. NB and SB stands for Northbound 
and  Southbound. 
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Firstly, in contrast to RE3 (see Figure 3-6), the squared  term of concentration (CR4^ 2) is 
no longer significant. So, a negative linear relationship between concentration and  
market share instability is found at trade level. Secondly, growth at trade level (TGR) is 
important in the model due to its disturbance effect on competition (Kato & Honjo, 
2006). In contrast to the estimated  results at industry level, the coefficient of trade lane 
growth (TGR) is significantly negative while its squared  term (TGR^ 2) show s a 
significant and positive growth. This result ind icates the presence of a U-shaped  
relationship between instability index and  trade lane growth. So, the instability index 
initially decreases and  then increases as growth increases from negative to positive 
levels. The outcome of this quadratic effect for trade lane growth concurs with the study 
of Davies and Geroski (1997). The minimum occurs at a TGR value of 0.15545 %. Davies 
and Geroski (1997) state that a value so close to zero implies that both positive and  
negative growth bring greater uncertainty. 
The question becomes whether this quadratic effect at trade level can be explained . A 
first explanation might be found in the commonly used volume (service) contracts with 
large shippers. Such volume (service) contracts establish freight rates, assured space, 
service levels, etc. for a predetermined period . A change in demand can be captured  
within the terms of the contract. So, volume (service) contracts might delay the 
destabilisation of market shares as long as the liner carrier is not brought up  against 
capacity constraints. This leads us towards the deployed capacity (e.g. on the 
Transatlantic trade, Maersk Line deploys ships with a capacity varying between 2,890 – 
5,040 TEUs, MSC runs this trade with vessels of 3,876 up to 6,732 TEUs while CMA CGM 
put into service vessels of about 2,556 TEUs). Given fixed  liner shipping capacity in the 
short-run and  mostly a capacity utilisation of less than 100 %, market shares are expected  
to be stable at low levels of trade lane growth. Stability should  fall or instability should  
increase when some competitors are brought up against capacity and  add  extra vessels 
and/ or upgrade scale. Next, according to Caves & Porter (1978), a fast growth could  
destabilise shares by widening the errors in firms’  p lanned capacities. Last, a growing 
trade lane is attractive for new entrants. Here, the results suggest that entry is only 
attractive as from a certain level of growth in the trade lane.  
Third ly, the regression coefficient of the 6(&21'+$1' ä å æ  variable remains negative and  
insignificant.  
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Last, the impact of the dummy variable 0(5*(5 at trade level is positive but not 
significant. 
 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
The objective of this paper was to study how the degree of concentration and  the degree 
of competition changes over time for the container liner shipping industry, both at 
aggregated and  d isaggregated  level. This study contributes to the CLSI literature.  
Two absolute ind icators of concentration (i.e. the four-firm concentration ratio and  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and one relative concentration measure (i.e. numbers 
equivalent) were calculated to assess the degree of concentration. The Hymer-Pashigan 
index of market share instability was employed to determine the degree of competition. 
Calculations were done both at industry and trade level. The assessment of market share 
instability by means of time-series method  may contribute to the characterisation of 
trade lane rivalry. 
This paper firstly presents evidence that the container liner shipping industry is 
becoming as a whole more concentrated. Regard ing the degree of competition over time, 
the value of the instability index is closer to zero than to one. This result ind icates that 
the container liner shipp ing industry is characterised by a relatively stable competition. 
This index also allowed  to measure rivals’  behaviour at the level of trade lane. At 
disaggregated  level, the degree of concentration and  degree of competition d iffers from 
trade route to trade route. Not surprisingly, the competition is in some trades stronger. 
From policy perspective, regulators should analyse the impact of a further merger at 
trade level. 
Secondly, linking the degree of concentration to the degree of oligopoly allows to 
catalogue the d ifferent trade lanes in no, loose or tight oligopolistic submarkets. This 
analysis is useful for policymakers who want to enhance competition. In the case of a 
new merger, the trade lane portfolio of the newly merged shipping company should be 
screened to ascertain that the degree of competition does not d iminish. This is certainly 
the case if the involved  trade lanes are labelled  ‘concentrated ’  or ‘highly concentrated ’ . 
Finally, the relationship between concentration and market share instability was 
analysed . Besides a graphical and  correlation analysis, an empirical model for the 
determinants of liner operators’  market share instability was estimated. The find ings 
indicate the presence of an inverted U-shaped  relationship between concentration and  
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market share instability at industry level. At trade level, concentration is negatively 
related  to market share instability and  evidence is provided that the variable ‘growth’  (in 
terms of volume) plays a major role in affecting the dynamics of market share. 
Future research is suggested  in testing the relationships concentration – instability index 
over a longer time period  and  in analysing the effect of cooperation between liner 
operators by re-computing the market share instability index using combined market 
shares. 
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$SSHQGL[&RQFHQWUDWLRQPHDVXUHV
Many ways to measure concentration exist. For the purpose of this paper, Appendix 3-1 
briefly describes two absolute indicators of concentration, viz. the n-firm concentration 
ratio (A1) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (A2)61 and one relative concentration 
measure, viz. the reciprocal measure, numbers equivalent62:  
Regard less the concentration measure, the market share of liner operator i is denoted  as 
si. There are n firms in the industry. The container liner operators are ordered accord ing 
to market share. Liner operator 1 has the largest market share, liner operator 2 has the 
second-largest market share and  so on (s1  s2 s3…sn). 
&5Q
In early empirical stud ies, the n-firm concentration ratio, denoted  as CRn, was the most 
common measure of concentration. The n-firm concentration ratio is the cumulative 
share of the n-largest container liner operators to the market. The formula for the n-firm 
concentration ratio is as follows:  
CRn = ∑
=
M
N
NV
1
     (A1) 
The number of liner operators included  in the concentration is not determined  by 
underlying principles. The four-firm concentration ratio, known as CR4, is the most 
typical concentration ratio for judging the degree of concentration in an industry. 
++,
HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. HHI takes into account both the number of 
liner operators and  the inequality of market shares. HHI is the sum of squares of all liner 
operators’  percentage of market shares, accord ing to the existing on board TEU (twenty 
equivalent unit) capacities of liner operators, and ranges from 0 (a perfectly competitive 
industry) to 10,000 (a monopoly).  
The HHI is a concentration measure based  on the sum of squares of market shares of all 
liner operators in the industry. The HHI is calculated  as follows 
                                                     
61
  See also Sys, 2009. 
62
  For an overview, see Lipczynski et al., 2005. 
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∑
=
=
n
1i
2
i 10,000 x sHHI     (A2)
This measure gives added  weight to the biggest operators. The principle is: the higher 
the index, the more concentration and (within limits) the less open market competition. 
As a benchmark, a market with an HHI below 1,000 is considered to be unconcentrated  
and unlikely to be subject to any adverse competitive effects. A value between 1,000 and 
1,800 generally ind icates moderate concentration. Any value over 1,800 indicates a 
highly concentrated  market (Shepherd , 1999 and Brooks, 2000). 
1(
The numbers-equivalent (NE) is computed by d ivid ing the theoretical maximum HHI 
(10,000) by the calculated  HHI. This reciprocal measure translates the measure of 
concentration, as reported  by the HHI, into the hypothetical equivalent number of 
equally-sized  firms constituting the same level of concentration. In other words: into a 
number to ind icate how many "effective" competitors exist in a sector (Lipczynski HWDO, 
2005 and  Gutiérrez, 2007).  
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 $QRQVWUXFWXUDOWHVWIRUFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKH
FRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\ O;P 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the competitive conditions of the containerised  liner shipping 
industry. The degree of competition prevailing in this industry w ill be assessed  using the 
H-statistic proposed by Panzar and  Rosse (1987). The properties of this non-structural 
methodology (e.g. using firm level data, robustness in small samples, no need  to specify 
a relevant market, etc.) make it an excellent framework for assessing the degree of 
competition in the containerised  liner shipping industry. The empirical specifications are 
based on an unbalanced  panel of data regard ing a sample of 18 major liner operators 
covering the 1999-2008 period. A significantly positive unscaled  value of the H-statistic 
has been found . This means that the hypothesis can be rejected  that the containerized  
liner shipping industry market structure corresponds to a neoclassical monopoly, a 
collusive oligopoly or a conjectural variations short run oligopoly. 
.H\ZRUGV:  
Container liner shipping industry, competition, Panzar-Rosse model 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
The liner shipping industry has experienced fundamental changes in recent years due to 
globalisation, deregulation, horizontal/ vertical integration, (increased) co-operation, 
rationalisation, developments in information technology, consolidation and  increased  
concentration. These developments may affect competition. As in other industries, 
competition in the (containerised) liner shipping industry matters for a number of 
reasons: it encourages the level of innovation (e.g. vessel size, low emission ships, 
tracking and  tracing of cargo, etc.) and the quality and efficiency of services rendered in 
the sector. 
Besides these changes, the liner shipping industry was under the spell of the question 
whether the block exemption would  be abolished . As from October 18th, 2008 this 
abolishment is a fact (EEC Regulation n° 4056/ 86)64. The liner carrier association, 
European Liner Affairs Association, expects the liner shipping market to become even 
more competitive as soon as conferences and  in particular conference surcharges65 and 
ancillary charges66 w ill d isappear.  
Remarkably, in publicly available reports of the European Commission - Directorate 
General of Competition (DG Comp  -
ec.europa.eu / comm/ competition/ antitrust/ overview_en.html), the European Shipper 
Council (ESC - www.europeanshippers.com) and the European Liner Affairs Association 
(ELAA - www.elaa.net), the degree of competition has never been established neither by 
applying the structural nor the non-structural approach. Knowledge of the degree of 
competition is important for antitrust authorities. This offers an extra incentive to 
examine the degree of competition. 
                                                     
64
  Since 1986, the European Commission has granted  a block exemption from the competition ru les for 
conference liner operators. A Block Exemption Regulation defines certain categories of agreements which 
are compatible with EU competition ru les provided  that the agreements meet the conditions laid  down 
in the Regulation. In March 2003, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition 
announced a review of Regulation 4056/ 86. On  September 25th, 2006, the Council agreed  to repeal 
Regulation 4056/ 86. By consequence, it pu ts an end  to the coord ination of prices, charges and  surcharges 
as well as coord inated  capacity management in Eu ropean Union trades as of October 2008. Since that 
date, liner operators have to fix their own freight rates and  any surcharge (European Commission, 1997 
and  2007; ELAA, 2003). 
65
  Surcharges relate to charges that are meant to cover uncertainties, such as the Bunker Adjustment Factor 
(BAF), Currency Adjustment Factor (CAF), Congestion Surcharges (CSC) and War Risk Surcharge (WRS) 
(Competition Commission of Singapore, 2006). 
66
  Ancillary charges – such as terminal handling charges, demurrage costs, change of destination, special 
equipment and  charges based  on the nature of the cargo (dangerous, noxious, refrigerated  etc.), … – 
cover the supplementary increase in charges that are triggered  by or linked  with the operation of moving 
containers, i.e. they are ancillary to the service provided  by liner operators (Competition Commission of 
Singapore, 2006). 
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The main emphasis of the present paper is to examine the competitive conditions of the 
liner shipping industry, more specifically, the containerised liner shipping industry 
(hereafter CLSI). To do this, a non-structural measurement of competition is documented  
and estimated  at the level of CLSI. For this purpose, and in function of data availability, 
a panel data set of 18 major liner operators w ith a global presence was set up. The 
evolution of the competitive structure of the CLSI w ill be stud ied  over the 1999-2008 
period. 
The paper w ill be structured as follows: Section 4-2 provides a brief overview of the 
literature. Section 4-3 is devoted to the non-structural methodology used to assess the 
degree of competition in the CLSI. Section 4-4 presents the data and  selection criteria. 
Section 4-5 reports and discusses the econometric results. Ultimately, section 4-6 
summarises and  d raws conclusions. 
 /LWHUDWXUHUHYLHZ
A scan of shipping literature reveals that a number of stud ies theoretically examined  the 
issue of competition in the liner shipping industry (e.g. Molenaar. & Van de Voorde, 
1994; Brooks, 2000; …). Few of these stud ies focused  on modelling competition (e.g. 
Sjostrom, 2002). Additionally, literature has long focused  on the regulation/ deregulation 
of the liner shipping industry (for example: see EC DG COMP, 1997 and 2007; Heaver, 
2001; OECD, 2002; ELAA, 2003; Benacchio HWDO, 2007).  
In contrast, assessing empirically the degree of competition is a recurrent topic in the 
literature of other newly liberalised  service sectors, such as banking industry, 
telecommunication, broadcasting, etc.. This literature shows two major approaches, viz. 
the structural and the non-structural approach. The structural approach is based on the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. It is assumed that observable 
structural characteristics of a market determine the conduct of firms operating in that 
market which in turn influences measurable aspects of market performance. In contrast, 
the non-structural approach attempts to d raw inferences about market structure and  
competitive conditions from d irect observations of conduct at firm level (Martin, 2002; 
Lipcynski HWDO, 2005). 
As a reaction to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings attributed  to the structural 
stream, namely recognition of the need  to endogenise market structure and  the neglect 
of potential competition (Gischer and  Stiele, 2009), non-structural models of competitive 
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behaviour have been developed . These ‘New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO)’  
approaches, such as the Iwata-model (1974), Bresnahan (1982) and  Lau (1982) mark-up 
model, and Panzar and  Rosse (1987) model measure competition and analyse the 
competitive conduct of firms without using explicit information about the structure of 
the market.  
As the first two models are very data-intensive, the majority of the studies have 
investigated  competition using the non-structural methodology put forward  by Panzar 
and Rosse - the so-called  H-statistic - (1HZVSDSHU LQGXVWU\: Panzar & Rosse, 1987; 
%DQNLQJ67: Shaffer, 1993; Vesala, 1995; Bikker & Groeneveld , 2000; De Bandt & Davis, 
2000; Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Bikker, 2004; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Bikker, Spierdijk, & 
Finnie, 2006 and 2008; Al-Muharrami HW DO, 2006; Matthews, Murinde & Zhao, 2007; 
Chan et al, 2007; Goddard  & Wilson, 2007; Gutiérrez, 2007; Gischer and  Stiele (2008); 
Bikker, Shaffer and  Spierd ijk (2009); /LIHLQVXUDQFH: Bikker & Leuvensteijn, 2008; 3K\VLFLDQ
VHUYLFHVLQGXVWU\: Wong, 1995; &LJDUHWWHLQGXVWU\: Sullivan, 1985; Ashenfelter and  Sullivan, 
1987; 6HFXULW\VHFWRU: Tsutsui and Kamesakab, 2005).  
In the field  of transport, two stud ies were found applying this methodology. First, 
Fischer and  Kamerschen (2003) applied  the Panzar-Rosse test to assess market 
performance in selected  airport-pairs originating from Atlanta. Secondly, Endo (2005) 
stud ied the competitive nature of the liner shipping industry estimating Panzar-Rosse 
H-statistic based on panel data of three major Japanese shipping companies between 
1986 and  2002. He concluded: “ 3DQ]DU5RVVH +VWDWLVWLF LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH WKUHH PDMRU
-DSDQHVHOLQHUFDUULHUV68GRQRWEHKDYHDVIRUPLQJSHUIHFWFROOXVLRQ7KLVUHVXOWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
PRQRSROLVWLF FRPSHWLWLRQ ,W VHHPV WKDW FRPSHWLWLRQ KDV EHHQ LQWHQVLILHG IROORZLQJ WKH
LQWURGXFWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQSURPRWLRQSROLF\.”  (Endo, 2005).  
An extra advantage of the Panzar-Rosse model (hereafter, abbreviated to the P-R model), 
as well as other non-structural models, is that there is no need  to specify a relevant  
  
                                                     
67
 The booming of papers in the banking industry is fuelled by recent developments in the European 
banking industry (e.g. financial liberalisation, ongoing economic and  regulatory integration, introduction 
of the Euro, developments in information technology, etc.). 
68
 Endo most likely studied  the behaviour of Mitsu i O.S.K Lines (MOL), N ippon Yusen Kaisha (N YK) and 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (K-line). Their shipping business is wide-ranging, covering container, car, bu lk 
and  energy resources transport. 
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market69, since the behaviour of ind ividual firms provides an ind ication of their market 
power. Furthermore, the P-R approach works well with firm-specific data on revenues 
and factor prices, and does not require information about equilibrium output prices and  
quantities for the firm and/ or industry. In addition, the P-R approach is robust in small 
samples, while the Bresnahan-Lau model tends to exhibit an anticompetitive bias in 
small samples (Shaffer, 2004).  
The fact that the P-R methodology uses firm-level data on revenues and  factor prices, is 
robust in small samples and  does not need the specification of the  relevant market 
makes it an excellent framework for assessing the degree of competition for the CLSI. 
 0HWKRGRORJ\
This section presents the theoretical background  of the P-R model, the interpretation of 
the +-statistic, the debate regard ing the dependent variable and  subsequently focuses on 
the empirical implementation of the model. 
 7KHRUHWLFDOEDFNJURXQGRIWKH35PRGHO
Rosse & Panzar (1977) and  Panzar & Rosse (1987) developed  a non-structural estimation 
technique to d iscriminate between oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive and 
perfectly competitive markets. For this purpose, the P-R model derives a competition 
indicator also referred  to as the H-statistic or revenue test. The H-statistic provides a 
quantitative assessment of the competitive nature of a market. This statistic is calculated  
from reduced-form revenue equations and  measures the elasticity of total revenues with 
respect to changes in factor input prices. 
The P-R model starts from a number of assumptions. Firstly, firms are treated  as profit-
maximising, single product firms. The single product firm assumption is consistent with 
the intermediation approach. The intermediation approach which describes liner 
operators as profit-maximising firms that transport boxes (standard ized twenty feet 
equivalent units, TEU’s) by using physical capital (assets i.e. ships), human labour and  
financial capital as input is adopted . Secondly, higher input prices must not be correlated  
                                                     
69
 Although the Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Maritime Transport Services 
(OJ C 245, 26.09.2008) state that it is necessary to define the relevant product and  geographic market(s), it 
is not possible to use data at p roduct level and/ or geographical markets level due to a shortage in data of 
input factor p rices with respect to specific trades (e.g. the eastbound market d iffers from the westbound 
market), to products (niche products (dangerous goods, reefer,...) versus transportation of a box), etc. 
Applying the Panzar Rosse model solves this problem. 
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with higher quality services that generate higher revenues because such a correlation 
would  bias the calculated  H-statistic. A final crucial assumption is that the firm must be 
in long-run equilibrium (Panzar & Rosse, 1987; De Bandt & Davis, 2000)70.  
Given these assumptions Panzar and  Rosse [21] start their analysis with the firm’s profit 
function. A firm L wants to produce the output level [ Q  which maximizes  
 i = Ri – Ci =  (xi, z i, w i, ti) (1) 
where [ Q  refers to the output of firm L, ] Q  and W Q  denote resp. a vector of exogenous 
variables that shift the firm ’s revenue function, Z Q  is a vector of m factor p rices of firm L. 
The vectors ] Q  and  W Q  may or may not have variables in common. Hereafter subscripts 
referring to firm i are dropped .  
Next, they consider an equi-proportionate increase in all factor input prices, from w to  
(1+h) w. Let x° be the argument that maximises profit function (1) and x1 the output that 
maximises  (x, z, (1+h) w , t) with the scalar h ≥ 0. Then, let R°= R(x°, z) ≡ R*(z,w ,t) and 
R1= R(x1, z) ≡ R*(z,(1+h) w, t). R* denotes the firm’s reduced  form revenue function. By 
definition 
 R1 - C(x1, (1+h) w, t) ≥ R° - C(x°, (1+h) w, t) (2) 
Costs are linearly homogeneous in factor input prices, so (2) can be rewritten as 
 R1 – (1+h)C(x1, w , t) ≥ R° - (1+h)C(x°, w, t) (3) 
which subsequently resu lts in 
 (R1 – R°)/ h = [R*(z, (1+h) w, t) – R*(z, w , t)]/ h ≤ 0 (4) 
Assuming that the reduced-form revenue equation is d ifferentiable, taking the limit of 
(4) for h Æ 0 and  d ivid ing by R* yields 
 H= ∑
=
∂
∂R
S
S
S 5
Z
Z
5 T
T1
*
*
.  (5) 
Market power is measured  by the amount to which a change in P factor input prices 
( UVZ∂ ) is mirrored  in the equilibrium revenues ( *W5∂ ) realised  by firm i.  
                                                     
70
  The Panzar Rosse methodology has been largely applied in the banking industry. Although to provide 
banking services, a bank license is a condition for a financial institu tion under most jurisd ictions, every 
study accepted  the assumption of free entry and/ or exit. In contrast, the containerized  liner shipping 
industry is not regulated . We also accept this assumption. 
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In order to calculate the H-statistic, the following linear regression is used 71: 
Ln Ri,t = 0 + 1 ln (w 1,i,,t) + 2 ln (w 2,i,,t) + 3 ln (w 3,i,,t) + ∑
=
+
X
Y Z
[YY )6)
4
,,3β  i,t (6) 
The notation is as follows: the subscript L and  W values represent firm L at time W. Ri,t 
denotes the revenue of firm L in year W and Z\ ] Q ] ] ^
 
 represents the price of factor input M paid  
by firm L in year W. If the price of factor inputs cannot be observed  directly, they are 
usually imputed  using the ratio of quantity of each factor employed to the level of 
expenditure on the same factor (Lipczynski HW DO, 2005). )6)\  stand for firm specific 
exogenous factors and  Q ] ^  denotes an error term. With three factor inputs in the notation 
of Eq. 6, the Panzar-Rosse H-VWDWLVWLF LVGHILQHGDV+  1  2  3. Thus, Panzar and  
Rosse define a measure of competition H as the sum of elasticities of the reduced-form 
revenues w ith respect to factor prices.  
 (PSLULFDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH35PRGHO
The P-R revenue test is implemented  by estimating the following linear regression using 
container d ivision level data, in line w ith Equation 6: 
WLWL0$'800<WL$/'800<WL9(66(/&$3WL(47$
WL3&(WL3/WL327851 _`
,
)
,
_ln()
,
_ln()
,
ln()
,
ln(
)
,
ln(3),ln(2),ln(10ln
4321
,
εγγγγ
ββββ
++++
++++=
(7) 
where 7851 Q ] ^  denotes the turnover at container d ivision level; 32 Q ] ^
 
is a proxy for the 
input price of operation and  calculated  as the ratio of operating expenses to transported  
TEU; 3/ Q ] ^  is a proxy for the input price of labour and calculated  as  the ratio of staff 
expenses to the number of employees and 3&( Q ] ^  is a proxy for input price of capital stock 
and obtained by divid ing the non-operating expenses by total assets for the business 
segment container shipping.  
Next, a set of CLSI-specific variables are added  in essence to catch d ifferences in risk and  
business profile. The first control variable, (47$ Q ] ^  (Equity to Total Assets) accounts for 
the leverage reflecting d ifferences in risk preferences. Secondly, the business profile is 
proxied  by the ratio of TEU capacity to the number of ships (&$39(66(/ Q ] ^ ). This 
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 See Panzar & Rosse, 1987 and Bikker et al., 2006 for the translation of the theoretical P-R model into an 
emp irical specification by using a simp le single product monopoly model w ith a demand curve of 
constant price elasticity and  a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas technology. 
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variable is included  to control for d ifferences in deployed  ship sizes. A positive 
coefficient value is expected  since larger ship size should  provide economies of scale, 
hence a higher return. In add ition, two dummy variables taking on the values 1 and  0 
are included  to capture the effect of being a member of an alliance ('800<B$/) 
and/ or to study the impact of mergers and  acquisitions ('800<B0$) on turnover.  
8OWLPDWHO\ i,t is a stochastic d istu rbance term  which is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution (
 i,t ~ N(0, òThe subscript Ldenotes liner operator L and  the subscript W 
denotes year W. All variables are taken in natural logarithms. 
 (TXLOLEULXPWHVW
A key assumption underlying the P-R model is that the H-test must be undertaken on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium. In long-run equilibrium, rates of return 
should  be uncorrelated with input prices. The equilibrium test is based on a regression in 
which the dependent variable TURN in Eq. 7 is replaced  by a measure of profitability 
such as return on assets (ROA). Since ROA can take on small negative values, following 
Claessens and  Laeven (2004), the dependent variable is calculated  as ln(1 + ROA) where 
ROA is the unadjusted  return on assets. The data set allows for the estimation of the 
equilibrium test as shown in the following equation: 
WLXWL0$'800<WL$/'800<WL9(66(/&$3WL(47$
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The long-run equilibrium test measures the sum of the elasticity of return on assets with 
respect to input prices (  1  2  3). If the E-statistic equals zero, it implies that the 
CLSI is in long-run equilibrium72. If rejected , the market is assumed not to be in 
equilibrium. Figure 4-1 gives an overview  of the tests (equilibrium test and competitive 
environment test) and  the relation with the market structure. 
                                                     
72
  It should  be noted  that equilibrium does not mean that competitive cond itions are not allowed to change 
during the sample period . It only imp lies that changes are to be taken as gradual (Shaffer, 1982; 
Claessens and  Laeven, 2004).  
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)LJXUH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI(VWDWLVWLFDQG+VWDWLVWLF
 ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH+VWDWLVWLF
The H-statistic ranges from minus infinity to unity. Until the publication of a recent 
contribution by Bikker, Shaffer and  Spierdijk (2009) the following conclusions were 
reached on the relation between H  and  market structure: 
If firms pricing policies are consistent with the model of monopoly or a perfect collud ing 
oligopoly, H is negative. In long-run equilibrium, the market structure is characterized  
by monopolistic competition, if H  is positive but less than unity and  by perfect 
competition if the H-statistic equals unity (Panzar and  Rosse, 1977). Shaffer (1982) 
proved  that a monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable market and  a sales 
maximising firm subject to a break even constraint also are consistent with an H-statistic 
of unity. In 1983, Shaffer (1993) showed that a short-run conjectural variations oligopoly 
corresponds with H   7KH QXPHULFDO YDOXH RI WKH +-statistic is interpreted as a 
continuous measure of the level of competition (Shaffer, 1993). So, an H-value closer to 
unity ind icates a stronger competition than lower values (Vesala, 1995, p . 56, Bikker and  
Haaf, 2002, p . 2203). 
Figure 4-1 summarises the interpretation of the H-statistic. To assure a valid  
interpretation of the PR model, the market has to be in a long-run equilibrium. The long-
run equilibrium test or E-statistic (see section 4.3.3) is already integrated in this 
ab-bﬁc!d'eﬂfDg h/i
jlk bmf nﬂf g bmf g o E < 0
disequilibrium
pﬀk b&f nqfDg b&fDg o r#st 0 < H < 1 H = 1
uwv h/eLx*v f y
without threat of entry
ab-bﬁc!d'eﬂfDg h/i
pﬀk b&f nqfDg b&fDg o
znv {Lxf;bmfDv cLoqfDcwv x
monopoly
collusive oligopoly
short-run conjectural 
variation oligopoly
other cases perfect competition
Natural monopoly in a 
contestable market
Sales maximising firm subject 
to a breakeven constraint
uwv h/eLx*v f y
revenu of the firm is 
independent of 
decision of rivals, 
actual or potential
e!v h*|Dg fﬀdnq}~g d'g bqg iL|&g v d
revenu of the firm is affected by the actions of others

hﬀiwk v cwixw*c!g

g wv g cwd
E = 0
equilibrium
free entry and exit result in zero profits in equilibrium
H > 0H 0
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overview . For either monopoly or collusive oligopoly, the assumption of profit 
maximisation is sufficient (See Panzar & Rosse, 1987, p . 446). 
Turning to the new interpretation of the H-statistic, Bikker HWDO (2009) link the properties 
of the H-statistic with the shape of the average cost function (i.e. u-shaped  versus 
constant average cost function) to allow meaningful interpretations. Figure 4-4 sums up  
the properties of the H-statistic accord ing to Bikker HWDO (2009). 

)LJXUH3URSHUWLHVRIWKH+VWDWLVWLF & 
In the same study, they also show that the equilibrium test is a joint test for competitive 
conduct and  long-run structural equilibrium, and the unscaled  P-R test is a one-tail test 
of conduct. So, according to their findings, a positive unscaled  value of the H-statistic is 
inconsistent w ith any form of imperfect competition, while a negative value may arise 
under various conditions, includ ing short-run competition or even long-run competition 
with constant average cost (Bikker HW DO, 2009). In other words, a negative unscaled  
H-value cannot by itself d iscriminate between perfect and  imperfect competition without 
information about the shape of the cost function. 
For the containerised liner shipping industry,  a U-shaped  average cost curve is 
assumed. While the presence of large and  small liner operators might suggest that scale 
effects are not important, increased concentration (e.g. Hoffman, 1998; Sys, 2009), 
explosion in containership size (e.g. Cullinane & Khanna, 2000; Sys HWDO, 2008), etc. are 
indications that scale effects are important in this industry. 
Ultimately, Bikker HW DO (2009) also concluded that the numerical value of H is not a 
reliable ind icator of the strength of competition.  
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  Source: Bikker q(L ., 2009. 
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 'DWDGHVFULSWLRQ
Data has been obtained  from Liner Intelligence financial analysis (www.ci-online.co.uk) 
and from investor/ annual reports published on the publicly available internet websites 
of the selected  liner carriers74. In the notes to financial statement as well as fact books, 
Powerpoint presentations, etc. more information at the level of the container shipping 
division was available. Subsequently, extra data (e.g. number of staff, staff costs, etc.) 
also has been obtained from these complementary files. The resulting panel of container-
related  financial results (in millions of USD) is unbalanced as (for a variety of reasons) 
not all liner operators submit information for all the variables throughout the entire 
period. 
First, ad justments to the resulting panel were made exclud ing all observations where 
liner operators reported missing values for operating income and  net profit (e.g. 
Hamburg Süd, Pacific International Line, United Arab Shipping Company). Next, some 
liner operators were deleted  as segmented  figures for container d ivision were not 
available (e.g. Evergreen, Hyundai Merchant Marine). Ultimately, because the test for 
the nature of competitive conditions is based  on the properties of a reduced form log-
linear revenue equation and  logarithms of negative values do not exist, observations 
with negative values were d ropped.  
Despite the above modifications, the small sample should be regarded as fairly 
representative and  comprehensive.  
In sum, the empirical specifications at container d ivision level are based on an 
unbalanced panel data for a sample of 18 major liner operators covering the 1999-2008 
period. 
                                                     
74
  Data incurred  in currencies other than US dollars were translated  into US dollar using the cu rrency 
convertor www.oanda.com/ currency/ convertor at the currency exchange rate prevailing at the balance 
sheet data (End of March or December).  
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
)LJXUH6DPSOHRIVHOHFWHGOLQHURSHUDWRUV
Figure 4-5 lists the selected  ocean carriers. As the study uses firm-level data aggregated  
from raw balance sheet data, it is noteworthy that the second largest liner operator, 
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) is not integrated in the sample.  
 (PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
In this section, the econometric results are reported and  d iscussed . The reduced-form 
revenue function expressed  in equation 7 is linear in its unknown parameters and, 
therefore, amenable to estimation by least squares regression methods (OLS).  
Figure 4-6 summarises the results of the E-statistic (RE1: ROA) and  the estimated values 
of H-statistic of three regressions (RE2/ 3/ 4: TURN) (includ ing t-values and  p-values). 
The reported standard  errors are based  on White’s heteroskedasticity robust covariance 
matrix. The test results for the hypothesis H = 0 and 1 are also reported . 
¦/§C¨C©ª*«
¬!­/®L­ ¯L°
¨ª~±(²³wª~± §´ ²± µ¶ª~·C³w§L¸Cª ¹ﬀº»
­/®q¼­/®ﬁ¼¬!­/®L­¾½'¿ﬀ®­*­
¹
²~´ §!À/± ªÁ~ª;¨CÂ9§L´
Ã
²¨´ §
°
¨wª~±/À ªwÁ~ª;À
Ä
¬!­*­*Å!Æ
»
¿;Ç È
À À
°
§!¨
Ã
ª(É
½Ê(È
5 APL/ NOL w w w .nol.com.sg 549,508 4.41% 7,945 NWA
29 CCNI w w w .ccni.cl 36,712 0.30% 972
8 China Shg C.L. (CSCL) w w w .cscl.com.cn 453,009 3.64% 5,070 Ë
3 ÌÎÍÐÏÑÌÎÒÍ w w w .cma-cgm.com 1,031,327 8.29% 13,393 Ë
7 COSCO Container L. w w w .coscon.com 453,204 3.64% 6,391 CHKY
13 CSAV w w w .csav.com 328,721 2.64% 4,887
9 Hanjin Shipping w w w .hanjin .com 440,299 3.54% 6,559 CHKY Ë
6 ÓJÔLÕ*ÔLÖ×CØ ÙﬂÚCÛ w w w .hapag-lloyd.com 462,288 3.72% 8,767 GA Ë
11 K-Line w w w .kline.com 342,043 2.75% 11,421 CHKY
1 Í#ÔLÜﬂÝ-Þlß9×Cà á(Ü w w w .maerskline.com 2,044,981 16.44% 28,666 Ë
36 Matson w w w .matson .com 29,074 0.23% 1,024
21 MISC Berhad w w w .misc.com.my 125,101 1.01% 3,727 GA
12 Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) w w w .mol.co.jp 341,820 2.75% 6,529 NWA Ë
10 NYK w w w .nykline.com 375,925 3.37% 6,061 GA
14 OOCL w w w .oocl.com 324,209 2.61% 6,502 GA
25 RCL w w w .rclgroup.com 53,435 0.43% 584
15 Yang Ming Line w w w .yml.com.tw 312,962 2.52% 3,573 CHKY
17 ZIM w w w .zim.co.il 305,523 2.46% 4,325
CHKY CHKY Alliance
GA Grand Alliance
NWA New  World Alliance
MS100 market share based on TOP100 
Liner operators in  bold  are Europe-based carriers
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)LJXUH3DQHOHVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKH35PRGHO
We experimented  with different cod ing of the variable GXPP\0$. In the regressions 1 
and 2, the dummy variable, GXPP\0$ is set equal to one in the year of the merger and  
zero in other years. In regression 2 the merger activity is assumed to last a number of 
years. The best results were obtained  with a lag of two years. In regression 3, the dummy 
variable, GXPP\0$E was coded one for liner operators involved in a merger and  
acquisition in the year of the merger and all consecutive years, zero otherwise (i.e. before 
mergers and  for liner operators not involved  in mergers). This means that it is assumed  
that a merger has a permanent impact on turnover. This is a too strong assumption given 
the results for regression 3. Although for all regressions, the 5-squared  is high (>70%) 
and they are able to exp lain a large fraction of the variation in turnover, it is clear that 
the results for RE2 give the best fit in terms of the adjusted  R².  
Over the regressions, the +-statistic varies for the containerized  liner shipping industry 
from 0.68 to 0.87 but is in all cases largely d riven by the price of operations. The 
assumption that mergers may have a lasting or permanent character as is the case in RE2 
and RE3, reduces the significance of the impact of membership of an alliance. The 
estimation results show a positive value for OQ(47$ or equity to total assets which 
accounts for the leverage reflecting differences in risk preferences [62]. A possible 
explanation may be that capital buffers encourage risk-taking (i.e. to order larger ship  
sizes).  
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Intercept 0.1646 0.4675 0.6416 0.9481 0.4053 0.6865 5.2452 0.9003 0.3716 0.7771 0.2910 0.7719 2.0031 0.3560 0.7230 1.0083 0.4370 0.6635
lnPO -0.0206 -1.3051 0.1963 0.4757 3.7910 0.0003 -0.1406 -0.5221 0.6035 0.3783 2.9430 0.0045 -0.1829 -0.6816 0.4979 0.4034 3.7053 0.0004
lnPL 0.0033 0.3087 0.7585 0.2046 3.9849 0.0002 0.1321 0.7544 0.4536 0.1559 2.4864 0.0154 0.1447 0.8299 0.4097 0.1611 2.7854 0.0069
lnPCE 0.0002 0.0294 0.9766 0.1899 3.1127 0.0027 0.0752 0.5747 0.5677 0.1486 2.5172 0.0142 0.1131 0.8526 0.3971 0.1639 2.4366 0.0173
lnEQTA 0.0288 1.9615 0.0539 0.2130 5.6220 0.0000 0.3314 1.2793 0.2057 0.1638 3.9435 0.0002 0.5702 2.2730 0.0264 0.1826 5.5712 0.0000
lnCAPVESSEL -0.0287 -0.7946 0.4296 1.5616 7.3504 0.0000 -1.0839 -1.7792 0.0803 1.4140 6.0141 0.0000 -0.6325 -1.0570 0.2945 1.4204 6.5167 0.0000
DUMMY_AL 0.0499 2.3516 0.0216 -0.5211 -3.4714 0.0009 0.7544 1.7880 0.0788 -0.1475 -0.8861 0.3787 0.3664 0.8495 0.3987 -0.1843 -1.1261 0.2639
DUMMY_MA 0.0170 0.5020 0.6173 0.4920 3.5161 0.0008 0.2890 0.5283 0.5992 0.4642 3.7745 0.0003 -0.3229 -1.5124 0.1354
DUMMY_MA(-1) -0.4536 -0.8029 0.4252 0.7904 4.0800 0.0001
DUMMY_MA(-2) -0.3957 -0.6458 0.5209 0.7056 4.7507 0.0000
DUMMY_MAb 0.7671 3.9950 0.0002
E-value -0.0171 0.0667 0.07485
H-value 0.87029 0.68281 0.72838
Wald test (F-statistic) 
for testing E = 0 0.68678 0.4102 0.03601 0.8501 0.04560 0.8316
Wald test (F-statistic) 
for testing H = 0 45.1944 0.0000 16.2784 0.0001 30.5243 0.0000
Wald test (F-statistic) 
for testing H = 1 1.00401 0.3197 3.51281 0.0653 4.24458 0.0430
R² 0.74127 0.80939 0.78236
Adj. R² 0.71576 0.78378 0.7609
N° of observations 76 79 70 77 72 79
ñﬁòDó ô õ ñlöq÷ ñﬁòDó ø&õ ùlúñﬁû ñﬁò ü ô õ ñlöq÷ ñﬁò üDø&õ ù-úñﬁû ñﬁò ý ô õ ñlöﬁ÷ ñﬁò ý ø&õ ù-úﬂñﬁû
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 ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH+VWDWLVWLF
Firstly, we interpret the +-statistic in accordance w ith the traditional approach 
summarized  in Table 1. Prior to estimating the +-statistic, an equilibrium test was 
conducted  to verify the long-run equilibrium assumption of the P-R model. The test for 
long-run equilibrium based  on equation 8 and  the estimates reported  in column RE1a of 
Table 4 yields an (-statistic that is close enough to zero. Accord ing to the results of a 
Wald test the null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium cannot be rejected  at a 5% 
significance level. Consequently, the +-statistic can be interpreted  for all the market 
models. The equilibrium test was also conducted  for the regressions 2 and 3 (see 
columns RE2a and  RE3a). In each scenario the null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium 
cannot be rejected  at a 5% significance level. 
Accord ing to Table 1, the P-R model show s that the +-statistic can be used  to identify the 
market structure in which a carrier operates. For equation RE2b, an unscaled  +-statistic 
of 0.68 would  suggest that the CLSI could  be described  as d isplaying monopolistic 
competitive behaviour. Or, an increase in costs causes turnover to increase at a lower 
rate (0 < + < 1).  
The usual statistical framework is applied to test the value of H. Following Bikker HWDO 
(2006), a t-test for the one-sided  hypotheses and a Wald-test for the two-sided ones are 
used . The one-sided  test for monopoly (H 0: H    YHUVXV+1: H  > 0) rejects the null 
hypothesis. To test whether or not the calculated  H-statistic is statistically d ifferent from 
zero and unity, the Wald test (F-statistics) was conducted. The null hypothesis of the 
two-sided  test for the value of H (H 0: + = 0 versus H 1: + FDQclearly be rejected . The 
)-statistic of 3.51 implies that the hypothesis that + = 1 can be rejected  at the 10% 
significance level.  
So, the +-statistic suggests that the CLSI operates in a monopolistic competitive 
environment. Furthermore perfect competition, sales maximising firms subject to 
breakeven constraint and natural monopoly in a contestable market can be rejected  at a 
10% significance level, even at a 5% significance level if RE4 is considered . 
Secondly, following Bikker HWDO (2009), the interpretation of the H-statistic deviates from 
prior stud ies. The estimate of the H-statistic based  on an unscaled  revenue equation is 
significantly positive in all regressions (RE1/ 2/ 3a). According to Figure 4-4, a 
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significantly positive unscaled  value of H  is inconsistent with any form of monopoly or 
collusive oligopoly but under certain conditions, it is consistent with monopolistic 
competition. Based  on the unscaled PR model, we reject the null hypothesis (H  < 0) 
based on a one-sided t-test. Then, accord ing to the study of Bikker HWDO (2009), no further 
tests are required to rule out the possibility of neoclassical monopolist, collusive 
oligopolist or short-run conjectural variation oligopolist. 
 2WKHUUHJUHVVLRQV
We also ran several regressions to test alternative variables (e.g. non-operating expenses 
to transported  TEU, dummy variable indicating liner operators quoted on the stock 
exchange, etc.).  Neither of these tests had any significant effect. Next, macro data (e.g. 
GDP, world container traffic to GDP,…) was included  in the P-R model (Bikker HW DO, 
2008). The outcomes were not statistically significant. 
In add ition, we worked  with a time-dependent coefficient since liberalisation, 
deregulation, etc. may cause changes in the competitive structure of a market over time. 
For that reason, Bikker and  Haaf (2002) add  a time-dependent coefficient, assuming that 
the long-run equilibrium market structure changes gradually over time. The reduced  
form revenue equation is then written as 
WLWL0$'800<WL$/'800<WL9(66(/&$3WL(47$
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The time-dependent +-statistic can be written as +7,0(        H    For a 
situation where the competitive structure is constant over time  will be equal to zero. 
For the CLSI, the test yields a not significant , ind icating no significant changes in 
competitive conditions. 
Ultimately, to identify whether ind ividual liner operators’  features have a significant 
effect on the competitive structure, a series of specification tests were run between 
pooled  OLS, fixed  effects and random effects. It comes as no surprise that the fit of the 
P-R model w ith fixed effects (measured  by 5²) is higher. Based on the Hausman test, the 
random effects model was rejected in favour of fixed  effects. However, fixed  effects 
estimation of a static revenue equation results in an upward  bias of the unscaled  
H-statistic (see also Goddard  & Wilson, 2007). Goddard and  Wilson suggest a dynamic 
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panel estimation method. In this stage of the research, the small number of observations 
does not allow the estimation of a dynamic revenue equation. 
 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
This paper investigates in detail the competitive conditions of the containerised  liner 
shipping industry for the period 1999 to 2008, viz. the period  before the abolishment of 
the conferences in liner shipping industry and the financial and economic crisis. 
To assess the degree of competition at the level of the container liner shipping industry, 
a modern empirical analysis based  on the non-structural method developed  by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) was conducted . This method is also known as the H-statistic or revenue 
test. It examines whether the conduct of a liner operator is in accordance w ith the models 
of perfect competition, imperfect or monopolistic competition, or monopoly. A new 
study of Bikker, Shaffer & Spierd ijk (2009) adds that only an unscaled revenue equation 
yields a valid  measure for competitive conduct. The methodology has been applied  to 
several sectors ranging from banking systems to airline industries. To test the impact on 
firm-level revenues of variations in the prices of factors of production, a sample of 
18 liner operators was observed.  
The main finding of the study is that the significantly positive unscaled  value of the 
H-statistic for the containerised  liner shipping industry means that the hypothesis can be 
rejected  that the CLSI market structure corresponds with a neoclassical monopolist, 
collusive oligopolist or conjectural-variations short-run oligopolist. An equilibrium test 
was also conducted to satisfy the long-run equilibrium assumption of the P-R model. 
Noteworthy is the impact of mergers and  acquisitions on turnover. The results show that 
the liner operators involved  in mergers and  acquisitions have higher revenues in later 
years  
From a policy viewpoint, the find ings of this study have a high economic relevance since 
it is important to have information on the degree of competition in the container liner 
shipping industry. The results of the present study form a good starting point to 
compare and to evaluate the effects of future changes and  regulations in the stated  
industry. The findings are also interesting for the liner operators since the market 
structure under which a carrier operates determines its behaviour. 
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An interesting avenue for future research might be to focus on applying the Panzar-
Rosse model between port pairs to assess the nature of the trade lanes in which the liner 
operator competes. In this stage of the research, due to a shortage of data, these aspects 
could  not be examined. 
The Panzar Rosse model might also be applied on other business segments of the liner 
shipping industry (e.g. bulk transport, tanker segment as well as terminal operations) or 
other transport modes. 
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Abstract75 
How does competition in the container liner shipping industry evolve over time? To 
answer this question, the present paper examines a new model-based  measure of 
competition. This measure of competition based  on Boone’s theoretical work quantifies 
the impact of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of p rofits or market 
shares. Boone (2000 and 2004) shows that when profit d ifferences are increasingly 
determined by marginal cost differences, this ind icates increased competition. The 
evolution of competition w ill be calculated using a pooled data set of 20 liner operators. 
The sample period  covers the years from 2000 to 2008. The analysis is carried out at 
industry level. After correcting for industry-specific effects (i.e. number of services, 
average ship size), the find ings suggest that over the 2000-2008 period  the competition 
has intensified . 
.H\ZRUGV: 
Competition, Container liner shipping industry, Boone ind icator, Efficiency, Market 
structure 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Accord ing to economic theory, firms under monopolistic competition and  oligopoly earn 
supernormal profits in the short-run while profits will tend towards a normal level for 
all firms in the industry in the long-run. Sys HWDO (2010) state that the containerised  liner 
shipping industry (hereafter abbreviated , CLSI) operates in a monopolistic competitive 
environment and  that the market structures, viz. perfect competition, sales maximising 
firm subject to breakeven constraint and  natural monopoly in a contestable market can 
be rejected at a 10 % significance level. This points in the d irection of the opportunity to 
earn supernormal profits. On the other hand, the transport sector generally is known for 
its small profit margins. Thus, the CLSI might be characterised by small profit margins. 
Two opposite find ings. 
Maritime advisor, Drewry (2009, p . 1) observes that “ 5XQQLQJDJOREDOFRQWDLQHUEXVLQHVVLV
QR GLIIHUHQW IURPEHLQJ D VPDOOPDQXIDFWXUHU RI WH[WLOHV ² WKHXOWLPDWH DLPPXVW EH WR UHPDLQ
SURILWDEOHQRWWREHWKHELJJHVW&ROOHFWLYHRFHDQFDUULHUVWUDWHJ\KDVFHUWDLQO\QHYHUUHVXOWHGLQ
WKH IRUPHU DW OHDVW IRU DQ\ VXVWDLQHGSHULRG”  Given the quote by Drewry, the scenario of 
small profit margins is expected .  
The aim of the present paper is to better comprehend  the performance of the liner 
operators. To do this, this paper uses the Boone indicator. The Boone indicator measures 
the effect of efficiency on performance. 
The remainder of this paper is structured  as follows. Section 5-2 first analyses the 
profitability of the container liner shipping industry. Section 5-3 provides a brief 
overview  of empirical stud ies which concentrate on the causes and  effects of market 
performance. The Boone ind icator is introduced in Section 5-4. This section also contains 
a brief survey of the literature on this particular methodology. The data is described  in 
the following section. Using firm-level data, Section 5-6 presents the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5-7 ends w ith conclud ing remarks, sets a few challenges for further 
economic research and  derives implications for policy makers. 
 
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 3URILWDELOLW\RIWKHFRQWDLQHUOLQHUVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
As background  for the empirical part of this paper, this section provides an overview of 
the profitability of the container liner shipping industry from 2000 to mid 2010.  
To study the profitability of the CLSI, the evolution of three profitability measures w ill 
be examined 76. First, Appendix 5-1 gives an overview  of the evolution of the operating 
profit or earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and  amortisation (EBITDA)77 in 
absolute values (upper panel) and year-on-year percent change (lower panel). Secondly, 
a barometer of long-term industry profitability viz. the evolution of return on sales 
(ROS)78 is shown in Appendix 5-2. Third ly, Appendix 5-3 lists both in absolute values 
and year-on-year percent change the evolution of the bottom line performance or net 
profit for the selected  firms engaged in the container liner shipping industry. 
The sample selection process is driven by those liner operators that publish accounts at 
the level of the container shipping division and  resulted  in a sample of 20 liner operators 
covering the 2000-2008 period 79. Figure 5-1 provides a short description of the selected 
carriers. 
                                                     
76
  Data was collected from Liner Intelligence financial analysis (ww w.ci-online.co.uk), annual reports, the 
notes to financial statements as well as fact books and  Powerpoint presentations. Data in currencies other 
than US dollars w ere converted  into US dollar u sing the currency convertor 
w ww.oanda.com/ cu rrency/ convertor at the currency exchange rate prevailing at the balance sheet data 
(End of March or December). All figures in Appendix 5-1, 5-2 and  5-3 are in US dollar million except % 
changes. 
77
  N ot all liner operators have the same accounting ru les on vessel depreciation. Therefore, EBITDA is 
p referred  above EBIT. 
78
  Return on sales is defined  as EBITA divided  by sales revenue and  measures the ability to extract 
operating profit ou t of every dollar earned  before financial items and tax.  
79
  N ote: some Top 20 liner operators are not included in the sample. Due to missing data for operating 
income and  net profit, for instance, Hamburg Süd and  Pacific International Line are not included  in the 
sample. Fu rthermore, some liner operators are excluded  as segmented  figures for container d ivision 
w ere not available (e.g. Evergreen, Hyundai Merchant Marine). Boone 	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)LJXUH6DPSOHRIOLQHURSHUDWRUV
As shown in Appendices 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3, the financial results for the year 2000 were 
generally good. Focusing on the operating results of the liner operators, the year 2003 
was a much better year than either 2001 (i.e. influence of currency exchange factors on 
liner operators’  bottom line performance) and  2002 (i.e. weaker results posted  in 2001 
continued  in 2002). The most impressive improvements were witnessed  by Asian-based  
carriers (e.g. CSCL, COSCO Container line). The improved  financial performance posted  
by liner operators in 2003 continued  into the year 2004. By comparison, the number of 
liner operators realising a ROS above 10 %, doubled (see Appendix 5-2). During the 
latter two years, the container market improved  due to a combination of factors (e.g. 
general freight rate recovery programs, network optimisation, (tight) cost control, better 
performance and  a strong demand on all main trade routes even faster than the increase 
in available vessel capacity). However, the improvement in the container market was 
tempered  by the adverse impact of continuous increases in rates for chartered  tonnage, 
high fuel prices, high land operations costs and  increased  costs relating to the 
repositioning of empty containers. 
The last year of strong profitability was the year 2005. Increased  costs, especially those 
relating to bunkering and  chartered  tonnage yet again neutralised  the freight rates which 
were on average above the level of 2004. H igher bunker recoveries were introduced . The 
FAGHIKJL HMONOPAQMON G%R9PAN STMOUQGVM WAXﬂY Z[L QE\ ]6^_
UMONOPO`
\M<N a3L bM<\ c
G7N IM7R
\'[GN Medf f L G7HbM<\
4 APL/ NOL w w w .nol.com.sg 549,508 139 70 4.41% g
29 CCNI w w w .ccni.cl 36,712 16 10 0.30%
8 China Shg C.L. (CSCL) w w w .cscl.com.cn 453,009 125 46 3.64%
3 CMA CGM w w w .cma-cgm.com 1,031,327 353 91 8.29%
7 COSCO Container L. w w w .coscon.com 453,204 134 88 3.64% g
13 CSAV w w w .csav.com 328,721 96 22 2.64%
9 Hanjin  Shipping w w w .hanjin .com 440,299 99 52 3.54% g
6 Hapag Lloyd w w w .hapag-lloyd.com 462,288 113 68 3.72% g
11 K-Line w w w .kline.com 342,043 90 66 2.75% g
1 Maersk Line w w w .maerskline.com 2,044,981 538 104 16.44%
36 Matson w w w .matson.com 29,074 15 5 0.23%
21 MISC Berhad w w w .misc.com.my 125,101 39 22 1.01%
12 Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) w w w .mol.co.jp 341,820 91 85 2.75% g
10 NYK w w w .nykline.com 407,300 106 41 3.27% g
14 OOCL w w w .oocl.com 324,209 71 69 2.61% g
25 RCL w w w .rclgroup.com 53,435 39 36 0.43%
19 UASC w w w .uasc.net 196,237 49 15 1.58%
22 Wan Hai Lines w w w .w anhai.com 125,060 66 34 1.01%
15 Yang Ming Line w w w .yml.com.tw 312,962 77 51 2.52% g
17 ZIM w w w .zim.co.il 305,523 94 47 2.46%
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optimistic expectations for continued economic growth led  to extra contracts for new 
and larger container vessel tonnage. One year later, looking at the % change (lower panel 
of Appendices 5-1 and 5-3), a reduction in profit levels is clearly observable. Operating 
profits plummeted by an average of 30 % (see sample average, Appendix 5-1) and some 
liner operators even slipped  into the red  at net level (see Appendix 5-3). Excepting some 
liner operators, Beddow and Ajala (2007) note that diversified groups better maintain 
their profit than pure container liner operators. Following the d ramatic decrease seen in 
2006, liner operators’  profits increased again in 2007. The recovery experienced  in 2007 
was only temporary since the container vessel capacity increased  more than the volumes 
transported  causing freight rates to develop negatively.  
A reversing trend is noticeable starting in the last quarter of 2008 as global demand 
slows drastically following the global financial and  economic crisis. The period  
end 2008 - beginning 2009 is characterised by a downswing in demand and freight rates 
across all trade lanes caused  by the global downturn, higher operating costs caused  by 
escalating bunker fuel prices and  costs associated w ith the restructuring process. Some 
financially challenged  liner operators stopped  reporting net profit at container d ivision80.  
By the end  of 2009, most liner operators’  financial results have reached  negative results. 
Focusing on the container d ivision results, some examples illustrate the impact of the 
new market downturn on liner carriers' ongoing profitability. First, AP Moller-Maersk 
posted a post-tax loss of USD 373 million, d ragged  down by the segment result after tax 
for Maersk Line of USD -555 million. Next, Hapag-Lloyd  posted  a USD 300 million 
operating loss for the first quarter of 2009. Hapag-Lloyd  as well as other carriers (e.g. 
CMA CGM,…) applied for state aid . Furthermore, Taiwan's duo of ocean carriers - Yang 
Ming and Wan Hai Line - as well as the Japanese ocean carriers NYK Line, MOL and  
K-Line have all seen their 2009 financial results falling. Their net profit sank into the red  
compared  to p revious years’  profit. The list of carriers posting substantially lower 
financial results in 2009 grew, such as Hanjin Shipping's container d ivision, China Cosco 
Hold ings' container shipping arm COSCON and fellow Chinese ocean carrier China 
Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) as well as the Malaysian transport group, MISC 
Berhad . Furthermore, the Chilean shipping line, CSAV and  the Intra-Asia feeder and  
domestic carrier, Regional Container Lines (RCL) also reported  considerable losses in 
                                                     
80
  Based  on Containerisation International (w ww.ci-online.co.uk), the evolu tion of the profitability can 
further be described  in broad  outlines up  to the reporting of interim resu lts of the first quarter of 2010.  
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2009. In fighting to keep their cost base in check, both carriers trimmed operating costs 
(i.e. a lower fuel bill and renegotiated  charter rates).  
For the first quarter of 2010, Maersk Line, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, China Cosco 
Hold ings turned  back into operating profits. Even with a significant improvement in 
carryings and  turnover, Singapore’s lead ing liner shipping and  logistics group, APL still 
reported heavy losses. An explanation might be found  in its much smaller share of the 
Asia-Europe trade and its heavier reliance on the transpacific than other Top 10 liner 
operators. Other carriers forecast a return to profit. 
Mid 2010, most liner operators expect to make a much bigger profit in 2010 than 
previously forecast, assuming that freight rates, oil prices and  exchange rates remain 
stable over the remainder of the year. Once again, the shipping companies experience a 
ongoing shortage of sea container equipment in many areas, which drives up  
operational costs (Beddow & Ajala, 2006-8; Beddow, 2009 and 2010; Drewry, 2000-9).  
Summing up, the containerised liner shipping industry suffers from the current 
economic downturn like most other industries. Knowing that the liner operators have 
taken action to cut costs (e.g. reduced  number of sailings, introducing bigger cost 
effective tonnage, slow-steaming to save fuel, sailing via the Cape of Good  Hope to save 
on Suez canal transit fees, off-hiring vessels, scrapping vessels, cutting overhead , selling 
some of their profitable terminal operations (e.g. Hanjin, Hapag-Lloyd Maersk Line, 
OOCL), one might conclude that there is no indication of earning supernormal profits at 
current profitability levels. Moreover, it was financially a grim five years’  period  for liner 
operators.  
Like stated  before, the aim of the present paper is to better understand  the performance 
of the liner operators. Is it a matter of buying of market share activity (e.g. Maersk Line, 
APL), facing competition from non-vessel common operating carriers (e.g. Ecu-Line) and  
global forwarders (e.g. DHL, K&N, Panalpina, DB Schenker), artificial competition, a 
lack of competition or inefficient behaviour?  
Many empirical studies, using d ifferent methodologies, have attempted  to explain the 
variations in performance between firms, most commonly measured  by profitability. The 
next section provides a selective overview of the recent developments in Industrial 
Organisation literature. 
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 (YROXWLRQLQ,QGXVWULDO2UJDQLVDWLRQOLWHUDWXUH
In the trad ition of the Industrial Organisation (IO) literature, an explanation for the 
variations in performance would be found in regressing the profit-concentration 
relationship. Since the seminal study by Bain (1956), a large number of IO-stud ies have 
been preoccupied  with this relationship. Some studies therefore used  a single-equation 
approach (i.e. regressing a measure of firms’  profitability on a proxy for market 
concentration, such as the n-firm concentration ratio (CRn) or the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI) as an exogenous ind icator of market power or an inverse ind icator of the 
intensity of competition). A positive coefficient is expected  as higher concentration goes 
hand  in hand  with higher market power. Many studies found a positive statistical 
relationship between profit (i.e. an index of performance) and concentration (an index of 
market structure) while other stud ies were often quite weak in their statistical 
significance and/ or found  an adverse relationship 81. Applying this single-equation 
approach for the CLSI resulted  in a negative statistical relationship.  
Besides to the conflicting evidence, the single-equation approach is subject to a number 
of statistical reflections82. For instance, the assumption of the existence of a unid irectional 
causality among structure-performance variables may result in biased and  inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters. Meanwhile, some studies refute this critique and state that 
the simultaneity bias is not so important and that the results of the single-equation are 
reliable (see Bhattacharya & Bloch, 1997). This debate led  eventually to a two-way 
causality. Round (1980) was the first to use a simultaneous equation approach to explain 
industry performance. Berger (1995) introduced  a reduced  form, which nests four 
hypotheses that are typically postulated  as potential d rivers of a positive relationship  
between structure and  performance. Earlier stud ies failed  to consider the four 
hypotheses simultaneously. The four hypotheses are two market-power theories (i.e. 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, SCP and  relative-market power hypothesis, 
RMP)83 as well as two efficiency explanations of the positive relationship, viz. the 
                                                     
81
  For a comprehensive review see Berger, 1995 and  De Jonghe & vander Vennet, 2008. 
82
  See Lipczynski 	
E ., 2005, pp . 14-16. 
83
  The SCP–hypothesis suggests that the performance of a firm depends upon its conduct which, in turn, 
depends upon the market in w hich it operates. In other words, the SCP-hypothesis  investigates w hether 
a highly concentrated  market (as measured  by four-firm concentration ratio or Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index) causes collusive behaviour among larger firms resu lting in greater market performance whereas 
the RMP-hypothesis asserts that only firms with large market shares have the power to set p rices and  
thus to earn supernormal profits (Berger, 1995). 
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efficient-structure hypothesis, ESX and  the efficient-structure-scale hypothesis, ESS84. 
Berger estimates a translog cost function to derive both efficiency measures. A translog 
cost function could  not be estimated for the CLSI due to data limitations. An in-depth 
analysis of studies applying this reduced form therefore is beyond  the scope of this 
paper.  
As of the early 1990s, there has been a shift in literature from ‘trad itional’  methods 
employed  in industrial organisation (e.g. SCP-analyses, stud ies of scale and  scope 
economies) towards ‘new ’  empirical methods (New Industrial Organisation, NIO: game 
theory and  New Empirical Industrial Organisation, NEIO: Bresnahan, Panzar and  
Rosse85). Empirical research in the NEIO stream is based  on microeconomic theory in 
which optimising behaviour is assumed  and  makes d irect observations of the conduct in 
specific industries. Regarding the measure of conduct, the focus moved  from firms 
prices/ profitability to efficiency, service quality, etc. w ith the advent of New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation. Regarding empirical models, there is a shift from static cross 
section short-run towards dynamic effects over time (Berger HWDO, 2004). 
Another question arises as to how efficiency can be measured? First, a straightforward  
measure is the popular empirical measure of competition, namely price cost margin 
(PCM). Price cost margin is equal to the output price minus the marginal costs, d ivided  
by the output price. A d isadvantage of this measure is that in many industries as well as 
in the CLSI competition cannot be measured d irectly, as costs and  often also price data of 
single products are usually unavailable. Moreover, a second  disadvantage observed  by 
Boone and  Weigand (2004) is the fact that PCM does not capture the notion of increased  
competition through more aggressive interaction between firms. Secondly, an alternative 
indirect measurement technique has been proposed  in the line of NEIO-literature. A new 
approach to measure the effects of competition is the so-called  Boone ind icator. The 
Boone ind icator (synonym: relative profit d ifference, RPB; relative profits measure, RPM 
or profit elasticity, PE) measures the effect of efficiency on performance in terms of 
profits or market shares. To do this, an empirical specification will be estimated to 
explain profits through market structure variables and  measures of efficiency using firm-
level panel data.  
                                                     
84
  The ESX-hypothesis states that firms are able to realise higher profits as a resu lt of superior management 
w hile the ESS-hypothesis claims that the d ifference in profitability between firms is caused  by d ifferences 
in the level of scale efficiency at which a firm is operating (Berger, 1995). 
85
  Sys 	
E . (2010) have applied  the Panzar and  Rosse model for the containerised  liner shipping industry. 
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Against the backdrop of both academic and  political interest in competition and its 
measurement, it is somewhat surprising to observe that little is known about the 
evolution of competition in the CLSI (see also Sys HWDO, 2010). The Boone ind icator is an 
interesting tool to estimate how (the intensity of) competition in the CLSI evolves over 
time.  
 7KH%RRQHLQGLFDWRUPRGHO
This section presents the Boone ind icator and d iscusses the literature on this topic. 
 7KHWKHRU\
Boone (2000) has developed  an indicator to measure the effects of competition based  on 
firms’  profits. Two effects can be d istinguished  in which competition can be intensified 
within a market. The first effect is a fall in entry barriers. Consequently, increased entry 
leads to more intense competition. Secondly, competition can be intensified  by more 
aggressive behaviour by incumbents. This forces inefficient firms out of the market and  
increases concentration. The Boone ind icator captures both effects. 
To do so, Boone parameterises competition in terms of a negative relationship between 
relative efficiency and  relative profits. (Boone, 2000 and  2004; Griffith HW DO, 2005). The 
relative profits measure or the Boone indicator relies on the notion that competition 
enhances the performance of efficient firms (i.e. w ith lower marginal costs) and impairs 
the performance of inefficient firms, which is reflected  in lower profits or smaller market 
shares (van Leuvensteijn HWDO, 2007). This effect of efficiency on profits or market shares 
will be greater in a more competitive environment, since firms are punished more 
harshly for being inefficient (Boone, 2004). This approach is related to the efficiency 
hypothesis86, which also explains firms’  performances by differences in efficiency 
(van Leuvensteijn HWDO, 2007)87. 
The advantages of the Boone indicator are threefold. First, the Boone indicator is shown 
to be more robust theoretically than the price cost margin (Boone, 2004). Secondly, the 
Boone ind icator is able to measure competition at d isaggregated  level. Third ly, as 
mentioned in van Leuvensteijn HW DO (2007), the ind icator requires relatively little data 
compared  to many other approaches (e.g. the Bresnahan model) which are very data 
                                                     
86
  See section 5.3, footnote 90. 
87
  Measuring efficiency using a production/ cost frontier analysis was impossible due to a lack of data. 
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intensive. The Boone ind icator does not require to have data for all firms in the market 
all years. 
The ind icator relies on two key assumptions. First, Boone (2000) assumes that firms 
generally pass on at least part of their efficiency gains to their clients (read: shippers). 
Secondly, the Boone ind icator ignores d ifferences in product quality and  design across 
firms, as well as the attractiveness of innovations (van Leuvensteijn HW DO, 2007). This 
might be a caveat with regard  to the Boone ind icator. 
 7KHPRGHO
Following Boone HWDO (2004), van Leuvensteijn HWDO (2007) and  van Leuvensteijn (2008), 
the mathematical derivation starts from the assumption that firm L faces a demand curve 
of the form 
∑
≠
≠ −−= h
i
i
hh
i
h TGETDTTS ),(
     (1) 
whereby each firm has a constant marginal cost, PF j . To maximise profits, firm L chooses 
the optimal output level T j  to solve 
kkkk TPFS )( −=pi
     (2) 
or 
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ml TPFTGETD )(max
     (3) 
Two key assumptions are imposed . First, the intercept D has to exceed  the marginal cost 
(D!PF j !). Secondly, the parameter G which can be interpreted  as the measurement of 
the degree of substitution of this product between firms is positive and  less than or equal 
to the parameter E (0 < G E). The first order condition for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is 
then given by 
02 =−−− ∑
≠
n
no
on PFTGETD
     (4) 
Let there be N firms producing positive output levels, one can solve the N first order 
condition yield ing 
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If profits, j  are defined  as variable profits excluding entry costs, ( a firm with marginal 
costs PF j  enters the market if, and  only if, (PFrr ≥)(pi  in equilibrium. Combining the 
profit function (Eq. 2) with Eq. 5 which relates output with marginal costs, it can be 
shown that profits depend  on marginal costs in a quadratic way 
[ ]²)()( sss PFTEPF =pi
      (6) 
Based  on these properties, Boone HWDO (2004) considered  two ways in which competition 
in a market can be intensified  through (i) an increase of G (keeping d  below b) and / or (ii) 
the effect of a reduction in the entry cost, (. In the former regime, the products offered  
by d ifferent firms become closer substitutes. In the second regime, the lower the entry 
barriers, the more firms should enter and  the more competitive the industry should  be. 
The Boone indicator picks up both forms of changes in competition correctly (Boone HWDO 
2004). 
In order to calculate the Boone indicator, Boone (2004), Griffith HWDO (2005), Boone HWDO 
(2007), van Leuvensteijn HWDO (2007) postulate the following linear specification between 
profits (OQ j t u ) and  marginal costs (OQPF j t u ) which can be viewed  as a first order Taylor 
approximation 
OQ j t u =  +  OQPF j t u
 
 + j t u
    
(7) 
The notation is as follows: the subscript L and  W values represent firm L at time W. The 
parameter of interest is the absolute value of the slope coefficient, The Boone ind icator 
or  is expected  to have a negative sign. It represents the percentage decrease (increase) 
in profits of firm L as a result of one percentage point increase (decrease) in marginal 
costs. The larger , the more intense the competition. The parameter  is the constant 
term and j t u  is an error term following the classical assumption, namely, E( j t u ) ~ N( ò). 
In order to deal w ith heteroskedasticity, Eq. (7) has been specified  in log-linear terms. 
As data on marginal costs cannot be observed directly, most stud ies used a proxy. In the 
next section, the Boone literature will be reviewed in order to inventarise the used  
proxies used . 
5-126 The Boone indicator, a new approach to measure the evolu tion of competition for the container liner 
shipping industry 
 
 
 /LWHUDWXUHUHYLHZ
This subsection provides a brief review of the growing literature that has applied  the 
Boone ind icator and elaborates on the choice of the dependent and independent 
variables. A summary of this strand of literature is given in Appendix 5-488.  
In the first study, Boone (2000) investigates the conceptual d ifferences between 
competition measures for a broad set of economic models and  proves that intensifying 
competition entails more emphasis on reward ing efficiency advantages. 
After developing the theoretical framework, Boone and  Weigand  (2000) and  Boone 
(2004)89 have tested their model using data from different manufacturing industries. As 
dependent variable, Boone and Weigand  (2000) used  the relative values of profits where 
Boone (2004) selected the absolute values of profits. Given that the marginal costs cannot 
be observed  d irectly, both papers approximated  the independent variable by the ratio of 
variable costs and  revenues.  
Since then, several articles have applied  the Boone ind icator for d ifferent industries. 
Following Boone & Weigand  (2004), Creusen HWDO (2006a) apply the Boone indicator to 
measure the intensity of competition for a number of sectors of the Dutch economy (i.e. 
manufacturing industry, construction sector and  service sector). Griffith HW DO (2005) 
concentrated on the UK market whereas Creusen HW DO (2006b) investigated  the Dutch 
market sector using four competition indicators (i.e. price-cost margin, Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, labour-income ratio and  the Boone ind icator). Covering the 1993-2001 
period, Creusen HW DO (2006b) found  elasticities between average variable costs and  
profits of about -5.7 and -2.5 respectively. Maliranta HWDO (2007) tested various relatively 
well-known competitiveness ind icators across the Finnish manufacturing and service 
sectors at a relatively d isaggregated level. Out of nine different ind icators, these authors 
state that the Boone ind icator is preferred for both analytical/ theoretical and  empirical 
reasons. All the above-mentioned  stud ies estimated  the firm’s marginal cost by the ratio 
of variables costs and revenues. Maliranta HWDO (2007) used d ifferent functional forms. 
van Leuvensteijn HW DO (2007) is the first to app ly the Boone ind icator to the banking 
sector covering the 1994-2004 period . For six major EU countries and  two non-EU 
                                                     
88
  Appendix 5-4 lists the papers accord ing to the year of publication. The next tw o columns report the 
sample period  and  the industries stud ied . The fourth column p rovides an overview  of the chosen 
dependent variable while the last column summarises the independent variable used. 
89
  In the meantime, this study has been published  in Economic Journal, 188, pp . 1245-1261. In the literatu re 
review , here, Boone (2008) is not mentioned as it concerns a revised version of Boone (2004).  
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countries (i.e. the US and  Japan), van Leuvensteijn HW DO (2007) measures the level of 
competition in the lending markets, a separate product market as well as among specific 
types of banks. In contrast to previous stud ies, van Leuvensteijn HW DO (2007) measures 
the impact of marginal cost on performance in terms of market shares and calculates the 
marginal cost (i.e. employing a translog function) instead  of using average variable costs 
as a proxy for marginal cost. 
Whereas most studies estimate the cross-sectional relationship between marginal costs 
and profits of d ifferent firms at a given time, van Leuvensteijn (2008) applied  the Boone 
indicator to identify different regimes of competition for one firm, viz. the American 
Sugar Refining Company during different periods of time (1890-1914). In this study, 
van Leuvensteijn again uses information on market shares as a proxy for the profits. 
Another study of Bikker & van Leuvensteijn (2008) applies the Boone model to the Dutch 
life insurance industry over 1995–2003. The Boone indicator of this industry is around  
-0.45. They estimated  the Boone indicator in three ways. First, Bikker & van Leuvensteijn 
consider marginal cost derived  from a translog cost function (TCF). Secondly, they test 
the model using an ad justed  marginal cost (i.e. marginal costs ad justed for scale 
economies). Last, marginal costs are represented  by average variable cost. Bikker & van 
Leuvensteijn (2008) found  that average variable costs and  model-based  marginal costs 
result in similar estimates.  
Tarryn (2008) regresses absolute values of profit on marginal cost to determine the 
effectiveness of measuring the degree of competition within the electricity markets. 
Accord ing to Tarryn (2008), the Boone Ind icator may not be an adequate measure to use 
within the electricity sector due to intricacies of the electricity market (e.g. hourly 
fluctuating demand). 
Maslovyck (2009) adopts the Boone ind icator approach in estimating the level of 
competition in the Ukrainian loan market. This study estimated the Boone ind icator, 
using  both the average cost and  the translog cost function approach. The author found  
that the translog cost function approach is more  robust and   reliable  in  estimating  the  
level  of  competition. 
Schaeck & Cihák (2010) estimate a modified version of the Boone model. To estimate the 
Boone ind icator, these authors opt for a lin-log specification and  use return on assets 
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(ROA) as a dependent variable instead  of lnROA. The independent variable is proxied  
by average variable costs.  
Applying a similar concept as van Leuvensteijn HWDO (2007), Roengpitya (2010) measures 
the level of competition in the loan market of the Thai and U.S. banks. In contrast to the 
study of van Leuvensteijn HWDO (2007), this author estimated the translog cost function 
includ ing the states’  fixed  effects and calculated the marginal cost differently.  
Braila HWDO (2010) estimate the Boone ind icator from firm-level data to describe product 
market competition in the Belgian economy covering the 1997-2004 period . Here, the 
dependent variable is defined  as the difference between a firm’s revenue and its variable 
cost. The marginal cost is approximated by the ratio of variable cost and  operating 
revenue (or turnover). 
The study of Schiersch & Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) is the first to question the applicability 
of the Boone ind icator. These authors conclude that “ WKH %RRQH,QGLFDWRU DOWKRXJK
WKHRUHWLFDOO\VXSHULRU LVDW OHDVWDWWKLVVWDJHQRWDQHPSLULFDOO\UREXVW LQGLFDWRU7KH/HUQHU
,QGH[RQWKHRWKHUKDQGLQGLFDWHVFKDQJHVLQFRPSHWLWLRQDVH[SHFWHG+RZHYHUWKHUHVXOWVRIWKH
53'5HODWLYH3URILW'LIIHUHQFHVEDVHG%RRQH,QGLFDWRUDUHSURPLVLQJ” . 
Summing up, this compilation of articles does not seem to offer a consensus regard ing 
the choice of dependent and  independent variables. Furthermore, this body of literature 
can be applied  to all kind  of industries except for network industries (i.e. media, 
electronic communication, railways), ICT-industries as well as very knowledge-intensive 
industries (i.e. pharmacy) (see Creusen HWDO, 2006a). This paper adds to this literature by 
using the Boone-indicator for the CLSI.  
 9DULDEOHVGDWDXVHG
This section d iscusses the variables used and  required data used. 
First, the key variables to calculate the Boone ind icator are measures of efficiency and 
profitability. Following van Leuvensteijn (2008) and  Bikker & van Leuvensteijn (2008), as 
a left-hand  variable in Eq. 7, market share (V j t u ) is used  instead  of profits or relative 
profits. For the purpose of this study, market share is defined  as V j t u    v
w
v
w
;
[
,
, where [ j t u  
equals the market share of liner operator L for year W and  ; j t u  ∑
=
100
1
x y
x[
,
for Top 100 liner 
operators.  
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van Leuvensteijn HWDO 2007 and  Bikker and  van Leuvensteijn (2008) state that working 
with market share has two advantages. The first advantage is the fact that a market share 
model will be more precise since the impact of efficiency on market share and its relation 
with competition is theoretically known. Another advantage of working with market 
share is the ever positive value of this variable. Given that logarithms of negative values  
do not exist, observations w ith negative values (read : negative profits) would  be 
dropped. Consequently, the estimation results would be distorted  by sample bias as it 
would  ignore inefficient, loss-making liner carriers.  
A lack of data prohibits the estimation of a translog function in order to determine the 
marginal costs. So, as an explanatory variable, average variable cost (avcj t u )90 is used  as an 
approximation of the marginal costs (the relationship is in fact exact, if the marginal cost 
is constant). The choice for the right-hand  variable  is based upon the study of Bikker & 
van Leuvensteijn (2008). These authors found  that average variable costs and  model-
based marginal costs result in similar estimates. Here, the average cost is calculated  as 
the ratio of operating expenses to transported  twenty feet equivalent unit (TEU).  
Secondly, to estimate the Boone model, data was obtained  from investor/ annual reports 
(see Section 5.2). It resulted  in an unbalanced  firm-level panel of data91 for a sample of 20 
liner operators (see Figure 5.1). Figure 5.1 lists the sample of liner operators and shows 
the market share as well as other variables (number of TEU capacity, ships and offered  
services) to explain competition. The paper focuses on the 2000-2008 period. The next 
section d iscusses and  analyses the estimates of the Boone indicator. 
 
                                                     
90
  Bikker and  van Leuvensteijn (2008) state that z{ |}~%/ﬂ"~ﬂ'  ?Ł "ﬂ~Ł ~ﬂ'Ł 7 # 7 
CE O? </Ł ?,*ﬁE'ŁO!% /?OŁŁ ﬂ/>'* ?2/</Ł ﬁ//D:?'ŁOﬂ Ł  ﬂ7 ?,Ł ,~7'?  
'E2 %Ł  ” . Boone (2004, p . 18) d iscusses the definitions of fixed  and  variable costs and  states that 
only variable costs and  no fixed  costs shou ld  enter the calcu lation. 
91
  The Boone indicator requires data of fairly homogeneous p roducts (Creusen Ł ., 2005; van Leuvensteijn 
ŁD . 2007). Although some heterogeneity (i.e. service, transit time, etc.) exists, the product is assumed 
highly homogeneous (read: transport of a container/ box) in the containerised liner shipping industry. 
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 (PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
Boone and  Weigand  (2000) made several transformations and ad justments to the basic 
equation (i.e. control for firm-specific effects, control for time-specific effects, etc.) (see 
also Creusen HWDO., 2006a). In this section, some of these transformations and  adjustments 
are tested  for the CLSI.  
The regressions d ivide this section in two parts. In the first part, the Boone indicator is 
calculated  by estimating the basic equation, in line with Eq. 7. In the second part, the 
measure of efficiency is corrected  for industry effects by add ing control variables. So, an 
extended  version of Eq. 7 is estimated . The analysis is embedded in each section. 
 %DVLFHTXDWLRQ
Estimation of the basic equation (Eq. 7) depends on the assumptions about the intercept 
( , the slope coefficients (  and the error term ( j t u ). Several scenarios are possible. 
Firstly, the intercept and  the slope coefficient are constant across time and  space. In this 
scenario, the error term captures d ifferences over time and among liner operators. So, 
the first regression estimates the relation between profitability, measured  by market 
shares and average variable costs d isregard ing space and  time d imensions of the pooled  
data (both variables are in logarithms). This OLS regression suggests a significant 
positive slope coefficient where a negative sign is expected  by theory (see Section 5.4).  
Secondly, the intercept is allowed to vary over time. Taking into account a common 
intercept and 9 year dummies, the slope coefficient again does not attain the appropriate 
sign. The R² value is very low .  
Since the aim of the paper is to detect how competition evolves over time, in the third  
regression,  is estimated separately for every year (hence u ) while the intercept is 
constant. The results from the basic equation for estimating the year-by-year Boone 
indicator are summarised  in Figure 5.2. The slope coefficient or Boone ind icator is shown 
in the middle column with the standard  errors in the last column.  
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)LJXUH(VWLPDWHG%RRQHLQGLFDWRU
In all years, the slope coefficients are significantly different from zero. Yet, the slope 
coefficients do not have the expected  negative signs except for the year 2008. An 
estimated   of – 0.094747 for 2008 would  suggest that a liner carrier with one percentage 
point higher average costs than another (more efficient) liner carrier would  have 9.47 
percent lower profit (proxied  by market shares) than the more efficient liner carriers 
(Griffith HWDO, 2005). Figure 5-392 and Figure 5-4 plot log market share (ln ms) against log 
average variable cost (ln avc) for the years 2005 and  2008 with the ind ividual liner 
operators labeled  (Griffith HW DO, 2005). The slope of the regression line show s the 
estimated  beta. 
Comparing the latter two figures, a first observation is the turning of the slope of the 
regression line from positive into negative between 2005 and  2008. This suggests an 
increase in competition over the period . A second  observation is the shift of CMA CGM 
and Hapag-Lloyd  (HL) from the third  quadrant to the second  quadrant. These liner 
carriers appear to become less efficient. Thirdly, RCL, a liner operator that does not have 
the economy of scale (fleet size from 500 TEU to 2,600 TEU) of the rest of the sample has 
the lowest average variable costs in both years while Matson has twice the highest 
average variable costs. These regional niche players are not really comparable with the 
other liner operators. Fourthly, interesting to note is the nearly unchanged  situation for 
liner operators involved  in an alliance (marked  in bold italic), except for Hapag-Lloyd. 
Following the completion of the acquisition of CP Ships (2005) by TUI AG, parent of 
Hapag-Lloyd , the carrier entered a difficult period  of changing ownership.  
                                                     
92
  Data regard ing the average variable costs of COSCO and UASC for the year 2008 was not yet available at 
the time of the writing of this paper. 
<HDU
6ORSH
FRHIILFLHQW 6WG(UURU
%DVLFHTXDWLRQ
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)LJXUH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Finally, the intercept as well as the slope coefficients are allowed to vary over time to 
estimate the Boone ind icator more accurately. Time-specific intercepts capture 
unobserved  effects (i.e. control for business cycles, removing the effects of any 
macroeconomic fluctuations) common to all liner operators (Boone, 2004; Creusen HWDO, 
2006a; Bikker and  van Leuvensteijn, 2008). Adding fixed  period  effects does not alter the 
signs to negative. The slope coefficient for 2008 becomes slightly more negative (i.e. 
-0.131577) or efficiency becomes more rewarded. Both the statistical significance of the 
estimated  coefficients and the R² value have increased.  
How can positive profit elasticities (i.e. an increase in market share due to a one percent 
increase in marginal cost) in the other years be explained?  
A first explanation for these positive profit elasticities concerns the issue of the relevant 
market or the market where the competition takes place (Boone, 2000; Boone and 
Weigand, 2000; Creusen HW DO, 2006b). In theory, the definition of a market is clear-cut 
while in practice, it is known to be a difficult problem. The question is whether the 
relevant market has been correctly defined? If not, it consequently may affect the 
outcome of the Boone indicator. Boone (2000) states that if the market is defined  too 
broadly (narrowly) then concentration is too low (high) and  will overestimate 
(underestimate) the degree of competition. In this paper, the relevant market consists of 
suppliers of fully cellular container liner shipping services. These services have been 
branded  as the relevant product market. The geographical d imension is considered  
globally (Sys, 2009). Due to a lack of detailed  information, the present study cannot take 
into account that liner operators compete at trade level and  neglect the possible 
interrelationship between trade lanes. In order to match with the relevant market, data 
for the empirical investigation has solely been collected  at container d ivision level 
assuming that all liner operators compete globally. 
Sample problems could  be a second explanation. The results would also be inaccurate if 
the sample is uneven in favour of the more efficient firms. Re-estimating the above 
scenarios w ithout the lead ing liner carrier, Maersk Line d id  not alter the results except 
for the last scenario. Next to the year 2008, the sign for the year 2005 turns to negative 
(-0,035344). This ind ication of increased competition might be linked  with the statement 
of Maersk Sealand (since then known as Maersk Line) in May 2005 regard ing its plans to 
buy P&O Nedlloyd. Next, the smallest p layers in the sample (i.e. CCNI and Matson) 
were left out. This experiment again d id  not change the signs of the slope coefficients. 
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Third ly, the Boone ind icator measures to which extent the market maps efficiency 
differences into profit d ifferences. Marginal costs and  profits are not directly observable. 
Mis-measurement within these variables and/ or working with proxies – a common 
practice (see Appendix 5-4) - may bias the result (Boone, 2000; van Leuvensteijn HW DO, 
2007). Boone and  Weigand  (2000) note that approximating marginal costs with average 
variable costs is only correct if production is characterised  by constant returns to scale 
technology93. The latter holds for the containerised  liner shipping industry. 
Last, the Boone indicator is based  on two assumptions (see Subsection 5.4.1). Most 
stud ies accept the assumption regard ing the ignorance of the d ifferences in product 
quality and  design across firms. However, Boone and Weigand  (2000) state that 
´>3@URGXFLQJKLJKHUTXDOLW\SURGXFWV LVXVXDOO\PRUH H[SHQVLYH LQ WHUPVRI LQSXWV EXW FOHDUO\
WKHVHKLJKHUFRVWVDVVXFKGRQRWLQGLFDWHDODFNRIHIILFLHQF\7RWDNHWKLVLQWRDFFRXQWDILUP
V
FRVWVVKRXOGEHFRUUHFWHGIRUWKHTXDOLW\RILWVJRRGV.”  Not correcting for quality might explain 
the outcome of positive profit elasticities for the container liner shipping industry. This 
aspect will be analysed and  tested  in the next section. 
 ([WHQGHGPRGHO
To test whether a liner operator’ s costs should be corrected  for the quality of its 
products, firstly, the product should be defined . The product or service can be defined as 
the transportation of a box/ container between A and  B (door to door, port to port, etc.). 
Liner carriers are assumed to be single product firms.  
Does the container liner shipping industry produce higher quality products?94 In other 
words, is there a quality d ifference between the transportation of a box/ container by 
liner operator x and  y both offering – for instance - a door-to-door service? From the 
viewpoint of the shipper, the answer is positive. Transit time, schedule reliability, etc. 
d iffers from liner carrier to liner carrier. Assuming a quality d ifference, another question 
arises namely whether it is more expensive in terms of inputs for the liner operator? Due 
to a lack of data at trade level, the latter is unobservable. 
                                                     
93
  Boone and  Weigand  (2000) discuss in detail the limitations of the Boone ind icator w ith respect to an 
unobservability of marginal costs, an (unobserved) unlevel p laying field  and  problems with defining the 
relevant market. These au thors use excellent examples to illustrate the limitations. 
94
  From June 1st, 2010, Maersk Line is the first carrier that launched  a ‘Priority Product’-upgrade on 
selected  services (that is apart from those that are prohibited  by Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) 
regulations or are otherwise restricted). This new product (precedence loading of cargo, reduced  risk of 
costly delays, etc.) seeks to give p riority to shippers in an increasingly common overbooked situation. As 
the sample period  ends in 2008, this fact is not yet cap tured  in the resu lts of this empirical research. 
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Is it possible that long hauls are both more expensive and  more profitable than short 
hauls? Put d ifferently, should  one take the portfolio of services into account? Due to the 
practices of “ double/ triple dipping” 95 as well as transhipment combinations on long 
hauls, it is very d ifficult to get insight in costs and  revenues per trade lane and to 
conclude that long hauls are both more expensive and  more profitable. But then, these 
practise are introduced to cut costs and  wring greater efficiencies from their networks. 
The Boone indicator should turn out to attain the appropriate sign.  
Creusen HW DO (2006a) suggest to adjust the basis equation for industry-specific effects. 
For the CLSI, industry-specific effects might be like d ifferences in technology (ship size), 
the w ide range of services, being a member of an alliance, etc. A look at Figure 5-1 shows 
that the dataset is very heterogeneous regard ing the number of services offered and the 
average ship size (TEU capacity divided by number of ships). Given this observation on 
the one hand  and  the suggestion Creusen HW DO (2006a) on the other hand, the 
year-by-year Boone indicator is re-estimated  based  on  
OQV Æ Ç È   ÉÊ ËÉÊ ËÉÊ ËÉÉ
ÌÍ
Ë Î Î Î Ë
É
É DYWHXVHUYLFHDYFOQG +++++ ∑∑
=−= 1,...1 ÏÐ
ÐÐ Gγα
   
(8)
 
where d È  is the year t dummy variables and  W = 2000…2008. In order to estimate the 
Boone ind icator more accurately, the variables number of services (servicei,t) and average 
TEU (avteu i,t) were added as explaining variables to the basic equation. A wider range of 
services and the deployment of larger ship sizes might affect profit. The parameters  
and  can be estimated by ord inary least squares (OLS)96. 
Figure 5-5 presents the heteroskedasticity-robust OLS estimates of the Boone ind icator 
based on Eq. 8 w ith market shares and  average variable costs in logarithms. The middle 
column shows the annual estimates of beta while the last column shows the t-statistics. 
                                                     
95
  The practice of double/ trip le d ipping is often used  on long-haul routes. It means that other vessels also 
load  containers for other trade lanes using intermediate wayports or hubs along the route to unload 
them. This logistic pattern ensures that, w herever is p ractical, empty slots are filled  and/ or that a slot is 
u sed  more than once on a given leg, which p roduces opportunities to earn additional revenue.  
96
  van Leuvensteijn ÑÒÓÔ Õ , 2007; Schaeck and  Cih k, 2010 and  Roengpitya, 2010 have applied  a Generalised 
Method  of Moments (GMM) estimator whereby one-year lagged  values of the explanatory variables are 
u sed as instruments. Statistical tests (for overidentification of the instruments, Hansen J-test and  for 
relevance of excluded  instruments, Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio) and  variance 
estimation (kernel-based  heteroskedastic and  au tocorrelation consistent) are performed in these studies. 
The GMM-style estimator with as instruments the one-year lagged  values of the explanatory variable, 
average cost (in logarithms) is also tested  for the containerised  liner shipping industry. When fitting a 
model by GMM, one shou ld  check w hether the instruments used  are uncorrelated  w ith the errors. The 
Ö9×%ØÖ<ØÖ9ÙÖ Ú ØÖ9Ú ÛﬁÜOÙﬂØ2Ù Ý!ÞOÚ ØÖ ßÚ àáÖ9Ú â7ã áãÞO×ß3Ö Ü×ã<áä äÜEåOæâ7Ö ÜO×ØÚ ØDÖ ÜOÙÖ<Ö Ü×Ú ãOØÖ9ß?áOç×ãOÖ Ø2Ùﬂß×DèÙä Ú ÞAé
 The significant 
statistic (557.2609; Hansen J-test p  value: 0) ind icates a decisive rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
model is correctly specified . 
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Year dummy coefficients are not reported separately since the key parameter of interest 
is the slope coefficient, . 
 
)LJXUH7LPHIL[HGHIIHFWVHVWLPDWHVRIWKH%RRQHPRGHO ê?ë 
From the regression resu lts obtained , the slope coefficients are significant in all years and  
fluctuate between 0.23 and -0.20. The annual estimates of beta are negative in the years 
2001, 2004 to 2008. The impact of the announcement of the takeover of Royal P&O 
Nedlloyd is again observable in the negative peak in beta in 2005. Subsequently, 
competition weakens till the year 2008. During that year the container liner shipping 
industry was under the spell of the question whether the block exemption would  be 
abolished . As from October 18th, 2008 this abolishment is a fact (EEC Regulation 
n° 4056/ 86)(see Sys HWDO, 2010). This might explain the further increase in competition. 
Turning to the added  variables, both the number of services and the average ship size 
are positive and  significant. Incorporating these explanatory variables impacts p rofits.  
In another experiment, a dummy variable was added  to capture the effect on efficiency 
of being a member of an alliance. This dummy variable was coded  one for liner operator 
member of an alliance and  zero otherwise. The impact on market shares is negative and  
significantly. Regard ing market shares, this might ind icate that alliances are not 
                                                     
97
  The asterisks ind icate the statistical significance at 1 percent (**) and  5 percent (*) respectively. 
9DULDEOH &RHIILFLHQW
SERVICE? 0.018289 19.1554 **
AVTEU? 0.000412 4.9372 **
C -5.609487 -28.8473 **
LNAVC?--2000 0.233333 210.3799 **
LNAVC?--2001 -0.135650 -1.8942 *
LNAVC?--2002 0.192068 2.5820 *
LNAVC?--2003 0.160307 2.9221 **
LNAVC?--2004 -0.166424 -3.4781 **
LNAVC?--2005 -0.200081 -7.9306 **
LNAVC?--2006 -0.159378 -5.6320 **
LNAVC?--2007 -0.110895 -3.5568 **
LNAVC?--2008 -0.166986 -12.0238 **
Adjusted R² 0.530435
W6WDWLVWLF
([WHQGHGPRGHO
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necessary more efficient (see also Sys HWDO, 2010). The adjusted  R-squared  increased  to 
0.53.  
Next, to visualise how the competition in the CLSI has been evolving over time, Figure 
5-6 plots the estimated  beta over time (see solid  line). Figure 5-6 relates the absolute 
value of the slope coefficient  on the vertical axis to the years of the sample period  on 
the horizontal axis. The dashed line running from 2000 to 2008 depicts the regression of 
this estimated  beta over time.  
 
)LJXUH%RRQHLQGLFDWRURYHUWLPH
The regression line clearly slopes downward. This suggests an increase in competition 
over the years observed .  
 &RQFOXVLRQ
This paper started  w ith an analysis of the profitability in the container liner shipping 
industry. No supernormal profits have been observed. In search for an explanation, the 
review  of the Industrial Organisation literature over the past decade clearly showed a 
shift from ‘profit’  to ‘efficiency’ , as a measure of conduct.  
In the present paper, efficiency is measured  for the containerised  liner shipping industry 
based on Boone’ s theoretical work. The basic idea of the Boone ind icator is that the (cost) 
advantage of each firm to its competitors in terms of lower marginal costs translates into 
ì
í î
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(relatively) higher profitability (Boone, 2000 and 2004; Boone & Weigand , 2000). This 
indicator allows one to measure how competition in the containerised  liner shipping 
industry evolves over time. Therefore, a firm-level panel dataset of 20 liner operators 
was compiled . The analysis involves the period from 2000 to 2008. The present study 
estimates the relation between market shares and  average variable costs (both in 
logarithms) add ing explanatory variables for industry-specific effects (the growing 
number of services d riven by globalisation, the introduction of larger container vessels).  
The contribution of the present paper to the debate of competition in the container liner 
shipping industry is fourfold . First, it documents and  estimates a consistent indicator to 
measure competition over time in the container liner shipping industry. Secondly, the 
paper show s that the Boone ind icator helps to understand the effects of competition and 
efficiency on the liner operators’  behaviour. Thirdly, it also controls for industry-specific 
effects on the change in competition. Correcting for industry-specific effects appears to 
be very important to attain the appropriate sign. Finally, the Boone ind icator is 
interesting for policy makers who want to enhance competition or for regulators to see 
whether competition indeed  increases over time after a policy change. 
Several find ings emerge from the empirical analysis. In terms of the degree of 
competition, the first find ing is that competition increased  over the 2000-2008 period. 
Over the 2002-2003 period , the leading liner operators enjoyed  profits while 
subsequently competition has intensified. This find ing corresponds with the analysis of 
the evolution of the profitability in the first part of the paper. Intensified competition 
forces the competitors to set low  prices. Only efficient firms with a technological 
advantage (lower operating costs due to the deployment of larger vessels) as well as 
having a large network of services over (inefficient) competitors can attain profits. In a 
more competitive market, liner operators are hurt more severely for being inefficient. By 
theory, inefficient liner operators are forced  to exit the market. The latter is hardly the 
case in the container liner shipping industry. Very few  liner operators (e.g. Cho Yang, 
2001, Senator Lines, 2009 and MBG Shipping, 2010) failed  and exited the market. 
Secondly, the other explanatory variables have a significantly positive impact on the 
profits (proxied by market shares). Adding a dummy variable ind icates that alliances are 
not necessary more efficient in terms of profits. Finally, it is very important to check for 
quality differences and  industry-specific effects in order to estimate the Boone ind icator 
accurately. 
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What can liner operators learn from this empirical analysis of the evolution of 
competition for the CLSI?. First, to realise higher profits, the focus should be on 
becoming more efficient. Secondly, liner operators involved in an alliance should  
wonder what the reason(s) is/ are for the negative impact on profit. 
For policy makers, this research is especially relevant. As far as the author knows, no 
study has put forward  the overall p icture on the degree of competition at container 
division level. This paper contributes to the lack of such research.  
First, it introduces in the CLSI an new way to measure competition over time which 
stands in the tradition of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation approach.  
Second , this research has assessed  the degree of competition over time just before the 
abolishment of the block excemption as of October 18th, 2008 - a policy change with the 
objective of intensifying competition - (EEC Regulation n° 4056/ 86) and the global 
downturn. A suggestion for further research is to check what the effect is on competition 
of both events.  
Third ly, it introduces a framework to discuss competition in the CLSI.  
Last, the present empirical evidence is based  on the container liner shipping industry. 
The indicator can also be used  for separate submarkets (read  trade lines), in other 
segments of the (liner) shipping industry as well as in other transport modes. Data 
availability often limits research at d isaggregated level. Here, lack of data on average 
costs makes estimating competition at trade level impossible.  
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$SSHQGL[(YROXWLRQRSHUDWLRQDOUHVXOWDWFRQWDLQHUGLYLVLRQ
  
EBITDA 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
APL 284.00 189.00 134.00 406.00 892.00 845.00 566.90 766.00 299.00
CCNI -5.00 19.00 38.00 -20.00 -14.00 4.70
CSCL 130.81 -27.34 224.93 629.19 694.94 365.96 764.17
CMA CGM 109.28 36.33 110.00 328.00 620.00 819.69 823.09 1284.00 1260.00
COSCO Container L. -17.62 328.91 610.38 1114.28 1912.36 3835.01
CSAV 34.69 66.53 145.35 188.73 -197.00 93.00
Hanjin Shipping 317.09 193.30 9.00 362.00 792.77 615.77 325.66 481.72
Hapag Lloyd 86.67 287.95 238.01 456.00 392.88 537.78 267.22 851.08
K-Line 273.33 649.31 1099.84 991.72 1023.17 1837.74
Maersk 1091.84 1356.42 1480.77 2082.22 2805.84 3419.66 1539.97 2407.98 2262.00
Matson 145.00 166.00 189.00 164.00 190.00
MISC Berhad 455.00 435.23 379.93 661.52 1680.86 1320.36 1393.52 774.33
Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) 173.00 555.00 383.00 75.20 150.00
NYK 215.00 445.00 188.00 211.00
OOCL 90.85 359.38 729.01 744.93 805.41 867.53 610.00
RCL 61.00 57.00 128.00 160.00 116.70 107.00 57.00
UASC 0.28 56.17 117.64 136.43 79.31
Wan Hai Lines 21.00 48.00 187.00 202.00 153.00 252.00
Yang Ming Line 460.00 232.00 497.00 455.00 50.00 187.00
ZIM 28.00 99.00 251.00 261.00 189.00 142.00
ïOðOñò ï3óñ ô<õDö÷/øùôôøﬂ÷ úûø7ü:øﬂ÷ öDôýôø7ö÷ þ2ßOö úßô<÷ ü

üDß<÷ ß õﬁß3ú÷ þõ ßßOü÷ ô üDô

÷ õ
 	

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
APL -33.45% -29.10% 202.99% 119.70% -5.27% -32.91% 35.12% -60.97%
CCNI 480.00% 100.00% -152.63% -30.00% 133.57%
CSCL -120.90% 922.67% 179.72% 10.45% -47.34% 108.81%
CMA CGM -66.76% 202.81% 198.18% 89.02% 32.21% 0.41% 56.00% -1.87%
COSCO Container L. 1966.50% 85.58% 82.56% 71.62% 100.54%
CSAV 91.78% 118.47% 29.85% -204.38% 147.21%
Hanjin Shipping -39.04% -95.34% 3922.22% 119.00% -22.33% -47.11% 47.92%
Hapag Lloyd 232.22% -17.34% 91.59% -13.84% 36.88% -50.31% 218.49%
K-Line 137.55% 69.39% -9.83% 3.17% 79.61%
Maersk 24.23% 9.17% 40.62% 34.75% 21.88% -54.97% 56.37% -6.06%
Matson 14.48% 13.86% -13.23% 15.85%
MISC Berhad -4.34% -12.71% 74.12% 154.09% -21.45% 5.54% -44.43%
Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) 220.81% -30.99% -80.37% 99.47%
NYK 106.98% -57.75%
OOCL 295.60% 102.85% 2.18% 8.12% 7.71% -29.69%
RCL -6.56% 124.56% 25.00% -27.06% -8.31% -46.73%
UASC 19962.14% 109.42% 15.97% -41.87%
Wan Hai Lines 128.57% 289.58% 8.02% -24.26% 64.71%
Yang Ming Line -49.57% 114.22% -8.45% -89.01% 274.00%
ZIM 253.57% 153.54% 3.98% -27.59% -24.87%
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Note: By way of comparison, the A.P. Møller Maersk Group improved  its financial performance between 
2007 and  2008 increasing its ROS from 23.3 % to 26.9 % while it only gained  18.94 US cents ou t of every 
dollar in 2009. Drilling dow n towards tw o other of its business segments, the annual reports reveal that the 
ROS of the business segment, A.P.M. terminal continuously grew (2007: 16.27 %, 2008: 18.37 % and  2009: 
24.09 %) (cross-subsid isation?) while the business segment Maersk Tankers saw its ROS drop  to 25,76 % after 
maintaining its ROS at about 30 % for the 2007-2008 period . As a bench-mark, a look at other industries 
shows that Audi achieved a ROS of 8.1 % in 2008 and  5.4 % in 2009. The ROS of Nippon Steel continuously 
d iminished  (2006: 13.9 %, 2007: 11.7 % and  2008: 7 %) while the ROS of Proctor & Gamble slightly grew  
(2006: 19.42 %, 2007: 20.20 % and 2008: 20.46 %). 
ROS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
APL 0.07452 0.05262 0.03912 0.09713 0.16814 0.14173 0.09533 0.11515 0.03763
CCNI -0.0127 0.03619 0.06333 -0.0471 -0.0191 0.00483
CSCL -0.0215 0.1217 0.26913 0.19761 0.09354 0.14353
CMA CGM 0.05745 0.01832 0.04178 0.08611 0.11328 0.13657 0.09775 0.10881 0.08344
COSCO Container L. -0.007 0.10517 0.15675 0.1874 0.18909 0.25901
CSAV 0.02071 0.03115 0.05412 0.04846 -0.0513 0.02241
Hanjin Shipping 0.09385 0.05501 0.00238 0.0775 0.16448 0.12744 0.05787 0.06499
Hapag Lloyd 0.09246 0.08355 0.06012 0.15136 0.10702 0.11841 0.0339 0.10013
K-Line 0.04628 0.09733 0.16016 0.12393 0.08627 0.12472
Maersk 0.11474 0.13305 0.12715 0.15409 0.1776 0.15888 0.06093 0.09029 0.07891
Matson 0.18686 0.19529 0.21526 0.17336 0.18868
MISC Berhad 0.29549 0.30011 0.26505 0.32987 0.59694 0.43342 0.41218 0.20776
Mitsui-OSK L. (MOL) 0.04968 0.14903 0.09189 0.01553 0.02161
NYK 0.05531 0.10468 0.04099 -0.0053 0.03172
OOCL 0.03696 0.11088 0.17607 0.15862 0.17472 0.15352 0.0932
RCL 0.20199 0.16864 0.27766 0.2974 0.21126 0.18739 0.10307
UASC 0.0004 0.0685 0.1198 0.13068 0.07663
Wan Hai Lines 0.02331 0.04336 0.12995 0.13369 0.09462 0.13447
Yang Ming Line 0.35088 0.10861 0.17936 0.15274 0.01518 0.04542
ZIM 0.01689 0.0487 0.09929 0.08893 0.06181 0.03728
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  
Net profit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
APL 284.00 19.00 -73.00 406.00 892.00 845.00 344.00 523.00 83.00
CCNI 9.00 17.00 35.00 -19.50 -13.80 0.60
CSCL 161.91 -72.22 167.29 486.35 444.41 110.90 440.87
CMA CGM 100.81 24.81 49.00 255.00 566.00 553.00 611.00 966.00 111.00
COSCO Container L. -144.69 210.76 599.71 861.03 1215.11 2907.30
CSAV 72.00 206.00 132.00 -58.20
Hanjin Shipping -58.96 -59.66 15.54 247.67 501.81 390.35 403.78 155.72
Hapag Lloyd 73.48 203.78 149.94 455.00 386.00 328.00 107.30 268.80
K-Line 96.83 305.00 620.00 382.40 562.00 918.94
Maersk 518.47 151.60 59.15 586.33 1512.42 1278.01 2249.08 106.00 205.00
Matson 93.00
MISC Berhad 443.68 353.88 345.89 603.78 1259.46 813.81 874.58 730.03
Mitsui-OSK Line 56.00 517.00 965.00 26.70 69.40
NYK 44.00 149.00 -82.00 114.00
OOCL 51.79 329.04 670.60 651.29 581.14 2548.40 275.53
RCL 28.00 20.00 95.00 119.00 80.00 100.00 -24.00
UASC 4.00 70.00 135.00 115.00 54.00
Wan Hai Lines 98.00 130.00 212.00 165.00 95.50 193.20
Yang Ming Line 32.00 195.00 307.00 282.00 35.90 186.60
ZIM -9.00 47.00 172.00 187.00 80.00 28.20
-.(/(0 -1/ 2354 657"8%6948,6 227489:2694 3(;<92ﬀ8%4 3; =5==4 ;&9>3?@;4 ;6
ACBEDGF,HI$JLK M F
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
APL -93.31% -484.21% -656.16% 119.70% -5.27% -59.29% 52.03% -84.13%
CCNI 88.89% 105.88% -155.71% -29.23% 104.35%
CSCL -144.61% 331.62% 190.73% -8.62% -75.05% 297.54%
CMA CGM -75.39% 97.52% 420.41% 121.96% -2.30% 10.49% 58.10% -88.51%
COSCO Container L. 245.66% 184.55% 43.57% 41.12% 139.26%
CSAV 186.11% -35.92% -144.09%
Hanjin Shipping -1.19% 126.05% 1493.85% 102.61% -22.21% 3.44% -61.44%
Hapag Lloyd 177.31% -26.42% 203.46% -15.16% -15.03% -67.29% 150.51%
K-Line 215.00% 103.28% -38.32% 46.97% 63.51%
Maersk -70.76% -60.98% 891.33% 157.95% -15.50% 75.98% -95.29% 93.40%
Matson
MISC Berhad -20.24% -2.26% 74.56% 108.60% -35.38% 7.47% -16.53%
Mitsui-OSK Line 823.21% 86.65% -97.23% 159.93%
NYK -155.03% 239.02%
OOCL 535.37% 103.80% -2.88% -10.77% 338.52% -89.19%
RCL -28.57% 375.00% 25.26% -32.77% 25.00% -124.00%
UASC 1650.00% 92.86% -14.81% -53.04%
Wan Hai Lines 32.65% 63.08% -22.17% -42.12% 102.30%
Yang Ming Line 509.38% 57.44% -8.14% -87.27% 419.78%
ZIM 622.22% 265.96% 8.72% -57.22% -64.75%
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

 
Study (in chronological order) sample characteristics industry dependent variable independent variable
2000 | Boone, J.
2000 | Boone, J. & J. Weigand 1978-1992 manufacturing industries relative values of profit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
2004 | Boone, J. manufacturing industries absolute values of p rofit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
2004 | Creusen, H., B. Minne & H. van der Wiel manufacturing, 1978-1999 
construction , 1982-1999
market services, 1987/ 93-1999
manufacturing 
construction
market services
relative values of profit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
2005 | Griffith, R., J. Boone & R. Harrison UK, 1986-1999 pharmaceutical industry
supermarkets
absolute values of p rofit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
2006 | Creusen, H., B. Minne & H. van der Wiel 1993-2001 Dutch manufacturing industry
and service sector
absolute values of p rofit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
2007 | Boone, J., J. van  Ours & H. van der Wiel 1993-2002 Dutch market absolute values of p rofit average variable costs
2007 | Maliranta , M., M. Pajarinen, P. Rouvinen & P. Ylä-Anttila 1994-2004 business sectors operating profits (different 
functional form)
average variable costs (differen t 
functional forms)
2007 | van Leuvensteijn, M., J. Bikker, A. van  Rixtel & C. Sørensen EU countries
+ UK, US and Japan
1994-2004 
banking industry: loan markets market share estimate of marginal cost (MC)
2008 | van Leuvensteijn, M. 1890-1914 sugar industry market share MC
2008 | Bikker, J. & M. van Leuvensteijn 1995-2003 life in surance industry relative values of profit or 
market shares
estimate of MC or proxy: average 
cost
2008 | Roos, T. 2006-2007 electricity sector absolute values of p rofit MC
2009 | Maslovych, M. 2005-2008 Loan market in Ukraine market share estimate of MC or proxy: average 
cost
2010 | Schaeck, K. & M. Cihák European banks: 1995-2005
U.S. banks: 2005
banking industry ROA proxy: average cost
2010 | Roengpitya, R. 1994-2004 banking industry: loan markets market share estimate of MC (fixed effects)
2010 | Braila, C., G. Rayp & S. Sanyal 1997-2004 manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries
difference betw een a  firm’s 
revenue and its variable 
cost
proxy: ra tio of variable cost and 
operating revenue (or turnover)
2010 | Sch iersch, A. & J. Schmidt-Ehmcke 1995-2006 German manufacturing firms absolute values of p rofit proxy: average variable 
cost/ revenu
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Abstract98 
Oligopolistic firms are often thought to generate larger economic profits, and  whenever 
there are profits there is an inducement to entry. While the role of entry and exit has 
been dealt with in shipping literature in general and with regard  to liner conferences, the 
study of entry and  exit conditions was ignored  for the container liner shipping industry. 
An analysis of entry/ exit conditions for the containerised  liner shipping industry is an 
interesting issue.  
Firstly, this paper investigates how freely container liner operators can enter/ exit the 
industry, alliances and a trade. Secondly, entry conditions also determine the extent to 
which incumbent firms need to fear competition from potential entrants. This paper 
adopts the persistence of profit methodology to capture this unobservable threat. 
Mueller’ s (1977, 1986) persistence of profit hypothesis will be tested  for a sample of 
container liner operators between 2000 and  2008. To this end , a time-series analysis on 
firm-level profits is used  to estimate the short-run and  long-run persistence. The 
hypothesis is that (actual and  potential) entry into and exit from any market are 
sufficiently free to bring any abnormal profits quickly into line with the competitive rate 
of return (Lipczynski HWDO., 2005). In the containerised  liner shipping case, the empirical 
results suggest that the hypothesis can be rejected . 
.H\ZRUGV: 
Competition, barriers to entry, container liner shipping industry, persistence of profits 
  
                                                     
98
  The au thor is grateful to Prof. dr; H . meersman and  Prof. dr. E; van de Voorde for their valuable 
comments and  suggestions which contribu ted  to the writing of this article. The au thor remains solely 
responsible for the article’ s content. 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
In analysing competition in a particular industry, the conditions for entry and  exit 
cannot be overlooked . Since the seminal work of Bain (Barriers to New Competition – 
1956) and  Baumol (Theory of Contestability99 - 1982), a vast amount of literature has 
stud ied the entry/ exit conditions for various industries to determine the extent to which 
established firms or incumbents need to fear competition from outside the market. While 
the role of entry and exit has been dealt w ith in shipping literature in general (e.g. 
Brooks, 2000; Cullinane & Khanna, 2000) and  with regard to liner conferences100 (e.g. 
Heaver, 1973; Davies, 1983a and  1986), the study of entry and  exit conditions has been 
ignored  for the containerised liner shipping industry. This offers an incentive to analyse 
the entry/ exit conditions for the containerised liner shipping industry.  
The main emphasis of the paper is to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1 How freely can container liner operators enter/ exit the containerised liner 
shipping industry?; 
RQ2 Are the competitive forces in the containerised  liner shipping industry 
sufficiently powerful to bring any abnormal profits (positive or negative) into line 
with the competitive rate of return?  
In studying the dynamics of entry/ exit conditions for the containerised  liner shipping 
industry101 (hereafter CLSI), the relevant market102 is the first element to be considered. 
Although the importance of non vessel operating common carriers (NVOCC) and global 
forwarders is growing, here, the relevant market consists of all vessel operating common 
carriers (e.g. Maersk Line, MSC, CMA CGM) offering container liner shipping services, 
includ ing actual or potential competitors. The transportation of a box is the product 
                                                     
99
  A perfectly contestable market is characterised  by two properties: (a) there are no barriers to entry in the 
market and  exit is costless and  (b) incumbent operators will not react (through pricing) to new entry 
(Davies, 1986 and  Haralambides, 2007). Since some maritime economists (e.g. Heaver, 1993; Pearson, 
1987; Jankow ski, 1989) and  regulators (i.e. Federal Maritime Commission, 1989 and the European 
Commission, 1989) have extensively refu ted  the application of the theory of contestable markets to the 
liner shipping sector, the present paper focuses on barriers to entry/ exit.  
100
  Since the promulgation of the US Shipping Act of 1984, the ability of conferences to raise barriers to entry 
has eroded . Starting 18/ 10/ 2008, liner conferences are abolished  on trade to/ from ports of the European 
Union. 
101
  Container shipping industry, a major segment of the liner shipp ing industry, is a maritime industry, 
international if not global in scope. This industry operates vessels transporting containers w ith various 
but standard ised  d imensions/ sizes, regard less of the contents. Whether filled  or not, these (container) 
vessels are pu t into service on a regular basis and  often accord ing to a fixed  sailing schedu le, loading and  
d ischarging at specified  ports (Sys, 2009). 
102
  See also Van der Ziel (1994), Brooks (2000), Eu ropean Union (1997 and  2007) and  Sys (2009). 
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d imension. The relevant geographical d imension of the market is defined  globally and  at 
trade level respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is structured  as follows: To answer the first research 
question, Section 6.2 first focuses on the dynamics in the containerised  liner shipping 
industry. Subsequently, the freedom of entry/ exit and entry/ exit conditions will be 
stud ied at trade level, viz. the case study Belgium-India (6.2.2) as well as at the level of 
alliances (6.2.3). Section 6.3 deals with the second research question. The persistence of 
profit hypothesis w ill be tested  for a sample of container liner operators between 2000 
and 2008. The hypothesis is that (potential and  actual) entry/ exit from any market are 
sufficiently free to bring any abnormal profits quickly into line w ith the competitive 
return (Mueller, 1977, 1986 and  1990). To this end , a time-series analysis on firm-level 
profits is used  to estimate the short-run and  long-run persistence. Subsection 6.3.1 
presents the sample and  data. The methodology is explained in Subsection 6.3.2. 
Subsection 6.3.3 reports and d iscusses the econometric results. Finally, Section 6.4 gives 
concluding remarks.  
 (QWU\H[LW FRQGLWLRQV IRU WKH FRQWDLQHULVHG OLQHU
VKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\
Entry may take many forms. First, a firm can enter the CLSI by buying an established  
liner operator. Secondly, an entirely new liner operator can start deploying fully cellular 
or non cellular containerships. Thirdly, an established  liner operator active in other 
shipping d ivisions may expand  its activities to the containerised liner shipping industry 
i.e. pursuing strategies of d iversification. Finally, an entrant also may be an established  
container liner operator d iversifying its portfolio of services, that is, the carrier enters a 
trade route where it was not previously active or re-enters a trade route.  
Exit is the reverse of entry, viz. a liner operator withdrawing from a trade route or 
discontinuing its activities completely (Besanko HWDO, 2004).  
Entry and exit conditions refer to barriers to entry and  exit. Bain (1956, p . 10) defined  the 
condition of entry to an industry as “ … DGYDQWDJHVZKLFKHVWDEOLVKHG ILUPV LQDQ LQGXVWU\
KDYHRYHUHVWDEOLVKHGHQWUDQW ILUPV  HYDOXDWHG LQJHQHUDOE\PHDVXUHV RI WKHKHLJKWVRI HQWU\
LQGXFLQJ SULFHV UHODWLYH WR GHILQHG FRPSHWLWLYH OHYHOV” . Since then, there has been a 
considerable debate in the economic literature about a precise definition of ‘barriers to 
entry’  (OECD, 2002). For example, Bain’ s definition has been criticised  by Stigler (1968, 
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p. 67) who restricted  the term ‘entry barrier’  to differentially higher costs faced  by 
entrants but not by incumbents. Stigler states that economies of scale are not an entry 
barrier if the same cost conditions are available to entrants and established firms at any 
given output level. Von Weizsäcker (1980) extends Stigler’s approach to include welfare 
effects in the definition of barriers to entry (Lipczysnki HWDO, 2005).  
A more recent debate focuses on the relevance of a fixed  definition of barriers to entry 
for competition policy. Pragmatics argue that it is more important to answer the more 
practical questions of whether, when, and to what extent entry is likely to occur. This 
pragmatic view is largely accepted  by most competition agencies in OECD countries 
(OECD, 2002 and 2007).  
This section aims to answer these practical questions for the containerised  liner shipping 
industry.  
 ,QGXVWU\G\QDPLFV
Before studying how freely liner operators can enter/ exit the CLSI, the industry 
dynamics w ill be analysed. To this end , an interesting tool is the classification of the 100 
largest container liner operators sourced by Alphaliner. Since 1996103, the Top 100 
consists of the ranking of the container liner operator, their TEU capacity and  number of 
ships deployed, their market share as well as their total order book. The consolidation of 
the Top 100s over the 1996-2010 period  allows the change in ranking, market share, etc. 
to be observed . 
To start, the analysis of the dynamics of the industry focuses on the first tier of the Top 
100s, viz. the segment + 20. Furthermore, the impact of the financial and  economic 
downturn is examined (6.2.1.1). Next, the change in ranking and  market share are 
analysed  for the segment 21-100 (6.2.1.2). Finally, a look at new ventures completes the 
analysis of the dynamics of the CLSI. 
 6HJPHQW
Appendix 6-1 summarises the liner operators in alphabetical order, showing their 
ranking and  their market share (in italic – percentage represents the liner operator’s 
                                                     
103
  N ote: Alphaliner published  a Top 65 for the years 1997 and 1998. 
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share of the Top 100 liner fleet in TEU terms) covering the 1996-2010 period 104. The Top 
20 carriers on January 1st, 2010 are shaded.  
Firstly, Appendix 6-1 highlights the rise and  fall of world  largest liner operators. A total 
of 30 different names105 occurred  in the segment 1-20 during those 15 years. Of them, 
15 liner operators106 remained  in this segment during the whole period . UASC, Wan Hai 
Lines (2010 – ranked  22) and PIL constantly flirt w ith the rank 20 limit. CSAV and CSCL 
have been in the segment 1-20 since 2000. CSAV’s financial d ifficulties brought along the 
temporary departure of the segment 1-20 (October 2008). Hamburg Süd  appeared  in this 
segment in 2001 a first time and returned  in 2004. There were seven mergers (1997: 
P&OCL; 1998: DSR-Senator; 1999: Nedlloyd, Sealand  Services and  Safmarine; 2005: P&O 
Nedlloyd and  CP Ships), one acquisition (NOL/ APL, 1998) and one liquidation (Cho 
Yang, 2001). 
Secondly, Appendix 6-1 also reports the evolution of the ranking. Maersk Line, MSC, 
CMA CGM and  Evergreen retained their ranking during the last five years. The 
evolution in ranking of the other carriers is more volatile. Climbing in rank is the result 
of the occasion of mergers (e.g. in 2005 TUI AG, former parent company of Hapag-Lloyd  
took over the 16th-ranked transatlantic carrier CP Ships, causing Hapag-Lloyd  to climb 
from 17th to 5th rank) as well as organic growth (e.g. CMA CGM, MSC, CSLS climbed  in 
ranking largely through organic growth, although CMA CGM bought a few niche 
carriers). Conversely, the decrease in ranking is due to the lack of investment in TEU 
capacity. Except for K-line, the carriers NYK and  MOL lost rank. All three Japanese liner 
operators are no longer as expansive in the container liner shipping industry as they 
used  to be. 
Finally, a look at the evolution of the market shares also shows quite some dynamics in 
this segment. Between January 1996 and  January 2010, the TEU capacity deployed on 
liner trades has continuously risen from 3,194,896 TEU to 12,440,630 TEU. To retain their 
market shares, liner operators had  to increase their TEU capacities at the same pace. The 
world ’s top 20 carriers represent a combined  global market share of 86.94 % in 2010, up 
from 65.04 % in 1996. Only Maersk Line controls more than 15 % of the market share. 
Although the Maersk Line’ s capacity has grown from 1,665,272 TEU to 2,044,981 TEU 
                                                     
104 
 Figures refer to 1 January of each year - ww w1.axsmarine.com. 
105
  Maersk Line and  its p redecessors are taken as one name. 
106
  In alphabetical order: APL/ NOL, CMA CGM, COSCO, Evergreen, H anjin, H apag-Lloyd , HMM, K-Line, 
N YK, Maersk Line, MOL, MSC, OOCL, Yang Ming Line and  ZIM. 
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(+ 22.80 %), the market share of the world ’ s number one container carrier has slid  from 
19.23 % to 16.44 % during the last five years (2005: A.P. Møller-Maersk bought P&O 
Nedlloyd). Both MSC, ranked second , and CMA CGM, ranked  third , have strengthened  
their position at the expense of rivals. Evergreen, world ’s fourth biggest line after slid ing 
from second place in 1999, saw  it market share shrank to 4.49 % in 2010. Given its empty 
order book, Evergreen will continue to go backwards. The levels of market share 
controlled  by the Japanese carriers, NYK and  MOL decreased  and  will continue to 
decrease given their post-global downturn corporate strategies to restructure their 
containership sectors. As reflected  in Appendix 6-1, the post-1997 financial crisis affected  
the Korean liner operators Hanjin-Senator and  Hyundai Merchant Marine. As a result, 
the new building programs of both carriers were slowed down at that time. The notion 
of global market share for smaller carriers (e.g. PIL, Wan Hai, etc.) with a regional focus 
is of low significance. As market shares d iffer from trade to trade, their regional market 
shares are more important. 
What is the impact of the economic downturn on this segment? Figure 6-1 compares the 
ranking, the number of ships and  the TEU capacity of the top league of liner operators 
on January 1st, 2010 with October 1st, 2008107 (compiled with data from 
www1.axsmarine.com). A first observation is the return of CSAV in the segment 1-20 at 
the expense of Wan Hai Lines. Secondly, concerning the ranking, various liner operators 
changed  position in the ranking in the chaotic year 2009. This change in ranking is 
clearly observable since July 2009. The liner operators Hapag-Lloyd, MOL, OOCL, PIL 
and ZIM lost rank while APL, CSAV, Hamburg Süd , Hanjin, NYK, K-Line and YML 
gained  rank. For the latter 4 liner operators, the number of ships d ropped  while their 
TEU capacity increased . This increase is d riven by the delivery of larger new vessels. The 
rest of the liner operators succeeded  to keep their rank unchanged. Another observation 
is the growth of the global cellular ship capacity both in TEU capacity and  number of 
ships. This trend is only followed  by CSAV, Hanjin, and  NYK. As a result of the market 
conditions, the majority of the liner operators has taken vessels out of service as part of 
their capacity rationalisation program (e.g. redelivery of chartered vessels, scrapping 
programs, id ling of operated vessels,…).  
                                                     
107
  Except in the case of CSAV, January 1st, 2009 was compared  w ith January 1st, 2010. 
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)LJXUH,PSDFWRIHFRQRPLFGRZQWXUQRQVHJPHQW
Maersk Line has suffered  the largest d rop in vessels. In contrast, MSC’s active fleet grew 
significantly despite its aggressive scrapping campaign (see July 2009 – January 2010). 
The growth in TEU capacity was due to delivery of a series of owned  11,000-14,000 TEU 
vessels and  to its well known strategy of scooping up the market for cheap charter 
tonnage. After the return of chartered tonnage (January-July 2009), CMA CGM’s active 
fleet also grew significantly. The world's third  largest container line, CMA CGM 
continues to take delivery of ordered  +11,000 TEU ships. In contrast, some Asian liner 
operators also trimmed their owned containership fleet but their d isposals are not 
compensated by the delivery of newbuildings or through chartering-in.  
 6HJPHQW
There is a gap between the lead ing Top 20 liner operator’ s and the carriers ranking after 
them. First, the share of the carriers located  in the segment 21-100 does not pass the 1 % 
mark each. Secondly, over the 1996-2010 period , more than 50 mergers and  acquisitions 
took place. It is interesting to note that most liner operators that were taken over were 
located  in segment 30 - 50 before merger/ takeover. Thirdly, in a normally competitive 
market, firms that are unsuccessful fail. Over those 15 years, all 
bankruptcies/ liquidations were located within this segment. As a consequence, new 
names appeared .  
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World Fleet 9,321 9,406 9,525 9,480 9,535 214 13,898,349 14,143,656 14,705,773 14,806,337 14,951,771 1,053,422
Maersk 1 1 1 1 1 0 452 437 439 420 427 -25 1,791,124 1,770,223 1,780,821 1,734,937 1,746,639 -44,485
MSC 2 2 2 2 2 0 405 421 416 399 394 -11 1,351,550 1,421,975 1,510,842 1,495,023 1,507,843 156,293
CMA CGM 3 3 3 3 3 0 271 284 265 274 289 18 810,247 849,857 886,981 916,174 944,690 134,443
Evergreen Line 4 4 4 4 4 0 181 181 178 172 167 -14 628,993 631,216 623,111 609,180 592,732 -36,261
Hapag-Lloyd 5 5 6 7 7 -2 135 131 129 123 129 -6 496,927 492,097 491,603 482,291 470,171 -26,756
COSCON 6 6 7 6 6 0 151 154 143 144 143 -8 483,073 491,481 480,703 495,512 495,936 12,863
APL 7 7 5 5 5 2 125 128 130 129 116 -9 447,560 473,157 497,187 526,054 524,710 77,150
CSCL 8 8 8 8 8 0 120 118 122 123 120 0 409,155 412,002 438,471 456,355 457,126 47,971
MOL 9 9 10 11 11 -2 111 106 98 93 89 -22 374,376 366,871 360,091 351,017 348,353 -26,023
OOCL 10 10 12 14 14 -4 92 93 84 70 77 -15 362,944 365,240 351,066 306,545 290,350 -72,594
Hanjin 11 11 9 9 9 2 76 78 87 88 90 14 344,949 350,274 385,990 388,826 400,033 55,084
NYK 12 12 11 10 10 2 78 81 81 82 89 11 334,854 349,040 351,916 360,460 359,608 24,754
K Line 13 13 13 13 12 1 102 101 104 92 80 -22 310,004 312,721 33,587 321,068 325,280 15,276
YML 14 14 14 12 13 1 86 84 83 83 63 -23 298,718 302,365 316,683 326,879 317,304 18,586
Zim 15 15 17 17 17 -2 91 83 80 62 88 -3 274,291 252,735 253,887 210,376 215,726 -58,565
HMM 16 16 15 16 16 0 57 56 62 57 53 -4 249,065 238,332 289,488 273,319 259,941 10,876
Hamburg Sud 17 17 16 15 15 2 79 77 83 88 64 -15 221,547 232,594 268,472 281,870 283,897 62,350
PIL 18 18 20 20 20 -2 80 80 76 77 66 -14 158,915 159,337 152,541 160,105 173,989 15,074
UASC 19 19 19 19 19 0 45 47 42 42 45 0 137,958 152,864 153,384 165,572 176,578 38,620
Wan Hai 20 74 129,581
CSAV 20 18 18 18 2 55 59 65 84 29 139,587 167,680 190,672 195,884 56,297
Rank TEUcapacity
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 1HZYHQWXUHV
While established  liner operators wrestle w ith cash flow problems and heavy expansion-
induced  debt burdens, new competitors enter the market. Hereafter, the focus is on two 
recent new ventures, viz. MBG Shipping and The Containership Company. These 
entrepreneurs seek new opportunities in the current d ifficult economic climate. Both 
new competitors are helped  by the current market conditions, which enable them to pick 
up the vessels and  containers at highly competitive daily charter/ rental rates.  
First, Cape Town-based  MBG Shipping108 p lanned to enter the South Africa/ Europe fruit 
trade in December 2009 with a regular reefer container liner service. MBG Shipping 
intended  to charter seven 1,000 TEU-class ships with high reefer capacity (+300-plug 
points per vessel). For the South African fru it exporters, this newcomer offered  a 
competitive and  effective alternative to the reefer services between South Africa and  
Europe (Fossey, 2009a). MBG Shipping had  to compete against liner operator MSC 
(ships deployed ranged  between 4,850 TEU and  6,742 TEU) and  the SAECS consortium. 
The members of the South Africa Europe Container Service (SAECS) which comprise 
Deutsche Afrika Linien (DAL), MOL and liner heavyweights Maersk Line and  Safmarine 
- both part of the AP Moller-Maersk Group  - deploy 1 x 4,500/ 2 x 4,931/ 1 x 4,258 and  
2 x 4,035 TEU-class ships respectively. The question will be whether this ‘new ’  carrier 
will be able to compete against those established players that have much larger 
economies of scale.  
The launch of the weekly sailing (i.e. nine weeks after planned  departure date) was not 
only very difficult but seems to have failed  even before completing its first voyage.  
Firstly, the venture was not easy. The South Africa fruit season was already under 
contract by that time and the potatoes and onions season was underperforming due to 
the September drought. In addition, the freight rates for these commodities are 
remarkably lower than other products. Secondly, the launch was not easy either due to 
the previous record  of MBG Shipping initiator Ian Wicks, the resignation and  
withdrawal of Carl van der Westhuizen after one week from shareholding in the 
operations, the pending payment of harbour dues, the delayed  departure of the 
chartered 1,347 TEU vessel Alioth and the consequent affected  confidence. Finally, the 
new carrier MBG Shipping only offered  one sailing. In the meantime, the chartered  ship  
                                                     
108
  The management and  the rotation of this service strongly resemble those of the shipp ing company SAILS 
w hich ended  its activities previous year. 
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has been transferred  to the ship owner w ith the cargo (i.e. one full (reefer) 40 ft and 20 
empty containers) still onboard . Immediately, the market reacted. The SAECS 
consortium has reintroduced  the Reefer Express or REX service and  phases into 
operation additional capacity to help satisfy the increased seasonal demand of South 
Africa’ s fruit exporters. 
Starting a liner shipping company from scratch was rarely successful. For instance, the 
German shipyard  Bremer Vulkan had access to low-priced  ships. Therefore, in 1987, they 
began with a 14-day round-the-world  service under the name Senator Lines. Senator 
Lines later merged  with the shipping-line d ivision of Deutsche Seereederei Rostock. 
Since 1997, Hanjin Shipping has been their principal shareholder. Early 2009, Senator 
Lines ceased  business (www.senatorlines.com). Other predators e.g. Blue Anchor Line, 
Great Western Shipping and  US Lines (bought up by CMA CGM, 2007) also assumed  
that the availability of vessels when container charter rates were low  was a sufficient 
factor for setting up  a successful liner service. To be successful, a liner operator requires 
besides ships, good management, a global network, human resources, customer 
relations, (IT) systems, p referably a track record , and  sufficient cargo coverage. Will the 
venture of the carrier-to-be, The Containership Company be successful?  
The business model of The Containership Company (TCC) announces to be quite 
different from established  players. Given that enough funding is found , the liner 
carrier’s services will be run along the lines of a budget airline, offering only port-to-port 
bill of ladings (B/ Ls)109 and  not always on mainstream ports (Fossey, 2009a).  
Can such business model be successful in the liner shipping industry? Possibly, but 
some side-notes are required : firstly, a look at air transport shows us that favourable 
leasing, secondary airport strategy and subsid ies allow starting from scratch. But then, 
even low cost airlines do not sell belly hold capacity (i.e. freight capacity supplied  by 
passenger airlines in the bellies of passenger or combi aircrafts) on short-haul routes. It 
complicates the operation and  jeopardises turnaround  times. On long-haul, low cost 
airlines putting aircrafts with large cargo capacity into service are pressed towards the 
traditional operating model (i.e. the importance of cargo capacity from revenue 
                                                     
109
  A bill of lading is a shipping document by which the master of a ship  acknowledges having received  in 
good order and  condition (or the reverse) certain specified  goods consigned  to him by some particu lar 
shipper and  binds himself to deliver them in similar conditions to the consignees of the shipper at the 
point of load ing (Paelinck, 2008). There are several forms of B/ Ls. A port-to-port or the classic ocean B/ L 
covers ocean port to ocean port carriage of cargo on a single ocean going vessel and  no other stage or 
form of carriage. 
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perspective). Secondly, offering port-to-port B/ Ls only works in such trades where 
freight forwarders are powerful (merchant haulage110), such as the European continent, 
Asia, Ind ian Sub Continent to name a few. The USA market is a d ifferent situation. A 
liner carrier cannot enter this market offering a port-to-port B/ L. Here, the freight 
forwarders are not involved. The liner carrier does inland  trucking (carrier haulage111). 
Third ly, the business model is not quite new. The established liner operators have a 
global footprint to serve secondary ports via transhipment. Finally, it needs to be seen if 
the business model of TCC will be successful. Its first service between Taicang (near 
Shanghai) and  Los Angeles is expected  to start in the middle of April 2010. TCC will 
enter the CLSI also through chartering-in of smaller ship  sizes (i.e. ranging in size 
between 2,500TEU and  3,000TEU capacity). 
Clearly, the analysis of the industry dynamics suggests that the industry is not stable. 
This can be interpreted  as an indication of actual entry and  exit. 
 $FWXDOHQWU\DQGH[LWDFDVHVWXG\ \]\_^ 
In this subsection, following Brooks (2000), the freedom of entry/ exit will be stud ied at 
trade level. Therefore, the growing Europe – Indian Subcontinent trade has been 
(connection to present) selected. Ind ia, becoming an authoritative economy in Asia has 
been chosen for its growing demand for containerised services (at 12.2 per cent to reach 
12.7 million TEU of import and export trade in 2015 – www.imf.org). The Indian 
Subcontinent (ISC) covers Ind ia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. After introducing 
this trade, barriers to entry/ exit w ill be analysed  in detail for the market Belgium – 
Ind ian Subcontinent.  
 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Following the EU’s abolition of anti-trust immunity for operators on European trade 
routes (as from 18 October 2008 ), European Liner Affairs Association (ELAA) trade 
association publishes monthly historical data regard ing aggregated  trade volumes and  
                                                     
110
  Merchant haulage refers to the inland  transport of shipping containers arranged  by the merchant/ freight 
forwarders. This includes empty container moves to and  from handover points in respect of containers 
released  by the carrier to merchants. 
111
  Under the term ‘Carrier hau lage’  or liner’ s haulage is understood  the inland  transport service which is 
performed by the sea-carrier under the terms and  conditions of the tariff and of the relevant transport 
document. 
112
  The emp irical observations are based  on data from AXSLiner, Dynamar, CI Online and  various volumes 
of the Containerisation Yearbook. 
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freight rates for all trades to and from Europe gathered  from its 25 members. The ISC 
trade is included  in the statistics Europe - ISC & Middle East (hereafter ICS & ME). 
Figure 6-2 show s the evolution of the westbound and eastbound  volume (in TEU) over 
the period  January 2008 - January 2010 (compiled  with data from www.elaa.net). The 
impact of the worldwide financial and economic downturn (October 2008) is clearly 
observable. Since Aug. 2009, Europe’ s ISC & ME containerised import volume has 
picked up to the same volume as January 2008. In the same month, the market from 
Europe to the ISC increased  with 23.84 basis points (i.e. January 2008 = 100). The ELAA's 
statistics show that westbound trade grew by 12.97 % in January 2010, compared  to the 
same month of 2009, with eastbound  traffic ahead  by 20.53 %. While, the year on year 
comparison January 2008 - January 2009 showed a decrease of 12 % for both legs. 
 
)LJXUH7UDGH9ROXPHV(VWLPDWHG7(8'U\	5HHIHU
Secondly, Ind ian Subcontinent is delineated from the ISC & ME statistics. Focusing on 
the entry/ exit of liner operators over the 1985-2008 period , it can be recorded  that 
entry/ exit on the stated  trade is not restricted. As shown in Figure 6-3, the number of 
players evolved from 14 in 1985 up to 28 liner operators in 2008 with a minimum of 12 
liner operators in 1997 and a maximum of 30 in 2004 (compiled with various ed itions of 
Containerisation Yearbook). 
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)LJXUH(QWU\H[LW,6&
Some liner operators left the trade and  returned a few years later (e.g. Yang Ming, K-
Line, Rickmers Linie, MSC…). An explanation can be found in the fluctuations of 
volume (see Figure 6-2). Again mergers and acquisitions, new entry and  exit of liner 
operators unravel the changing number of players. 
The evolution of the fleet deployment (right-hand  axis) and volume (left-hand  axis) for 
the Europe – ISC trade is summarised  in Figure 6-4 (compiled  with data from www.ci-
online.co.uk).  
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQIOHHWGHSOR\PHQW,6&
While the fleet deployment grew by a factor of 1.17, the TEU deployed  (volume) 
increased at a rate of 1.2 during the 2001-2009 period . Entry and exit movements 
influence both graphs. The line graph of n° of ships rises gradually to a peak in 2008 due 
to the cascad ing effect as a result of the deployment of ultra large container ships in the 
Europe-Far East trade. The Europe - Ind ian Subcontinent trade also felt the global 
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economic down turn. Ocean carriers have cut capacity by 14 vessels or 88,033 TEUs 
(year-on-year comparison 2008-2009). 
Finally, Ind ian major seaports are marked  out from the Indian Subcontinent trade. The 
major ports/ terminals in Ind ia are Chennai, Kandla, Cochin, Kolkata, Mumbai, JNPT, 
NSICT, Mundra, New Mangalore, Pipavav, Tuticorin, and Visakhapatanam. Figure 6-5 
lists the number of liner operators calling at these major Ind ian ports over the 1985-2008 
period (compiled with various ed itions of Containerisation Yearbook). 
 
)LJXUH(QWU\H[LW,6&DWWHUPLQDOOHYHO
Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal is the biggest container port called  in Ind ia. It 
was called  at by 24 liner operators in 2008 followed  by Mumbai (22), Mundra and  
Titicorin (15), Kochi and  Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal (14), Pipavav 
(12), Chennai (11) and  Kolkata (10). In comparison with 2006, Pipavav won +10 liner 
operators, while the majority of ports/ terminals lost p layers (see Figure 6-5). An analysis 
of the top 3 liner carriers, shows a clear shift from the ports of Kochi and  Kolkata to new 
and/ or larger ports is. Figure 6-6 summarises the calls at Indian ports for the three 
largest liner operators over the 1995-2008 period .  
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Chennai 27 25 24 21 21 21 13 11
Kandla 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3
Kochi 7 12 24 25 25 24 24 22 20 20 15 15 14
Kolkata 10 9 35 35 34 32 31 10 10 10 10 10
Mumbai 7 30 37 23 25 23 23 23 23 22
Jaw aharlal Nehru Port (JNP) Container Terminal 9 16 16 16 12 11 10 24 33 34 24
Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal (NSICT) 8 10 4 16 16 14
Mundra 13 13 15
New  Mangalore 3 3 7 7 7
Pipavav 2 2 2 2 12
Titicorin 11 22 22 22 15
Visakhapatnam 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 16 16 8 9 9
tuGvwhxzy%{+|~}  hx+y~{+hx+y + {+y  17 36 28 88 111 143 121 126 129 148 173 166 156
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)LJXUH2YHUYLHZ,QGLDQSRUWFDOOVE\0DHUVN/LQH06&DQG&0$&*0
At this point in the study, all figures ind icate that container liner operators can freely 
enter/ exit the industry, a trade and a port/ terminal. However, linking up with terminal 
concessions, entry might be restricted . If some carriers (such as Maersk Line, MSC, 
CMA CGM) govern the exploitation of terminals, they can deny access to this 
infrastructure to potential rivals. This leads us to barriers of entry/ exit. To analyse this, 
from the Europe - Ind ian Subcontinent trade the d irect calls between Belgian ports and  
major Ind ian ports/ terminals served by fully cellular ships were singled  out. This 
market is chosen because Ind ia is one of the fastest growing economies of the world in 
the fields of IT, medical technology, biotechnology and  telecommunication, the 
importance of the economic relations between both countries is increasing (i.e. Ind ia is 
the fifth non-European exporter to Belgium and  the second non-European importer of 
Belgian products, www.flanderstrade.com) and  the market is surveyable.  
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 %HOJLDQ,QGLDWUDGH
Since mid-2007, the Belgian-Ind ia trade has been monitored . From all European ports to 
Ind ia there are 19 services, of which 12 serve the trade route between Belgium and Ind ia. 
10 services depart from Antwerp and  2 from the port of Zeebrugge (ME1 Maersk 
Line/ IEC2 (ME1) UASC). For this study, 5 direct cellular container services departing 
from the port of Antwerp (IMEX, IPAK, ISES, EPIC and IOS) were marked  out the 
departure list.  
Appendix 6-2 gives an overview of the fully cellular services departing from Belgium, 
viz. the number of deployed  vessels, the size of the vessels, the partners, the number of 
ports, the transit time and the day of sailing. Given the fact that only the Belgium-India 
trade is stud ied and taking into account that Appendix 6-2 is a snapshot of the situation 
at the moment of time of writing of the paper, only a limited  number of observations can 
be formulated . 
 (QWU\DQGH[LW
First, the main players in the trade study are CMA CGM, CSAV Norasia, Maersk Line, 
MSC, Hapag-Lloyd  and  Hamburg Süd. The majority of services from European ports to 
Ind ian ports are ded icated links which are joint service offerings113. An example of such 
joint service is the Europe Pakistan India Consortium or EPIC service. CMA CGM is the 
founding partner of the original EPIC service in 1997. Partner Hamburg Süd  participated  
in January 2003 and  Hapag-Lloyd  got involved in 2005. As of May 2008, CMA CGM, 
Hapag-Lloyd  and  Hamburg Süd  d isbanded  their established 2-sling Europe Pakistan 
Ind ia Consortium (EPIC). CMA CGM continued with a single weekly service 
(www.cmacgm.com). The amended  EPIC-service of Hapag-Lloyd (IOS) and  Hamburg 
Süd  (EPIC) was launched  in the same month. MSC entered  in March 2001 with the 
NEur-Ind ia & Pakistan service while CSAV launched its service in December 2006. As a 
part of the new Maersk Line network following the merger of the Maersk Sealand  and  
P&O Nedlloyd  services (2005), the ME-1 services of the tandem Maersk Line/ Safmarine 
                                                     
113
  The analysis does not take into account the dry ports (for instance Coimbatore, Bangalore, …) as 
operations serving India by transhipment via Colombo (e.g. APL, SCX service; CMA CGM, FAL8 (SCX) 
and  FAL9 (AE9); Evergreen, UAE service; Maersk, AE9 service and  MSC, NEur-IndOC-ANZ service) or 
elsewhere (e.g The Grand Alliance serves the region via Singapore, The New  World  Alliance makes calls 
at  the hub of Salalah, Singapore and  a westbound call in Colombo, The members of the CKH Y-alliance 
w ork via the hubs of Singapore, Port Kelang, Khor Fakkan and  Colombo, The carrier IRISL feeders from 
and  to Dubai, etc.). N or does the analysis take into account the phenomenon of ‘double dipping’  where 
cargo for India on for instance Australia services are doubled d ip  over Singapore to Ind ia. 
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supersedes the former ME-1 as of May-June 2006. The most recent new  entrant is UASC 
as slot partner. Starting from September 2009, UASC serves the trade through a slot 
charter agreement with Maersk Line. 
On the topic of exit, CSAV-Norasia announced  in March 2009 a port change for the 
IMEX Service (or Ind ia-Middle East-Europe service - launched in December 2006) from 
Antwerp to Rotterdam. After an absence of less than one year, CSAV re-entered  the 
Belgium – Ind ia trade by again add ing Antwerp to the schedule of CSAV Norasia’s 
Ind ia-Middle East-Europe Express. Antwerp is the last European port of call before 
head ing to Port Said, Jebel Ali, Karachi, Nhava Sheva and  Mundra. In December 2009, 
Antwerp replaced  Rotterdam in the ISES service organised by MSC and  S.C. Ind ia, 
returning for this latter carrier to the original ISES service. An extra service is offered 
(www1.axsmarine.com). To sum up, the Belgium-India trade lane is in principle open to 
everyone with some cargo to ship. Due to cred ibility, an exiting firm easily enters 
another trade. 
Next, regard ing the deployment of vessels, Maersk Line successively upgraded the ship 
size replacing units with capacities ranging from 4,026-4,822 TEU to a more homogenous 
fleet of 6,250 TEU (October 2006) towards 6,978 TEU ships (February 2010). In this trade 
lane the shipboard  capacity of Maersk Line largely exceeds the deployed capacity of the 
other players. A study of the name of Maersks’  ships show s that the majority of the ships 
stayed  in operation in this trade. In contrast, MSC’s fleet is a rather non-homogenous 
fleet varying from 2,258 TEU to 3,268 TEU units in the period  Aug. 2007 - Aug. 2008 
(except for the 5,100 TEU vessel ‘MSC Benedetta’  which suggested at that time the 
upgrad ing of the fleet in succession of Maersk Line). In the period  March-May 2009, 
MSC doubled the capacity of the service to approximately 5,500-6,000 weekly TEU. 
Furthermore, MSC quite often replaces its ships (corresponding with seventeen d ifferent 
vessels) and  changes the day of sailing mostly in the port of departu re. A clear indication 
that barriers to entry between markets are particularly low as vessels deployed  on one 
trade can be redeployed on another trade as a function of supply and  demand as well as 
ending the charter.  
In general, the increase in scale is largely due to the cascading effect since the 
introduction of ultra large container vessels in the Europe-Far East trade and  the 
growing volume (see Figure 6-4). The increase in the number of ships is linked  with the 
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introduction of slow-steaming programs114 of most liner operators. The latter clearly has 
an impact on the transit-time (from min. 42 days up to max. 56 days). 
Notable is the re-entry of CSAV which was accompanied  with an injection of larger ships 
on its IMEX service. The carrier has replaced  the previous 3,100 TEU units w ith larger 
tonnage of up to an average weekly capacity of 4,452 TEU (www.csav.com).  
Finally, regarding port selection, the services of liner operators MSC, CMA CGM (with 
partner Hapag-Lloyd  and  Hamburg Süd) depart from Antwerp and call Mundra and  
Jawaharlal Nehru. North/ West Indian ports (see Figure 6-5) serve as entry point for 
European shipments. These ports are preferred  over South/ East ports for their shorter 
transit times, their d raught and accessibility, their customs’  policy, their hinterland 
connectivity (to New Delhi, to distribution centres, etc.) and improving logistical 
services. More specifically, Mundra is chosen as a preferred  alternative for the heavily 
congested  and still much-preferred  Nhava Sheva container terminal in Jawaharlal Nehru 
Port Trust (JNPT) on the one hand and  for the development of a container freight station 
(CFS) at its Dadri inland container depot (ICD) complex) on the other hand . Jawaharlal 
Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), the (hub) container port of Mumbai is most likely called  for its 
‘memorandum of understand ing’  w ith the port of Antwerp115. In the restructuring of the 
new EPIC service, CMA CGM and  Hapag-Lloyd/ Hamburg Süd  keep calling at the 
Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal (Mumbai). Leaving from the port of 
Zeebrugge, Maersk Line calls before Jawaharlal Nehru at the port of Pipavav on the 
Gujarat coast d riven by the booming cargo volumes from the north-western Indian 
hinterland . CSAV opted  for a d ifferent port rotation, viz. starting in the south and  
coming up to the north and  back.  
The number of port calls varies between 8 (MSC – Aug. 2007) and  16 (CMA CGM – 
February 2010). Every service calls at two ports in Ind ia. MSC often changes ports. E.g. in 
2005, the IPAK service first called  at India followed  by Pakistan. At the beginning of 2006 
MSC switched  the d irection. Till November 24th, 2005 Nhava Sheva was the first port of 
call. Since then, MSC has frequently reshuffled  the port rotation. Twice such a reshuffle 
coincided  with a restructuring of the EPIC service. This suggests that obtaining an 
                                                     
114
  Leading liner operator, Maersk Line, p ioneered  the p resent trend  for slow and  super slow steaming. 
Most liner operators are in the process of, or have already adopted  this strategy. Slow and  super-slow 
steaming programs aim to save costs (i.e. annual reduction of tonnes of bunkers), trim back overcapacity 
and  with it environmental concerns (i.e. reduction of tonnes of C02 per year). 
115
  The port of Zeebrugge has a ‘memorandum of understanding’  with Ennore, sister port of Chennai 
(Madras). 
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interesting berth w indow is not an impediment. Obtaining an interesting berth w indow 
is very important since a berth window in one port might not be compatible w ith a berth 
window in another port (i.e. Mundra might have a window on Tuesday morning and  
Cochin Tuesday evening). 
To sum up, the analysis of the Belgium-India trade ind icates that entry/ exit is 
sufficiently free. Free access of shipping companies as well as their flexibility in port 
choice are a clear p roof of this. Is this an ind ication of low/ surmountable barriers to 
entry/ exit? 
 %DUULHUVWRHQWU\H[LW ¤¤z¥ 
A liner operator w ill enter the industry if it expects that the net present value of post-
entry profits exceeds the sunk cost (i.e. costs that cannot be recovered  if the liner 
operator decides to exit the industry) of entry (Besanko HW DO, 2004). The likelihood  of 
entry can be reduced  through entry barriers as well as barriers to exit.  
Barriers to entry are circumstances particular to a given market or industry that create 
disadvantages for new competitors attempting to enter the market. Figure 6-7 classifies 
the barriers to entry/ exit.  
 
)LJXUH2YHUYLHZEDUULHUVWRHQWU\
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 The focus is on sellers entry barriers since buyers entry barriers are non existent in this industry.  
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Entry barriers may be grouped  into three categories. The first category groups structural 
barriers or entry barriers over which neither incumbent nor entrant have d irect control 
(Lipczynski HW DO, 2005). Under this heading, five types of entry barriers w ill be 
discussed : economies of large scale, product d ifferentiation, and  absolute cost 
advantages of incumbent firms compared  with entrants (Bain, 1956, pp. 15-16), legal 
barriers and  geographical barriers (Lipczynski HWDO, 2005, pp. 277-315). In CLSI, the most 
important barriers to entry are the traditional ‘Bain’  barriers. The second category is the 
strategic barriers to entry, which are those created or raised by incumbents through their 
own entry-deterring strategies. Entry-deterring strategies may include limit pricing, 
predatory pricing, strategic product differentiation and signalling commitment. The 
third  category is formed by firm-level specific barriers. Each category will be discussed  
in turn. 
To assess entry conditions, the VWUXFWXUDOHQWU\EDUULHUV must be understood (Besanko HW
DO, 2004). 
Firstly, Lipczynski et al (2005, p. 280) state that economies of scale can act as a barrier to 
entry in two ways. First, economies of scale are an entry barrier if the minimum efficient 
scale of production is large relative to the total size of the market. Secondly, there is an 
entry barrier when average costs associated  w ith a production level below the minimum 
efficient scale are substantially greater than average costs at the minimum efficient scale. 
Are there economies of scale in the CLSI? Literature proves that economies of scale do 
exit in liner shipping industry (see e.g. Jansson & Shneerson, 1987; Davies, 1983a/ b; 
Brooks, 2000). Economies of scale are based  on the firm size (number of vessels) or on the 
size of one vessel. The latter (i.e. the ability to operate larger ship sizes) is a classical 
example of economies of scale (see Cullinane & Khanna, 2000; Sys HWDO, 2008). Following 
Stigler (1968), Davies (1983a, p. 91) concludes for the liner shipping industry that 
economies of scale do not constitute a barrier to entry.  
However, is this still correct for the containerised liner shipping industry? In the CLSI, 
the minimum efficient scale of production differs from trade route to trade route and  is 
determined by the level of service (i.e. transit time, reliability, etc.) a carrier aims to 
provide. So, the number of vessels to set up a service and  the accompanied  huge 
investments can act as a barrier to entry. In order to provide a weekly service, liner 
operators need  to deploy more than one ship. Vessel speed , distance, ports served, etc. 
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determine the number of vessels in a string. The need to maintain fixed day weekly 
services as the minimum acceptable quality of service requires 5 ships on the 
Transatlantic trade, 6 on the Indian-Subcontinent (see Appendix 6-2) and  8 on the Far 
East trade. The slow steaming program of the main carriers adds 1 or 2 ships.  
On the topic of average costs, either a new liner operator faces high risks by entering at a 
large scale to avoid  the penalty of higher average costs, or the newcomer enters at a 
smaller scale (e.g. see 6.2.1.3), which would  mean that it incurs the penalty of higher 
average costs. Additional, the significant economies of multi-plant operations and  
distribution network will increase the barrier. To compete with the existing firms in the 
first case, the entrant would  be forced  to enter as a horizontally integrated firm. In the 
second  case the firm would  have to be vertically integrated . The containerised  liner 
shipping industry has become dominated by large carriers, which through economies of 
scale and  the majority shareholder or ownership of terminal operations (so, vertical 
integrated), can effectively keep out potential entrants. If some carriers (like Maersk 
Line, MSC, … ) govern the exploitation of ded icated terminals, they can deny access to 
this infrastructure to potential rivals or ask for phenomenal fees117. Another possible 
strategy could  be to block deliberately the access to non-ded icated terminals with the 
aim to discourage the new player whose ships have to wait several days before entering 
the small port. So, it w ill be very d ifficult for an entrant to compete on equal terms with 
the established  companies and  to be able to start up on a very large scale. Unless the 
entrant is already established  in another shipping segment (e.g. bulk industry) it w ill be 
hard  to survive this competition. Consequently, these economies of scale will reinforce 
the next two main barriers. 
Secondly, Lipczynski HWDO (2005) indicate that an established  player has an absolute cost 
advantage over an entrant if the long-run average cost function of the entrant lies above 
that of the existing firm. The absence of a global network, a track record, sufficient cargo 
coverage, the existence of vertically integrated  operations; the dominant position on 
certain trades; etc. explains why entrants might face higher absolute costs in the stated  
industry. So, new carriers would  find  it again hard to compete. 
The third  main barrier Bain d istinguishes is product d ifferentiation. What is the product 
in the CLSI? The ‘product’  equals the transportation of a box (read: container). But, a 
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  In the current economic situation, other liner operators are welcomed. A source of revenue. 
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broader look tells us that in the containerised  liner shipping industry, it isn’ t just the 
movement of a container but also the services that surround  it (e.g. frequency, port of 
call, combination of arrival and  departure, etc.). Product d ifferentiation is not yet a 
common feature in the CLSI. It exists in some degree in the services offered . For instance, 
the Marseille-based  carrier, CMA CGM offers two alternatives in transporting goods 
towards Malta. The first alternative is the fast services from Antwerp to Marseille via 
train. Subsequently, the goods are feedered to Malta. The second  alternative is the direct 
service (FAL) to Malta (Antwerp-Zeebrugge: 1 day and  Zeebrugge – Malta: 7 days). On 
long d istances, the same carrier offers more possibilities. For instance, on the route 
Belgium-Australia, the shipper can choose between the services EPIC (via Le Havre), 
NEMO and  PAD service via Panama canal. The transit time is respectively 51 days, 40 
days and  44 days not including the barging from Antwerp to Rotterdam. 
Advertising is a proxy for the extent of product d ifferentiation. In theory, entrants w ill 
have to spend  more on advertising than incumbents. Launching advertising in the CLSI 
largely d iffers from other sectors. Large-scale advertising is not common in this business 
segment. Each major liner operator advertises in maritime journals (e.g. Containerisation 
International, Lloyd ’s shipping economist). A good idea would  be to advertise in the 
specialised  journals of their major clients (e.g. chemical, pharmaceutical,… sector). If the 
liner operator MSC would publish accounting data, the cost of advertising would  largely 
be attributed  to the business segment ‘cruises’ . For entrants, this structural entry barrier 
only exists if shippers are loyal to their carrier. 
Other types of structural barriers are legal barriers and geographic barriers. The most 
effective of all entry barriers are legal barriers to entry. In the containerised liner 
shipping industry regulatory barriers are low . No license, patents, etc. are required. 
Maybe countries (e.g. West Africa, Syria, …) can raise ‘legal’  barriers to call at a port? 
Geographic barriers may take the form of tariffs (e.g. since cargo is the driving force, for 
instance, WTO- agreements might have an influence), quotas, subsid ies, physical and  
technical barriers (i.e. access to ports), fiscal barriers, preferential public requirement 
policies and language (language of communication is English) and  cultural barriers. 
Besides the magnitude of structural entry barriers, an entrant also must consider the 
strategic behaviour of the established  firms against (potential) market entry. Three entry 
conditions can be d istinguished , viz. blockaded , accommodated  and  deterred  entry. The 
first entry condition corresponds with high structural barriers so that established  carriers 
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need  do nothing to discourage entry. The latter also applies for the accommodated entry, 
where, the structural entry barriers are low . The incumbent’ s costs of deterring entry are 
higher than the benefits it could gain from repelling the entrant. If the incumbent can 
keep the entrant out by employing an entry-deterring strategy and  doing so boost its 
profit, entry is deterred. Only in the latter case, the incumbent should take on a 
predatory act. 
To sum up, the analysis of the structural entry barriers ind icates that there are some 
barriers to entry. The extent of the barriers to entry is moderate. Clearly, the extent of the 
barriers to entry differ from trade lane to trade lane. This does not imply that barriers are 
permanent. For instance, the building a new terminal can eliminate physical and  
technical barriers. From the incumbent viewpoint, this is a position of accommodated  
entry.  
Subsequently, whereas structural barriers focus on basic industry cond itions such as 
demand and  cost, VWUDWHJLFEDUULHUV are intentionally created by established  firms with 
the aim of deterring entry. These barriers may arise as a result of limit pricing, predatory 
pricing, strategic product d ifferentiation and  creating and signaling commitment. Limit 
pricing refers to the practice whereby an incumbent firm discourages entry by charging a 
low price before entry occurs, whereas predatory pricing refers to the practice of setting 
a low price in order to d rive other firms out of business. Both pricing strategies can 
succeed only if the entrant is uncertain about the nature of post-entry competition 
(Besanko HW DO, 2004; Lipczynski HW DO 2005). In the studied  relatively new trade route, 
there are no indications of such strategic barriers. Given the growing volume (see 
Figures 6-2 and  6-4), strategic product d ifferentiation is not yet of importance. 
Furthermore, no established  liner operator signals a commitment to fight entry by 
engaging the entrant in a price war. However, it is not excluded  that such strategic 
barriers do occur on other trades. 
Other entry-deterring actions might be changes in production level (read : increase of 
deployed  TEU capacity) or price level. A threat that such changes might occur can act as 
a barrier to entry. Mid  2009, the re-entry of CSAV, ISES-service calling Antwerp, etc. d id  
not significantly alter the deployed TEU capacity of the other players. 
In general, on the topic of price level, the three-monthly aggregated  price index by trade 
direction compiled by ELAA is an interesting tool to check whether the general level of 
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prices is rising or falling. Figure 6-8 shows the evolution of the price index of ELAA from 
Europe to and from the Ind ian Subcontinent & Middle East (ISC&ME). The index for 
eastbound rates stood  at 83 % of 2008 levels in January 2010. On the westbound  leg, the 
price index shows rates down about 25 per cent compared  to the price level of January 
2008 (= 100).  
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQ3ULFH,QGH[ Ô$Ô+Õ 
On the eastbound  leg, the decrease in p rice level continued  throughout the months 
January until March 2009. Since then the p rices stead ily continued  to increase. For the 
Westbound leg the price decrease shows a more distinct decrease which remained  for 
the entire duration of February until July below 60 % of the 2008 price level. In August 
2009 a first rise above 60 % was noted .  
Figure 6-9 depicts the evolution of volume and  freight rate indexes (January 2008 = 100) 
on the Belgium-India trade lane119 covering a two-year period. Quarterly westbound 
freight data per 40-foot container was obtained from two liner operators (LO). End  2008, 
freight rates plummeted , in part due to reduced  demand precipitated  by the current 
global economic crisis. An improvement in freight rates occurred over the second half of 
the year 2009. The increase/ decrease of the freight rate index follows two months after a 
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  Compiled  w ith data from www.elaa.net. 
119
  In February 1998, the rates were around USD 850/ 20’  and  USD 1,000/ 40' eastbound  and  westbound 
rates amounted  USD 700/ 20’  and  USD 900/ 40’ . At the end  of 2006, Eastbound  to India west coast ports, 
base rates for general cargo reported ly dropped  to around USD 500/ 20’  and  USD 700/ 40’  or even lower. 
The westbound  freights reached levels of USD 600 and  1,200 respectively (excluding THC and 
su rcharges) (Dynamar). 
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collapse in/ signs of a pick up of cargo volume. Clearly, no ind ications of 
limit/ predatory pricing were observed  in the trade study. 
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQYROXPHDQGIUHLJKWUDWHLQGH[HV
Besides structural and  strategic barriers, there are ILUPOHYHOEDUULHUV or other operating 
barriers (i.e. capital, time and  management) to complete the analysis of barriers to entry. 
Firstly, the cost of entry into the CLSI w ith sufficient and  additionally matching or nearly 
matching vessels to provide regular fixed  services is substantial. The small scale entry of 
MBG Shipping and  The Containership Company (TCC) calls for USD 70 million and  
USD 50 million capital respectively. Even in times of recession there was plenty of 
interest to subscribe TCC’s USD 50 million share issue. Is it, therefore, right to assume 
that the finance market lightens this barrier to entry? To mount a credible service on the 
European – Far East trade lane, nine or ten similar or matched  ships offering a capacity 
of between 11,000 TEU and  14,000 TEU are required or an investment of between 1 
billion USD and 1,5billion USD (Fossey, 2009b). What is more, given that one aims to 
compete with global operators in each relevant market requires even more vessels. 
Despite the fact that new and  second-hand  vessels as well as the other ad joined  
investments (e.g. terminals and / or cargo handling facilities, containers, inland  facilities 
and an agency network) cost several billion USD, finance was generally available. So, 
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capital requirements do not represent insurmountable barrier to investment in new 
equipment. 
Secondly, time might be a potential barrier as build ing a new ship takes after all several 
years. But then, if there is a second  hand  market, this barrier is low . For the CLSI an 
active second  hand  market is in place.  
Management (including knowledge) could  be a third  operating barrier120 (Brooks, 2000; 
Clarkson Research Stud ies, 2004; Haralambides, 2007). Where in other segments of 
shipping both the technical and  commercial management of the vessel are easily 
outsourced, this is hardly the case in the CLSI. 
The final consideration in understand ing a new entrants’  incentive to enter a market 
paradoxically is the firm’s ability to exit the market. The size of barriers to exit may be an 
important element in determining the incentive for new entrants. If it is costly to exit a 
market, the incentives to enter are reduced  (Besanko HWDO 2004; Lipczynski HWDO, 2005). 
In the case of the CLSI, is it costly to exit the market? Negatively, if a liner operator 
decides to exit a trade, the liner operator will opt to redeploy its assets in other trades. 
Conversely, If the carrier decides to exit the industry (e.g. MBG Shipping), the carrier 
sells off its assets or returns the chartered  tonnage to the owner. In the latter scenario, 
there w ill be some sunk costs (e.g. advertising, redundancy payments, financial penalty 
clause, … ) that cannot be recovered if the liner operator decides to exit the industry. 
Consequently, there are barriers to exit but the extent of these barriers is not significant. 
MBG Shipping exited  the industry w ith loss. 
 $OOLDQFHV
Caves and  Porter (1977) suggest entry barriers apply not only to entrants, but also 
between different groups of established  firms within industries. The three largest 
alliances, CHKY Alliance, the Grand Alliance and  the New World Alliance may be 
defined  as groups in the CLSI. In a study conducted by Das and  Teng (1997), strategic 
alliances are defined along similar lines as ‘LQWHUILUP FRRSHUDWLRQ DUUDQJHPHQWV DLPHG DW
SXUVXLQJPXWXDOVWUDWHJLFJRDOV’ . So, alliances allow  a liner operator to enter a trade even 
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  Irrespective of the shipping d ivision, finding officers and  good/ specialised  crew is rather a hindrance 
than a barrier, since established  firms also are confronted  with this issue.  
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without the deployment of additional tonnage, simply by using slots on its partners’  
existing services (Midoro, 2000)121.  
An overview of the process of operational agreements on one trade to the formation of 
alliances is provided  in the left-hand  side panel of Appendix 6-3. The right-hand  side 
panel reports the milestones during the 1994–2010 period . What conclusions can be 
derived  from Appendix 6-3?  
First, very quickly after the creation, most of the alliances were restructured , modified  or 
re-named. Since, no new members entered  an alliance. Secondly, regard ing exit, the 
process of transition is largely driven by mergers and  takeovers (e.g. the merging of P&O 
and Nedlloyd ended  the first most important alliances). Subsequently, entry/ exit in/ out 
of the Top 100 had  no impact on the alliances since solely major liner operators (ranked  
in the segment 1-25) are involved  in these operational agreements. In add ition, the 
impact on the alliance of the bankruptcy of Cho Yang (2001: ranked  25) and  Senator Line 
is negligible. Finally, one ‘pure’  exit is reported . MISC withdrawing its participation 
from the European and  Mediterranean trade lanes (as of January 1st, 2010) fits w ithin a 
portfolio restructuring due to the global economic downturn. Since, MISC solely 
participated  in the Europe-Far East trades the w ithdrawal w ill not affect the Grand  
Alliance’ s services. 
 6\QRSVLV
To sum up, as in most industries, while liner operators enter, other carriers exit 
simultaneously. Martin (2002) compares this process with the picture of a revolving 
door. He proceeds by saying that few  firms make it into the lobby and manage to 
maintain an enduring presence in the industry. This picture also fits for the CLSI. Small 
liner operators (of which the majority exit the CLSI in less than a year after entrance) 
have little influence on the industry. Survivors do grow precipitously (e.g. on the 
Europe/ Asia trade, CSCL has entered  the market in 1999 (ranked  46; 2010: ranked  8). 
The economic downturn as yet has only a small impact on the Top 20. Regard ing 
entrance, a lot of attempts are to be expected as a lot of assets are available. On the other 
hand , there is a growing number of liner operators requiring fresh capital from their 
shareholders, and  even government help and/ or d isposal of assets in an attempt to 
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 Other alliance forms are joint ventures, joint R&D, product sw ap , equ ity investment and sharing, and  
licensing. 
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survive, some liner operators are expected to fail and disappear from the scene. It could  
be one of the top league players, smaller niche liner operators, …  
At the level of alliances, it appears that the alliances are in a position to retain their 
members. The detailed study of the Belgium-Indian trade lane indicates that there are 
barriers to entry/ exit. However, the extent of the barriers is not significant122.  
In this part, the focus was solely on actual entry. Entry conditions should  also determine 
the extent to which established  liner operators need  to fear competition from potential 
entrants. The threat of entry cannot be neglected 123. Geroski (1988) stated  that “ HQWU\GRHV
QRWQHHGWRRFFXULQRUGHUWRKDYHHIIHFWRQWKHEHKDYLRXURIILUPVLQPDUNHWVWKHPHUHWKUHDWRI
ODUJHVFDOHLPLWDWLRQPD\OHDGLQFXPEHQWILUPVWRWDNHSUHHPSWLYHDFWLRQVZKLFKERWKORZHUWKHLU
FXUUHQWSHULRGSURILWDQGGLVFRXUDJHSRWHQWLDOHQWUDQWV IURPDFWXDOO\HQWHULQJµ. The next part 
observes patterns in time-series variation of firm-level profit rate data which allows to 
draw interferences about the nature of competition (i.e. actual and  potential entry/ exit). 
 3HUVLVWHQFHRISURILW
The threat of entry determines in a fundamental way the market performance. From 
econometric view, assessing the likelihood  of potential entry is a problem since the 
threat of entry is an unobservable variable. In addition, Martin (2002) states that even 
actual entry of the kind  that affects the performance of established firms is an 
unobservable variable. To deal with this issue, a body of literature, known as Persistence 
of Profit (PoP) approach, observes profit outcomes over time to make interferences about 
the nature of competition. 
The literature d istinguishes two representations of the competitive processes, viz. the 
static and  dynamic view. The static view is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) model. Accord ing to SCP, the structure of the market (reflected  in characteristics, 
such as the number and  size d istribution of firms, the extent of product differentiation 
                                                     
122
  This observation corresponds with the business segments tanker and  d ry bulk market. Here the barriers 
of entry also are low due to the presence of an active second  hand market. Conversely, there are 
substantial barriers to entry in the capital intensive LNG market and  the Pure Car Carrier market for 
immediate entries. In addition, the LNG market also requires a specially trained  crew (Clarkson Research 
Studies, 2004). 
123
  Davies (1983a and  1986) has stud ied  the entry and  exit of liner operators into/ from liner conferences 
serving Canada covering the period  1975-1982 as well as the actual entries and  exits of ships into/ from 
Canadian liner trades between 1977 and  1979 to validate the contestability theory. On the basis of this 
emp irical analysis, the conclusions were that entry/ exit happen a lot and  that liner shipp ing markets can 
accurately be described  as being contestable. In their critique on contestability, both Pearson (1987) and  
Jankowski (1989) argued  that the focus solely was on actual entry and  neglected  the threat of entry.  
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and the strength of entry and exit barriers) affects the conduct of the firms operating in 
that market which in turn influences their performances. Competition among an existing 
set of firms suffices to produce zero profits at each point in time. This static view does 
little to explain the dynamics of competition124. The dynamic view owes its origin to J. 
Schumpeter. Under the dynamic view, the entry and  exit of firms drives profits to zero 
in the long run, and  is thus consistent w ith there being non-zero economic profits at 
d ifferent points in time. This Schumpeterian perspective on the competitive process is 
adopted in PoP-stud ies125 (Mueller, 1977 and  1986; Geroski, 1990; Lipczynski HWDO, 2005). 
In this section, the persistence of profits w ill be stud ied for the CLSI. To this end, 
Mueller’ s (1977, 1986) Persistence of Profit hypothesis will be tested  for a sample of 
container liner operators between 2000 and  2008. A time-series analysis on firm-level 
profits is used  to estimate the short-run and  long-run persistence. Persistence should be 
interpreted as the percentage of a firm’s rent in any period  before period  t that 
systematically remains in period  W (Waring, 1996). The hypothesis is that (potential and  
actual) entry/ exit conditions are sufficiently powerful to ensure that no firm persistently 
earns profits above or below the norm (Lipczynski HWDO., 2005). 
 6DPSOHYDULDEOHDQGGDWD
The persistence of profit approach analyses time-series data on firm-level profit rates. A 
time-series study requires time series as long as possible. In contrast to other industries, 
the containerised  liner shipping industry suffers from a lack of long time-series data. 
Consequently, it puts a restriction on the number of liner operators that may be included  
in the sample. For this purpose, and  in function of data availability, the empirical 
specifications at container division level are based  on an unbalanced panel data set for a 
sample of 21 major liner operators covering the period from 2000 to 2008 inclusive126. 
To control for business cycles and  to remove the effects of any macroeconomic 
fluctuations, the PoP literature concentrates on the persistence of a firm’s standard ised  
profit rate denoted  ß+àá
,
pi . The persistence of a liner operator’s standard ised  profit rate is 
                                                     
124
  Contestability theory is an example of static model. 
125
  Overview of firm-level PoP-stud ies: see Lipczynski âã@äLå æ , 2005; Gschwandter, 2009. 
126
  The data set comprises the following 21 liner operators in alphabetical order: APL (5), CCNI (29), CMA 
CGM (3), COSCO (7), CSAV (13), CSCL (8), Hapag-Lloyd (6), H orizon Line (30), Hanjin (9), K-Line (11), 
Maersk Line (1), Matson (36), MISC (21), MOL (12), NYK (10), OOCL (14), RCL (25), UASC (19), Wan Hai 
Line (22), Yang Ming Line (15) and  ZIM (17). The number in parentheses denotes their ranking at 
January 1st, 2010. 
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defined  as ççèé çè pipipi −=
,,
 where êë
,
pi  is firms L’ s actual profit rate at time W and  
∑
=
=
ì
í
î
í
î Q1
,
pi
pi  the average profitability of the industry profit rate in year W. In other words, 
ß+à
á
,
pi  represents the deviation of the profitability of liner operator L at time W from the 
average profitability of all liner operators in the sample at a given time. 
Most PoP-studies measure profit as the firm ’s return on assets (ROA). The interpretation 
of this main variable however varies. Firstly, some stud ies define the profit rate as the 
ratio of EHIRUH taxes to total assets (e.g. Mueller, 1977 and  1990; Geroski & Jacquemin, 
1998; Glen HW DO, 2001; Yurtoglu, 2004; Eklund  & Wiberg, 2007). Mueller (1977) argues 
that before-tax profits were used  to avoid  noise as a result of d ifferences in tax treatment. 
In the same study, Mueller tested  all of the models using an after-tax definition of 
profits. He obtained  the same qualitative results. Secondly, other stud ies used  net profit 
DIWHU tax plus interest payments (e.g. Goddard, 1996; Waring, 1996; Goddard  & Wilson, 
1999; Maruyama & Odagiri, 2002; Bektas, 2007; Gschwandtner, 2009). On the topic 
‘after-tax’ , Maruyama & Odagiri (2002) reason that entrants should  make their entry 
decisions based  on after-tax profits if effective tax rates d iffer across industries. In 
add ition, they argue that interest should  be included  because total assets in the 
denominator include those financed  by debt and, so, the numerator should  also take 
account of the returns to debt. Another viewpoint is offered  by Mueller (1990), the 
author defined company’s return on capital as its profits net of taxes and  JURVV of interest 
d ivided by total assets. The line of reasoning is based  on the assumption that the 
convergence of profits to the competitive return is d riven by exit and  entry of other firms 
and that this entry and exit respond  to after tax profit levels. Finally, Stephan & Tsapin 
(2008) used two measures of profit rate: price-cost margin (or revenue minus costs 
relative to revenue) and  return on assets, which is defined  as operating profits d ivided  
by the assets of the firm.  
A study of the persistence of profit for the CLSI differs from other PoP-studies where the 
persistence of profit is investigated across industries or across firms located  in a specific 
country (e.g. -DSDQ: Maruyama & Odagiri, 2002; 6SDLQ: Bou & Santorra, 2007; 7XUNH\: 
Bektas, 2007, Yurtogli, 2004; 8QLWHG .LQJGRP: Goddard  & Wilson, 1996, Cubbin & 
Geroski, 1990; 8QLWHG 6WDWHV: Mueller, 1990). The CLSI is a global industry with liner 
operators having their headquarters all over the world . Different accounting methods 
are used . Leasing and/ or chartering of ships is common practice, certainly of carriers-to-
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be (see 6.2.1.3). In addition, this study focuses on the business segment of container liner 
shipping. Therefore, assuming that entry into and  exit from the container liner shipping 
industry is d riven by operational profit, this PoP-study measures profit as the return on 
sales (ROS or EBITDA127 to turnover, where the denominator equals a proxy for total 
assets)128. EBITDA is a useful parameter for an entrant in evaluating the operating 
performance as it removes depreciation and  amortisation which can vary depending 
upon accounting methods as well as interest and  taxes.  
To test/ confirm the valid ity of this assumption, regressions were run using return on 
assets (ROA or net income to total assets at container level d ivision) and  return on 
capital employed (ROCE or EBITDA to total assets). In the case of 100 % liner operators, 
the results of these three profitability measures do not d iffer significantly. In the case of 
liner operators w ith d iversified  operations portfolio, the results of ROA differ from the 
other results. This d ifference can largely be attributed  to the fact that not all liner 
operators report net income at container division (e.g. Evergreen, Hamburg Süd, 
Hyundai Merchant Marine) or stopped  reporting it (e.g. Hapag-Lloyd). The above 
arguments argue in favor of the profitability measure, return on sales129. 
The data for the empirical investigation were collected from Liner Intelligence financial 
analysis (www.ci-online.co.uk) and  from investor/ annual reports published  on the 
publicly available internet websites of the selected  liner operators.  
 0RGHO
This paper applies the well established profit persistence methodology pioneered  by 
Mueller (1977, 1986) and  extended  in contributions by Geroski and  Jacquemin (1988) and  
Geroski (1990) in modelling variations in company profitability over time. 
Firstly, Mueller (1986) shows that persistence of profits can be estimated  using first order 
autoregressive (AR(1)) equation for each firm’s standardised profit rate as follows 
ï
ð
ñ
ï
ðð
ò
ðð
ñ
ï
ð
,1,,, )1( µpiλpiλpi ++−= −
   (1) 
                                                     
127
  Reconciliation from Earnings before interest, taxes, dep reciation and  amortization (EBITDA) to Net 
income: subtract non-cash chargers (i.e. depreciation and  amortisation expenses), non-operating 
expenses (such as interest and  "other" non-core expenses) as well as income tax from EBITDA.  
128
  Maritime consultancy bu reaus also opt to work with return on sales in their stud ies. 
129
  N eglecting the ratio owned versus chartered  ships might obtain biased  resu lts. 
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where ó  and  ôõ
,
pi  are the key parameters. These parameters of interest describe the 
impact of the previous years’  firm-specific profits to the current year’s profit rates by 
regressing öz÷ø 1, −pi  on ùzúû ,pi , and  reflect the strength of persistence of p rofit in both the short 
and the long run (Lipczynski HW DO, 2005). The measure of persistence is the slope 
coefficient, ó . The value of ó  pred icts the intensity of competition or the speed with 
which profits converge on üý
,
pi . For convergence, ó  must lie between zero and one (Cable 
& Mueller, 2008). üý
,
pi
 
represents the permanent profitability level of firm L. The 
permanent component üý
,
pi can itself be partitioned into two terms as üý
,
pi = c + r i where F 
is the competitive rate of return common to all firms and U ó  equals a permanent rent 
specific to firm L. The cost of entry/ exit into/ from the industry is assumed to be reflected  
by the latter term. The error term, ó þ ß  captures the effect of random shocks to these 
profits which is assumed  to satisfy the usual conditions for OLS. 
Letting  αˆ  and  λˆ be the estimates of the autoregressive equation, this reduces Eq. 1 to 
the following testable empirically model: 









,1,, µpiλαpi ++= −
∧∧
    
(2) 
where 
,
)1( piλα
∧∧
−= . If 	αˆ  and λˆ DUHWKHJHQHUDOLVHGOHDVWVTXDUHVHVWLPDWRUVRI i en 
i, then the permanent profitability level of firm i, üý
,
pi  can be derived  and estimated  as 
∧
∧
−
=






λ
α
pi
1
,
      (3) 
An overview of the interpretation of short-run and  long-run persistence and with it the 
link to barriers to entry is given in Figure 6-10.  
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)LJXUH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRISHUVLVWHQFH
Secondly, Geroski and  Jacquemin (1988) and  Geroski (1990) have shown that equation 1 
is a reduced  form of a more elaborate two equation structural model which makes 
explicit the role of actual and  potential entry (and exit) in the model, but which do not 
affect the specification of the reduced form. The central idea is that profits can be 
expected  to attract entry, and  entry d rives profits down.  
In the first structural equation, profits are assumed to depend  on the threat of entry in 
the market, (    









 (
,1,2,10, µpiγγγpi +++= −
    (4) 
where 1γ < 0, 0 < 2γ  < 1 and  0γ may take any value. The parameter 1γ  measures the 
direct impact through actual entry or ind irectly by forcing established  firms to undertake 
pre-emptive actions, and  varies inversely with the level of entry barriers protecting firm 
%DUULHUVWR
HQWU\
i
<HDURQ\HDUYDULDWLRQLQ si,t is random
1RDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQ si,t-1DQG si,t 
,I si,t-1LVDERYHEHORZ]HURLWLVOLNHO\WKDW si,t 
will also be above (below)
3RVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQ si,t-1DQG si,t 

Positive Firm i’s actual long-run average profit rate is 
above average for all firms
Negative Firm i’s actual long-run average profit rate is 
below average for all firms
  
i,p = 0 Standardised profit rates of all firms tend to 
fluctuate around the same long-run convergence
No or 
surmountable
Standardised profit rates of all firms tend to 
fluctuate around different long-run average 
valuesNo convergence
i,p 
Yes
6KRUWUXQSHUVLVWHQFH
i =0 No
 i < 1 Yes
/RQJUXQSHUVLVWHQFHﬁﬀﬂ ,pi
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L, while 2ﬃγ  describes the effect of entry on ! " ,pi . The error term, # $ %   is characterised  as a 
normally distributed  i.i.d . (independently and  identically d istributed) stochastic p rocess 
with mean, E( # $ % ) = 0 and variance, E( &!'(
,
µ ) = constant (Geroski, 1990).  
Next, the threat of (actual and potential) entry and  exit is assumed to depend on the 
standard ised  profits observed  in the last period . The second  structural equation can be 
written as follows:  
)
**
+
)
**
)
*(
,41,3, )( εγpiγ +−= −
    (5) 
YJGTG 43 , ,, γγ  
The amount of entry attracted by a unit increase in excess profit (i.e. those profits that 
can be bid  away) is measured  by the parameter, 3-γ . According to Geroski (1990), this 
parameter reflects the number of potential entrants. The exogenous flow of entry or exit 
is captured  in the white noise error term, ./
,
ε which is assumed to be independent of 0 1 2 . 
Equations 4 and 5 cannot be estimated directly since the variable 34(
,
 cannot be 
quantified. This unobservable variable can be eliminated by solving for the reduced  
form. Substituting Eq. 5 into Eq. 4, and rearranging yields again equation 2 where  
5αˆ
 
= ( 06γ - 17γ 43 88 γγ ), 9λˆ = ( 2:γ  + 1:γ 3:γ ) and  )( ,1,, ;<<;<;< εγµµ += . Despite the fact that 
the model is built around an unobservable variable called ‘threat of entry’ , Eq. 2 can be 
estimated  with observable data, viz. firm level profit rates. 
 (PSLULFDOUHVXOWVDQGGLVFXVVLRQ
This section will firstly test the admissibility of the data. Secondly, the empirical results 
are reported  and  d iscussed .  
 $GPLVVLELOLW\RIGDWDVHW
This study works with a relatively short time d imension of the data (see also Glen HWDO, 
2001). This is a d isadvantage of time series with a short time d imension. Conversely, an 
advantage of a short time series is that the time series is less likely to be subject to the 
kinds of shocks that would  change the profits dynamics of a firm (Cable & Mueller, 
2008).  
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However, some econometric issues can arise. So, it is necessary to test the admissibility 
of the data. The analysis starts with the test whether the time series are stationary or not, 
then the lag structure of the equation is investigated  and  finally, the serial correlation of 
the disturbances in Eq. 2 are checked . 
A first econometric issue in estimating Eq. 2 is stationarity. Empirical work based on 
times series data as in the analysis of the speed  of ad justment of profitability assumes 
that the underlying time series is stationary. The existence of non-stationarity (or unit 
root) in the firm-level profitability series would  ind icate that shocks to profitability 
persist indefinitely and that competitive pressures never erode d ifferences in 
profitability (Yurtoglu, 2004).  
Studies testing for unit root mostly used  the augmented  Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and  the 
Phillips-Perron test (e.g. Glen HWDO, 2001; Yurtoglu, 2004; Bektas, 2007). Both tests have a 
null hypothesis of a unit root process. Cable & Mueller (2008) concluded  that the right 
null hypothesis for profits times series should  be one of stationarity. Following these 
authors, here, stationarity is tested by using the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) procedure. The KPSS-test is an inverse of the Phillips-Peron test, so, it reverses 
the null (stationary) and  alternative (non-stationary) hypothesis. An extra advantage of  
this p rocedure is its robustness in small samples. The results of the KPSS test show that 
the times series were stationary130. 
The second  econometric issue concerns the introduction of more lagged  dependent 
variables to the right-hand  side of Eq. 2. To decide on the appropriate lag structure, the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and  the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) were 
computed . Both criterion favored Eq. 2 above alternative higher order autoregressive 
models.  
Testing for the presence of serial correlation is a third  econometric issue. Before using an 
estimated  equation for statistical inference (e.g. hypothesis tests), it is essential to 
examine the residuals for evidence of serial correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
                                                     
130
  This study also applied  a unit root test p rovided  by Im et al. (2003) to the panel data which has time and 
cross-section d imension. The test is based  on the average value of the Augmented  Dickey–Fuller (ADF) 
statistics obtained  for each of the ind ividual firms’  data. The result is equal to -2.7084 for the sample of 21 
liner operators observed  over the 2000 tot 2008 period. Since the calcu lated  t-statistics is lower than the 
critical value of the standard ised  t-bar test at 5%level, the null hypothesis of non-stationary is rejected . 
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and the Ljung-Box Q-statistic were performed 131. Both tests for serial correlation ind icate 
that the residuals are not serially correlated and Eq. 2 should  not be re-specified  before 
using it for hypothesis tests. 
 (PSLULFDOUHVXOWV =?>A@ 
A point of interest during studying the empirical results is the d ifferent behaviour of 
independent carriers and liner operators involved in an alliance. Mediterranean 
Shipping Company (MSC – ranked  2nd), Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM, member of 
The New World Alliance) and Evergreen133 are not integrated in the sample. MSC does 
not report its financial results and the latter two carriers publish no d isaggregated data 
(i.e. for their business segment ‘container’ ). In add ition, in the annual report 2008 the TUI 
group, former parent of Hapag-Lloyd  (participate in the Grand  Alliance) stopped to 
report d isaggregated  data. Therefore, the present study compares the empirical results of 
two independent Top 3 liner operators (i.e. CMA CGM and Maersk Line) w ith the 
CHKY alliance formed by COSCO, K-Line, Hanjin and  Yang Ming Line.  
A visual plot of data is usually the first step in the analysis of any time series. Appendix 
6-4 sets out plots of the excess profit, B!CD
,
pi  for Maersk Line (ranked  1st) and CMA CGM 
(ranked  3rd) against time (left-hand panel). The right-hand  panel of Appendix 6-4 plots 
their associated  phase d iagrams with EGFH 1, −pi  on the horizontal axis and  E!FH ,pi  on the vertical 
axis. Both carriers are European-based  and  family-owned companies. Their growth is 
driven by mergers and  acquisitions; and  partly by organic growth (Sys, 2009). Maersk 
Line is part of the A.P. Møller-Maersk group  which is engaged in a multitude of 
activities (e.g. liner shipping; tanker, offshore and  other shipping operations; oil and  gas 
activities, APM terminals). CMA CGM dates from the merger of CMA and CGM. Two 
separate entities in 1999. Maersk Line account for 52 % of group turnover whereas the 
container liner shipping division of CMA CGM accounts for +90 %. 
The phase d iagrams give a visual impression of the persistence category (Cable & 
Mueller, 2008). With two exceptions, Maersk’s data points are situated  in the first 
                                                     
131 
 If there are lagged  dependent variables on the right-hand  side of the regression, the DW test is no longer 
valid . 
132
  The complete analysis is available from the au thor upon request. 
133
  Studying the behaviour of Evergreen w ou ld  have been most interesting as this liner operator decided  not 
to follow the trend  of buying/ chartering u ltra large container ships. Evergreen is now the only large 
operator with an empty order book. Will the present economic slowdown and  the d ifficult situation of 
the liner business contribu ted  to Evergreen’s corporate strategy? 
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quadrant. The first quadrant corresponds with the scenario “ profits are consistently 
above the norm” . The d iscomfort from PONL integration (2005) is observable in both 
graphs. Since, Maersk Line no longer has to absorb extra costs associated w ith the 
integration of P&O Nedlloyd , they turned  back in the first quadrant. In the case of CMA 
CMG, the phase d iagram ind icates an evolution from below the norm (third  quadrant) to 
above the norm. This might suggest that the acquisitions of CMA CGM were more 
successfully. In order to preserve space, the graphs of the members of the CHKY alliance 
are not reported . Except for Hanjin which strays occasionally into the other quadrants, 
the observations of the other members are located  in the third  quadrant, i.e. profits 
below the norm134. 
Turning to the formal analysis, separate regressions for each liner operator were 
estimated  following Eq. 2. Estimation is carried  out with the aid  of E-views. The OLS 
estimates of Eq. 2 for CMA CGM, Maersk Line and the CHKY alliance are reported  in 
Figure 6-11 (t-statistics in parentheses). Figure 6-11 is sorted in descending order of 
estimated  Iλˆ . 
 
)LJXUH(PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
                                                     
134
  The observations of CCNI, COSCO, CSAV, NYK, Wan Hai Line and  ZIM are located  in the third  
quadrant. In contrast, the observations of MISC, RCL, OOCL (with one exception) and  Matson (with two 
exceptions) are situated  in the first quadrant. The other liner operators stray occasionally into the other 
quadrants. 
UDQN OLQHURSHUDWRU J K  K  K L M
3 CMACGM 0.01124 0.68231 0.31769 0.03536
(0,8134) (2,2579) (1,0513) (1,4964)
1 Maersk 0.01120 0.61205 0.38795 0.02886
(0,9495) (2,7154) (1,7211) (1,4525)
&+.<DOOLDQFH
11 Kline -0.01769 0.08035 0.91965 -0.01923
(-1,0426) (0,2551)
7 COSCO -0.02007 0.07100 0.92900 -0.02160
(-0,4718) (0,0545)
15 YML -0.06819 0.06179 0.93821 -0.07268
(-2,6326) (0,2447)
9 Hanjin -0.02491 -0.09550 1.09550 -0.02274
(-3,1155) (-0,4647)
DYHUDJH 0.02941
6DPSOH
strenght of persistence 0.19775
7RSOLQHURSHUDWRUV
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Firm level PoP literature examines two forms of persistence, viz. short-run and  long-run 
persistence (see Figure 6-10).  
First, short-run persistence refers to the percentage of firm’s standardised profit rate in 
any period  before period  W that remains in period W. The first order autocorrelation 
coefficient, Nλˆ  can be interpreted as a measure of short run persistence of profit135. As 
reflected in Figure 6-11, the estimated  Iλˆ s are positive and  significant for CMA CGM 
and Maersk Line. The closer Iλˆ is to one, the more rapidly liner operators’  profits 
converge to their long-run level. In the case of CHKY, Oλˆ  is close to zero, there is low 
persistence of profits. In other words, profits in year t do not depend largely on profits in 
year W. Regard ing the low  average value (i.e. 0.02941), no generalisation for all alliances 
can be formulated  since there is no data for Hyundai Merchant Marine. Another thing to 
note is that the ranking of the liner operators (see column 2) differs from ranking based  
on market share (see column 1). Sorting for long-run persistence leads to another 
hierarchisation, viz. MISC, RCL, OOCL, CMA CGM and Maersk Line. This might be an 
indication that large operators give up profit to preserve their market share. Next, the Oλˆ
s of the independent carriers are significantly larger than those of the members of the 
CHKY alliance. This leads us to the values of the speed of profit adjustment parameter, 
(1 - Oλˆ ) (see column 5). The expression (1 - Oλˆ ) is an estimate of the speed  of erosion of 
short-run rents and  indicates how quickly the profit rate O
,
pi  approaches its long-run 
equilibrium level PQ
,
pi . On a longer time series, the lower value of (1- R S T ) for CMA CGM 
and Maersk Line would  be interpreted  as if it is more than likely that both carriers w ill 
earn abnormal profit the following year (Lipczynski HW DO, 2005). Now it is d ifficult to 
formulate such statement, the financial and  economic downturn might be indicated  in 
future research as a structural break since some liner operators wrestle with cash flow 
problems and  heavy expansion-induced debt burdens and  announce substantially 
poorer financial results for 2009. Certainly and  not surprisingly, the short-run rents of 
CMA CGM and  Maersk Line erode slower. Conversely, if (1- Oλˆ ) is high, then the degree 
of persistence of past profits is also small and consequently short-run rents are quickly 
                                                     
135
  One side note urges: since the sample size is small, some cau tion is required  for interpreting the 
estimated  Uλˆ and accord ingly, the estimated  long-run profit rate. From theory, the least-squares estimate 
of an au toregressive model is known to be biased  dow nward , when the sample size is small (Patterson, 
2000). Adjusting for this bias, the mean of Uλˆ equals 0.2636. The ad justed  Uλˆ still corresponds with low 
persistence. 
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eroded. Literature states that quick erosion is a sign of increased competition 
(Gschwandter, 2009). Another ind ication of quick erosion can be found , in common with 
previous stud ies, in the explanatory power of the regressions for Oλˆ which is quite low  
with a mean R² value of 0.15. Thus the transitory component of a firm’s profit rate would 
not seem to require more than a year to be eliminated (Mueller,1986). 
Secondly, the degree of variation in the long-run average standard ised  profit rates 
between liner operators is known as long-run persistence. VW
,
pi is a measure of permanent 
rents which are not eroded  by competitive forces. The long-run VW
,
pi  is calculated as 
∧
∧
− X
X
λ
α
1
 (see Eq. 3). In the case of CMA CGM, a VW
,
pi  of 0.03536 implies that CMA CMG’s 
profit to assets/ sales ratio (at container d ivision) is on average permanently 3.5 % above 
the sample mean. In the left-hand  panel of Appendix 6-4, the dashed  horizontal line 
corresponds w ith the average of equilibrium value of PQ
,
pi . 
The sign of the parameter Yαˆ determines whether firm i’ s long-run averaged  
standard ised  profits is positive or negative. Together with Figure 6-10, the positive value 
of Yαˆ  for CMA CGM and  Maersk Line ind icates that those liner operators earn returns 
above the competitive norm 136. In the case of the CHKY alliance, there is an ind ication 
that the members earn returns below the competitive norm. This corresponds with the 
observations of the informal method. Except for APL and OOCL, a look at the sample 
teaches us that all liner operators participating in an alliance earn returns below the 
competitive norm. An interesting topic for future research.  
To formally test the hypothesis that (potential and  actual) entry into and exit from any 
market are sufficiently free to bring abnormal profits quickly into line w ith the 
competitive rate of return, would  be to test whether Z[
,
pi differs significantly across firms. 
If VW
,
pi  equals zero for all i, one would  accept the hypothesis that all long run rents are 
zero (Mueller, 1990; Lipzcynski HWDO, 2005). If \]
,
pi  IRUVRPHOLQHURSHUDWRUVWKHUHLV
long run persistence, in the sense that these liner operators earn profits which tend  to 
differ permanently from the average profitability of liner operators in general (see Figure 
6-10). The Wald  test is applied to test the significance of estimated  ‘permanent’  profits or 
                                                     
136
  The estimated  value of ^αˆ  is also positive for APL, CSCL, Horizon Line, Matson, MISC, OOCL and RCL. 
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‘long-run projected  profits’ , Z[
,
pi . As reflected in Figure 6-11, Z[
,
pi  is > 0 for CMA CGM 
and Maersk Line137; and  \]
,
pi  < 0 for the CHKY alliance. In the containerised  liner 
shipping case, the empirical results suggest that the hypothesis can be rejected.  
The aim of observing patterns in the times series variation of firm-level profit rate data 
was to d raw interferences about entry and  exit as well as whether barriers to entry exits. 
Goddard and  Wilson (1996) state that “ _λˆ VXPPDULVHV LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH H[WHQW WRZKLFK
KLJKSURILWVLQWKHSUHYLRXVWLPHSHULRGLQGXFHVHQWU\LQWKHFXUUHQWSHULRGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
VXFKHQWU\DIIHFWVSURILWLQWKHFXUUHQWSHULRGDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKVXFKWKHILUPZRXOGKDYHEH
DEOH WR PDLQWDLQ LWV DGYDQWDJHV LQ DEVHQFH RI HQWU\” . The quick erosion of the short-run 
persistence indicates the existence of entry. The fact that some liner operators do earn 
long-run rents implies that barriers to entry and  exit do exist (see Figure 6-10). 
Finally, for the sample, the estimated  _λˆ‘s range from 0.68 to - 0.39 around  a mean of 
0.19775 (see bottom line of Figure 6-11). The values of _λˆ are negative in 5 cases but of 
these none are statistically significant at the 5  % level. The average estimated  value of 
`λˆ  of 0.19775 suggests relatively low persistence of profit. This result is significant lower 
than those obtained in other industries (see Lipczynski HWDO, 2005; Gschwandtner, 2009).  
 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
Liner operators should  know the entry and  exit conditions of their industry, since both 
are powerful forces because they strongly influence behaviour. To this end, this paper 
stud ied both the (actual and potential) entry and exit.  
This issue was translated into two research questions. First, the study addressed  the 
question whether container liner operators can freely enter/ exit the containerised  liner 
shipping industry. Secondly, the paper dealt with the question whether the competitive 
forces in the containerised liner shipping industry are sufficiently powerful to bring any 
abnormal profits (positive or negative) into line w ith the competitive rate of return. 
These two questions divided  the paper in two parts. 
In the opening part, firstly the industry dynamics were firstly examined. Next, the exit 
and entry as well as the entry and  exit conditions were analysed for the selected  trade 
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 This ou tcome also applies for APL, CSCL, H orizon Line, Matson and  UASC. The remaining carriers 
know a ab
,
pi  < 0. 
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route Belgium-India. Finally the dynamics at alliance level were observed  at the three 
levels: the industry, the alliances and  the trade level indicate the existence of actual 
entry/ exit. The trade study indicates that structural barriers exists but the extent of these 
barriers is moderate. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that established  carriers need  do 
nothing to d iscourage entry. No generalisation can be formulated for other trade routes. 
Secondly, to model both actual and  potential entry, this study adopted the growing 
persistence of profits literature. This literature observes firm-level profit outcomes over 
time to d raw interferences about the nature of competition as both actual and potential 
entry are unobservable variables. In other words, the central idea is that profits should  
persist if there are impediments to the competitive dynamic (e.g. entry barriers). This 
methodology is applied to a panel of 21 liner operators observed over the period  
2000-2008. 
Estimation of the persistence of profits for the CLSI firstly reveals that the short-run 
persistence is significant higher for large independent carriers than liner operators 
involved  in alliances. Secondly, it showed that the ranking short-run/ long-run 
persistence does not correspond  with the ranking based  on market shares. This find ing 
might suggest that large carriers give up profit to preserve their market share. Third ly, 
the hypothesis that (actual and  potential) entry into and  exit from any market are 
sufficiently free to bring any abnormal profits quickly into line with the competitive rate 
of return was tested . Since cd ,
∧
pi
 does not equal zero for all liner operators i, the results for 
the CLSI imply that there is long-run persistence. In the containerised liner shipping 
case, the empirical results suggest that the hypothesis can be rejected . Last, the excess 
returns erode at a faster pace than other industries. 
Finally, liner operators that persistently earn profits above the norm today should  
continue to do so in subsequent periods. An interesting suggestion for future research 
might be to examine whether the ‘persistence of profits’  would  persist and  to identify the 
determinants of the speed of profit adjustment. 
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6 6
SEA-LAND NEW YORK 6252 TEU MSC LUGANO 3032 TEU
SAFMARINE HIMALAYA 6252 TEU MSC CARINA 3029 TEU
SEA-LAND WASHINGTON 6252 TEU MSC BRIANNA 3014 TEU
SEA-LAND ILLINOIS 6252 TEU MSC DYMPHNA 2918 TEU
MAERSK KOLKATA 6252 TEU MSC NIKITA 2686 TEU
MAERSK KALAMATA 6252 TEU MSC SOCOTRA 2258 TEU
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MAERSK KOBE 6420 TEU MSC BRIANNA 3268 TEU
SEA-LAND WASHINGTON 6420 TEU MSC CARINA 3029 TEU
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Felixstowe 0 Fri Felixstowe 0 Wed
Zeebrugge 2 Sun Antwerp 2 Fri
Bremerhaven 4 Tue Suez 10 Sat
Rotterdam 5 Wed Port Mohammad Bin Qasim 18 Sun
Salalah 16 Sun Mundra 20 Tue
Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Wed Jawaharlal Nehru 23 Fri
Pipavav 22 Sat Jeddah 28 Wed
Jawaharlal Nehru 25 Tue Felixstowe 42 Wed
Jeddah 31 Mon
Malaga 38 Mon
Algeciras 39 Tue
Felixstowe 42 Fri
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SEA-LAND WASHINGTON* 6420 TEU MSC CARINA 3029 TEU
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MAERSK KOLKATA* 6416 TEU MSC SOCOTRA* 2258 TEU
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öGÔﬁÓ × ÷ ØAÓ Ö Ñﬁà Ð × × Ð øzÒùöGÔﬁÓ × öGÔ!Ó ×
Felixstowe 0 Fri Felixstowe 0 Wed
Zeebrugge 2 Sun Antwerp 2 Fri
Bremerhaven 4 Tue Suez 10 Sat
Rotterdam 5 Wed Port Mohammad Bin Qasim 18 Sun
Salalah 16 Sun Mundra 20 Tue
Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Wed Jawaharlal Nehru 23 Fri
Pipavav 22 Sat Jeddah 28 Wed
Jawaharlal Nehru 25 Tue Felixstowe 42 Wed
Jeddah 31 Mon
Malaga 38 Mon
Algeciras 39 Tue
Felixstowe 42 Fri
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MAERSK KALMAR 6990 TEU MSC CAROUGE 4860 TEU
MAERSK KAMPALA 6802 TEU MSC CATANIA 4741 TEU
MAERSK KIEL 6930 TEU MSC INDEPENDENCE 5551 TEU
MAERSK KIMI 6990 TEU MSC LIBERTY 5551 TEU
MAERSK KITHIRA 6802 TEU MSC MARINA 6742 TEU
MAERSK KLAIPEDA 6990 TEU MSC MICHAELA 6724 TEU
MAERSK KUSHIRO 6200 TEU
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Felixstowe, GB 0 Sat Felixstowe, GB 0 Thu
Zeebrugge, BE 1 Sun Antwerp, BE 3 Sun
Bremerhaven, DE 2 Tue Jeddah, SA 17 Sun
Rotterdam, NL 4 Thu Salalah, OM 22 Fri
Aqaba, JO 14 Sun Mundra, IN 26 Tue
Jebel Ali, AE 21 Sun Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 29 Fri
Bandar Abbas, IQ 22 Tue Gioia Tauro, IT 39 Mon
Jebel Ali, AE 25 Thu Valencia, SP 42 Thu
Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 29 Mon Felixstowe, GB 49 Thu
Pipavav, IN 31 Wed
Salalah, OM 34 Sat
Jeddah, SA 37 Tue
Algeciras, SP 44 Tue
Felixstowe, GB 49 Fri
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MAERSK KIEL 6930 TEU MSC INDEPENDENCE 5551 TEU
MAERSK KIMI 6990 TEU MSC LIBERTY 5551 TEU
MAERSK KITHIRA 6802 TEU MSC MARINA 6742 TEU
MAERSK KLAIPEDA 6990 TEU MSC MICHAELA 6724 TEU
MAERSK KUSHIRO 6200 TEU
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Zeebrugge, BE 1 Sun Antwerp, BE 3 Sun
Bremerhaven, DE 2 Tue Jeddah, SA 17 Sun
Rotterdam, NL 4 Thu Salalah, OM 22 Fri
Gioia Tauro, 14 Sun Mundra, IN 26 Tue
Port Said 21 Sun Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 29 Fri
Jebel Ali, AE 22 Tue Gioia Tauro, IT 39 Mon
Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 25 Thu Valencia, SP 42 Thu
Pipavav, IN 29 Mon Felixstowe, GB 49 Thu
Salalah, OM 31 Wed
Jeddah, SA 34 Sat
Port Said 37 Tue
Algeciras, SP 44 Tue
Felixstowe, GB 49 Fri
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MAERSK KALMAR 6990 TEU MSC DISCOVERY 5711 TEU HS LIVINGSTONE 4992 TEU
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MAERSK KIMI 6673 TEU MSC CONFIDENCE 5443 TEU MSC MATILDE 4396 TEU
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MAERSK KLAIPEDA 6788 TEU MSC CATANIA 4953 TEU MSC NORA 3014 TEU
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Zeebrugge, BE 1 Mon Felixstowe, GB 2 Tue Antwerp, BE 2 Thu
Bremerhaven, DE 3 Wed Jeddah, SA 12 Fri Felixstowe, GB 3 Wed
Rotterdam, NL 5 Fri Salalah, OM 17 Wed Port Said, EG 11 Thu
Gioia Tauro, IT 12 Fri Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 22 Mon Jeddah, SA 14 Sun
Port Said, EG 15 Mon Mundra, IN 24 Wed Colombo 22 Mon
Jebel Ali, AE 17 Wed Salalah, OM 28 Sun Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 25 Thu
Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 25 Thu Jeddah, SA 33 Fri Mundra, IN 28 Sun
Pipavav, IN 29 Mon Gioia Tauro, IT 39 Thu Salalah, OM 31 Wed
Salalah, OM 31 Wed Valencia, SP 41 Sat Port Said, EG 36 Mon
Jeddah, SA 37 Tue Antwerp, BE 49 Sun Barcelona, SP 41 Sat
Port Said, EG 40 Fri Hamburg, DE 49 Sun
Algeciras, SP 45 Wed
Felixstowe, GB 49 Sun
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EPIC Loop 1 
(Europe Pakistan India Consortium) 
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1 sailing a week 1 sailing a week 1 sailing a week
e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Yes Yes Yes
V
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L nKO a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6 4
BAVARIA EXPRESS 4252 TEU NORASIA BALKANS 3108 TEU
THURINGIA EXPRESS 4252 TEU NORASIA TEGESOS 2890 TEU
CMA CGM NILGAI 4252 TEU CSAV RIO MAIPO 2732 TEU
CMA CGM KINGSTON 4252 TEU CSAV RIO LOA 2732 TEU
CMA CGM SAMBHAR 4043 TEU
MUMBAI EXPRESS 3987 TEU
b o J Q Y OR N ]_pR QR d J S U
25038 TEU 11462 TEU
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j \ Q M M]
24,5 22
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j ] WKS
51150 39500
R cj TPqﬀr
4173 TEU 2865 TEU
N O S R S J O L
42 42
stR N d o_k l l u
L nKO a\ o J Q\
3 3 5
CMA CGM NILGAI 4253 TEU BAVARIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU CSAV TENO 2741 TEU
CMA CGM KINGSTON 4253 TEU THURINGIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU CSAV TUBUL 2741 TEU
CMA CGM SAMBHAR 4043 TEU SAIGON EXPRESS 4253 TEU NORASIA BALKANS 3108 TEU
NORASIA TEGESOS 2890 TEU
WADI ALRAYAN 3011 TEU
b o J Q Y OR N ]_pR QR d J S U
12549 TEU 12355 TEU 14491 TEU
R cj \ Q M M]
24,5
R cj ] WKS
51421 38988
R cj TPqﬀr
4183 4118 2898
N O S R S J O L
42 42 42
Slot-charter ANL Container Line Pty Ltd
Partner CMA CGM SA Partner CMA CGM SA
Partner Hamburg Süd Partner Hamburg Süd
Partner Hapag-Lloyd AG Partner Hapag-Lloyd AG
Partner MacAndrews & Co Ltd Partner MacAndrews & Co Ltd
vON S w TﬀN R L\ J S S J x_Myv(ON S v(O N S v(ON S
Tilbury 0 Tue Tilbury 0 Tue Jebel Ali (Dubai) 0 Wed
Hamburg 2 Thu Hamburg 2 Thu Mundra 3 Sat
Antwerp 4 Sat Antwerp 4 Sat Jawaharlal Nehru 5 Mon
Malta 10 Fri Marsaxlokk 10 Fri Port Said 13 Tue
Port Said 12 Sun Port Said 12 Sun Antwerp 21 Wed
Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Sun Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Sun Hamburg 23 Fri
Mundra 22 Wed Mundra 22 Wed Felixstowe 25 Mon
Jawaharlal Nehru 24 Fri Jawaharlal Nehru 24 Fri Port Said 34 Thu
Damietta 33 Sun Damietta 33 Sun Jebel Ali (Dubai) 42 Wed
Malta 36 Wed Marsaxlokk 36 Wed
Tilbury 42 Tue Tilbury 42 Tue
z`nﬀO aQ ON S \
11 11 9
stR U`k l l u
L nKO a\ o J Q\
3 4 4
CMA CGM NILGAI* 4253 TEU BAVARIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU CSAV TENO* 2741 TEU
CMA CGM KINGSTON* 4253 TEU THURINGIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU CSAV TUBUL* 2741 TEU
CMA CGM SAMBHAR* 4043 TEU LIVERPOOL EXPRESS* 4253 TEU NORASIA BALKANS* 3108 TEU
MUMBAI EXPRESS* 4038 TEU NORASIA TEGESOS* 2890 TEU
b o J Q Y OR N ]_pR QR d J S U
12549 TEU 16393 TEU 11480 TEU
R cj ] WKS
51421
R cj TPqﬀr
4183 2870 TEU
N O S R S J O L
42 42 42
Slot-charter ANL Container Line Pty Ltd Partner Hamburg Süd
Partner CMA CGM SA Partner Hapag-Lloyd AG
Partner MacAndrews & Co Ltd
vON S w TﬀN R L\ J S S J x_Myv(ON S v(O N S v(ON S
Tilbury 0 Tue Tilbury 0 Tue Jebel Ali (Dubai) 0 Wed
Hamburg 2 Thu Hamburg 2 Thu Mundra 3 Sat
Antwerp 4 Sat Antwerp 4 Sat Jawaharlal Nehru 5 Mon
Malta 10 Fri Marsaxlokk 10 Fri Port Said 13 Tue
Port Said 12 Sun Port Said 12 Sun Antwerp 21 Wed
Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Sun Jebel Ali (Dubai) 19 Sun Hamburg 23 Fri
Mundra 22 Wed Mundra 22 Wed Felixstowe 25 Mon
Jawaharlal Nehru 24 Fri Jawaharlal Nehru 24 Fri Port Said 34 Thu
Damietta 33 Sun Damietta 33 Sun Jebel Ali (Dubai) 42 Wed
Malta 36 Wed Marsaxlokk 36 Wed
Tilbury 42 Tue Tilbury 42 Tue
z`nﬀO aQ ON S \
11 11 9
b MN cJ d Mv(R N S L MN \
b MN cJ d Mv(R N S L MN \
TﬀN R L\ J SKTKJ xM TKN R L\ J SKTKJ x_M TﬀN R L\ J SKTKJ xM
IOS-1
Europe-Middle East-Pakistan-India service
IMEX
(India-Middle East-Europe service) 
TﬀN R L\ J SKTKJ xM TKN R L\ J SKTKJ x_M TﬀN R L\ J SKTKJ xM
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EPIC Loop 1 
(Europe Pakistan India Consortium) 
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~ 
`   Ł 8 6
CMA CGM AZURE 4250 TEU BAVARIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU
CMA CGM CORAL 4300 TEU THURINGIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU
CMA CGM JADE 4250 TEU JAKARTA EXPRESS 4253 TEU
CMA CGM ONYX 4250 TEU SAIGON EXPRESS 4253 TEU
CMA CGM QUARTZ 4300 TEU Cap Gabriel (Hamburg Süd) 4294 TEU
CMA CGM TURQUOISE 4300 TEU Cap George (Hamburg Süd) 4294 TEU
HANJIN LISBON 5752 TEU
Ville d'Orion 3961 TEU

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  $i Ł     35363 TEU 25196 TEU
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Slot-charter ANL Container Line Pty Ltd Partner Hamburg Süd
Partner CMA CGM SA Partner Hapag-Lloyd AG
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Southampton, GB 0 Fri Hamburg, DE 0 Fri
Hamburg, DE 2 Sun Tilbury, GB 2 Sun
Rotterdam, NL 4 Mon Antwerp, BE 4 Tue
Antwerp, BE 5 Wed Cagliari, IT 10 Mon
Le Havre, FR 8 Thu Jebel Ali, AE 19 Wed
Port Said, EG 17 Sat Port Muhammad Bin Qasim Karachi, PK 22 Sat
Djibouti, DJ 22 Sun Mundra, IN 24 Mon March 2009: Rotterdam replaces Antwerp
Jebel Ali, AE 27 Mon Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 26 Wed
Port Muhammad Bin Qasim Karachi, PK 30 Wed Cagliari, IT 36 Sat
Nhava Sheva Jawaharlal Nehru, IN 32 Sat Hamburg, DE 42 Fri
Mundra, IN 35 Wed
Djibouti, DJ 40 Fri
Jeddah, SA 44
Malta - Marsaxlokk, MT 48
Tangier Med, MA 52
Southampton, GB 55
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   16 10
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 8 6
CMA CGM AZURE 4250 TEU BAVARIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU
CMA CGM CORAL 4300 TEU THURINGIA EXPRESS 4051 TEU
CMA CGM JADE 4250 TEU JAKARTA EXPRESS 4253 TEU
CMA CGM ONYX 4250 TEU SAIGON EXPRESS 4253 TEU
CMA CGM QUARTZ 4300 TEU Cap Gabriel (Hamburg Süd) 4294 TEU
CMA CGM TURQUOISE 4300 TEU Cap George (Hamburg Süd) 4294 TEU
HANJIN LISBON 5752 TEU
Ville d'Orion 3961 TEU

  Ł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     35363 TEU 25196 TEU
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
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 
 
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Slot-charter ANL Container Line Pty Ltd Partner Hamburg Süd
Partner CMA CGM SA Partner Hapag-Lloyd AG
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 

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Southampton, GB 0 Fri Hamburg, DE 0 Fri
Hamburg, DE 2 Sun Tilbury, GB 2 Sun
Rotterdam, NL 4 Mon Antwerp, BE 4 Tue
Antwerp, BE 5 Wed Cagliari, IT 10 Mon
Le Havre, FR 8 Thu Jebel Ali, AE 19 Wed
Port Said, EG 17 Sat Port Muhammad Bin Qasim Karachi, PK 22 Sat
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EPIC Loop 1 
(Europe Pakistan India Consortium) 
P ¡¢ £¤(¥ ¤
¦§`¨ ©ª «¬ ­ª 8 7 7 TEU
CMA CGM AZURE 4250 TEU BAVARIA EXPRESS 4252 TEU CSAV APPENNINI 4800 TEU
CMA CGM CORAL 4308 TEU THURINGIA EXPRESS 4252 TEU CSAV PYRENEES 4800 TEU
CMA CGM JADE 4250 TEU JAKARTA EXPRESS 4250 TEU CSAV JURA 4800 TEU
CMA CGM ONYX 4250 TEU SAIGON EXPRESS 4250 TEU CSAV CANTABRIAN 4800 TEU
CMA CGM QUARTZ 4308 TEU MANILA EXPRESS 4250 TEU HS BEETHOVEN 4389 TEU
CMA CGM TURQUOISE 4308 TEU Cap Gabriel (Hamburg Süd) 4298 TEU MARE PHOENICIUM 4038 TEU
CMA CGM JAMAICA 4298 TEU Cap George (Hamburg Süd) 4298 TEU PAGO 3534 TEU
Ville d'Orion 3961 TEU
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1994 Hapag Lloyd  Nedlloyd Cosco DSR-Senator
NYK CGM Cho Yang
MOL MISC À_ÁKÂÄÃ Å Æ Ç Å È É Ê Ë Ì
K-Line Hanjin
Hapag Lloyd  OOCL NOL
NYK APL OOCL DSR-Senator
NOL Cho Yang
Cosco
Hanjin
MOL
K-Line
HMM
Norasia
Yang Ming Line
HMM
Yang Ming Line
1996 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Ö Í$Ó × ØÏ Ó(Ò_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö ÙKÎ Ô Õ × Ð$Õ × Ð(Ú × Î Û Ô ÜÝ
Hapag Lloyd  APL Cosco DSR-Senator
NYK MOL Cho Yang
NOL OOCL Hanjin
P&OCL Nedlloyd K-Line
MISC Yang Ming Line
HMM
1997 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Ö Í$Ó × ØÏ Ó(Ò_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö ÙKÎ Ô Õ × Ð$Õ × Ð(Ú × Î Û Ô ÜÝ
Hapag Lloyd  APL Cosco DSR-Senator
NYK MOL K-Line Cho Yang
OOCL OOCL Yang Ming Line Hanjin
P&O Nedlloyd (P&O Nedlloyd) HMM UASC
MISC
1998 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ Þ ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖåäæiçèÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Ö éiÐPÔ Û Ö Ñ$Ò_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö
Hapag Lloyd  APL/ NOL Cosco
NYK MOL K-Line Cho Yang
OOCL HMM Yang Ming Line Hanjin-Senator
P&O Nedlloyd UASC
MISC (1)
2001 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ Þ ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Ö äæ_êçëÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö éiÐPÔ Û Ö Ñ$Ò_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö
Hapag Lloyd  APL/ NOL Cosco
NYK MOL K-Line Cho Yang Cho Yang w ent bankrupt
OOCL HMM Yang Ming Line Hanjin-Senator
P&O Nedlloyd Hanjin-Senator UASC Hanjin  also represen ts Senator Line (2)
MISC
2003 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ Þ ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Öåäæ_êçëÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö
Hapag Lloyd  APL/ NOL Cosco
NYK MOL K-Line
OOCL HMM Yang Ming Line
P&O Nedlloyd Hanjin-Senator
MISC UASC
2005 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ Þ Þ ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Öåäæ_êçëÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö
Hapag Lloyd   (CP Ships) APL/ NOL Cosco
NYK MOL K-Line
OOCL HMM Yang Ming Line
MISC Hanjin-Senator
2007 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ Þ Þ ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Öåäæ_êçëÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö Name CP Ships dropped
Hapag Lloyd   (5) APL/ NOL (9) Cosco (7)
NYK  (10) MOL (12) K-Line (13)
OOCL (11) HMM (18) Yang Ming Line (14)
MISC (22) Hanjin-Senator (8)
2010 ÍÎ Ï Ð(Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ ÖiÞ ì ßàÖ áãâã× Î Ó Ñ$ÒiÓ Ó Ô Ï ÐÕ Ö äæ_êçëÒ_Ó Ó Ô Ï Ð(Õ Ö
Hapag Lloyd  APL/ NOL Cosco
NYK MOL K-Line
OOCL HMM Yang Ming Line
Hanjin
MISC
(1) MISC on ly participate in the Europe-Far East Trade
(2) Senator Line w ent bankrup t in  2009
í îPï ð ñﬀòôó õ ö$÷ îPï ø ù ð ñúøû(ø üPï îîKý_îKú ù þiñúÄñúîàù ï ø òî
Creation of a fourth alliance, the Sino-Japanese 
Alliance (now adays know  as the CHKY-
May 2005: merger of Maersk Sealand and 
P&O Nedlloyd 
August 2005: acquisition of CP Ships by 
Hapag-Lloyd
í îPï ð ñﬀò ß
A new  period w ill start on January 1, 2010. On  
15 May 2009 MISC Bhd , participating solely in 
the Europe-Far East trades, announced  that it 
w ould w ithdraw  from the Grand  Alliance 
Merger to form P&O Nedlloyd. P&O Nedlloyd  
choses  for the Grand  Alliance
Tricon consortium renamed  in  United Alliance 
(incl. loose agreement w ith  UASC)
New ly merged NOL/ APL opt to join the 
restructured Global Alliance.
As OOCL w as not included  in  the new  Global 
Alliance (later on  renamed into The New  
World Alliance (TNWA)), it became a 
participant in the Grand  Alliance (GA).
MISC chose also to join the GA w hile Hyundai 
Merchant Marine (HMM) opted to participate 
in TNWA.
í îPï ð ñﬀò

Alliances w ere not a  new  phenomenon. Before 
1995, these operational agreements already 
existed  bu t they w ere of a limited scope or only 
active on one trade (ind icated by different 
colours). 
í îPï ð ñﬀò õ  ñï ýø ù ð ñúÄñKøû û ð øú  îPþ
The first cooperation w as the Global Alliance, 
formed by APL, MOL, OOCL and Nedlloyd  
(w ith  side arrangements w ith MISC). 
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&KDSWHU
 ,QVHDUFKRIWKHOLQNEHWZHHQVKLSVL]HDQG
RSHUDWLRQV
Abstract138 
Since the 1990s the liner shipping industry has faced a period of restructuring and  
consolidation, and  been confronted  with a continuing increase in the container vessel 
scale. The impact of these changes is noticeable in trade patterns, cargo handling 
methods and shipping routes, in short ‘operations’ . After listing the factors influencing 
size, growth in container ship size is explained by the economies of scale in deploying 
larger vessels. In order to quantify the economies of scale, this paper uses the liner 
service cash flow model. A novelty in the model is the inclusion of +6,000-20-foot 
Equivalent Unit (TEU) vessels and  the d istinction in costs between single and  tw in 
propeller units on ships. The results illustrate that scale economies have been - and  will 
continue to be - the driving force behind the deployment of larger container vessels. The 
paper then assesses the link between ship size and  operations, given the current 
discussion about the increase in container vessel scale. It is found  that (a) ship  size and  
operations are linked; (b) optimal ship size depends on transport segment (deep-sea vs. 
short-sea shipping, SSS), terminal type (transhipment terminals vs. other terminals), 
trade lane (East-West vs. North-South trades) and  technology; and  (c) a ship optimal for 
one trade can be suboptimal for another. 
.H\ZRUGV:  
Container liner shipping, containership size, container operations, economies of scale 
 
                                                     
138 The paper is published  in Transportation Planning and  Technology, 2008, 31(4), 435 – 463.This chap ter is 
joint work w ith Prof.dr. E. Omey, Prof. d r. E. Van de Voorde, Prof. dr. G. Blauwens and  Prof. d r. F. 
Witlox. The au thors wish to thank the ed itor-in-chief for his comments, and  acknowledge the 
anonymous referees for their constructive criticism and  helpfu l suggestions that contribu ted  to the 
overall quality of this paper. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the au thors.  
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
History tells us that the liner shipping industry has been characterised by a number of 
profound changes, starting from the introduction of the container box in the early 1960s, 
the set-up of consortia and  other operational agreements (1970 - 1980), and  in the 1990s, 
the formation of (global) alliances. These alliances have made it financially possible to 
deploy bigger ships which, in turn, allow the economies of scale associated  w ith such 
vessels (Ham, 2004; Stopford, 2004; European Commission, 2005; UNCTAD, various 
ed itions). The planned  abolition of the European conferences in October 2008 puts the 
liner shipping industry on the threshold  of a new era. 
The maritime landscape, which plays a vital role in the industrial and economic 
development, was redesigned by successive waves of consolidation. The first 
consolidation in the liner shipping industry took place around  1995. Ten years later a 
second  consolidation round started. In Mid-June 2005 the liner shipping industry was 
shaken up by the takeover of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  by Maersk Sealand (since then 
known as Maersk Line). No doubt this merger will redesign the liner shipping industry 
and inevitably provoke others to follow , as can already be noted (Fossey, 1990; Brooks, 
2000; Containerisation International, various ed itions). After all, liner shipping is an 
example of the oligopolistic market where interdependence is a key feature (Lipczynski 
et al, 2005). The question becomes: ‘Will the trend  towards mega concerns affect the 
operations of liner shipping companies? If so, how?’ . 
The focus of this paper is to examine from an economic point of view the way ship size is 
linked  with operations. The paper is d ivided  into four sections. In Section 7.1 the market 
configuration is explained . The next two Sections focus on the concept ‘Optimal ship 
size’  and ‘Optimal operations’  respectively. Section 7.4 outlines the link between both 
concepts. Finally, conclusions are d rawn in Section 7.5. 
 0DUNHWFRQILJXUDWLRQ
Firstly, the world ’ s pure cellular fleet capacity (or the capacity of container ships fitted  
throughout with fixed  or portable cell guides for the carriage of containers, OECD
Glossary of Statistical Terms) as at January 1st, 2008 was assessed  at 4,312 vessels w ith a 
total nominal capacity of about 11 million 20-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) (BRS, 2008). 
Assuming all vessels are delivered as contracted  and  with the sustained  minimum 
scrapping taking place, this carrying capacity is forecasted  to increase by another 15.18 % 
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during 2009, 14.00 % during 2010, 13.71 % during 2011 and  by 8.59 % by 2012 (see Figure 
7-1, Figures refer to January 1st of each year. The figures for the period  2009 to 2012 have 
been derived  from the order book. As liner operators can still book orders for delivery in 
2010, the figures for the period  2010 to 2012 are not definitive yet). The 10 million-TEU 
barrier was overstepped in 2007.  
 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQRIWKHFHOOXODUIOHHW
Secondly, we zoom in on the evolution of the world  container fleet over two decades (see 
Figure 7-1 - compiled  with data from BRS, 2008 and Drewry Shipping Consultants, 
2005). While the number of ships grew by a factor of five, the carrying capacity (TEU) 
increased at twice that rate. In combination these two aspects show that the average ship 
size increased  from about 1,306 TEUs at the end  of the 1980s up to 2,533 TEUs (2008). 
Consultancy reports confirm that this trend  of increased  average ship size w ill continue. 
The trend forecast suggests that the average size w ill move to about 3,300 TEUs in ten 
years’  time (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2005). 
\HDU

	

 ﬀ LQGH[
FDUU\LQJ
FDSDFLW\
7(8
LQGH[ JURZWK
DYHUDJH
VKLSVL]H
1988 1,151 100 1,503,244 100 1,306
…
1998 2,332 203 3,875,130 258 1,662
1999 2,512 218 4,296,511 286 10.87% 1,710
2000 2,611 227 4,525,919 301 5.34% 1,733
2001 2,735 238 4,936,737 328 9.08% 1,805
2002 2,892 251 5,540,085 369 12.22% 1,916
2003 3,033 264 6,125,493 407 10.57% 2,020
2004 3,174 276 6,667,758 444 8.85% 2,101
2005 3,347 291 7,318,184 487 9.75% 2,186
2006 3,606 313 8,258,608 549 12.85% 2,290
2007 3,943 343 9,587,306 638 16.09% 2,431
2008 4,312 375 10,921,474 727 13.92% 2,533
2009 4,798 417 12,579,049 837 15.18% 2,622
2010 5,240 455 14,340,308 954 14.00% 2,737
2011 5,600 487 16,306,339 1085 13.71% 2,912
2012 5,788 503 17,706,885 1178 8.59% 3,059
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)LJXUH1XPEHURIVKLSVQHZO\GHSOR\HG
In detail, Figure 7-2 illustrates the d istribution by size range of the newly delivered  ships 
in the respective years (BRS, 2008). While in 1995, nine new vessels were deployed  with 
a capacity in the size range of 5,001-6,000 TEUs, a decade later, 76 vessels were delivered 
with a capacity of over 5,000 TEUs. Although the smallest size segments still account for 
the largest share, a shift towards larger ships is noticeable. Looking at the cellular ship  
deliveries for the period 2008 to 2011, one can conclude that this trend will continue (see 
Figure 7-3) (BRS, 2008).  
 
)LJXUH&HOOXODUVKLSGHOLYHULHV
Ultimately, the container liner shipping industry is currently undergoing a period of 
unprecedented  structural growth, in terms of both volume and ship size. Figure 7-4 
shows the evolution of the biggest ships (listed  by TEU) in the world , the information 
about the owner and  the characteristics of the ship (i.e. length over all (length o.a.), 
beam, draught, TEU, Gross Register Ton (GRT), and Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) 
(Compiled with data from www.answer.com and  information from liner operators). 
<HDU
5DQJH    
ﬁﬃﬂ  !"!"! 97 53 11 0
ﬂ  !"!"!$#&%" '"'"' 208 150 101 40
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 !"!"!$#)* !
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)* ﬂ+!"!$#&," -'"' 48 44 47 12
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)LJXUH7KHELJJHVWVKLSVOLVWHGE\7(8LQWKHZRUOG
The impressive size growth – particularly during the last decade - is astonishing, 
especially when compared  with the preced ing period  of 25 years. In the latter period 
(1970-1995) the vessel size tripled, while during the last 10 years it almost doubled .  
The official number of TEU is not necessarily the same as the nominal number of TEU 
the ship can carry. In the column of the TEU characteristics in Figure 7-4, the nominal 
values between brackets can be noted . Maersk Line for instance does not quote the TEU 
capacity of its ships in the same way as the other liner shipping operators do. Maersk 
Line quotes the maximum load  capacity of their ships in terms of filled  TEUs with a 14 
tonne load (tare weight included). This will always result in a smaller TEU capacity than 
the true TEU capacity (i.e. the ship MS ‘Axel Maersk’  most likely has a capacity of 8,650 
TEU instead  of the reported  7,226 TEU).  
Assuming that a 13,500-TEU vessel is soon to be deployed , how does this reflect on the 
problematic nature of d raught and  accessibility of ports (see Section 7.3)? Further 
research yields the following explanation: a containership cannot transport its nominal 
capacity, even if we are talking about empty containers. A hypothetical example 
illustrates this point: suppose all 20-foot containers are filled with sand , and  each 
container loaded up  to a weight of 18t + 2t (weight of the container) or 20t. Multiplying 
the weight by the number of slots, viz. 9,580 TEUs, equals 191,600t, which exceeds the 
6 798:6 ;
<>=8
2006 Emma Maersk 394,00 m 56,40 m 
17 
(22) 16.00 m
11,000 
(13,460) n.n. 173000 Maersk Line/ Denmark
2006
COSCO 
Guangzhou 350,00 m 45,60 m 17 15.00 m 9,580 105,000 115,000
China Shipping Container 
Lines/ China
2005 MSC Pamela 336.70 m 45.60 m 18 15.00 m 9,200 107,849 109,600 MSC/ Sw itzerland
2004 CSCL Europe 334.00 m 42.80 m 17 14.50 m 8,468 90,465 101,612
China Shipping Container 
Lines/ China
2003 OOCL Shenzhen 322.97 m 42.80 m 17 14.50 m 8,063 89,097 99,518 OOCL/ Hongkong
2003 Axel Maersk 352.10 m 42.80 m 17 15.02 m 7,226 (8,650) 93,496 109,000 Maersk Sealand/ Denmark
1997 Sovereign Maersk 346.98 m 42.80 m 17 14.50 m 6,600 (8,050) 91,500 104,690 Maersk Line/ Denmark
1996 Regina Maersk 318.24 m 42.80 m 17 14.00 m 6,000 (7,048) 81,488 82,135 Maersk Line/ Denmark
1995 OOCL Hongkong 276.02 m 40.00 m 16 14.00 m 5,344 66,046 67,637 OOCL/ Hongkong
1991 Hannover Express 294.00 m 32.30 m 13 13.50 m 4,639 53,783 67,686 Hapag-Lloyd/ Germany
1988 Marchen Maersk 294.12 m 32.22 m 13 11.00 m 4,300 53,600 60,639 Maersk Line/ Denmark
1984 Louis Maersk 270.00 m 32.30 m 13 11.00 m 3,390 (3,700) 43,392 53,395 Maersk Line/ Denmark
1981 Frankfurt Express 287.73 m 32.28 m 13 13.06 m 3,430 57,540 51,540 Hapag-Lloyd/ Germany
1972 Hamburg Express 287.70 m 32.20 m 13 12.04 m 3,010 58,088 47,995 Hapag-Lloyd/ Germany
1972 Tokyo Bay 289.32 m 32.26 m 13 13.00 m 2,961 58,889 47,462 OCL then P&O/ GB
1971 Kamakura Maru 261.00 m 32.20 m 13 12.00 m 2,500 51,069 35,737 NYK/ Japan
1970 Sydney Express 217.00 m 30.58 m 12 11.58 m 1,665 27,407 33,350 Hapag-Lloyd/ Germany
1969 Encounter Bay 227.31 m 30.56 m 12 9.00 m 1,572 28,800 28,794 OCL then P&O/ GB
1968 Hakone Maru 187.00 m 26.00 m 10 9.00 m 752 10,423 14,745 NYK/ Japan
?ﬀ@
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deadweight of the ship (115,000t - see Figure 7-4). Starting from its deadweight and 
using the Maersk Line rule of thumb, a 9,580 vessel could transport about 8,214 TEUs 
loaded  (115,000t/ 14t).  
Linking weight w ith trade lane, vessels on the Far East/ Europe trade lane are fully 
loaded  by TEU and not by weight. On the contrary, the African trade lane is 
characterised by heavy cargo (e.g. chemicals,… ), so here the vessels are fully loaded  by 
weight and  not on slot capacity.  
Besides the characteristics of cargo, the commercial aspect also plays an important role. 
In a very competitive environment on the one hand and with the forecasted  risk of 
overcapacity on the other, it will become hard  to sell all slots of these larger vessels. We 
can cautiously conclude that the problem of accessibility of ports is not an issue yet, as 
vessels are seldom fully loaded  by weight and , in add ition, main ports respond  largely 
by intensive dredging investments (see Section 7.3).  
The shift towards larger ships seems to continue, possibly even up to 18,000 TEUs 
(known as the Malacca-max vessels which refers to the maximum size and draught to 
transit the Strait of Malacca, a vital part of the Asia trade route). Although it is not clear 
if and  when an 18,000-TEU containership w ith an allowable d raught will be built, it is 
fairly certain that the recent surge in vessel size w ill not stop at the barrier of 11,000 
TEUs. Technically there seem to be no limitations.  
 2SWLPDOVKLSVL]H
Wijnolst HW DO (1999) state that: “ WKHGULYLQJ IRUFH LV WKH FUHDWLRQRI D FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH
WKURXJK HFRQRPLHV RI VFDOH 7KH 0DODFFDPD[ GHVLJQ KDV DQ RYHUDOO ORZHU FRVW OHYHO RI
DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RYHU WKH FXUUHQW ODUJHVW FRQWDLQHU VKLSV RI  7(8V ,Q D ZRUOG RI
FXWWKURDW FRPSHWLWLRQ  FDQPDNH D GHFLVLYH GLIIHUHQFH” . From a technological point of 
view , 18,000 TEUs can be considered  as the maximal ship design, but it is not the optimal 
ship size.  
 )DFWRUV,QIOXHQFLQJ6L]H
Various technical stud ies have shown that the deployment of larger container ships is 
feasible and  that there are neither technical limitations nor market obstacles to 
introducing them (Wijnolst HW DO 1999; Akiyama HW DO, 2002; Ham, 2004). Currently, 
further engineering is still needed regard ing future Panamax vessels and  new logistical 
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concepts are required . The tremendous growth in ship size makes it necessary to look for 
a systematic explanation of the factors influencing the size of ships.  
The driving variables were obtained by reviewing the relevant literature and  from 
interviews with liner carriers and  shippers. After listing the variables, it became clear 
that the criterion for cataloguing the d riving key factors would  be a synthesis of the 
different points of view of all p layers involved. In clockwise order this includes the 
shipper, the (port) authorities, technology, the terminal operators, the carrier and finally, 
though not least important, market-driven forces. The result of the d riving variables 
pushing the vessel scale is summarised  in Figure 7-5. 
 
)LJXUH,QIOXHQFLQJNH\IDFWRUV
From the viewpoint of the carrier the response to the expanding market, the permanent 
strive for cost cutting, the formation of strategic cooperations, and  most particularly the 
(global) alliances have fuelled the upsizing trend . Economies of scale, the engine that 
drives the scale of the container ship, exist when the unit costs of operating a ship 
decrease as the size of containerships increases. In a very competitive market new 
build ing orders for bigger ships provoke others to follow. These orders have not been 
solely placed  by alliance members. In an attempt to maintain their market share by 
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keeping pace with this level and type of investment, most major independent liner 
operators have also placed  orders for such vessels. 
In addition, other variables such as the increase in the worldwide demand for liner 
shipping, technological evolution (e.g. the development of the 45’  high cube/ pallet wide 
containers), ongoing conversion of cargoes to containerisation,…  have also contributed  
to the increase in the container vessel scale. The economies of scale definitely form the 
main variable. But, w ithout any doubt, the interaction between all factors plays a very 
important role in this upsizing movement. 
 2SWLPDO6KLS6L]H
In general, micro-economic theory links the size of a company to efficiency; that is to say, 
a size that minimises the average long-run costs. Furthermore, the size of a business 
depends on the market that it is in. If the demand is not sufficiently great, it is not 
possible to produce at the minimum efficiency level, even if it were technologically 
possible to take advantage of the economies of size.  
Another approach refers to economies of scale, which are predominantly of a technical 
nature and  which determine the optimal size of the firm (Baumol, 1982). However, 
organisational factors also have an influence on the optimal size, possibly creating 
diseconomies of scale, and thus changing the optimal size of the firm. Consequently the 
balance between the predominance of economies of scale and  the predominance of 
diseconomies of scale determines the optimum size of a company. 
Size, a common denominator for ships expressing type as well as capacity (TEU), is 
singled  out as the most important design variable or analytical tool for liner service 
optimisation.  
Before the 1970s the theory was to use the largest ship  possible that could be 
accommodated at both origin and destination ports (Heaver, 1968; Van de Voorde, 2005). 
Since then, the subject of optimal ship  size has received  a lot of attention from transport 
economists (Heaver, 1968; Goss, 1971; Kendall, 1972; Jansson HWDO, 1982 and  1987; Talley, 
1990; McLellan, 1997; Lim, 1998; Cullinane HWDO, 1999 and  2000; Stopford, 2004; Imai HW
DO, 2006). Nowadays we know that other determinants, such as volume of trade, length 
of route, sailing frequency, the number of port calls, etc., also influence ship size. 
Regard ing the number of port calls, an interesting question is: ‘Is the reduction in the 
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number of ports due to the d imensions of the ships or do liner operators in some cases 
decide to tailor their ship size to a port/ region?’ . The right answer probably lies 
somewhere in between. 
A scan of the literature yields the following definitions: Kendall (1972) describes the 
optimum size of a ship used  on a particular route as the size which minimises the total 
transport costs. By ‘total transport costs’  he does not only mean those costs incurred  by 
the ship at sea, but also the related  cost of the terminals at either end  of the voyage (port 
costs - d redging, berthing, …  -, handling costs, storage costs). This definition already 
refers to the link w ith operations, which will be explored in Section 7.4. 
Accord ing to Jansson and  Shneerson (1982), optimal ship size is obtained by trad ing off 
economies of size in the hauling operations with diseconomies of size in the handling 
operations. In port, handling costs per ton increase with ship size, while hauling costs 
per ton at sea, on the other hand , decline w ith size.  
Talley (1990) defines optimal ship size as the containership size that minimises the cost 
per TEU moved  per voyage leg (between two port calls) on a given route.  
Cullinane and Khanna (1999 and  2000) and Stopford  (2004) refer in their studies 
regarding optimal ship size to economies of scale as the determinant for optimal ship 
size. 
Previous maritime studies provide an insight into the concept ‘optimal ship size’  but 
exclude from their model the costs linked  with cargo handling, shore infrastructure etc. 
(Heaver, 1968; Jansson HW DO, 1987; Cullinane HW DO, 1999 and 2000). Given the current 
expansion towards door-to-door transportation systems, recognition of these costs and  
their impact on logistic decisions (regard ing waiting time, inventory, etc.) must be 
considered . 
From the point of view of a profit-maximising liner operator, the notion ‘optimal’  is 
determined by minimising costs per TEU, given the current and  forecasted demand. In 
the next section, it w ill become clear that the optimum is rather a segment than a point 
estimation. Currently, due to technological advances and  specialisation, optimal ship 
size on a particular route is equal to the number of containers a line can capture between 
port A and  port B on a weekly fixed-day basis by minimising cost per TEU, at sea, in the 
port and  hinterland  connection, while still offering the greatest flexibility to liner 
operators in their movement toward  logistic providers. 
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There are many d ifferent factors (e.g. number of ports, time in port, d istance,… ) that 
might determine optimal ship size and  many d ifferent points of view of what optimal 
ship size really is. The fact is that minimising costs per TEU recurs as a crucial element. 
This point leads to the question: ‘How can we identify the optimal containership?’  
The optimal containership size can be found by studying the economies of scale in 
deploying larger vessels. In order to quantify the economies of scale, this paper uses the 
liner service cash flow model of Stopford  (2004). This model is based  on a transatlantic 
round-trip  voyage, assuming a hypothetical weekly-service frequency, an 8,500-mile 
distance , an average operating speed of 19 knots, 7 port calls and  a capacity utilisation 
of 80 % outward  and 90 % return. The model consists of two levels. Level one constructs 
the six components of liner service costs (viz. service schedule, ship  costs, port charges, 
container operations, container costs and  administration costs). In the second  stage the 
calculated  costs are used  in a cash flow model. The model was later updated  by 
Notteboom (2000). In add ition, he linked the days/ portcall w ith ship size. Stopford ’ s and  
Notteboom’s calculations are limited  to ships up to 6,500 TEUs. 
For an impact analysis of economies of scale, we focus on ship costs, more specific on the 
unit cost per TEU (expressed  in terms of USD/ day) by comparing d ifferent ship sizes. 
The unit cost per TEU (USD/ day) is defined  in the following way: 
7(8VL]HVKLS
86'GD\FRVWEXQNHU86'GD\FRVWFDSLWDO86'GD\FRVWRSHUDWLQJ
86'GD\7(8SHUFRVW8QLW
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Given the increase in container vessel scale, it is most interesting to enlarge the model 
with +6,500-TEU vessels. In this paper the model has been expanded to include ship  
sizes up to the hypothetical 18,000 TEUs. Another novelty in the model is the distinction 
in costs between single and  twin propeller units on ships. The use of single-propeller 
units on ships larger than 10,000 TEUs would require progressively longer engine rooms 
to accommodate such installations. Given the current structural implications it has been 
assumed, in our model, that ultra large containerships are equipped  with a twin-
propeller configuration. Ship owners opting for a twin configuration would  have to be 
assured  that operating costs would more than compensate for higher capital costs. 
Two scenarios were computed . In the cost assessment of containerships exceed ing 
current sizes, the assumptions of Stopford ’ s model were, in a first stage, maintained  and  
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extrapolated  (s1). Subsequently the cost calculation (s2) was repeated  taking into account 
that: 
` By the end of 2005, on the transatlantic trade, the outward capacity utilisation was 
68 % and  the retu rn capacity utilisation was 80 % instead of respectively 80 % and  
90 % (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2005); 
` the average speed  for vessels larger than 4,500 is 21.5 knots rather than 19 knots; 
` the moves per hour/ crane are for the first 3 categories 30 moves/ hour/ crane, for the 
next 3 ship sizes 45 moves/ hour/ crane and  for the remaining sizes 50 
moves/ hour/ crane as the productivity of new cranes improves; 
` the number of cranes increases gradually. In this calculation it is assumed that 4 
cranes will be used  for a 6,500 TEU vessel, 5 cranes for the next two sizes and  up to 6 
cranes for the ultra large container ships (ULCSs); and  
` the capital cost is updated . 
The data, processed  in a standard spreadsheet application, are obtained  from The 
Drewry Annual Container Market Review and  Forecast (DSC, various editions) and  
from interviews with sales managers of top 10 liner carriers. The results of both 
calculations are shown in Figure 7-6. 
 
)LJXUH5HVXOWVRIFRVWFDOFXODWLRQ²
On closer analysis of the results of the first calculation (s1), we notice - not surprisingly - 
that savings are achieved  by using bigger ships. The unit cost per TEU drops from  
16.59 $/ TEU/ day for a 1,200-TEU ship to about 6 $/ TEU/ day for a ship whose carrying 
1,200 TEU single propeller 16.59 15.10
2,600 TEU single propeller 11.06 -33.33% 10.10 -33.11%
4,000 TEU single propeller 9.50 -14.10% 8.34 -17.43%
6,500 TEU single propeller 7.45 -21.58% 6.63 -20.50%
7,500 TEU single propeller 7.20 -3.36% 6.25 -5.73%
8,500 TEU single propeller 7.02 -2.50% 5.97 -4.48%
10,000 TEU single propeller 6.52 -7.12% 5.63 -5.70%
12,500 TEU single propeller 6.02 -7.67% 5.45 -3.20%
10,000 TEU tw in propeller 7.70 6.63
12,500 TEU tw in propeller 6.75 -12.34% 6.04 -8.90%
15,000 TEU tw in propeller 5.97 -11.56% 5.73 -5.13%
18,000 TEU tw in propeller 5.35 -10.39% 5.35 -6.63%
6KLSVL]H 8QLWFRVWSHU7(886'GD\
FDOFXODWLRQ FDOFXODWLRQ
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capacity is ten times bigger (see Figure 7-6). The rationale for this conclusion is that the 
unit cost generally falls as the ship size increases, because capital, operating and cargo 
handling costs - key elements in the economies of scale calculation - do not increase 
proportionally with the capacity. For example, a 12,500-TEU ship only costs twice as 
much as a 5,000-TEU ship, but carries more than two and  a half times as many 
containers. Further increases in vessel size provide only limited  unit cost reductions. 
Once the 7,500-TEU barrier is exceeded , the economies of scale d iminish very rapid ly, 
which is in line w ith the results of the Malacca report (Wijnolst HWDO, 1999). 
 
)LJXUH(FRQRPLHVRIVFDOHFXUYH²V
Graphically, the economies of scale curve relates the unit cost per TEU (USD/ day) on the 
vertical axis to the ship size (TEU) on the horizontal axis (see Figure 7-7). Introducing the 
distinction between single versus tw in-propeller configuration results in a split 
economies of scale curve (see the dotted line in Figure 7-7). 
Comparing the results of the size bracket [10,000 TEUs - 12,500 TEUs] from a cost 
perspective, a liner operator will rather opt for a single-propeller than a twin-propeller 
configuration. It goes w ithout saying a tw in-propeller configuration is more costly 
(initial cost, maintenance, etc.). But then again, it also has some advantages: (a) the 
second  propeller serves as a spare part, (b) increased  manoeuvrability, (c) it economises 
on the number of tug boats, etc. 
In the second scenario (s2), Stopford ’ s assumptions were altered (as above). The results 
are also shown in Figure 7-6 (second  calculation - s2). The conclusion of the adjusted  
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calculation does not d iverge from the conclusion of the first calculation. For the majority 
of  vessel sizes the unit cost per TEU is lower. Again, the cost falls sharply when sizing 
up towards 4,000 TEUs, and  in the larger categories the marginal return levels off. The 
results of both calculations are shown graphically in Figure 7-8.  
 
)LJXUH(FRQRPLHVRIVFDOHFXUYH²V	V
The cost curve of the second  calculation is situated below the curves of the first 
calculation. The marked  full line corresponds with ship sizes fitted  with a single 
propeller (i.e. 1,200 TEUs - 12,500 TEUs), while the marked  dotted  line shows the cost 
curve for ships equipped  with a tw in propeller (i.e. 10,000 TEUs - 18,000 TEUs). The 
black colour illustrates the economies of scale curve of the first calculation (s1), while the 
grey curves show the results of the second  calculation (s2) for both single (marked  full 
line) and twin propeller (marked  dotted  line). By coincidence the latter curve overlaps 
and continues the economies of scale curve of the first calculation (full black line), giving 
the false impression that +12,500-TEU ships will be equipped  with a single propeller. 
Again the curve becomes very flat and  the optimal ship size seems to become very large.  
When looking to minimise costs, a liner operator should  opt for the largest ship  
available. But there is far more than this to take into consideration.  
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First, the determination of optimal ship size is undeniably linked to operational 
occurrence (see Sections 7.3 and 7.4). Secondly, the port-to-port cost saving will only be 
achieved  if the vessel is fully utilised . Poor slot utilisation can have an impact on carriers’ 
revenues and  lead  to lower profitability. 
Furthermore, the deployment of larger ships will also increase an operator’s cost base as 
add itional sales and  marketing staff may have to be employed, particularly if new trades 
are targeted  to provide the additional cargo necessary to load the vessels and  if 
operations are reconfigured .  
Eventually, if the add itional feeder, transhipment and  landside d istribution costs are 
taken into account, the cost per TEU will hypothetically increase for 12,500-TEU, 
15,000-TEU and  18,000-TEU vessels. The shape of the economies of scale curve (see 
Figure 4) is likely to change into a U-shaped  curve (see Figure 7-9). If this proves to be 
the case, the size bracket [10,000 TEU - 12,500 TEU] appears to be the optimum, under 
the assumptions that the carrier operates efficiently and  that there is sufficient volume 
on a particular trade. 
 
)LJXUH,QWHUYDOHVWLPDWLRQRIRSWLPDOVKLSVL]H
This latter assumption cannot be ignored . Returning to the starting point, the cost 
calculation is based  on a transatlantic round-trip  voyage. The long-term prognosis for 
this trade, according to Drewry Shipping Consultants, is not very promising, with 
growth in both d irections forecasted  to be in the 2 % to 2.5 % range for the foreseeable 
future (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2005). Even though a liner operator wants to 
reduce unit costs (i.e. to achieve economies of scale) and  to increase his income (i.e. to 
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gain greater market power), on the transatlantic trade lane smaller ships will be put in 
service compared with the other major line routes (see Section 7.4). Thus features, such 
as demand, space for future volume growth and cargo imbalances also need  to be 
examined .  
Another important issue is the infrastructure needed  at ports to accommodate large 
ships. The trend  toward  increased size of containerships presents challenges not only for 
liner operators, owners, designers and  classification societies… , but especially for 
operational managers. This brings us to a discussion of the impact of vessel scale 
increase on operations. 
 2SWLPDOVKLSRSHUDWLRQV
Optimal ship operations should  be interpreted in a broader sense than ship operational 
management. Optimal operations include:  
` linking economic centres by choosing the right route w ith the best number of port 
calls, taking into account the possibilities of feeder and  hinterland  connections; 
` a reasonable frequency; this should  be interpreted  for the liner operator as e.g. 
offering a weekly fixed-day service with the smallest number of ships employed. 
Setting up a weekly service on the Europe-Far East line will require the deployment 
of 7 to 8 ships; for the Transpacific 5 vessels employed  is sufficient; 
` an efficient agency network; 
` a sufficient number of stevedores provid ing a reliable service; 
` good  logistical support; and 
` acceptable port conditions (i.e. port entry charges - port and  canal dues, frequency 
reduction, pilotage, etc., if applicable, acceptable time-windows, etc.).  
In other words, optimal operations involve all aspects geared towards minimising cost. 
The impact of previously listed  aspects should be integrated  into the outline of costs (e.g. 
the impact of frequency on waiting time cost, inventory cost, etc.) (Witlox & Vandaele, 
2005; Blauwens HWDO., 2006). 
Clearly, the central question regarding optimal ship size cannot be studied  without 
reference to operations. In the decision process liner operators take into account 
potential implications on ports by deploying ever-larger vessels.  
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In the past ports and  terminals have responded  to size increases by making large and  
rapid investments in infrastructure in order to cope with these new vessel sizes. Until 
now they could  provide whatever capacity to ensure that the vessel only stayed in port 
for a brief period . But the movement to the next size echelon has struck terror into the 
hearts of terminal operators (Stopford, 2002). 
Opting for minimisation of the number of port calls (see Section 7.4), container shipping 
alliances, as well as independent lines, put pressure on domestic ports to keep skylines. 
Moreover, the movement towards larger ships confronts the port authorities with a 
number of pressing issues with regard  to investing in stronger tugs; deepening and/ or 
widening approach channels, port and  turning basins; environmental and  regulatory 
constraints; expansion projects; organising traffic (deepsea - shortsea - barges); etc. 
At present, the limiting factor is water depth in ports and navigable waterways. Rumour 
has it that in future the limiting factor will no longer be vessel d raught but rather vessel 
length (i.e. turning circle). An ind ication can be found in the expansion plans of the 
Bremerhaven Basin. Extra limiting factors will be air d raft, bending moment and  torsion 
of the vessel. 
Returning to water depth, the current 14m-scantling design draught of +6,000-TEU ships 
already poses problems. Figure 7-4 shows that since containerisation vessel d raught has 
climbed  gradually from 9m up to 16m. It also clearly shows the changes in design, 
concentrating on length, followed  by beam and design draught. As ships get deeper, a 
number of ports will be faced  with restrictions on their capacity to handle them (e.g. East 
Coast U.S. ports). Figure 7-10 shows draughts of the top 20 container ports and  some 
secondary ports in alphabetical order. Note that the maximum draught should be taken 
with a pinch of salt. In practice the d raught is smaller (i.e. Antwerp: 14m). In addition, 
Figure 7-10 does not take into account the sequence of the port in a loop. The draught 
criterion is maybe less determined  for the fifth port of the loop.  
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)LJXUH'UDXJKWRIFRQWDLQHUSRUWV²
Bearing in mind  that Figure 7-10 is just a snapshot, two scenarios are possible: (a) for 
future ULCS’s the list becomes more limited . This, in its turn, will encourage the further 
development of a selected number of big transhipment hubs for containerships, which 
will cause fierce competition between ports and  terminals w ishing to become one of 
these few gigahubs (i.e. Tanjung Pelepas vs. Singapore); or (b) main ports/ terminals w ill 
remain the focus of large-scale major dredging and  port infrastructure developments to 
cater to them, while other ports/ terminals will need  to focus on niches.  
The latter scenario suggests that port and  terminal operators must take action and, 
moreover, continue to respond  by investing in terminals and in larger ship-to-shore 
handling equipment. Taking into account that the next generation of quay cranes w ith 
their ever greater outreach (± 65m) and  lift capacity will cause higher loads on the 
wheels, quay walls must be stronger, and  this has implications on quay wall 
construction methods, a serious concern for all container ports.  
In add ition to investment decisions about ship-to-shore equipment, terminal operators 
are also confronted  with an increased  quantity of TEU handling, partly due to their 
clients’  enormous growth in tonnage. As their clients grew - in tonnage as well as in 
market power -, terminal operators had to follow, if they wanted to carry on 
independently from any shipping line. Terminal operators have to be extremely cost-
conscious, as the handling rate remains the principal factor for the liner operator when 
selecting a port and an operator. From this point of view, the advent of ever-larger 
container vessels necessitates port decisions regarding the container yard  area, higher 
yard stacking, terminal automation, improved  gate system, reduced  container dwell 
3RUW 'UDXJKW 3RUW 'UDXJKW 3RUW 'UDXJKW
Amsterdam 14m - 15m Hong Kong 12.2m - 15m Rotterdam 10.65m - 13.5m
Antw erp 7,5 - 16,7m Kaoshiung 12m - 15m(*) Seatle 9m - 15m
Bremerhaven 14.6m Laem Chabang 14m Shanghai 9.4m - 12.5m
Busan 11m - 15m Long Beach 11m - 15.2m Shenzhen 6.5m - 14m
Dubai 14m Los Angeles n/ a Singapore 8.9m - 15.3m
Dunkirk 12.5m Marseille 14.5m Tacoma 15.24m
Felixstow e 9.75m - 15m New  York 11m - 13.5m Tanjung Pelepas 15m
Gioia Tauro 12.5m - 14m Port Kelang 10.5m - 13m Tokyo 12m - 15m(**)
Hamburg 14.5m Quingdao 7.2m - 14.5m Zeebruges 15m - 16m
(*) 4 terminals w ith a draught of 12m, 1 of 13m, 14 of 14m and 3 of 15m
(**) >5 terminals w ith a draught of 15m
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times, security and  safety issues, environmental aspects (e.g. the EU-habitat d irective), 
the depth of berth, etc. 
Berth time is an ever more critical aspect. A lot of equipment and  work force are 
required  when such a mega-vessel arrives. Can a terminal handle these ships cost-
effectively? Will the handling cost remain relatively constant? Over time as vessel size 
increased, berth productivity (moves/ vessel/ hour) became ever more important to 
guarantee that vessels could  adhere to their sailing schedule. The operating system 
enabling these high productivities is the so-called  “ d irect stradd le carrier system” . A 
fully automated yard  management and  operation planning system is necessary to exploit 
the potential of the straddle carrier. Terminal operators also need  to consider decisions 
regarding new IT and communication systems, Internet applications, etc. w ith regard to 
this operating system. 
Another question emerges: ‘Is the handling a 12,500-TEU vessel comparable to the 
handling of two 6,000-TEU ones?’  To answer this question, one needs to know what is 
required  to cater to an ULCS or vessels with a nominal capacity in excess of 10,000 TEU. 
Figure 7-11 compares the requirements concerning berth length, depth alongside,…  for 
both ship sizes (revealed  from interviews (2005) and  Rizvi, 2003). 
 
)LJXUH7HUPLQDOUHTXLUHPHQWV
Besides longer/ deeper berth d imensions and  a bigger terminal area, w ider vessels w ill 
require container terminals to invest in longer cranes that can handle +20-container-wide 
vessels. The main aspect is rather the number of gantries (or port cranes used  to load  and  
discharge containers from vessels able to be positioned by moving along rail track) and  
stradd le carriers (or wheeled vehicle designed for loading containers onto or unload ing 
them from a trailer, and  carrying them to and  from a stacking area, Port Glossary) a 
terminal operator must have at its d isposal when a large ship arrives. An excess of 
terminal handling equipment will jeopardise the overall cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, 
practise teaches us that the capacity/ crane is not the constraining factor; it is rather the 
7(8 7(8
berth length 350m 450 m
depth  alongside 14m 15.5 - 16.0m
approach channel depth 14m 18.0-19.0m 
terminal area 16.0 ha per berth 22.5 ha per berth
gantry cranes 40 - 45m  outreach/ 45 cycles per hour 60 - 63m  outreach/ 45 cycles per hour
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systems bringing the containers under the gantry crane that play a key role in the 
productivity of handling a ship. Depending on the clauses stipulated  in the terminal 
contract, 3 to 5 container cranes are used simultaneously for one 6,000-TEU vessel. Up to 
6 cranes have to be put into action to load/ unload  a +12,500-TEU ship . These vessels 
have to be served  in the shortest possible time (typically less than 24 hours, depending 
on the volume of the cargo). At the same time operations on other vessels must not be 
hampered  by a lack of equipment due to the operations on the ULCS. More and faster 
container handling is necessary just to keep up with vessel upsizing; otherwise extended  
port time will destroy the rationale for bigger ships. Thus ship size has a number of 
effects on container operations. 
Whereas the beam, or the number of rows of containers affects the outreach of cranes, 
the length of ships influences the quay length. Given a quay length of 1,000m, two ships 
of 6,000 TEUs can be catered  to at the same time. In future a 12,500-TEU ship and, say a 
6,000-TEU ship can easily be put into action alongside such quay length. Consequently, 
this w ill require a significant increase in productivity of terminals. 
When dimensions and  capacities of the equipment are considered , the impact of the 
ULCS on the terminal is rather minor. Vessel size has no influence on terminal transport 
equipment and  stacking area design. But what about the size of the terminal? The 
parameter ‘size’  is less important, because a containership hard ly unloads all its 
containers in one port. The impact difference between 2 x 6,000-TEU vessel deployment 
and a 12,500-TEU will be determined  by the hinterland  (offtake of the containers) and  
whether or not the terminal is a ded icated  terminal, rather than by the size of the 
terminal. Port operations will not be a bottleneck for their deployment, provided  large 
terminals are called  at. However, it seems likely that hinterland connections are 
becoming a significant factor, as a consequence of the move towards a door-to-door 
transportation system.  
In order to maintain acceptable container line schedules and  to compete successfully 
with smaller container ships, main liner operators are becoming more and  more 
involved  in extended  partnerships w ith terminal operators. The huge scale of investment 
required  for container handling operations favours these closer relationships. Besides 
infrastructure, operational managers are confronted with other issues, such as: 
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` the lobby of environmental groups against competitiveness and  growth of large 
terminals; 
` the containership loading problem; 
` lack of qualified people; 
` 24/ 5 or 24/ 7 availability of the customs office depending on the country; 
` hinterland  transportation operations; and  
` direct service versus the trend  towards hub-and-spoke operations. A hub is the 
central transhipment point in a transport structure, to which traffic from many ports 
is d irected and  from where traffic is fed to other areas/ ports (referred as spokes). 
Given the growing importance of transhipment, 12,000 TEU capacity will most likely 
be deployed between hubs. Note that the trend towards hub-and-spoke operations is 
located  in the East-West trade, and  less in the North-South trade. Moreover, it does 
not exist in the African trade. 
Until now the trend in the East-West Transpacific trade has been to call d irect at as many 
ports as possible in different loops. In Europe the biggest ships generally call at two or 
three Mediterranean ports and around  four in the North-West of the continent. The 
advantages are threefold , keeping transit times and  roundtrips as short as possible, 
limiting expensive feeder operations only to outports and finally, allowing the shipper 
the advantage of d irect port calls. As ship size continues to increase, various studies 
(Cullinane HWDO, 2000; Rijsenbrij, 2001; Ham, 2004) forecast that liner shipping companies 
in search of cost reduction and  faster transit times w ill reduce the number of port calls in 
favour hub-and-spoke global networks, w ith mother and  feeder services integrated  to 
serve the container trade. This upsizing movement in the main trades creates a 
corresponding increase in both number and  size of feeder vessels. This cascad ing effect 
is probably the most important application of scale economies in the container business 
(Stopford, 2004). However, other questions arise: w ill the lower slot cost outweigh the 
higher feeder cost for ships above 10,000 TEUs? Have we already reached  the point at 
which additional feeder and  inventory costs outweigh any further savings in slot costs 
on main line vessels? Tariffs diverge strongly, depending on the destination variables 
such as distance, degree of competition, expensive/ cheap ports and  surcharges like 
bunkering ad justment factor (BAF), International Ship and  Port Security (ISPS),…  One 
thing is certain: what matters is the total cost of the network. 
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Finally, the logistics of the container flow itself will become more important. Are these 
flows large enough to maintain container-shipping services with very large ships w ith a 
reasonable frequency, knowing that each container transported  requires two others, one 
in the port of origin and one in the port of destination? 
 7KHOLQNEHWZHHQVKLSVL]HDQGRSHUDWLRQV
It is obvious that ship  size and operations are linked , but to what extent? After 
expounding the experience of the sector through interviews, considering the cost price of 
bigger vessels - chartered  or owned  - and taking into account the operational process, 
cost-effectiveness will probably not increase by deploying such ships. There are three 
arguments to consider: 
First, various stud ies (Cullinane HWDO, 1999; Ham, 2004) state that larger ships will have 
access to fewer ports due to the limited draught of the ports (see Section 7.3). The 
number of port calls by the post-Panamax vessel will be reduced as long as the 
add itional costs for feeder and  intermodal connections are lower than the savings from 
fewer port calls. However, currently this is hardly the case for ship sizes up to 9,700 
TEUs calling at North European ports. For example, an analysis of the CMA CGM’s 
French Asia Line (FAL) tells us that in 2006 this liner operator gradually replaced  the 
6,500-TEU ships by new ships w ith a capacity of 8,450 TEUs with the same port rotation 
(Shanghai, Ningbo, Yantian, Hong Kong, Port Kelang, Suez, before calling at Malta and 
continuing to Le Havre, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Zeebrugge and Southampton) (see Figure 
12) (Compagnie Maritime d'Affrètement - Compagnie Générale Maritime abbreviates to 
CMA CGM). Starting of July 2007, the number of port calls in this service increased  (+4).  
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)LJXUH2YHUYLHZ)UHQFK$VLD/LQH)$/
Since August 2006, 8 vessels of 9,400-9,600-TEU capacity have been deployed  on the Far 
East liner service (FAL2) with the liner operator China Shipping Container Line (CSCL). 
The port rotation is Ningbo, Shanghai, Yantian, Hong Kong, Port Kelang, Le Havre, 
Rotterdam, Hamburg, Zeebrugge, Port Kelang and  back to Ningbo. With the launch of 
the FAL2 Malta (12m average draught ), Southampton (with a 12.6m channel depth ) and  
the ports in the Arabic Gulf were excluded  from this rotation. Under the denominator of 
provid ing optimum port coverage, FAL 4 (July 2008) and  FAL 5 (October 2009 - 11,000 
TEUs) are added  to the existing FAL network, linking Asia and  Europe (FAL1, FAL 2 & 
FAL3). The launch of the new service, FAL5 will coincide with the process of 
enlargement, since CMA CGM will in the same year take entities of 11,000 TEUs into 
service. 
Knowing that on the world ’s densest maritime routes nearly all main ports are 
considering expansion plans, we assume that for the deployment of + 10,000-TEU ships a 
revision of major loops will result in a reduction in the number of port calls. This trend  
by no means complies with the preferences of shippers who favour more ports, more 
routes, shorter transits, greater frequency and  all this with a lower freight rate. 
Economies of scale are the d riving force behind the trend of containerships calling at a 
limited number of big ports. This policy will, therefore, increase transhipment costs as 
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well as the risk of longer transit time for containers that have to be transhipped  and  
relayed, whether by feeder vessel or overland . But how long will carriers be able to 
follow  a strategy of restricting the number of entry ports into Europe to provide 
opportunity for consolidated  freight flows? And what about the impact on service 
levels? Or are shippers pleased  with a lower freight rate for slow moving containers? 
Second , not all terminals are ded icated terminals. To unload  such large ships three to 
five gantry cranes are required . Dedicated  terminals w ill organise the process of 
unloading so that a ship can leave the port as quickly as possible. But will other 
terminals have the same strategy? Will they only concentrate on the big ships or not? 
Third , containerships with higher container capacities have to sail at higher speeds than 
those w ith lower capacity, because they need  more port time. This is the reason why ship  
speed is of such enormous importance to large container ships. An hour’ s time loss in 
port would  require on average a four-knot increase in transit speed  to meet the 
scheduled  arrival time. The very large single-propeller containerships cannot reach the 
required  service speed  with their current main engines. Large ships, certainly those 
above 12,000 TEUs, will need tw in propellers, and this will logically increase 
maintenance and  fuel consumption. Fuel consumption rises exponentially with 
increased speed . A rule of thumb: a 10 % increase in speed  results in about a 30 % 
increase in fuel consumption (www.prads2004.de). 
Furthermore, there are financial implications. A ship with a capacity of 10,000 TEUs only 
has a reduced  slot cost w ith the assumption that the capacity is fully utilised . It is clear 
that these ships will be deployed  on the Far East trade (Far East - Europe route and  Far 
East - USA route). Knowing that to exploit a route on the Far East, a liner operator needs 
seven to eight ships for a weekly service and the capital cost of a 10,000-TEU ship  is 
about US$ 130 million (end  2005), it is quite obvious that only the main liner operators 
will be able to finance such ships. 
Nor can the load ing problem be ignored. A liner operator cannot operate a loop with one 
load ing port and  one discharging port. If this were the case, a weekly service would be 
impossible because the presence of more than one ship at the terminal would hinder 
operational speed . Imagine a loop with three loading ports and three d ischarging ports. 
Will it be possible to load a ship w ith a huge number of containers in each load ing port 
and to discharge the containers in the right d ischarging port without repositioning 
In search of the link between ship  size and  operations 7-221 
 
 
containers on the ship or by way of the quay? And what will be the projected  cost of 
repositioning? Moreover, how will a liner operator fill ULCS not once but with a 
reasonable frequency, preferably weekly? And will the ship in that first d ischarging port 
be expected  to take in add itional cargo for the next destination in order to keep it at full 
charging capacity?  
These arguments confirm the link between ship size and  operations and  confirm that 
ship  size influences operations, creating diseconomies of scale (e.g. increased cost of 
transhipment,… ). It is obvious that (optimal) ship  size goes hand in hand  with (optimal) 
operations. This brings us to the question ‘Is there an optimal ship size?’  
Until the mid-80s, size was limited by the d imensional constraints of the Panama Canal 
(length 294 m and  wid th 32 m), which strongly influenced the development in 
containership size. For a long time the market levelled  off at the maximum ship size of 
4,500 TEUs. This was undoubtedly the reason why this was labelled  as ‘optimal ship 
size’  for more than a decade. Note, due to technological reconfiguration, the capacity of 
new Panamax vessels is pushed  above 4,500 TEU - the so-called  high capacity Panamax 
vessels. In future the planned  expansion of the Panama locks will definitely cause 
another revolution in the global liner shipping industry and eliminate the distinction 
between Panamax and wider-than-Panamax vessels. 
The 2003-2006 ordering craze has fuelled  speculations on future ship  size. CEOs of big 
carriers give d ifferent statements. CMA CGM ind icates 9,500 TEUs as the optimal ship 
size. According to them deploying such ships is the best strategy without reducing the 
number of ports (www.cmacgm.com). This trend  towards ever-larger vessels is not 
followed  by all top 25-carriers. APL, CSAV/ Norasia, PIL, Wan Hai and  ZIM do not (yet) 
have ships larger than 7,500-TEU vessels on order. Will this be the optimal strategy or 
will they jump immediately towards +10,000-TEU vessels?  
Clearly ‘the’  optimal ship size does not exist. It evolves w ith WUDQVSRUWVHJPHQW (deep-
sea vs. short-sea shipping (SSS)), WHUPLQDO FRQFHSW WUDGH ODQH and  WHFKQRORJ\. These 
parameters - or four T’s - are taken into account. First, a distinction is made between 
terminals which operate solely as transhipment hubs (e.g. Gioia Tauro, Algéciras,… ) and 
other terminals, where hinterland throughput plays an important role (e.g. Antwerp, 
Rotterdam, Hamburg,… ). Hub terminals w ill be marked  by operational activities 
focused  on the quayside area, whereas other terminals will focus more on backyard  area 
7-222 In search of the link between ship  size and  operations 
 
 
or even both. Second, the determination of optimal ship size cannot be studied  
separately from a trade route (volume, port accessibility). Container business covers a 
spectrum of different trades. There are about 1,500 liner routes. The industry d ivides the 
trade routes into three groups: East-West trades, North-South trades and  intraregional 
cargo. The d ifferent routes are marked by a d ifferent volume and  therefore the global 
liner operator requires a portfolio of different ship sizes. Ultimately, as larger ships enter 
the market, a shift towards these ships can be expected , as they are more cost-effective 
with reference to the routes. 
Figure 7-13 gives an overview of the optimal ship size w ith the parameters of transport 
segment, type of terminal, trade lane, and  phasing-up of larger ships. This overview  is 
based on the results of section 7.2.2 and  on extrapolation of the demand, cost and  
technology parameters. At present neither 15,000-TEU nor 18,000-TEU ships have been 
built, but for the purpose of the present study we are already simulating the 
consequences of their existence. Since preparations to widen the Suez Canal have 
already begun, the arrival of those ships in the next 10 years is a serious possibility. 
Undoubted ly, this ship size will be the minority in the fleet portfolio of the main liner 
operators.  
 
)LJXUH2SWLPDOVKLSVL]HOLQNHGWRRSWLPDORSHUDWLRQV
Assuming that the main liner companies w ill continue to invest in larger tonnage, the 
size of a typical container ship on the (XURSH$VLDtrade lane will shift first towards vessel 
sizes varying between 7,500 TEUs and  12,500 TEUs. Within the portfolio of the fleet, one 
expects that the number of vessels varying between 7,500 - 9,500 TEUs will form the 
majority (read : be the optimal ship size segment). The vessels w ill be powered  by a 
single propeller and  will offer operators, compared  to a 4,500-TEU ship, potential cost 
savings of about 35 % (see Section 7.2). It is likely that the upcoming giant container 
ships w ill be single-propeller vessels. Due to economic reasons twin-propeller vessels are 
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currently not competitive (i.e. increased  maintenance, fuel consumption,… ). By 2012 the 
largest ships on the Europe/ Asia/ Europe and  the transpacific trade lanes will be 15,000-
TEU twin-propeller, rising to 18,000 TEUs. Few vessels of the future Panamax size, 
which will be able to load at least 22 containers across the weather deck, w ill enter 
service during the latter part of this decade, once the ports/ terminals operating 
companies have made the necessary investments in new equipment (cranes,… ), berths, 
etc. to handle them. Ever-larger vessels w ill most likely constitute a minority w ithin the 
fleet portfolio.  
The optimal ship size w ill be found around 12,500-TEU capacity. This vessel does not 
only offer economies of scale, but also environmental benefits (reduced emissions, 
improved fuel consumption, etc.). In the long run, optimal ship size will probably shift 
towards the 12,500-15,000-TEU segment, taking into account the expected  growth of 
China and India. The same trend  is expected for the WUDQVSDFLILFWUDGH. The last main trade, 
though not the least important, is the Intra-Asia trade. The smaller ports in this region 
are fed  with vessels up to a capacity of 1,500 TEUs. Given the increased  volume, optimal 
ship size will gradually increase. A noticeable trend  is the takeover of this trade by the 
main liner operators. Recently two feeder operators have filed  a petition of bankruptcy.  
The WUDQVDWODQWLF WUDGH is quite another story. Most of the reflections concerning future 
seaport development depend heavily on estimations of future demand for freight 
transport, a major element. Generally, the demand is expected  to grow continuously. 
But, as cargo volumes on the transatlantic route evolve at a slower pace and  no real 
durable growth margin is noticeable, the optimal ship size is currently situated  in the 
range between 3,000 - 5,500 TEUs, accord ing to the deployed ship sizes. In line w ith the 
trend on the other two major trade lanes and  under the assumption of sufficient volume, 
the optimal ship size for the transatlantic route is expected  to be located  in the 4,500-
6,500-TEU segment by 2012.  
Other trades will be served  with smaller ship sizes. The main constraints here are trade 
volume and  port accessibility. On the 1RUWK6RXWKURXWHV, the optimal ship size today is 
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about 3,000 TEUs. Hamburg Süd, a major player on these routes, started deploying ships 
with a capacity of 5,500 TEUs. According to them this capacity is the op timal ship size 
for this trade, taking into account the volume of trade and especially the accessibility of 
ports in South America. These ‘true giants’  (e.g. the Monte Rosa, a 5,500-TEU container 
freighter with the largest reefer capacity) represent the beginning of a new era for the 
South American trade. +10,000-TEU freighters cannot/ will not be handled  in, for 
instance, South American ports. Ports on the North-South trade lanes are advised  not to 
invest in large facilities. These ports are facing pressure to upgrade, as vessel sizes on 
these routes are also growing due to a cascade effect. The optimal ship size will steadily 
rise to 4,500 TEUs followed by a shift to the 5,500-6,500-TEU segment after 2012.  
The capacity of a terminal solely operating as a hub port needs to evolve hand  in hand  
with the growth of container ship size. Here the feeder network gains importance. 
Consequently the focus of the optimal ship size in deep-sea operations will shift towards 
the optimal ship size in short sea operations (SSS or Short Sea Shipping). 
The existing range of vessels deployed  on the LQWUDUHJLRQDOURXWHV d iverges between 1,000 
TEUs and 3,500 TEUs. Here the optimal ship size is expected  to increase repeatedly with 
+1,500 TEUs largely due to the cascad ing effect, but also because of the development of 
hub-and-spoke systems (see Section 3).  
 &RQFOXVLRQV
The liner shipping industry is an increasingly important and attractive transport market 
segment. Nowadays this industry is marked  by (increased) containerisation, 
globalisation, consolidation, deregulation, rationalisation and (intensified) competition. 
These have rad ically changed  the liner shipping industry and  helped  to fuel progress 
towards larger ships. 
The central question of this paper was to analyse the link between ship size and  
container operations.  
Firstly this paper dealt w ith the question of the driving variables behind  the growth in 
size of the containership . Evidently, the deployment of the new generation of container 
vessels is largely due to economies of scale which are based  on the assumption that a 
good  utilisation of the larger vessels can be achieved . Scale economies have been - and  
will continue to be - the driving force behind the deployment of larger container vessels. 
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Neither the desire to maximise profit nor the impact of the other variables can be 
ignored . 
Secondly, the economic analysis of the concept of ‘optimal containership size’  was 
stud ied, allowing the following conclusions to be drawn: 
` the economies of scale curve is rather a split curve (single propeller vs. tw in 
propeller); 
` for a long time the market levelled off at the maximum/ optimal ship  size of 4,500 
TEUs, while nowadays a shift of the optimal ship size towards larger vessel scale is 
noticeable: economies of scale still exist for +8,000 TEUs (see Figure 7-7 – Section 7.2); 
` the operating cost (especially feeder cost) and  the landside d istribution costs should  
be integrated in the cost model; and 
` consequently, the split economies of scale curve will likely turn into a U-shaped  
curve. 
Third ly the size of the future post-Panamax ships challenges not only the liner shipping 
companies, but also the ports and  terminals businesses. Ports and  terminals have 
responded  and  still respond  to size increases by making large investment plans. This is 
the case because the main limiting factor is the water depth in ports and navigable 
waterways besides the length of the vessel, the aird raft, etc. Furthermore it is quite 
obvious that the operation of bigger vessels raises terminal, intermodal and  commercial 
issues.  
Finally throughout this paper it has become clear that (optimal) ship size and (optimal) 
operations cannot be stud ied  separately. Both concepts develop hand  in hand . It has 
been shown that the determination of the optimal ship size in relation to operations 
depends on 7ransport segment; 7erminal type; 7rade lane and 7echnology. 
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&KDSWHU
 6\QRSVLVRIWKHUHVHDUFK
The present thesis has employed  both Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) tests and  
‘New Empirical Industrial organisation’  (NEIO) models to assess the competition, the 
concentration and  the market structure of the container liner shipping industry. Next to 
these two static methodological frameworks for empirical IO, a dynamic view of 
competition, known as the ‘Persistence of Profit’  (PoP) approach, has also been applied.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part compares  the results of the research 
on the level of competition. The second  part offers some critical reflections and suggests 
some d irections for further research.  
 %LODWHUDOFRPSDULVRQRIWKHGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKHV
This section compares the outcomes of the d ifferent approaches. Section 8.1.1 discusses 
and compares the results of the structural (i.e. concentration measurements) and non-
structural (i.e. Panzar Rosse model) approaches in order to determine the degree of 
concentration and  its d irect link to the market structure. Regard ing the change in 
competition intensity, the Section 8.1.2 investigates whether the results of the instability 
index equate with the ou tcomes of the Boone ind icator. The last subsection examines and  
discusses the coherence between the HHI and  the Boone ind icator.  
The comparison is limited  to the results at industry level. Because of a lack of sufficient 
disaggregated  data, a comprehensive analysis of competition at trade level using NEIO 
models was not possible. Since the study could  benefit from longer time-series, the 
coherence between the d ifferent indicators should  be interpreted with caution.  
 'HJUHHRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
Market structure refers to the number and  d istribution of firms in a market. Observing 
the number of liner operators can be an first ind ication of how competitive the container 
liner shipping industry (hereafter CLSI)  is. 
Another approach to measuring the degree of competition is to focus on the level of 
concentration of the industry. A common measure of market structure is the n-firm 
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concentration ratio, described  by the cumulative distribution of market shares. For the 
present research, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) has been calculated . One 
critique of the CR4-concentration ratio is that it fails to take into account the distribution 
of market share across all firms in an industry. Since, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) does not share this weakness, this measure, which a more comprehensive and  
revealing measure of industry concentration, is also computed  for the CLSI. The lower 
the HHI, the more competitive the market, and  under perfect competition the HHI 
approaches zero. However, the HHI ignores a number of factors that contribute to the 
potential exercise of market power, such as demand conditions, strategic behaviour, and 
overcapacity. Nonetheless, both ind ices139 are effective as a primary screening tool in the 
long-run (see Chapters 2 and 3). Furthermore, these measurements of concentration are 
used  by policy makers (i.e. Department of Justice140, Federal Trade Commission141 and 
European Community) as market concentration is a useful ind icator of the likely 
potential competitive effect of a merger.  
Accord ing to Shepherd  (1999), a CR4 of 40 % (the top four firms have ind ividual market 
shares averaging less than 10 %) serves as a benchmark for an oligopolistic market. If one 
accepts this cut-off, the market structure of the CLSI would  be labelled as monopolistic 
competition up to 2007. Since 2007, the CR4 has exceeded  40 %, and  as a consequence the 
level of competition has d ropped and the CLSI can be classified  as an oligopoly (see 
Chapters 2 and  3).  
Next, given that the CR4 and  the HHI are concentration ind ices in the trad ition of the 
SCP-approach, the criticism leveled  against the SCP approach (see Lipczynski HWDO, 2005, 
pp. 14-16) and  the cut-off of 40 %, which can be challenged  (i.e. the delineation may vary 
by industry), in accordance w ith the NEIO literature, the Panzar-Rosse approach is used  
to verify the outcome. This non-structural estimation technique allows a more accurate 
distinction between oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive and  perfectly competitive 
markets (see Chapter 4). Unlike the SCP-approaches, which depend on concentration to 
                                                     
139
  Other ind icators could  have been used  to measure competition. For further explanation see Lipczynski öd÷
øHù ú
, 2005, and  Bikker & Haaf, 2000. 
140
  For instance, in measuring market concentration, the current United  States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
guidelines apply the HHI in assessing whether a merger is likely to lessen competition. The DOJ may 
attempt to block mergers in markets in which the HHI exceeds 1,800. The soon to be revised  guidelines 
w ill still rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (www .ftc.gov/ bc/ docs/ horizmer.htm). 
141
  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses both the CR and  the HHI to assess the extent to which a 
p roposed  merger will affect competition in an industry. 
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measure competition, the calculation of the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic is based  on 
factor input prices. 
The results show that the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic is a significantly positive unscaled  
value. It means that the hypothesis can be rejected that the containerised liner shipping 
industry market structure corresponds with a neoclassical monopolist, collusive 
oligopolist or conjectural-variations short-run oligopolist. In other words, a significantly 
positive unscaled  value of H is inconsistent with any form of monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly, but under certain conditions, it is consistent with monopolistic competition.  
To sum up, the SCP-tests and  the NEIO model match for the 1999-2008 sample period. 
The NEIO model is arguably preferred  over the previously available alternatives for 
both theoretical and  empirical reasons. For instance, when calculating the concentration 
indices, the definition of the relevant market presents a notorious problem. The latter 
does not go to the Panzar Rosse model. But then, data on input factor prices are often not 
available. The matching results allow to fall back on the concentration indices as a 
screening tool for the degree of competition. 
 'HJUHHRIFRPSHWLWLRQ
The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic makes it possible to exclude certain states of competition, 
but an increase must not be unambiguously interpreted  as evidence of more 
competition. In this section, the results on how competition evolves over time are 
compared .  
Starting from the result of the SPC-tests, both the absolute concentration indicators as 
well as the number equivalent (see Chapter 3) point to similar outcomes: the 
containerised  shipping industry is characterised by increasing concentration. Other 
measures of market concentration has been used  to detect the change and  pace of 
concentration over time. As far as the change of concentration is concerned , the Lorenz 
curve indicates a trend  of growing concentration. The results of the Gini coefficient, 
which value the pace of concentration, suggest yet again, a higher market concentration 
as well as a likely deceleration of concentration.  
Trad itional concentration measurements have the d isadvantage of failing to take into 
consideration strategic behavioural incentives of firms. In add ition, evidence from the 
literature suggests that aggregate concentration measurements are not a sufficient 
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indicator of competitive behaviour, because the ind icators of concentration can mask the 
dynamics of change within industries (i.e. concentration may also be due to 
consolidation forced  by severe competition). Therefore, an indicator that measures WKH
PDJQLWXGH RI WKH FKDQJHV LQ WKHPDUNHW VKDUHV in an industry was firstly computed  
both at industry level and  at trade level (see Chapters 2 and 3). The result ind icates that 
the container liner shipping industry is characterised  by a relatively stable competition 
and suggests a nonlinear relationship between concentration and  market share 
instability.  
Secondly, the HHI has been increasing till the year 2007 (see Figure 8-1). However, it 
never exceeded  the value of 1,000. Accord ing to the theory, the latter suggests a 
competitive market. But, Boone (2000 and  2004), Griffith HWDO (2005), Creusen HWDO (2004 
and 2006) and  van Leuvensteijn HW DO (2007) state that the HHI fails as a reliable 
competition indicator since its relation with competition is not always straightforward. 
Competition can be intensified in two ways: (i) more firms in a market as a consequence 
of a fall in entry barriers and (ii) more aggressive conduct by incumbent firms. Analysis 
of the effects of both these ways of intensifying competition on the HHI explains why a 
widely applied  measure such as the HHI is less efficient. Regard ing the first way, the 
standard  intuition of the HHI is based on a Cournot model with symmetric firms. A fall 
in entry barriers is an exogenous shock that intensifies competition and  consequently 
lowers the HHI. The effect is correctly measured  by the HHI. The problem with the HHI 
as an ind icator of competition concerns the second  way. More aggressive behaviour by 
established firms may force inefficient firms out of the market (selection effect of 
competition). This increase in concentration incorrectly indicates a decrease in 
competition. Boone (2000 and 2004) suggests an alternative measure, based on relative 
profits, which is monotone in competition both when competition becomes more intense 
through a fall in entry barriers and  when there is more aggressive interaction between 
firms. 
After correcting for industry-specific effects (i.e. number of services, average ship size), 
the %RRQH LQGLFDWRU suggest that over the 2000-2008 period the competition had  
(slightly) intensified . In detail, the period before 2006 suggests intensified competition. 
The subsequent years point at a weakening of competition. The turning point coincides 
with the year when CR4 exceeds 40 % (see Chapters 2 and  3). 
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Since concentration measurements yield  ambiguous measures, the Boone ind icator is 
preferred  to establish how competition involves over time. 
 5HODWLRQEHWZHHQWKH%RRQHLQGLFDWRUDQGWKH++,
This section focuses on the relation between the Boone indicator and  the HHI. It also 
briefly elaborates on the differences in underlying economic determinants (Boone, 2000 
and 2004, and  Creusen HWDO2006).  
The relation between the Boone indicator (right-hand  axis) and  the HHI (left-hand  axis) 
is p lotted  in Figure 8-1. In the bilateral comparison, the HHI and  the Boone ind icator 
contrad ict each other on the d irection of change in competition at the industry level. On 
the one hand, the Boone ind icator suggests intensified  competition over the 2000-2008 
sample period. On the other hand , following the traditional interpretation, the HHI 
increased over the same period . In general, increases in the HHI indicate a gain of 
market power and a decrease in competition, while decreases imply the opposite.  
 
)LJXUH5HODWLRQVKLS++,²%RRQHLQGLFDWRU
However, according to the theory, a negative relationship between the Boone ind icator 
and the HHI is expected . Two analyses test the relationship between both variables. 
Given the sample period , one must remain cau tious about strong inferences from the 
correlation coefficient and  results of the simple regression. 
,,/  >  ,,/ >  
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First, the correlation between both variables is calculated . The two ind icators should be 
negatively correlated in order to agree on the d irection of the change of competition. 
Comparing the change of the estimates of the Boone ind icator w ith the change of the 
HHI statistic (in terms of percentage), both variables are correlated (Pearson correlation) 
with a coefficient of 0.1828, which is statistically insignificant.  
Secondly, Figure 8-2 relates the change of the estimates of the Boone ind icator to the 
change of the HHI statistic (both in terms of percentage) over the period  2000-2008. The 
plot indicates a weakly positive relationship. The outlier corresponds with the year 2006. 
Again the impact of the merger of Royal P&O Nedlloyd  and  Maersk Sealand  is 
observable. Discard ing the observation of 2006, the relationship between both variables 
turns negative.  
 
)LJXUH&KDQJH++,YHUVXVFKDQJH%RRQHLQGLFDWRU
Next, the conceptual difference between the competition measurements is analysed from 
a theoretical point of view. A first explanation for the poor coherence might be found in 
the fact that the Boone ind icator and  the HHI enclose d ifferent information, which may 
lead to contrad ictory changes in competition. Secondly, the observed  d ifferences in 
competition development between the ind icators at the industry level can to a degree be 
traced back to differences in their economic concepts. For instance, a reduction of the 
coherence between the indicators and  the change in competition may be due to more 
dispersion in efficiency among firms (Creusen HWDO, 2006). The latter might be the case in 
the CLSI (see Chapter 6). Another explanation for an opposite direction of change in 


,,/
2006
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competition might be found  in the cost reducing objective of liner operators by 
deploying larger vessels (see Chapter 7). This objective has a non-monotone impact on 
the HHI, but raises the Boone indicator. Last, if aggressive conduct affects in any way the 
market shares of inefficient firms (reallocation effect), this effect may bias the HHI 
(Boone, 2000; Griffith HWDO2005). At the level of the industry, aggressive conduct is not 
directly observable.  
Given that the change in the concentration ind icator for the CLSI is positive, Figure 8-3 
summarises the impact of underlying determinants across the ind icators (compiled from 
Creusen HWDO, 2006).  
 
)LJXUH(FRQRPLFLPSOLFDWLRQV
The change in the Boone indicator is positive in the 2003-2005 period . Accord ing to 
Creusen HW DO (2006), the change in competition might be caused by more strategic 
interaction and / or more product substitutability (i.e. more liner carriers offering more 
services to the Far East).  
In contrast, the subsequent two years point to a weakening in competition. Then, the 
explanation could  be found in less entry. The latter find ing is easily linked  with the 
results of the modelling of both actual and  potential entry. Chapter 6 applies the 
growing persistence of profits literature, an approach beyond the SCP tests and  NEIO 
models. The persistence of profit approach is based  on empirical investigation of the 
dynamics of ÀUP-level proÀWV7KHPDLQFRQFOXVLRQLs that the quick erosion of the short-
run persistence indicates the existence of entry but the fact that some liner operators do 
earn long-run rents implies that barriers to entry and exit do exist. A study of the 
Belgian-Ind ia trade confirms this find ing and finds that the extent of the barriers to entry 
is moderate. 
For the year 2008, the change in the Boone ind icator is again positive, while the 
concentration ratio is slightly decreasing. More entry is the economic implication when 
the change in the Boone indicator is positive (efficiency more rewarded) (see Figure 8-3). 
ûü"ý+þß  þ	
     +þ {ý 
in tensifying competition is caused by
- more strategic in teraction
- more product substitu tability
w eakening competition is caused by
- less entry, due to h igher fixed costs (more emphasis on scale economies)
ûﬀü"ý+þß  þ

xþ 
 þﬀ {ýﬁﬂ
ûﬀü"ý+þß  þﬃxþﬃ xþﬀ ﬂý  xþ þﬀ {ýﬁﬂ! 	
" ﬁ # 
positive 
(efficiency more rew arded)
negative 
(efficiency less rew arded)
Synopsis of the research 8-235 
 
 
Since end  2009, this phenomenon is observable. New competitors (e.g. MBG Shipping142, 
December 2009; The Containership Company, April 2010; Cyprus-registered  Rasiacon, 
July 2010; Hainan Pan Ocean, Aug. 2010) seek new opportunities. These new ventures 
are helped  by the market conditions, which enable them to pick up the vessels and  
containers at highly competitive daily charter/ rental rates. This might announce the start 
of a new period  with more competition. If so, the policy change searched for by shippers 
with the objective of intensifying competition (i.e. abolishment of block exemption) w ill 
be achieved .  
Further research is needed  to understand  the effect of the policy change, the financial 
and economic downturn as well as the recent new  ventures.  
 &ULWLFDOUHIOHFWLRQDQGIXWXUHUHVHDUFK
In the light of a policy reflection, this study is especially relevant. It aims to put forward 
an overall p icture of the concentration-competition-profit relationship in the container 
division. Hence, it contains to understand  the effects of competition and efficiency on the 
liner operators’  behaviour.  
Secondly, the results suggest that regulators should focus on the trade level since the 
effects are more clearly identified  when working at the disaggregated  level than at 
aggregated industry level (see Chapter 3). Trade lanes labelled  ‘unconcentrated ’  do not 
in general require further analyses from a policy perspective. Conversely, antitrust 
authorities need  to establish whether, in the case of a new merger, competition is 
threatened. The service portfolio of the shipping companies involved in merger and  
acquisition transactions may require further action. 
Third ly, given that competition measurements act as barometers only and in view of 
theoretical and statistical shortcomings of all applied  competition ind icators, it is advised  
to use more than one indicator to obtain an accurate impression of competition in the 
containerised  liner shipp ing industry.  
In add ition, the study may serve as a benchmark when monitoring and evaluating the 
effects of changes in competition due to mergers and  acquisition, policy changes, the 
global crisis as well as new entries and  exits. For instance, a competition ind icator such 
as the Boone ind icator is interesting for policy makers who want to enhance competition 
                                                     
142
  January 2010, MBG Shipping failed  and  exited  the market. 
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or for regulators to find  out whether competition indeed increases over time after a 
policy change (see Chapter 5).  
Regard ing future research, monitoring and  evaluating the effect of changes in 
competition is a first d irection for future research. In add ition, further research is needed  
to check whether the results also stand for a longer sample period . A critical reflection 
might concern the short time horizon of the research. In general, the containerised  liner 
shipping industry suffers from a lack of long time-series data. 
Another topic for future research is a similar analysis for other shipping segments (i.e. 
tanker, bulk, roll on/ roll of, as well as terminal operations)143 or other transport modes. 
The results of the study should  also encourage future empirical studies in the 
containerised  liner shipping industry to avoid  assumptions regard ing the market 
structure and  the loose use of the terms ‘liner shipping industry’  and ‘containerised  liner 
shipping industry’ . 
A challenge for future economic research concerns the data (sources). Liner carriers, 
government institu tions, maritime consultancy bureaus, etc. should  be encouraged  to 
avoid  changes and  cutback in data. More data would  allow  enlarging the sample period 
and the sample of liner operators. As a consequence, it would  also make it possible to 
compare results over time, to estimate the marginal cost instead  of approximating it (see 
Chapter 5), to examine whether the ‘persistence of profits’  would  persist as well as to 
identify the determinants of the speed  of profit ad justment (see Chapter 6).  
More detailed information at trade level would help to better delineate the relevant 
market. The future repetition of the analysis in chapters 4, 5 and  6 would  allow to model 
the non-structural approaches at trade level. To date, the research has been confronted  
with the limits of analysing firm-level data at trade level. 
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*ORVVDU\
 $%'&
 (liner operator) Atlantic Container Line 
$)(*+ﬁ, ,.-/102*ﬃ34-/"56	7
  cover the supplementary 
increase in charges – such as terminal hand ling 
charges, demurrage costs, change of destination, 
special equipment and  charges based  on the 
nature of the cargo (dangerous, noxious, 
refrigerated  etc.), …  – that are triggered  by or 
linked  with the operation of moving containers, 
i.e. they are ancillary to the service provided  by 
liner operators 
$89&
 (liner operator) ANL Container Line 
$8:<;9&
 (liner operator) Australia New Zealand 
Direct Line 
$=4&
 (liner operator) American President Lines 
$?>6/-56@*A7!B
 (variable) the ratio of total cost to 
output 
$DCFE
 (liner operator) Andrew  Weir Shipping 
G
$H
 (surcharge) Bunkering Adjustment Factor, 
used  to compensate for fluctuating fuel costs. 
G
-/!/!+ﬁ6/IB1A26J+ B K
or any cost incurred  by an 
incumbent wishing to exit from an industry
G
-/!/!+ﬁ6/"7'B1AL6	(BM/10 K
 or any factor which makes the 
average cost of a wou ld-be entrant higher than 
that of an incumbent or which impedes entry in 
any other way 
GN
&
* A bill of lad ing is a shipping document by 
which the master of a ship  acknowledges having 
received  in good order and cond ition (or the 
reverse) certain specified  goods consigned  to him 
by some particular shipper and  binds himself to 
deliver them in similar conditions to the 
consignees of the shipper at the point of loading
%O$H
(surcharge) Currency Adjustment Factor 
%D-/1/"+M6/'34-P4,ﬁ-	56
’  or liner’ s haulage is understood 
the inland  transport service which is performed 
by the sea-carrier under the terms and  conditions 
of the tariff and  of the relevant transport 
document.  
%D%'89Q
 (liner operator) Compania Chilena de 
Navegación 
%DRS%
(liner operator) Clipper Elite Carriers Lines 
%O3S+ﬁTSAU, V4/AUW
 (liner operator) Chinese-Polish Joint 
Stock Shipping Company 
%DXZY[
 (alliance) Coscon, Hanjin, K-line, Yang 
Ming 
%'&$8
 (liner operator) Compania Latin 
Americana de N avegacion 
%'&4ESQ
or container liner shipping industry 
%D\]$I%'^\
(liner operator) Companie Maritime 
d'Affrètement - Companie Générale Maritime 
%'89%
 (liner operator) China Navigation Company 
%'89%_&+ﬁ(S6
 (liner operator) Cheng Lie N avigation 
Company 
%'A(`6/"6	(*6
*, an affiliation of ship  owners or 
operators over the same regional rou te(s) who 
agree to charge uniform rates, sailing schedules 
and  other terms of carriage 
%'A(B1-+M(46/a734+ T
*, a ship constructed  in such a 
w ay that she can easily stack containers near and 
on top  of each other under as well as on deck. 
%'A(B1-+M(46/
*, a large rectangular or square 
container/ box of a strong structure that can 
w ithstand  continuous rough handling from ship 
to shore and  back. Typical containers may be 20 
feet or 40 feet in length, 8 feet or 8.6 feet in wid th 
and  8.6 feet or 9.6 feet in height. 
%'A(B16	7!B!-VS,ﬁ6b@-/"WS6B K
or a market with free entry 
and  exit conditions. An outside firm can enter 
temporarily, and  cover its costs w hen it 
subsequent exists. Consequently, the behaviou r 
of incumbents is constrained  not only by actual 
competition, bu t also by potential competition. 
%'c9ES%Dc
(liner operator) China Ocean Shipping 
Company 
%Dd'(
 or n-firm concentration ratio (concentration 
measure), the combined  market share of the N 
largest firms in the market, usually reported  as 
fou r-firm concentration ratio (CR4) 
%'E$)e
 (liner operator) Compania Sud America 
de Vapores 
%'E4%'&
(liner operator) China Shipping Container 
Lines 
%OfOR
(liner operator) Compania Transatlantica 
Espanola 
;g;
 or door-to-door, through transportation of a 
container and  its contents from consignor's 
p remises to consignee's premises 
;9$&
 (liner operator) Deutsche Afrika Linien 
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;9APSVS,ﬁ6ih+ﬁT4T4+ﬁ(45
The practice of double/ trip le 
d ipping is often used  on long-haul routes. It 
means that other vessels also load  containers for 
other trade lanes using intermediate wayports or 
hubs along the route to unload them. 
;9Ed
 (liner operator) Deutsche Seereederei 
Rostock 
;?C_f
 or deadweight tonnage, the load  capacity 
of a ship  measured  in tonnes. With container 
ships, the number of TEUs (Twenty Foot 
Equivalent Units) is used  as a unit of capacity. 
That is the maximum number of containers 
measured  in TEUs that the ship  can transport. 
Since an empty container takes up  as much space 
as a loaded  one, DWT is not used  with container 
ships. 
R
G
Q.f
 or Earnings before Interests and  Taxis 
R
G
Q.fO;$
or Earnings before Interests, Taxes, 
Depreciation and  Amortisation 
R*AU(jAUbk+M6	7lA	`_7*ﬃ-,.6 K
long-run average cost is 
decreasing with respect to an increase in output
R4&$)$
 or European Liner Affairs Association 
R,ﬁ-7!B.+ *+ Bﬁ0 K
a measure of the responsiveness of 
one economic variable to a small change in 
another variable
R4E4%
 or Eu ropean Shippers’  Council 
RCF&
 (liner operator) Europe West Indies Lines 
H%'&
 or fu ll container load 
HRm
 or forty foot equivalent unit 
HU\n%
or Federal Maritime Commission, US 
Government Agency responsible for regulatory 
aspects of all maritime activities. 
^$
 or Grand Alliance (Hapag-Lloyd, MISC, 
NYK, OOCL) 
^+ﬁ(4+*Aﬀ6`!`"+ﬁ*+M6	(B K
a measure of inequality based  
on the Lorenz curve, w hich can be applied  to data 
on firm sizes or market shares 
X9XQ
or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(concentration measure). It is calcu lated  by 
squaring the market share of each firm competing 
in the market and  then summing the resu lting 
numbers 
X9&
 (liner operator) Hapag-Lloyd or Hamburg-
Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft 
X\o\
(liner operator) Hyundai merchant Marine 
Co 
XP4V
 is the central transhipment point in a 
transport structu re, to which traffic from many 
ports is d irected  and from where traffic is fed  to 
other areas/ ports (referred  to as spokes) 
Q"%D&
 (liner operator), Independent Container Line 
Q!bkT46/1`6*"Bp*AUbkTS6ﬃB.+ B.+MA( K
market structures that 
fall between the polar cases of perfect 
competition and  monopoly
Q!(jhPS7!BM/10 K
a group  of firms producing a similar 
p roduct u sing similar technology
Q!Q
or instability index, a measure of the degree of 
market share instability 
Q!d'Q!E4&
(liner operator), Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipp ing Lines (renamed to HUB line) 
Q"E4%
 or Ind ian Subcontinent
Y&
(liner operator) K-line or Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaish Ltd 
Yq\ofO%
 (liner operator) Korea Marine Transport 
Company 
&S%D&
 or Less than container load  
&Sc$
, length o.a. or length over all meaning the 
overall 
&SA/6	(rs*P4/1>6 K
when p lotted  using firm size or 
market share data, show s the cumulative sizes or 
market shares of all firms up  to firm n 
&f
 (liner operator) Lloyd Triestino 
\nt$
, mergers and  acqu isition 
\n-/"5U+M(S-,*ﬃAﬀ7!B K
the additional cost of producing 
one extra unit of ou tput 
\n6/!*ﬃ34-	(Bq3S-P4,.-56
 refers to the inland  transport 
of shipping containers arranged  by the 
merchant/ freight forwarders. This includes 
empty container moves to and  from handover 
points in respect of containers released by the 
carrier to merchants 
\]Q!E4%
(liner operator) Malaysia International 
Shipp ing Corp  Bhd 
\]c9&
 (liner operator) Malaysia International 
Shipp ing Corp  Bhd 
\nAU(jAUTSA,ﬁ+M7!BM+ﬁ*u*AbkTS6ﬃBM+ BM+.AU( K
 a market structure 
w ith a large number of firms producing similar 
bu t not identical products, and with free entry 
\nAU(jAUTSA, 0 K
a market structure with a single firm, 
p roducing a unique product and  protected  from 
competition by insurmountable entry barriers 
\nE4%
 (liner operator) Med iterranean Shipping Co 
sa 
8-240 Synopsis of the research 
 
 
89-ﬃ>+ V4P4,ﬁ5-/
 (liner operator) Navigation Maritime 
Bulgare 
89;9E
 (liner operator) Nile Dutch Shipping 
89R
or number equivalent
K
 an inverse measure of 
concentration, which compares the structure of 
an observed  N-firm industry to a hypothetical 
industry comprising N equal-sized  firms.
89RQ!c
or New Empirical Industrial Organisation
K
 
an approach which attemp ts to draw 
interferences about market structure and 
competitive conditions form direct observation of 
conduct at firm level.
89Q1c
or N ew  Industrial Organisation
K
 theories of 
industrial organisation which focus primarily on 
strategy and  conduct at firm level, rather than on 
market or industry structure
89c9&
 (liner operator) Neptune Orient Lines 
89=v
 or New Panamax Ship 
89E4%'E$
 (liner operator) National Shipping Co. of 
Saudi Arabia 
8ec9%'%
 or N on Vessel Owning/ Operating 
Common Carrier - (a) A cargo consolidator of 
small shipments in ocean trade, generally 
soliciting business and  arranging for or 
performing containerization functions at the port. 
(b) A carrier issu ing Bs/ L for carriage of goods on 
vessel w hich he neither owns nor operates. 
8?Cl$
 (alliance) New World  Alliance (APL, 
Hyundai, MOL) 
8[DY
 (liner operator) Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
c, +M5ﬀATSA, 0 K
 a market structure with a small 
number of firms, whose products may be 
identical or d ifferentiated , and  w here there are 
barriers to entry. The firms recognize their 
interdepence 
c9c9%'&
 (liner operator) Orient Overseas Container 
Line Ltd  
cf$&Lw
liner operator) OT Africa Line 
=4Q!&
 (liner operator) Pacific International Lines 
=489E4%
(liner operator) Pakistan Nat’l Shg Corp . 
=4c9%'&
 (liner operator) P&Ocean Container Lines 
d'%'&
 (liner operator) Regional Container Line 
d'6>6(4Pj6aB!6	7!B
or a test p roposed  by Rosse and  
Panzar, which examines whether firm conduct is 
in accordance with the models of perfect 
competition, imperfect competition or monopoly, 
based  on observation of the impact of variations 
in factor prices on profit-maximising firm-level 
revenues. 
dc$
 (variable) return on assets, net income 
d ivided  by average earning assets 
dc9R
 (variable) return on  equity 
dc9E
 (variable) return on sales 
d=4cZ89&
 (liner operator) Royal P&O Nedlloyd  
Line 
E4$R4%'E
 Sou th Africa Eu rope Container Service
E4$)Q!&SE
(liner operator) Sou th Africa Independent 
Liner Services 
ES%DQ
 (liner operator) Shipping Corporation of 
India 
ES%D=
or Structure-Conduct-Performance
K
 an 
methodological approach for research in 
industrial organisation, in which the structural 
characteristics of industries are assumed  to 
influence or d ictate the conduct and  performance 
of the industry’ s member firms
ESQ!%Of
 (liner operator) Shandong International 
Transportation Corp. 
E4,MA	B
 refers to an unit of space in a containership . 
One slot equals one TEU of capacity 
E4,MA	B26J	*ﬃ3S-(S5ﬀ6x-5/"66b@6(B
 is an agreement 
betw een two or more carriers to exchange an 
equal amount of space on ship s operated  on each 
other’ s respective services in the same trade lane.  
EPS(4Wy*Aﬀ7!B K
expenditure on items, such as 
advertising and  research and  development that is 
non-recoverable in the event that the firm exits 
formt he industry 
EP4/!*ﬃ34-/"56	7
 relate to charges that are meant to 
cover uncertainties, such as the Bunker 
Adjustment Factor (BAF), Currency Adjustment 
Factor (CAF), Congestion Surcharges (CSC) and 
War Risk Surcharge (WRS) 
E[O\]E
 (liner operator) Shandong Yantai 
International Maritime Shipping Company 
fOR4m
* Twenty-foot equivalent unit or a 
measurement of cargo-carrying capacity on a 
containership , referring to a common container 
size of 20 ft in length 
fOXZ%
 (surcharge) Terminal handling charges 
fOcZ&
 (liner operator) Tasman Orient Line 
fO=S&
 (liner operator) Trans Pacific Line 
m$&
 (liner operator) Universal Africa Line 
m$ES%
(liner operator) United  Arab Shipping 
Company 
m%'E
 Ultimate Container Ship  (18,000 TEU 
Malacca-Max) 
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mHﬀE
 (liner operator) United  Feeder Services 
m&4%'E
 or Ultra Large Container Ship (+ 10,000 
TEU) 
mE4&
 (liner operator) United  States Lines 
e&4%'E
 or Very Large Container Ship  (between 
7,500 - 10,000 TEU) 
ec9%'%
 or Vessel Operating Common Carrier 
eE$
 or Vessel Sharing Agreement 
CFX9&
 ((liner operator) Wan Hai Line 
[O\n&
 (liner operator) Yang Ming Line 
:Q1\
 (liner operator) is an acrostic for the Hebrew 
w ords for Israel Merchant Navy. The Hebrew 
w ord  “ Zim”  is used to refer to “ large vessels”  
(www.zim.co.il) 
ClfOc
 or World  Trade Organisation isis the only 
international body dealing with the ru les of trade 
betw een nations 
Terminology, abbreviations,…  denoted  by an asterisk refer to Paelinck, 2010 while a d iamond  
refers to Lipczynski et al., 2009. 
 
